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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–6368
_________________
MICHAEL B. KINGSLEY, PETITIONER v. STAN
HENDRICKSON, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the seventh circuit
[June 22, 2015]
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the
Court.
In this case, an individual detained in a jail
prior to trial brought a claim under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42
U. S. C. §1983, against several jail officers, alleging
that they used excessive force against him, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The officers concede
that they intended to use the force that they used. Butthe parties
disagree about whether the force used was excessive.
The question before us is whether, to prove an
excessive force claim, a pretrial detainee must show that the
officers were subjectively aware that their use of force was
unreasonable, or only that the officers’ use of that force was
objectively unreasonable. We conclude that the latter
standard is the correct one.
I
A
Some but not all of the facts are undisputed:
Michael Kingsley, the petitioner, was arrested on a drug charge and
detained in a Wisconsin county jail prior to trial. On the evening
of May 20, 2010, an officer performing a cell check noticed a piece
of paper covering the light fixture above Kingsley’s bed. The
officer told Kingsley to remove it; Kingsley refused; subsequently
other officers told Kingsley to remove the paper; and each time
Kingsley refused. The next morning, the jail administrator,
Lieutenant Robert Conroy, ordered Kingsley to remove the paper.
Kingsley once again refused. Conroy then told Kingsley that
officers would remove the paper and that he would be moved to a
receiving cell in the interim.
Shortly thereafter, four officers, including
respondents Sergeant Stan Hendrickson and Deputy Sheriff Fritz
Degner, approached the cell and ordered Kingsley to stand, back up
to the door, and keep his hands behind him. When Kingsley refused
to comply, the officers handcuffed him, forcibly removed him from
the cell, carried him to a receiving cell, and placed him face down
on a bunk with his hands handcuffed behind his back.
The parties’ views about what happened next
differ. The officers testified that Kingsley resisted their efforts
to remove his handcuffs. Kingsley testified that he did not resist.
All agree that Sergeant Hendrickson placed his knee in Kingsley’s
back and Kingsley told him in impolite language to get off.
Kingsley testified that Hendrickson and Degner then slammed his
head into the concrete bunk—an allegation the officers deny.
The parties agree, however, about what happened
next: Hendrickson directed Degner to stun Kingsley with a Taser;
Degner applied a Taser to Kingsley’s back for approximately five
seconds; the officers then left the handcuffed Kingsley alone in
the receiving cell; and officers returned to the cell 15 minutes
later and removed Kingsley’s handcuffs.
B
Based on these and related events, Kingsley
filed a §1983 complaint in Federal District Court claiming (among
other things) that Hendrickson and Degner used excessive force
against him, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. The officers moved for summary judgment, which the District
Court denied, stating that “a reasonable jury could conclude that
[the officers] acted with malice and intended to harm [Kingsley]
when they used force against him.” Kingsley v.
Josvai, No. 10–cv–832–bbc (WD Wis., Nov. 16, 2011), App to
Pet. for Cert. 66a–67a. Kingsley’s excessive force claim
accordingly proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the
District Court instructed the jury as follows:
“Excessive force means force applied
recklessly that is unreasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances of the time. Thus, to succeed on his claim of
excessive use of force, plaintiff must prove each of the following
factors by a preponderance of the evidence:
“(1) Defendants used force on plaintiff;
“(2) Defendants’ use of force was
unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances at the
time;
“(3) Defendants knew that using force presented
a risk of harm to plaintiff, but they recklessly disregarded
plaintiff’s safety by failing to take reasonable measures to
minimize the risk of harm to plaintiff; and
“(4) Defendants’ conduct caused some harm
to plaintiff.
“In deciding whether one or more
defendants used ‘unreasonable’ force against plaintiff, you must
consider whether it was unreasonable from the perspective of a
reasonable officer facing the same circumstances that defendants
faced. You must make this decision based on what defendants knew at
the time of the incident, not based on what you know now.
“Also, in deciding whether one or more
defendants used unreasonable force and acted with reckless
disregard of plaintiff’s rights, you may consider
factors such as:
“• The need to use force;
“• The relationship between the need to
use force and the amount of force used;
“• The extent of plaintiff’s injury;
“• Whether defendants reasonably believed
there was a threat to the safety of staff or prisoners; and
“• Any efforts made by defendants to limit
the amount of force used.” App. 277–278 (emphasis added).
The jury found in the officers’ favor.
On appeal, Kingsley argued that the correct
standard for judging a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is
objective unreasonableness. And, the jury instruction, he said, did
not hew to that standard. A panel of the Court of Appeals
disagreed, with one judge dissenting. The major-ity held that the
law required a “subjective inquiry” into the officer’s state of
mind. There must be “ ‘an actual intent to violate [the
plaintiff’s] rights or reckless disregard for his rights.’ ”
744 F. 3d 443, 451 (CA7 2014) (quoting Wilson v.
Williams, 83 F. 3d 870, 875 (CA7 1996)). The dissent
would have used instructions promulgated by the Committee on
Pattern Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, which
require a pretrial detainee claiming excessive force to show only
that the use of force was objectively unreasonable. 744 F. 3d,
at 455 (opinion of Hamilton, J.); see Pattern Civ. Jury Instr.
§7.08 (2009). The dissent further stated that the District Court’s
use of the word “reckless” in the jury instruction added “an
unnecessary and confusing element.” 744 F. 3d, at 455.
Kingsley filed a petition for certiorari asking
us to determine whether the requirements of a §1983 excessive force
claim brought by a pretrial detainee must satisfy the subjective
standard or only the objective standard. In light of disagreement
among the Circuits, we agreed to do so. Compare, e.g.,
Murray v. Johnson No. 260, 367 Fed. Appx. 196, 198 (CA2
2010); Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F. 3d 1265, 1271
(CA11 2005) (per curiam), with Aldini v.
Johnson, 609 F. 3d 858, 865–866 (CA6 2010);
Young v. Wolfe, 478 Fed. Appx. 354, 356 (CA9
2012).
II
A
We consider a legally requisite state of mind.
In a case like this one, there are, in a sense, two separate
state-of-mind questions. The first concerns the defendant’s state
of mind with respect to his physical acts—i.e., his state of
mind with respect to the bringing about of certain physical
consequences in the world. The second question concerns the
defendant’s state of mind with respect to whether his use of force
was “excessive.” Here, as to the first question, there is no
dispute. As to the second, whether to interpret the defendant’s
physical acts in the world as involving force that was “excessive,”
there is a dispute. We conclude with respect to that question that
the relevant standard is objective not subjective. Thus, the
defendant’s state of mind is not a matter that a plaintiff is
required to prove.
Consider the series of physical events that take
place in the world—a series of events that might consist, for
example, of the swing of a fist that hits a face, a push that leads
to a fall, or the shot of a Taser that leads to the stunning of its
recipient. No one here denies, and we must assume, that, as to the
series of events that have taken place in the world, the defendant
must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state
of mind. That is because, as we have stated, “liability for
negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the
threshold of constitutional due process.” County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 849 (1998)
(emphasis added). See also Daniels v. Williams, 474
U. S. 327, 331 (1986) (“Historically, this guarantee of due
process has been applied to deliberate decisions of
government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property”). Thus, if an officer’s Taser goes off by accident or if
an officer unintentionally trips and falls on a detainee, causing
him harm, the pretrial detainee cannot prevail on an excessive
force claim. But if the use of force is delib-erate—i.e.,
purposeful or knowing—the pretrial detainee’s claim may proceed. In
the context of a police pursuit of a suspect the Court noted,
though without so holding, that recklessness in some cases might
suffice as a standard for imposing liability. See Lewis,
supra, at 849. Whether that standard might suffice for
liability in the case of an alleged mistreatment of a pretrial
detainee need not be decided here; for the officers do not dispute
that they acted purposefully or knowingly with respect to the force
they used against Kingsley.
We now consider the question before us here—the
defendant’s state of mind with respect to the proper
interpretation of the force (a series of events in the
world) that the defendant deliberately (not accidentally or
negligently) used. In deciding whether the force deliberately used
is, constitutionally speaking, “excessive,” should courts use an
objective standard only, or instead a subjective standard that
takes into account a defendant’s state of mind? It is with respect
to this question that we hold that courts must use an
objective standard. In short, we agree with the dissenting appeals
court judge, the Seventh Circuit’s jury instruction committee, and
Kingsley, that a pretrial detainee must show only that the force
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively
unreasonable.
A court (judge or jury) cannot apply this
standard mechanically. See Lewis, supra, at 850.
Rather, objective reasonableness turns on the “facts and
circumstances of each particular case.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) . A court must make
this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight. See ibid. A court must also
account for the “legitimate interests that stem from [the
government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual
is detained,” appropriately deferring to “policies and practices
that in th[e] judgment” of jail officials “are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 540,
547 (1979) .
Considerations such as the following may bear on
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used: the
relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount
of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort
made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the
severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably
perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively
resisting. See, e.g., Graham, supra, at 396.
We do not consider this list to be exclusive. We mention these
factors only to illustrate the types of objective circumstances
potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force.
B
Several considerations have led us to conclude
that the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive
force claim is solely an objective one. For one thing, it is
consistent with our precedent. We have said that “the Due Process
Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force
that amounts to punishment.” Graham, supra, at 395,
n. 10. And in Bell, we explained that such “punishment”
can consist of actions taken with an “expressed intent to punish.”
441 U. S., at 538. But the Bell Court went on to
explain that, in the absence of an expressed intent to punish, a
pretrial detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the
actions are not “rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive
governmental purpose” or that the actions “appear excessive in
relation to that purpose.” Id., at 561. The Bell
Court applied this latter objective standard to evaluate a variety
of prison conditions, including a prison’s practice of
double-bunking. In doing so, it did not consider the prison
officials’ subjective beliefs about the policy. Id., at
541–543. Rather, the Court examined objective evidence, such as the
size of the rooms and available amenities, before concluding that
the conditions were reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of
holding detainees for trial and did not appear excessive in
relation to that purpose. Ibid.
Bell’s focus on “punishment” does not
mean that proof of intent (or motive) to punish is required for a
pretrial detainee to prevail on a claim that his due process rights
were violated. Rather, as Bell itself shows (and as our
later precedent affirms), a pretrial detainee can prevail by
providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental
action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose. Cf.
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576 –586 (1984)
(where there was no suggestion that the purpose of jail policy of
denying contact visitation was to punish inmates, the Court need
only evaluate whether the policy was “reasonably related to
legitimate governmental objectives” and whether it appears
excessive in relation to that objective); Schall v.
Martin, 467 U. S. 253 –271 (1984) (similar); see also
United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 747
(1987) (“[T]he punitive/regulatory distinction turns on
‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
[to it]’ ” (quoting Schall, supra, at 269;
emphasis added and some internal quotation marks omitted)). The
Court did not suggest in any of these cases, either by its words or
its analysis, that its application of Bell’s objective
standard should involve subjective considerations. Our standard is
also consistent with our use of an objective “excessive force”
standard where officers apply force to a person who, like Kingsley,
has been accused but not convicted of a crime, but who, unlike
Kingsley, is free on bail. See Graham, supra.
For another thing, experience suggests that an
objective standard is workable. It is consistent with the pattern
jury instructions used in several Circuits. We are also told that
many facilities, including the facility at issue here, train
officers to interact with all detainees as if the officers’ conduct
is subject to an objective reasonableness standard. See Brief for
Petitioner 26; App. 247–248; Brief for Former Corrections
Administrators and Experts as Amici Curiae 8–18.
Finally, the use of an objective standard
adequately protects an officer who acts in good faith. We recognize
that “[r]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking,”
Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 –85 (1987), and
that “safety and order at these institutions requires the expertise
of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to
devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face,”
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of
Burlington, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 5).
Officers facing disturbances “are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving.” Graham, 490 U. S., at 397. For these
reasons, we have stressed that a court must judge the
reasonableness of the force used from the perspective and with the
knowledge of the defendant officer. We have also explained that a
court must take account of the legitimate interests in managing a
jail, acknowledging as part of the objective reasonableness
analysis that deference to policies and practices needed to
maintain order and institutional security is appropriate. See Part
II–A, supra. And we have limited liability for excessive
force to situations in which the use of force was the result of an
intentional and knowing act (though we leave open the possibility
of including a “reckless” act as well). Ibid. Additionally,
an officer enjoys qualified immunity and is not liable for
excessive force unless he has violated a “clearly established”
right, such that “it would [have been] clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202
(2001) ; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
27–28. It is unlikely (though theoretically possible) that a
plaintiff could overcome these hurdles where an officer acted in
good faith.
C
Respondents believe that the relevant legal
standard should be subjective, i.e., that the plaintiff must
prove that the use of force was not “applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline” but, rather, was applied
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Brief for Respondents
27. And they refer to several cases that they believe support their
position. See id., at 26–31 (citing Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U. S. 312 (1986) ; Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 (1992) ; Lewis, 523
U. S. 833 ; Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d
1028 (CA2 1973)).
The first two of these cases, however, concern
excessive force claims brought by convicted prisoners under the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, not claims
brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Whitley, supra, at 320;
Hudson, supra, at 6–7. The language of the two
Clauses differs, and the nature of the claims often differs. And,
most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners)
cannot be punished at all, much less “maliciously and
sadistically.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S. 651 –672, n. 40 (1977); Graham, supra, at
395, n. 10 (1989); see also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *300
(“[I]f the offence be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail,
he is to be committed to the county [jail] . . . [b]ut
. . . only for safe custody, and not for punishment”).
Thus, there is no need here, as there might be in an Eighth
Amendment case, to determine when punishment is unconstitutional.
Whitley and Hudson are relevant here only insofar as
they address the practical importance of taking into account the
legitimate safety-related concerns of those who run jails. And, as
explained above, we believe we have done so.
Lewis does not prove respondents’ point,
either. There, the Court considered a claim that a police officer
had violated due process by causing a death during a high-speed
automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspect. We wrote that
“[j]ust as a purpose to cause harm is needed for Eighth Amendment
liability in a [prison] riot case, so it ought to be needed for due
process liability in a pursuit case.” 523 U. S., at
854. Respondents contend that this statement shows that the Court
embraced a standard for due process claims that requires a showing
of subjective intent. Brief for Respondents 30–31. Other portions
of the Lewis opinion make clear, however, that this
statement referred to the defendant’s intent to commit the
acts in question, not to whether the force intentionally
used was “excessive.” 523 U. S., at 854, and n. 13. As
explained above, the parties here do not dispute that respondents’
use of force was intentional. See Part II–A, supra.
Nor does Glick provide respondents with
significant support. In that case Judge Friendly, writing for the
Second Circuit, considered an excessive force claim brought by a
pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Judge Friendly pointed out that the “management by a few
guards of large numbers of prisoners” in an institution “may
require and justify the occasional use of a degree of intentional
force.” 481 F. 2d, at 1033. He added that, in determining
whether that intentional use of force “crosse[s]” the
“constitutional line,” a court should look:
“to such factors as [(1)] the need for the
application of force, [(2)] the relationship between the need and
the amount of force that was used, [(3)] the extent of in-jury
inflicted, and [(4)] whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”
Ibid.
This statement does not suggest that the fourth
factor (malicious and sadistic purpose to cause harm) is a
necessary condition for liability. To the contrary, the
words “such . . . as” make clear that the four factors
provide examples of some considerations, among others, that might
help show that the use of force was excessive.
Respondents believe these cases nonetheless help
them make a broader point—namely, that a subjective standard
“protects against a relative flood of claims,” many of them perhaps
unfounded, brought by pretrial detainees. Brief for Respondents 38.
But we note that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42
U. S. C. §1997e, which is designed to deter the filing of
frivolous litigation against prison officials, applies to both
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. Nor is there evidence
of a rash of unfounded filings in Circuits that use an objective
standard.
We acknowledge that our view that an objective
standard is appropriate in the context of excessive force claims
brought by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
may raise questions about the use of a subjective standard in the
context of excessive force claims brought by convicted prisoners.
We are not confronted with such a claim, however, so we need not
address that issue today.
III
We now consider the lawfulness of the jury
instruction given in this case in light of our adoption of an
objective standard for pretrial detainees’ excessive force claims.
See Part II–A, supra. That jury instruction defined
“excessive force” as “force applied recklessly that is unreasonable
in light of the facts and circumstances of the time.” App. 277. It
required Kingsley to show that the officers “recklessly disregarded
[Kingsley’s] safety.” Id., at 278. And it suggested that
Kingsley must show the defendants “acted with reckless disregard of
[Kingsley’s] rights,” while telling the jury that it could consider
several objective factors in making this determination.
Ibid.
Kingsley argues that the jury instruction is
faulty because the word “reckless” suggests a need to prove that
respondents acted with a certain subjective state of mind with
respect to the excessive or nonexcessive nature of the force used,
contrary to what we have just held. Reply Brief 20–22. Respondents
argue that irrespective of our holding, any error in the
instruction was harmless. Brief for Respondents 57–58. And the
Solicitor General suggests that, because the instructions defined
“recklessness” with reference to objective factors, those
instructions effectively embody our objective standard and did not
confuse the jury. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
28–32.
We agree with Kingsley that the instructions
were erroneous. “[R]eckles[s] disregar[d] [of Kingsley’s] safety”
was listed as an additional requirement, beyond the need to find
that “[respondents’] use of force was unreasonable in light of the
facts and circumstances at the time.” App. 278. See also
ibid. (Kingsley had to show respondents “used unreasonable
force and acted with reckless disregard of [Kingsley’s]
rights” (emphasis added)). And in determining whether respondents
“acted with reckless disregard of [Kingsley’s] rights,” the jury
was instructed to “consider . . . [w]hether [respondents]
reasonably believed there was a threat to the safety of
staff or prisoners.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Together, these
features suggested the jury should weigh respondents’ subjective
reasons for using force and subjective views about the
excessiveness of the force. As we have just held, that was error.
But because the question whether that error was harmless may depend
in part on the detailed specifics of this case, we leave that
question for the Court of Appeals to resolve in the first
instance.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated,
and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–6368
_________________
MICHAEL B. KINGSLEY, PETITIONER v. STAN
HENDRICKSON, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the seventh circuit
[June 22, 2015]
Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice
and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
The Constitution contains no freestanding
prohibition of excessive force. There are, however, four
constitutional provisions that we have said forbid the use of
excessive force in certain circumstances. The Fourth Amendment
prohibits it when it makes a search or seizure “unreason-able.” The
Eighth Amendment prohibits it when it constitutes “cruel and
unusual” punishment. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
it (or, for that matter, any use of force) when it is used to
“deprive” someone of “life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”
This is a Fourteenth Amendment case. The Fifth
Amendment applies only to federal actors; Kingsley forfeited any
argument under the Fourth Amendment by failing to raise it below;
and he acknowledges that the Eighth Amendment standard is
inapplicable, Brief for Petitioner 27, n. 8. The only question
before us is whether a pretrial detainee’s due process rights are
violated when “the force purposely or knowingly used against him
[is] objectively unreasonable.” Ante, at 6. In my view, the
answer is no. Our cases hold that the intentional infliction of
punishment upon a pretrial detainee may violate the Fourteenth
Amendment; but the infliction of “objectively unreasonable” force,
without more, is not the intentional infliction of punishment.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.
520 (1979) , we held that the Due Process Clause forbids holding
pretrial detainees in conditions that “amount to punishment.”
Id., at 535. Conditions amount to punishment, we explained,
when they are “imposed for the purpose of punishment.” Id.,
at 538. Acting with the intent to punish means taking a
“ ‘deliberate act intended to chastise or deter.’ ”
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S. 294, 300 (1991)
(quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F. 2d 645,
652 (CA7 1985)); see also Bell, supra, at 537–538.
The Court in Bell recognized that intent to punish need not
be “expressed,” 441 U. S. at 538, but may be established with
circumstantial evidence. More specifically, if the condition of
confinement being challenged “is not reasonably related to a
legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action
is punishment.” Id., at 539. We endorsed the same inference
when we applied Bell’s intent-to-punish test in challenges
brought by pretrial detainees against jailhouse security policies,
id., at 560–562; Block v. Rutherford, 468
U. S. 576 –584 (1984), and statutes permitting pre-trial
detention, Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 255,
269 (1984) ; United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S.
739 –747 (1987).
In light of these cases, I agree with the Court
that “the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the
use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham
v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 395, n. 10 (1989) (citing
Bell, supra, at 535–539). I disagree, however, that
any intentional application of force that is objectively
unreasonable in degree is a use of excessive force that “amount[s]
to punishment.” Bell, 441 U. S., at 535. The Court
reaches that conclusion by misreading Bell as forbidding
States to take any harmful action against pretrial detainees
that is not “reasonably related to a legitimate goal.”
Id., at 539.
Bell endorsed this “reasonable relation”
inference in the context of a challenge to conditions of a
confinement—specifically, challenges to the State’s policy of
housing two people in each cell, id., at 528, and various
security policies, id., at 548–549, 553, 555, 558, 560–562.
The conditions in which pretrial detainees are held, and the
security policies to which they are subject, are the result of
considered deliberation by the authority imposing the detention. If
those conditions and policies lack any reasonable relationship to a
legitimate, nonpunitive goal, it is logical to infer a punitive
intent. And the same logic supports finding a punitive intent in
statutes authorizing detention that lacks any reasonable
relationship to a valid government interest. Schall,
supra, at 269; Salerno, supra, at 746–747.
It is illogical, however, automatically
to infer punitive intent from the fact that a prison guard used
more force against a pretrial detainee than was necessary. That
could easily have been the result of a misjudgment about the degree
of force required to maintain order or protect other inmates,
rather than the product of an intent to punish the detainee for his
charged crime (or for any other behavior). An officer’s decision
regarding how much force to use is made “in haste, under pressure,
and frequently without the luxury of a second chance,”
Hudson v. Mc-Millian, 503 U. S. 1, 6 (1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted), not after the considered
thought that precedes detention-policy determinations like those at
issue in Bell, Block, Schall, and
Salerno. That an officer used more force than necessary
might be evidence that he acted with intent to punish, but
it is no more than that.
In sum: Bell makes intent to punish the
focus of its due-process analysis. Objective reasonableness of the
force used is nothing more than a heuristic for identifying this
intent. That heuristic makes good sense for considered decisions by
the detaining authority, but is much weaker in the context of
excessive-force cl+aims. Kingsley does not argue that respondents
actually intended to punish him, and his reliance on Bell to
infer such an intent is misplaced.
Kingsley claims that “the protections of due
process . . . extend beyond the narrow context of
‘punishment.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 15. Unquestionably. A
State would plainly violate the Due Process Clause if it extended a
detainee’s confinement because it believed him mentally ill (not as
“punishment”), without giving him the constitutionally guaranteed
processes that must precede the deprivation of liberty. But
Kingsley does not claim deprivation of liberty in that normal sense
of that word—the right to walk about free. He claims that the Due
Process Clause confers, on pretrial detainees, a substantive
“liberty” interest that consists of freedom from objectively
unreasonable force. Kingsley seeks relief, in other words, under
the doctrine of “substantive due process,” through which we have
occasionally recognized “liberty” interests other than freedom from
incarceration or detention, that “cannot be limited at all, except
by provisions that are ‘narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.’ ” Kerry v. Din, ante, at 6
(plurality opinion) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507
U. S. 292 –302 (1993)).
Even if one believed that the right to process
can confer the right to substance in particular cases, Kingsley’s
interest is not one of the “fundamental liberty interests” that
substantive due process protects. We have said that that doctrine
protects only those liberty interests that, carefully described,
are “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S.
702 –721 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Carefully described, the liberty interest Kingsley asserts is the
right of pretrial detainees to be free from the application of
force that is more than is objectively required to further some
legitimate, nonpunitive, governmental interest. He does not argue
(nor could he) that this asserted interest could pass the test
announced in Glucksberg.
I conclude by emphasizing that our Constitution
is not the only source of American law. There is an immense body of
state statutory and common law under which individuals abused by
state officials can seek relief. Kingsley himself, in addition to
suing respondents for excessive force under 42 U. S. C.
§1983, brought a state-law claim for assault and battery. 744
F. 3d 443, 446, n. 6 (CA7 2014). The Due Process Clause
is not “a font of tort law to be superimposed upon” that state
system. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 332
(1986) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693,
701 (1976) ). Today’s majority overlooks this in its tender-hearted
desire to tortify the Fourteenth Amendment.