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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
Nos. 15–1111 and 15–1112
_________________
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION,
et al., PETITIONERS
15–1111
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA
WELLS FARGO & CO., et al.,
PETITIONERS
15–1112
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA
on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[May 1, 2017]
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Fair Housing Act (FHA or Act) forbids
“discriminat[ing] against any person in
the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race . . . .” 42
U. S. C. §3604(b).
It further makes it unlawful for
“any person or other entity whose business
includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions
to discriminate against any person in making available such a
transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction,
because of race . . . .” §3605(a).
The statute allows any “aggrieved person” to
file a civil action seeking damages for a violation of the statute.
§§3613(a)(1)(A), 3613(c)(1). And it defines an “aggrieved person”
to include “any person who . . . claims to have been
injured by a discriminatory housing practice.” §3602(i).
The City of Miami claims that two banks, Bank of
America and Wells Fargo, intentionally issued riskier mortgages on
less favorable terms to African-American and Latino customers than
they issued to similarly situated white, non-Latino customers, in
violation of §§3604(b) and 3605(a). App. 185–197, 244–245, 350–362,
428. The City, in amended complaints, alleges that these
discriminatory practices have (1) “adversely impacted the racial
composition of the City,”
id., at 232, 416; (2) “impaired
the City’s goals to assure racial integration and desegregation,”
ibid.; (3) “frustrate[d] the City’s longstanding and active
interest in promoting fair housing and securing the benefits of an
integrated community,”
id., at 232–233, 416–417; and (4)
disproportionately “cause[d] foreclosures and vacancies in minority
communities in Miami,”
id., at 229, 413. Those foreclosures
and vacancies have harmed the City by decreasing “the property
value of the foreclosed home as well as the values of other homes
in the neighborhood,” thereby (a) “reduc[ing] property tax revenues
to the City,”
id., at 234, 418, and (b) forcing the City to
spend more on “municipal services that it provided and still must
provide to remedy blight and unsafe and dangerous conditions which
exist at properties that were foreclosed as a result of [the
Banks’] illegal lending practices,”
id., at 233–234, 417.
The City claims that those practices violate the FHA and that it is
entitled to damages for the listed injuries.
The Banks respond that the complaints do not set
forth a cause of action for two basic reasons. First, they contend
that the City’s claimed harms do not “arguably” fall within the
“zone of interests” that the statute seeks to protect,
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v.
Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970) ; hence, the City is
not an “aggrieved person” entitled to sue under the Act, §3602(i).
Second, they say that the complaint fails to draw a
“proximate-cause” connection between the violation claimed and the
harm allegedly suffered. In their view, even if the City proves the
violations it charges, the distance between those violations and
the harms the City claims to have suffered is simply too great to
entitle the City to collect damages.
We hold that the City’s claimed injuries fall
within the zone of interests that the FHA arguably protects. Hence,
the City is an “aggrieved person” able to bring suit under the
statute. We also hold that, to establish proximate cause under the
FHA, a plaintiff must do more than show that its injuries
foreseeably flowed from the alleged statutory violation. The lower
court decided these cases on the theory that foreseeability is all
that the statute requires, so we vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
I
In 2013, the City of Miami brought lawsuits in
federal court against two banks, Bank of America and Wells Fargo.
The City’s complaints charge that the Banks discriminatorily
imposed more onerous, and indeed “preda-tory,” conditions on loans
made to minority borrowers than to similarly situated nonminority
borrowers. App. 185–197, 350–362. Those “predatory” practices
included, among others, excessively high interest rates,
unjustified fees, teaser low-rate loans that overstated refinancing
opportunities, large prepayment penalties, and—when default
loomed—unjustified refusals to refinance or modify the loans.
Id., at 225, 402. Due to the discriminatory nature of the
Banks’ practices, default and foreclosure rates among minority
borrowers were higher than among otherwise similar white borrowers
and were concentrated in minority neighborhoods.
Id., at
225–232, 408–415. Higher foreclosure rates lowered property values
and diminished property-tax revenue.
Id., at 234, 418.
Higher foreclosure rates—especially when accompanied by
vacancies—also increased demand for municipal services, such as
police, fire, and building and code enforcement services, all
needed “to remedy blight and unsafe and dangerous conditions” that
the foreclosures and vacancies generate.
Id., at 238–240,
421–423. The complaints describe statistical analyses that trace
the City’s financial losses to the Banks’ discriminatory practices.
Id., at 235–237; 419–420.
The District Court dismissed the complaints on
the grounds that (1) the harms alleged, being economic and not
discriminatory, fell outside the zone of interests the FHA
protects; (2) the complaints fail to show a sufficient causal
connection between the City’s injuries and the Banks’
discriminatory conduct; and (3) the complaints fail to allege
unlawful activity occurring within the Act’s 2-year statute of
limitations. The City then filed amended complaints (the complaints
now before us) and sought reconsideration. The District Court held
that the amended complaints could solve only the statute of
limitations problem. It consequently declined to reconsider the
dismissals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court. 800 F. 3d 1262 (CA11 2015); 801 F. 3d 1258 (CA11
2015). It held that the City’s injuries fall within the “zone of
interests,”
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control
Components, Inc., 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at
10), that the FHA protects. 800 F. 3d, at 1274–1275, 1277
(relying on
Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 409 U. S. 205 (1972) ;
Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91 (1979) ; and
Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U. S. 363
(1982) ); 801 F. 3d, at 1266–1267 (similar). It added that the
complaints adequately allege proximate cause. 800 F. 3d, at
1278; 801 F. 3d, at 1267. And it remanded the cases while
ordering the District Court to accept the City’s complaints as
amended. 800 F. 3d, at 1286; 801 F. 3d, at 1267.
The Banks filed petitions for certiorari, asking
us to decide whether, as the Court of Appeals had in effect held,
the amended complaints satisfied the FHA’s zone-of-interests and
proximate-cause requirements. We agreed to do so.
II
To satisfy the Constitution’s restriction of
this Court’s jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies,”
Art. III, §2, a plaintiff must demonstrate constitutional
standing. To do so, the plaintiff must show an “injury in fact”
that is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct and “that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___
(2016) (slip op., at 6) (citing
Lujan v.
Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 –561 (1992)). This Court has also
referred to a plaintiff’s need to satisfy “prudential” or
“statutory” standing requirements. See
Lexmark, 572
U. S., at ___–___, and n. 4 (slip op., at 6–9, and
n. 4). In
Lexmark, we said that the label
“ ‘prudential standing’ ” was misleading, for the
requirement at issue is in reality tied to a particular statute.
Ibid. The question is whether the statute grants the
plaintiff the cause of action that he asserts. In answering that
question, we presume that a statute ordinarily provides a cause of
action “only to plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked.”
Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have added that
“[w]hether a plaintiff comes within ‘the zone of interests’ is an
issue that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of
statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause
of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.”
Id.,
at ___ (slip op., at 8) (some internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, we conclude that the City’s claims of
financial injury in their amended complaints—specifically, lost tax
revenue and extra municipal expenses—satisfy the “cause-of-action”
(or “prudential standing”) requirement. To use the language of
Data Processing, the City’s claims of in-jury it suffered as
a result of the statutory violations are, at the least,
“
arguably within the zone of interests” that the FHA
protects. 397 U. S., at 153 (emphasis added).
The FHA permits any “aggrieved person” to bring
a housing-discrimination lawsuit. 42 U. S. C. §3613(a).
The statute defines “aggrieved person” as “any person who” either
“claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice”
or believes that such an injury “is about to occur.” §3602(i).
This Court has repeatedly written that the FHA’s
definition of person “aggrieved” reflects a congressional intent to
confer standing broadly. We have said that the definition of
“person aggrieved” in the original version of the FHA, §810(a),
82Stat. 85, “showed ‘a congressional intention to define standing
as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the
Constitution.’ ”
Trafficante,
supra, at 209
(quoting
Hackett v.
McGuire Brothers, Inc., 445
F. 2d 442, 446 (CA3 1971)); see
Gladstone, supra, at
109 (similar);
Havens Realty,
supra, at 372, 375–376
(similar); see also
Thompson v.
North American Stainless,
LP, 562 U. S. 170, 176 (2011) (“Later opinions, we must
acknowledge, reiterate that the term ‘aggrieved’ [in the FHA]
reaches as far as Article III permits”);
Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U. S. 154 –166 (1997) (“[
Trafficante]
held that standing was expanded to the full extent permitted under
Article III by §810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968”).
Thus, we have held that the Act allows suits by
white tenants claiming that they were deprived benefits from
interracial associations when discriminatory rental practices kept
minorities out of their apartment complex,
Trafficante, 409
U. S., at 209–212; a village alleging that it lost tax revenue
and had the racial balance of its community undermined by
racial-steering practices,
Gladstone, 441 U. S.
,
at 110–111; and a nonprofit organization that spent money to combat
housing discrimination,
Havens Realty, 455 U. S., at
379. Contrary to the dissent’s view, those cases did more than
“sugges[t]” that plaintiffs similarly situated to the City have a
cause of action under the FHA.
Post, at 5. They held as
much. And the dissent is wrong to say that we characterized those
cases as resting on “ill-considered dictum.”
Post, at 4
(quoting
Thompson,
supra, at 176). The “dictum” we
cast doubt on in
Thompson addressed who may sue under Title
VII, the employment discrimination statute, not under the FHA.
Finally, in 1988, when Congress amended the FHA,
it retained without significant change the definition of “person
aggrieved” that this Court had broadly construed. Compare §810(a),
82Stat. 85, with §5(b), 102Stat. 1619–1620 (codified at 42
U. S. C. §3602(i)) (changing “person aggrieved” to
“aggrieved person” and making other minor changes to the
definition). Indeed, Congress “was aware of” our precedent and
“made a considered judgment to retain the relevant statutory text,”
Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v.
Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip
op., at 13). See H. R. Rep. No. 100–711, p. 23 (1988) (stating
that the “bill adopts as its definition language similar to that
contained in Section 810 of existing law, as modified to reaffirm
the broad holdings of these cases” and discussing
Gladstone
and
Havens Realty); cf.
Lorillard v.
Pons, 434
U. S. 575, 580 (1978) (Congress normally adopts our
interpretations of statutes when it reenacts those statute without
change).
The Banks do not deny the broad reach of the
words “aggrieved person” as defined in the FHA. But they do contend
that those words nonetheless set boundaries that fall short of
those the Constitution sets. Brief for Petitioners in
No. 15–1112, p. 12 (Brief for Wells Fargo); Brief for
Petitioners in No. 15–1111, pp. 19–20 (Brief for Bank of
America). The Court’s language in
Trafficante,
Gladstone, and
Havens Realty, they argue, was
exaggerated and unnecessary to decide the cases then before the
Court. See Brief for Wells Fargo 19–23; Brief for Bank of America
27–33. Moreover, they warn that taking the Court’s words
literally—providing everyone with constitutional standing a cause
of action under the FHA—would produce a legal anomaly. After all,
in
Thompson, 562 U. S., at 175–177, we held that the
words “ ‘person claiming to be aggrieved’ ” in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the employment discrimination
statute, did not stretch that statute’s zone of interest to the
limits of Article III. We reasoned that such an interpretation
would produce farfetched results, for example, a shareholder in a
company could bring a Title VII suit against the company for
discriminatorily firing an employee.
Ibid. The Banks say it
would be similarly farfetched if restaurants, plumbers, utility
companies, or any other participant in the local economy could sue
the Banks to recover business they lost when people had to give up
their homes and leave the neighborhood as a result of the Banks’
discriminatory lending practices. Brief for Wells Fargo 18–19;
Brief for Bank of America 22, 24–25. That, they believe, cannot
have been the intent of the Congress that enacted or amended the
FHA.
We need not discuss the Banks’ argument at
length, for even if we assume for argument’s sake that some form of
it is valid, we nonetheless conclude that the City’s financial
injuries fall within the zone of interests that the FHA protects.
Our case law with respect to the FHA drives that conclusion. The
City’s complaints allege that the Banks “intentionally targeted
predatory practices at African-American and Latino neighborhoods
and residents,” App. 225;
id., at 409 (similar). That
unlawful conduct led to a “concentration” of “foreclosures and
vacancies” in those neighborhoods.
Id., at 226, 229, 410,
413. Those concentrated “foreclosures and vacancies” caused
“stagnation and decline in African-American and Latino
neighborhoods.”
Id., at 225, 409. They hindered the City’s
efforts to create integrated, stable neighborhoods.
Id., at
186, 351. And, highly relevant here, they reduced prop-erty values,
diminishing the City’s property-tax revenue and increasing demand
for municipal services.
Id., at 233–234, 417.
Those claims are similar in kind to the claims
the Village of Bellwood raised in
Gladstone. There, the
plaintiff village had alleged that it was “ ‘injured by having
[its] housing market . . . wrongfully and illegally
manipulated to the economic and social detriment of the citizens of
[the] village.’ ” 441 U. S., at 95 (quoting the
complaint; alterations in original). We held that the village could
bring suit. We wrote that the complaint in effect alleged that the
defendant-realtors’ racial steering “affect[ed] the village’s
racial composition,” “reduce[d] the total number of buyers in the
Bellwood housing market,” “precipitate[d] an exodus of white
residents,” and caused “prices [to] be deflected downward.”
Id., at 110. Those circumstances adversely affected the
village by, among other things,
producing a “significant
reduction in property values [that] directly injures a municipality
by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its ability to bear
the costs of local government and to provide services.”
Id., at 110–111 (emphasis added).
The upshot is that the City alleges economic
injuries that arguably fall within the FHA’s zone of interests, as
we have previously interpreted that statute. Principles of
stare
decisis compel our adherence to those precedents in this
context. And principles of statutory interpretation require us to
respect Congress’ decision to ratify those precedents when it
reenacted the relevant statutory text. See
supra, at 7.
III
The remaining question is one of causation:
Did the Banks’ allegedly discriminatory lending practices
proximately cause the City to lose property-tax revenue and spend
more on municipal services? The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
answer is “yes” because the City plausibly alleged that its
financial injuries were foreseeable results of the Banks’
misconduct. We conclude that foreseeability alone is not sufficient
to establish proximate cause under the FHA, and therefore vacate
the judgment below.
It is a “ ‘well established principle of
[the common] law that in all cases of loss, we are to attribute it
to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.’ ”
Lexmark, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13). We assume
Congress “is familiar with the common-law rule and does not mean to
displace it
sub silentio” in federal causes of action.
Ibid. A claim for damages under the FHA—which is akin to a
“tort action,”
Meyer v.
Holley, 537 U. S. 280,
285 (2003) —is no exception to this traditional requirement.
“Proximate-cause analysis is controlled by the nature of the
statutory cause of action. The question it presents is whether the
harm alleged has a sufficiently close connection to the conduct the
statute prohibits.”
Lexmark,
supra, at ___ (slip op.,
at 14).
In these cases, the “conduct the statute
prohibits” consists of intentionally lending to minority borrowers
on worse terms than equally creditworthy nonminority borrowers and
inducing defaults by failing to extend refinancing and loan
modifications to minority borrowers on fair terms. The City alleges
that the Banks’ misconduct led to a disproportionate number of
foreclosures and vacancies in specific Miami neighborhoods. These
foreclosures and vacancies purportedly harmed the City, which lost
property-tax revenue when the value of the properties in those
neighborhoods fell and was forced to spend more on municipal
services in the affected areas.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the City
adequately pleaded that the Banks’ misconduct proximately caused
these financial injuries. 800 F. 3d, at 1282. The court held
that in the context of the FHA “the proper standard” for proximate
cause “is based on foreseeability.”
Id., at 1279, 1282. The
City, it continued, satisfied that element: Although there are
“several links in the causal chain” between the charged
discriminatory lending practices and the claimed losses, the City
plausibly alleged that “none are unforeseeable.”
Id., at
1282.
We conclude that the Eleventh Circuit erred in
holding that foreseeability is sufficient to establish proximate
cause under the FHA. As we have explained, proximate cause
“generally bars suits for alleged harm that is ‘too remote’ from
the defendant’s unlawful conduct.”
Lexmark,
supra, at
___ (slip op., at 14). In the context of the FHA, foreseeability
alone does not ensure the close connection that proximate cause
requires. The housing market is interconnected with economic and
social life. A violation of the FHA may, therefore, “ ‘be
expected to cause ripples of harm to flow’ ” far beyond the
defendant’s misconduct.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal.,
Inc. v.
Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 534 (1983) .
Nothing in the statute suggests that Congress intended to provide a
remedy wherever those ripples travel. And entertaining suits to
recover damages for any foreseeable result of an FHA violation
would risk “massive and complex damages litigation.”
Id., at
545.
Rather, proximate cause under the FHA requires
“some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged.”
Holmes v.
Securities Investors
Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 268 (1992) . A damages
claim under the statute “is analogous to a number of tort actions
recognized at common law,”
Curtis v.
Loether, 415
U. S. 189, 195 (1974) , and we have repeatedly applied
directness principles to statutes with “common-law foundations,”
Anza v.
Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451,
457 (2006) . “ ‘The general tendency’ ” in these cases,
“ ‘in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the
first step.’ ”
Hemi Group, LLC v.
City of New
York, 559 U. S. 1, 10 (2010) . What falls within that
“first step” depends in part on the “nature of the statutory cause
of action,”
Lexmark,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14),
and an assessment “ ‘of what is administratively possible and
convenient,’ ”
Holmes,
supra, at 268.
The parties have asked us to draw the precise
boundaries of proximate cause under the FHA and to determine on
which side of the line the City’s financial injuries fall. We
decline to do so. The Eleventh Circuit grounded its decision on the
theory that proximate cause under the FHA is “based on
foreseeability” alone. 800 F. 3d, at 1282. We therefore lack the
benefit of its judgment on how the contrary principles we have just
stated apply to the FHA. Nor has any other court of appeals weighed
in on the issue. The lower courts should define, in the first
instance, the contours of proximate cause under the FHA and decide
how that standard applies to the City’s claims for lost
property-tax revenue and increased municipal expenses.
IV
The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit are vacated, and the cases are remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch took no part in the
consideration or decision of these cases.