SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
v. UNITED STATES
on petition for writ of certiorari to the
united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 13–113. Decided December 2, 2013
Per Curiam.
When a taxpayer overpays his taxes, he is
generally entitled to interest from the Government for the period
between the payment and the ultimate refund. See 26
U. S. C. §6611(a). That interest begins to run “from the
date of overpayment.” §§6611(b)(1), (b)(2). But the Code does not
define “the date of overpayment.”
In this case, after the Internal Revenue Service
advised Ford Motor Company that it had underpaid its taxes from
1983 until 1989, Ford remitted a series of deposits to the IRS
totaling $875 million. Those deposits stopped the ac-crual of
interest that Ford would otherwise owe once the audits were
completed and the amount of its underpayment was finally
determined. See §6601; Rev. Proc. 84–58, 1984–2 Cum. Bull. 501.
Later, Ford requested that the IRS treat the deposits as advance
payments of the additional tax that Ford owed. Eventually the
parties determined that Ford had overpaid its taxes in the relevant
years, thereby entitling Ford to a return of the over-payment as
well as interest. But the parties disagreed about when the interest
began to run under 26 U. S. C. §6611(b)(1). Ford argued
that “the date of overpayment” was the date that it first remitted
the deposits to the IRS.
Ibid. The Government countered that
the date of overpayment was the date that Ford requested that the
IRS treat the remittances as payments of tax. The difference
between the parties’ competing interpretations of §6611(b) is worth
some $445 million.
Ford sued the Government in Federal District
Court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.
§1346(a)(1). The Government did not contest the court’s
jurisdiction. See Brief in Opposition 3, n. 3. The District
Court accepted the Government’s construction of §6611(b) and
granted its motion for judgment on the pleadings. A panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that
§6611 is a waiver of sovereign immunity that must be construed
strictly in favor of the Government. 508 Fed. Appx. 506 (2012).
Ford sought certiorari, arguing that the Sixth
Circuit was wrong to give §6611 a strict construction. In Ford’s
view, it is 28 U. S. C. §1346—not §6611—that waives the
Government’s immunity from this suit, and §6611(b) is a substantive
provision that should not be construed strictly. See
Gómez-Pérez v.
Potter,
553 U.S.
474, 491 (2008);
United States v.
White Mountain
Apache Tribe,
537 U.S.
465, 472–473 (2003). In its response to Ford’s petition for
certiorari, however, the Government contended for the first time
that §1346(a)(1) does not apply at all to this suit; it argues that
the only basis for jurisdiction, and “the only general waiver of
sovereign immunity that encompasses [Ford’s] claim,” is the Tucker
Act, 28 U. S. C. §1491(a). Brief in Opposition 3,
n. 3. Although the Government acquiesced in jurisdiction in
the lower courts, if the Government is now correct that the Tucker
Act applies to this suit, jurisdiction over this case was proper
only in the United States Court of Federal Claims. See
§1491(a).
This Court “is one of final review, ‘not of
first view.’ ”
FCC v.
Fox Television Stations,
Inc.,
556 U.S.
502, 529 (2009) (quoting
Cutter v.
Wilkinson,
544 U.S.
709, 718, n. 7 (2005)). The Sixth Circuit should have the first
opportunity to consider the Government’s new contention with
respect to jurisdiction in this case. Depending on that court’s
answer, it may also consider what impact, if any, the
jurisdictional determination has on the merits issues, especially
whether or not §6611 is a waiver of sovereign immunity that should
be construed strictly.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the
judgment of the Sixth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
