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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
Nos. 12–79, 12–86, and
12–88
_________________
CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP,
PETITIONER
12–79 v.
SAMUEL TROICE et al.
WILLIS OF COLORADO INCORPORATED, et al.,
PETITIONERS
12–86 v.
SAMUEL TROICE et al.
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, PETITIONER
12–88 v.
SAMUEL TROICE et al.
on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fifth circuit
[February 26, 2014]
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (which we shall refer to
as the “Litigation Act”) for-bids the bringing of large
securities class actions based upon violations of state law. It
says that plaintiffs may not maintain a class action “based
upon the statutory or common law of any State” in which the
plaintiffs allege “a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact in con-nection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security.” 15 U. S. C. §78bb(f)(1) (emphasis
added). The Act defines “class actions” as those
involving more than 50 members. See §78bb(f )(5). It
defines “covered security” narrowly to include only
securities traded on a national exchange (or, here irrelevant,
those issued by investment companies).
§§78bb(f )(5)(E), 77r(b)(1)–(2).
The question before us
is whether the Litigation Act encompasses a class action in which
the plaintiffs allege (1) that they “purchase[d]”
uncovered securities (certificates of deposit that are not traded
on any national exchange), but (2) that the defendants falsely told
the victims that the uncovered securities were backed by covered
securities. We note that the plaintiffs do not allege that the
defendants’ misrepresentations led anyone to buy or to sell
(or to maintain positions in) covered securities. Under these
circumstances, we conclude the Act does not apply.
In light of the
dissent’s characterization of our holding, post, at
11–12 (opinion of Kennedy, j.)—which we believe is
incorrect—we specify at the outset that this holding does not
limit the Federal Government’s authority to prosecute
“frauds like the one here.” Post, at 11. The Federal
Government has in fact brought successful prosecutions against the
fraudsters at the heart of this litigation, see infra, at
5–6, and we fail to understand thedissent’s repeated
suggestions to the contrary, post, at 3, 4,11, 12, 17. Rather, as
we shall explain, we believe the basic consequence of our holding
is that, without limiting the Federal Government’s
prosecution power in any sig-nificant way, it will permit victims
of this (and similar) frauds to recover damages under state law.
See infra, at 15–17. Under the dissent’s approach, they
would have no such ability.
I
A
The relevant
statutory framework has four parts:
(1) Section 10(b) of
the underlying regulatory statute, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 48Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §78j
(2012 ed.). This well-known statutory provision forbids the
“use” or “employ[ment]” of “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” “in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”
§78j(b).
Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b–5 similarly forbids the use of any
“device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” (including the
making of “any untrue statement of a material fact” or
any similar “omi[ssion]”) “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.” 17 CFR
§240.10b–5 (2013).
For purposes of these
provisions, the Securities Exchange Act defines
“security” broadly to include not just things traded on
national exchanges, but also “any note, stock, treasury
stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture
. . . [or] certificate of deposit for a security.”
15 U. S. C. §78c(a)(10). See also
§§77b(a)(1), 80a–2(a)(36), 80b–2(a)(18)
(providing virtually identical defini-tions of
“security” for the Securities Act of 1933, the
Investment Company Act of 1940, and the InvestmentAdvisers Act of
1940).
(2) A statute-based
private right of action. The Court has read §10(b) and Rule
10b–5 as providing injured persons with a private right of
action to sue for damages suffered through those provisions’
violation. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U. S. 723, 730 (1975) .
The scope of the
private right of action is more limited than the scope of the
statutes upon which it is based. See Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. 148, 153,
155, 166 (2008) (private right does not cover suits against
“secondary actors” who had no “role in preparing
or disseminating” a stock issuer’s fraudulent
“financial statements”); Central Bank of Denver, N. A.
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164
(1994) (private right does not extend to actions against
“aiders and abettors” of securities fraud); Blue Chip
Stamps, supra, at 737 (private right extends only to purchasers and
sellers, not to holders, of securities).
(3) The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 109Stat. 737, 15
U. S. C. §§77z–1, 78u–4. This law
imposes procedural and substantive limitations upon the scope of
the private right of action available under §10(b) and Rule
10b–5. It requires plaintiffs to meet heightened pleading
standards. It permits defendants to obtain automatic stays of
discovery. It limits recoverable damages and attorney’s fees.
And it creates a new “safe harbor” for forward-looking
statements. See §§78u–4, 78u–5.
(4) The Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act. 112Stat. 3227, 15 U. S. C.
§78bb(f )(1)(A). As we said at the outset, this 1998 law
forbids any
“covered class action based upon the
statutory or common law of any State . . . by any private
partyalleging—
“(A) a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security; or
“(B) that the defendant used or employed
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”
§§78bb(f )(1)(A)–(B).
The law defines “covered security”
narrowly. It is a security that “satisfies the standards for
a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or (2) of section
18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933.”
§78bb(f )(5)(E). And the relevant paragraphs of
§18(b) of the 1933 Act define a “covered security”
as “[a security] listed, or authorized for listing, on a
national securities exchange,” §77r(b)(1) (or, though
not relevant here, as a security issued by an “investment
company,” §77r(b)(2)). The Litigation Act also specifies
that a “covered security” must be listed or authorized
for listing on a national exchange “at the time during which
it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative
or deceptive conduct occurred.”
§78bb(f )(5)(E).
The Litigation Act sets
forth exceptions. It does not apply to class actions with fewer
than 51 “persons or prospective class members.”
§78bb(f )(5)(B). It does not apply to actions brought on
behalf of a State itself. §78bb(f )(3)(B)(i). It does not
apply to class actions based on the law “of the State in
which the issuer is incorporated.”
§78bb(f )(3)(A)(i). And it reserves the authority of
state securities commissions “to investigate and bring
enforcement actions.” §78bb(f )(4).
We are here primarily
interested in the Litigation Act’s phrase
“misrepresentation or omission of a material factin
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered secu-rity.”
§78bb(f )(1)(A). Unless this phrase applies to the class
actions before us, the plaintiffs may maintain their
state-law-based class actions, and they may do so either in federal
or state court. Otherwise, their class actions are precluded
altogether. See §78bb(f )(2) (providing for the removal
from state to federal court of class actions that meet the
specifications of paragraph 1, and for the dismissal of such suits
by the district court).
B
1
The plaintiffs in
these actions (respondents here) say that Allen Stanford and
several of his companies ran a multibillion dollar Ponzi scheme.
Essentially, Stanford and his companies sold the plaintiffs
certificates of deposit in Stanford International Bank. Those
certificates “were debt assets that promised a fixed rate of
return.” Roland v. Green, 675 F. 3d 503, 522 (CA5 2012). The
plaintiffs expected that Stanford International Bank would use the
money it received to buy highly lucrative assets. But instead,
Stanford and his associates used the money provided by new
investors to repay old investors, to finance an elaborate
lifestyle, and to finance speculative real estate ventures.
The Department of
Justice brought related criminal charges against Allen Stanford. A
jury convicted Stanford of mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to
commit money laundering, and obstruction of a Securities and
Exchange Commission investigation. Stanford was sentenced to prison
and required to forfeit $6 billion. The SEC, noting that the Bank
certificates of deposit fell within the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act’s broad definition of “security,” filed a
§10(b) civil case against Allen Stanford, the Stanford
International Bank, and related Stanford companies and associates.
The SEC won the civil action, and the court imposed a civil penalty
of $6 billion.
2
The plaintiffs in
each of the four civil class actions are private investors who
bought the Bank’s certificates of deposit. Two groups of
plaintiffs filed their actions in Louisiana state court against
firms and individuals who helped sell the Bank’s certificates
by working as “investment advisers” affiliated with
Stanford, or who provided Stanford-related companies with trust,
insurance, accounting, or reporting services. (The defendants
included a respondent here, SEI Investments Company.) The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants helped the Bank perpetrate
the fraud, thereby violating Louisiana state law.
Two other groups of
plaintiffs filed their actions in federal court for the Northern
District of Texas. One group sued Willis of Colorado (and related
Willis companies) and Bowen, Miclette & Britt, two insurance
brokers; the other group sued Proskauer Rose and Chadbourne &
Parke, two law firms. Both groups claimed that the defendants
helped the Bank (and Allen Stanford) perpetrate the fraud or
conceal it from regulators, thereby violating Texas securities
law.
The Louisiana
state-court defendants removed their cases to federal court, and
the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation moved the Louisiana
cases to the Northern District of Texas. A single federal judge
heard all four class actions.
The defendants in each
of the cases moved to dismiss the complaints. The District Court
concluded that the Litigation Act required dismissal. The court
recognized that the certificates of deposit themselves were not
“covered securities” under the Litigation Act, for they
were not “ ‘traded nationally [or] listed on a
regulated national exchange.’ ” App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 12–86, p. 62.But each complaint in one way or
another alleged thatthe fraud included misrepresentations that the
Bank maintained significant holdings in “ ‘highly
marketable se-curities issued by stable governments [and] strong
mul-tinational companies,’ ” and that the
Bank’s ownership of these “covered” securities
made investments in the uncovered certificates more secure. Id., at
66. The court concluded that this circumstance provided the
requisite statutory “connection” between (1) the
plaintiffs’ state-law fraud claims, and (2)
“transactions in covered securities.” Id., at 64,
66–67. Hence, the court dismissed the class actions under the
Litigation Act. Id., at 75. See also 675 F. 3d,at 511.
All four sets of
plaintiffs appealed. The Fifth Circuit reversed. It agreed with the
District Court that the complaints described misrepresentations
about the Bank’s investments in nationally traded securities.
Still, the “heart, crux, and gravamen of” the
“allegedly fraudulent scheme was representing . . .
that the [uncovered] CDs were a ‘safe and secure’
investment that was preferable to other investments for many
reasons.” Id., at 522. The court held that the falsehoods
about the Bank’s holdings in covered securities were too
“ ‘tangentially related’ ” to the
“crux” of the fraud to trigger the Litigation Act. Id.,
at 520, 522 (quoting Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F. 3d 957,
965–966 (CA9 2009)). “That the CDs were marketed with
some vague references to [the Bank’s] portfolio containing
instruments that might be [covered by the Litigation Act] seems
tangential to the schemes,” to the point where the complaints
fall outside the scope of that Act. 675 F. 3d,at 522.
Defendants in the four
class actions sought certiorari. We granted their petitions.
II
The question before
us concerns the scope of the Litigation Act’s phrase
“misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale ofa covered security.”
§78bb(f )(1)(A). How broad is that scope? Does it extend
further than misrepresentations that are material to the purchase
or sale of a covered security?
In our view, the scope
of this language does not extend further. To put the matter more
specifically: A fraudulent misrepresentation or omission is not
made “in connection with” such a “purchase or
sale of a covered security” unless it is material to a
decision by one or more individuals (other than the fraudster) to
buy or to sell a “covered security.” We add that in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U. S.
71 (2006) , we held that the Litigation Act precluded a suit where
the plaintiffs alleged a “fraudulent manipulation of stock
prices” that was material to and
“ ‘concide[d]’ with” third-party
securities transactions, while also inducing the plaintiffs to
“hold their stocks long beyond the point when, had the truth
been known, they would have sold.” Id., at 75, 85, 89 (citing
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U. S. 642, 651 (1997) ).
We do not here modify Dabit.
A
We reach this
interpretation of the Litigation Act for several reasons. First,
the Act focuses upon transactions in covered securities, not upon
transactions in uncovered securities. An interpretation that
insists upon a material connection with a transaction in a covered
security is consistent with the Act’s basic focus.
Second, a natural
reading of the Act’s language supports our interpretation.
The language requires the dismissal of a state-law-based class
action where a private party alleges a “misrepresentation or
omission of a material fact” (or engages in other forms of
deception, not relevant here) “in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered secu-rity.” §78bb(f)(1).
The phrase “material fact in connection with the purchase or
sale” suggests a connection that matters. And for present
purposes, a connection matters where the misrepresentation makes a
significant difference to someone’s decision to purchase or
to sell a covered security, not to purchase or to sell an uncovered
security, something about which the Act expresses no concern. See
generally Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U. S.
___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 9–12) (a misrepresentation or
omission is “material” if a reasonable investor would
have considered the information significant when contemplating a
statutorily relevant investment decision). Further, the
“someone” making that decision to purchase or sell must
be a party other than the fraudster. If the only party who decides
to buy or sell a covered security as a result of a lie is the liar,
that is not a “connection” that matters.
Third, prior case law
supports our interpretation. As far as we are aware, every
securities case in which this Court has found a fraud to be
“in connection with” a purchase or sale of a security
has involved victims who took, who tried to take, who divested
themselves of, who tried to divest themselves of, or who maintained
an ownership interest in financial instruments that fall within the
relevant statutory definition. See, e.g., Dabit, supra, at 77
(Litigation Act: victims were “holders” of covered
securities that the defendant’s fraud caused to become
overvalued); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U. S. 813, 822 (2002)
(§10(b): victims were “duped into believing” that
the defendant would “ ‘invest’ their assets
in the stock market”); Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United
Int’l Holdings, Inc., 532 U. S. 588, 592 (2001)
(§10(b): victim purchased an oral option to buy 10% of a
company’s stock); O’Hagan, supra, at 655–656
(§10(b): victims were “members of the investing
public” harmed by the defendant’s “gain[ing of
an] advantageous market position” through insider trading);
Superintendent of Ins. of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U. S. 6, 10 (1971) (§10(b): victim was “injured as
an investor” when the fraud deprived it of
“compensation for the sale of its valuable block of
securities”). We have found no Court case involving a fraud
“in connection with” the purchase or sale of a
statutorily defined security in which the victims did not fit one
of these descriptions. And the dissent apparently has not
either.
Although the dissent
characterizes our approach as “new,” post, at 3, and
tries to describe several of our prior cases, such as Zanford or
Dabit, in a different way, post, at 14–15, it cannot escape
the fact that every case it cites involved a victim who took, tried
to take, or maintained an ownership position in the statutorily
relevant securities through “purchases” or
“sales” induced by the fraud. E.g., Zandford, supra, at
815, 820 (fraudster told customershe would “
‘conservatively invest’ their money” in the stock
market and made sales of “his customer’s
securities,”but pocketed the proceeds (emphasis added));
Dabit, supra, at 76, 85, 89 (the “misrepresentations and
manipulative tactics caused [the plaintiffs] to hold onto
overvalued securities” while also inducing third parties to
trade them); In re Orlando Joseph Jett, 82 S. E. C.
Docket 1211, 1236–1237 (2004) (trader’s scheme
“greatly inflated the reporting trading profits” that
his firm “used to determine . . . the amount of capital he
was permitted to commit on the firm’s behalf” (emphasis
added)).
Fourth, we read the
Litigation Act in light of and consistent with the underlying
regulatory statutes, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Securities Act of 1933. The regulatory statutes refer to persons
engaged in securities transactions that lead to the taking or
dissolving of ownership positions. And they make it illegal to
deceive a person when he or she is doing so. Section 5 of the 1933
Act, for example, makes it unlawful to “offer to sell or
offer to buy . . . any security, unless a registration
statement has been filed as to such security.” 15 U. S. C.
§77e(c). Section 17 of the 1933 Act makes it unlawful
“in the offer or sale of any securities . . . to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or to obtain
money or propertyby means of any untrue statement of a material
fact.” §§77q(a)(1)–(2). And §10(b) of
the 1934 Act makes it unlawful to “use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security
. . . any manipulative or de-ceptive device or
contrivance.” §78j(b).
Not only language but
also purpose suggests a statutory focus upon transactions involving
the statutorily relevant securities. The basic purpose of the 1934
and 1933 regulatory statutes is “to insure honest securities
markets and thereby promote investor confidence.” See
O’Hagan, su-pra, at 658. Nothing in the regulatory statutes
suggests their object is to protect persons whose connection with
the statutorily defined securities is more remote than words such
as “buy,” “sell,” and the like, indicate.
Nor does anything in the Litigation Act provide us with reasons for
interpreting its similar language more broadly.
The dissent correctly
points out that the federal securities laws have another purpose,
beyond protecting investors. Namely, they also seek to protect
securities issuers, as well as the investment advisers,
accountants, and brokers who help them sell financial products,
from abusive class-action lawsuits. Post, at 5. Both the PSLRA and
the Litigation Act were enacted in service of that goal. By
imposing heightened pleading standards, limiting damages, and
pre-empting state-law suits where the claims pertained to covered
securities, Congress sought to reduce frivolous suits and mitigate
legal costs for firms and investment professionals that participate
in the market for nationally traded securities.
We fail to see,
however, how our decision today undermines that objective. The
dissent worries our approach will “subject many persons and
entities whose profession it is to give advice, counsel, and
assistance in investing in the securities markets to complex and
costly state-law litigation.” Post, at 4. To the contrary,
the only issuers, investment advisers, or accountants that
today’s decision will continue to subject to state-law
liability are those who do not sell or participate in selling
securities traded on U. S. national exchanges. We concede that
this means a bank, chartered in Antigua and whose sole product is a
fixed-rate debt instrument not traded on a U. S. exchange,
will not be able to claim the benefit of preclusion under the
Litigation Act. But it is difficult to see why the federal
securities laws would be—or should be—concerned with
shielding such entities from lawsuits.
Fifth, to interpret the
necessary statutory “connection” more broadly than we
do here would interfere with state efforts to provide remedies for
victims of ordinary state-law frauds. A broader interpretation
would allow the Litigation Act to cover, and thereby to prohibit, a
lawsuit brought by creditors of a small business that falsely
represented it was creditworthy, in part because it owns or intends
to own exchange-traded stock. It could prohibit a lawsuit brought
by homeowners against a mortgage broker for lying about the
interest rates on their mortgages—if, say, the broker (not
the homeowners) later sold the mortgages to a bank which then
securitized them in a pool and sold off pieces as “covered
securities.” Brief for Sixteen Law Professors as Amici Curiae
24.
The dissent all but
admits this. Its proposed rule is that whenever “the purchase
or sale of the securities [including by the fraudster] is what
enables the fraud,” the Litigation Act pre-empts the suit.
Post, at 12. In other words, any time one person convinces another
to loan him money, by pretending he owns nationally traded
securities or will acquire them for himself in the future, the
action constitutes federal securities fraud, is subject to federal
enforcement, and is also precluded by the Litigation Act if it
qualifies as a “covered class action” under
§78bb(f )(5)(B) (e.g., involves more than 50 members).
Leaving aside whether this would work a significant expansion of
the scope of liability under the federal securities laws, it
unquestionably would limit the scope of protection under state laws
that seek to provide remedies to victims of garden-variety
fraud.
The text of the
Litigation Act reflects congressional care to avoid such results.
Under numerous provisions, it purposefully maintains state legal
authority, especially over matters that are primarily of state
concern. See §§78bb(f )(1)(A)–(B) (limiting
preclusion to lawsuits in-volving “covered,” i.e.,
nationally traded, securities); §78bb(f )(4) (providing
that the “securities commission . . . of any State
shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to
investigate and bring enforcement actions”);
§78bb(f )(3)(B) (preserving States’ authority to
bring suits of the kind forbidden to private class-action
plaintiffs). See also 112Stat. 3227 (“Congress finds that
. . . it is appropriate to enact national standards for
securities class action lawsuits involving nationally traded
securities, while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of
State securities regulators”). A broad interpretation of the
Litigation Act works at cross-purposes with this state-oriented
concern. Cf. Zandford, 535 U. S., at 820 (warning against
“constru[ing]” the phrase “in connection
with” “so broadly as to convert any common-law fraud
that happens to involve securities into a violation of
§10(b)”); Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 532 U. S., at 596
(recognizing that “ordinary state breach-of-contract
claims” are “actions that lie outside the [Securities
Exchange] Act’s basic objectives”).
B
Respondents and the
Government make two important counterarguments. Respondents point
to statements we have made suggesting we should give the phrase
“in connection with” a broad interpretation. In Dabit,
for example, we said that the Court has consistently
“espoused a broad interpretation” of “in
connection with” in the context of §10(b) and Rule
10b–5, and we added that the Litigation Act language
similarly warranted a “broad construction.” 547
U. S., at 85–86. In Bankers Life, we said that, if a
deceptive practice “touch[es]” a securities
transaction, it meets §10(b)’s “in connection
with” requirement, 404 U. S., at 12, and in
O’Hagan, we said the fraud and the purchase or sale of a
security must simply “coincide.” 521 U. S., at 656. The
idea, we explained in Zandford, is that the phrase “should be
‘construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes.’ ” 535
U. S., at 819 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens ofUtah v.
United States, 406 U. S. 128, 151 (1972) ).
Every one of these
cases, however, concerned a false statement (or the like) that was
“material” to another individual’s decision to
“purchase or s[ell]” a statutorily defined
“security” or “covered security.” Dabit,
supra, at 75–77; Zandford, supra, at 822; Wharf (Holdings)
Ltd., supra, at 590–592; O’Hagan, supra, at
655–657; Bankers Life, supra, at 10. And the relevant
statements or omissions were material to a transaction in the
relevant securities by or on behalf of someone other than the
fraudster.
Second, the Government
points out that §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act also
uses the phrase “in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.” 15 U. S. C. §78j(b). And the
Government warns that a narrow interpretation of “in
connection with” here threatens a simi-larly narrow
interpretation there, which could limit the SEC’s enforcement
capabilities. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28.
We do not understand,
however, how our interpretation could significantly curtail the
SEC’s enforcement powers. As far as the Government has
explained the matter, our interpretation seems perfectly consistent
with past SEC practice. For one thing, we have cast no doubt on the
SEC’s ability to bring enforcement actions against Stanford
and Stanford International Bank. The SEC has already done so
successfully. As we have repeatedly pointed out, the term
“security” under §10(b) covers a wide range of
financial products beyond those traded on national exchanges,
apparently including the Bank’s certificatesof deposit at
issue in these cases. No one here denies that, for §10(b)
purposes, the “material” misrepresentations by Stanford
and his associates were made “in connection with” the
“purchases” of those certificates.
We find it surprising
that the dissent worries that our decision will “narro[w] and
constric[t] essential protection for our national securities
market,” post, at 3, and put “frauds like the one here
. . . not within the reach of fed-eral regulation,”
post, at 11. That would be news to Allen Stanford, who was
sentenced to 110 years in federal prison after a successful federal
prosecution, and to Stanford International Bank, which was ordered
to pay billions in federal fines, after the same. Frauds like the
one here—including this fraud itself—will continue to
be within the reach of federal regulation because the authority of
the SEC and Department of Justice extends to all
“securities,” not just to those traded on national
exchanges. 15 U. S. C. §78c(a)(10); accord, §77b(a)(1),
§80a–2(a)(36), §80b–2(a)(18). When the
fraudster peddles an uncovered secu-rity like the CDs here, the
Federal Government will have the full scope of its usual powers to
act. The only difference between our approach and that of the
dissent, is that we also preserve the ability for investors to
obtain relief under state laws when the fraud bears so remote a
connection to the national securities market that no person
actually believed he was taking an ownership position in that
market.
Thus, despite the
Government’s and the dissent’s hand wringing, neither
has been able to point to an example of any prior SEC enforcement
action brought during the past 80 years that our holding today
would have prevented the SEC from bringing. At oral argument, the
Government referred to an administrative proceeding, In re
Richard Line, 62 S. E. C. Docket 2879 (1996), as its best
example. Our examination of the report of that case, however,
indicates that the defendant was a fraudster to whom the
fraud’s victims had loaned money, expecting that he would
purchase securities on their behalf. Id., at 2880 (“Line
represented to investors that he would invest their non-admitted
assets in various securities, including U. S. Treasury notes,
mutual fund shares, and collateralized debt obligations”);
ibid. (“[He] fabricated account statements which falsely
recited that securities had beenpurchased on behalf of certain
investors”).
The Government’s
brief refers to two other proceedings as demonstrating the
SEC’s broad §10(b) enforcement powers. Each, however,
involved defrauded investors who had tried to take an ownership
interest in the relevant securities. Jett, 82 S. E. C.
Docket, at 1251 (involving a §10(b) action where a defrauded
trading firm’s “decision to purchase or
‘invest’ in strips or bonds . . . stemmed
directly from the activity that constituted the fraud”); In
re D. S. Waddy & Co., 30 S. E. C. 367, 368 (1949) (involving a
§10(b) action where a broker “appropriated to his own
use money paid to him by customers for securities
purchases”). We have examined SEC records without finding any
further examples.
For these reasons, the
dissent’s warning that our de-cision will
“inhibit” “litigants from using federal law to
police frauds” and will “undermine the primacy of
federal law in policing abuses in the securities markets”
rings hollow. Post, at 4, 5. The dissent cannot point to one
example of a federal securities action—public or
private—that would have been permissible in the past but that
our approach will disallow in the future. And the irony of the
dissent’s position is that federal law would have precluded
private recovery in these very suits, because §10(b) does not
create a private right of action for investors vis-à-vis
“secondary actors” or “aiders and abettors”
of securities fraud. Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U. S., at
152, 155; Central Bank of Denver, 511 U. S., at 180; accord,
Brief for Petitioners in No. 12–86, p. 46 (“Any federal
securities action against Petitioners would clearly run afoul of
Central Bank and Stoneridge”); Brief for Respon-dents 48
(same); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28 (same).
III
Respondents’
complaints specify that their claims rest upon their purchases of
uncovered, not of covered, securities. Our search for allegations
that might bring their allegations within the scope of the
Litigation Act reveals the following:
(1) The first set of
Texas plaintiffs alleged that they bought certificates of deposit
from Stanford International Bank because they were told “the
CDs issued by SIBwere safer even than U. S. bank-issued
CDs” and “could be redeemed at any time,” given
that the Bank “only invested the money [i.e., the
Bank’s money obtained from its certificate sale proceeds] in
safe, secure, and liquid assets.” App. 433. They claimed
Stanford “touted the high quality of SIB’s investment
portfolio,” and such falsehoods were material to their
decision to purchase the uncovered certificates. Id., at 444.
(2) The second set of
Texas plaintiffs contended that they, too, purchased the
Bank’s certificates on the belief “that their money was
being invested in safe, liquid investments.” Id., at 715.
They alleged that the Bank’s marketing materials stated it
devoted “the greater part of its assets” to
“first grade investment bonds (AAA, AA+, AA) and shares of
stock (of great reputation, liquidity, and credibility).”
Id., at 744 (emphasis deleted).
(3) Both groups of
Louisiana plaintiffs alleged that they were induced to purchase the
certificates based on misrepresentations that the Bank’s
assets were “ ‘invested in a well-diversified
portfolio of highly marketable securities issued by stable
governments, strong multinational companies and major international
banks.’ ” Id., at 253, 345. And they claimed the
“ ‘liquidity/marketability of SIB’s invested
assets’ ” was “the most important factor to
provide security to SIB clients.” Id., at 254.
These statements do not
allege, for Litigation Act purposes, misrepresentations or
omissions of material fact “in connection with” the
“purchase or sale of a covered secu-rity.” At most, the
complaints allege misrepresentations about the Bank’s
ownership of covered securities—fraudulent assurances that
the Bank owned, would own, or would use the victims’ money to
buy for itself shares of covered securities. But the Bank is an
entity that made the misrepresentations. The Bank is the fraudster,
not the fraudster’s victim. Nor is the Bank some other person
transacting (or refraining from transacting, see Dabit, 547
U. S., at 75–77) in covered securities. And
consequently, there is not the necessary “connection”
between the materiality of the misstatements and the statutorily
required “purchase or sale of a covered security.” See
supra, at 8.
A final point: The
District Court found that one of the plaintiffs acquired Bank
certificates “with the proceeds of selling” covered
securities contained in his IRA portfolio. App. to Pet. for Cert.
in No. 12–86, p. 70. The plaintiffs, however, did not allege
that the sale of these covered securities (which were used to
finance the purchase of the certificates) constituted any part of
the fraudulent scheme. Nor did the complaints allege that Stanford
or his associates were at all interested in how the plaintiffs
obtained the funds they needed to purchase the certificates. Thus,
we agree with the Court of Appeals that “[u]nlike Bankers
Life and Zandford, where the entirety of the fraud depended upon
the tortfeasor convincing the victims of those fraudulent schemes
to sell their covered securities in order for the fraud to be
accomplished, the allegations here are not so tied with the sale of
covered securities.” 675 F. 3d, at 523. In our view,
like that of the Court of Appeals, these sales constituted no
relevant part of the fraud but were rather incidental to it.
For these reasons the
Court of Appeals’ judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.