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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 12–414
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SHERRY L. BURT, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. VONLEE
NICOLE TITLOW
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[November 5, 2013]
Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
When a state prisoner
asks a federal court to set aside a sentence due to ineffective
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, our cases require
that the federal court use a “ ‘doubly deferential’ ”
standard of review that gives both the state court and the defense
attorney the benefit of the doubt. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 17). In this case, the
Sixth Circuit failed to apply that doubly deferential standard by
refusing to credit a state court’s reasonable factual finding and
by assuming that counsel was ineffective where the record was
silent. Because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), 110Stat. 1214, and Strickland v. Washington, 466
U. S. 668 (1984) , do not permit federal judges to so casually
second-guess the decisions of their state-court colleagues or
defense attorneys, the Sixth Circuit’s decision must be
reversed.
I
Respondent Titlow and
Billie Rogers, respondent’s aunt, murdered Billie’s husband Don by
pouring vodka down his throat and smothering him with a pillow.
With help from attorney Richard Lustig, respondent reached an
agreement with state prosecutors to testify against Billie, plead
guilty to manslaughter, and receive a 7- to 15-year sentence. As
confirmed at a plea hearing, Lustig reviewed the State’s evidence
with respondent “over a long period of time,” and respondent
understood that that evidence could support a conviction for
first-degree murder. App. 43–44. The Michigan trial court approved
the plea bargain.
Three days before
Billie Rogers’ trial was to commence, however, respondent retained
a new lawyer, Frederick Toca. With Toca’s help, respondent demanded
a substantially lower minimum sentence (three years, instead of
seven) in exchange for the agreement to plead guilty and testify.
When the prosecutor refused to accede to the new demands,
respondent withdrew the plea, acknowledging in open court the
consequences of withdrawal (including reinstatement of the
first-degree murder charge). Without respondent’s critical
testimony, Billie Rogers was acquitted, and later died.
Respondent subsequently
stood trial. During the course of the trial, respondent denied any
intent to harm Don Rogers or any knowledge, at the time respondent
covered his mouth or poured vodka down his throat, that Billie
intended to harm him. Indeed, respondent testified to attempting to
prevent Billie from harming her husband. The jury, however, elected
to believe respondent’s previous out-of-court statements, which
squarely demonstrated participation in the killing, and convicted
respondent of second-degree murder. The trial court imposed a 20-
to 40-year term of imprisonment.
On direct appeal,
respondent argued that Toca advised withdrawal of the guilty plea
without taking time to learn more about the case, thereby failing
to realize the strength of the State’s evidence and providing
ineffective assistance of counsel. Rejecting that claim, the
Michigan Court of Appeals found that Toca acted reasonably in light
of his client’s protestations of innocence. That court found that
respondent’s decision to hire Toca was “set in motion” by
respondent’s “statement to a sheriff’s deputy that [respondent] did
not commit the offense.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 101a. Applying the
standard set forth by our decision in Strickland, which requires
that defense counsel satisfy “an objective standard of
reasonableness,” 466 U. S., at 688, the Michigan Court of
Appeals concluded that “[w]hen a defendant proclaims
. . . innocence . . . , it is not objectively
unreasonable to recommend that the defendant refrain from pleading
guilty—no matter how ‘good’ the deal may appear.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 102a.
Respondent then filed a
federal habeas petition under 28 U. S. C. §2254. Applying
AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the District Court
concluded that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ ruling was
“completely reasonable on the law and the facts” and denied relief.
No. 07–CV–13614, 2010 WL 4115410, *15 (ED Mich., Oct. 19, 2010). In
particular, the District Court concluded that “[c]ounsel could not
be ineffective by trying to negotiate a better plea agreement for
[Titlow] with Billie Rogers’s trial imminent and [Titlow] stating
at the time that Billie Rogers had committed the murder without
. . . assistance.” Ibid.
The Sixth Circuit
reversed. It found that the factual predicate for the state court’s
decision—that the withdrawal of the plea was based on respondent’s
assertion of innocence—was an unreasonable interpretation of the
factual record, given Toca’s explanation at the withdrawal hearing
that “the decision to withdraw Titlow’s plea was based on the fact
that the State’s plea offer was substantially higher than the
Michigan guidelines for second-degree murder.” 680 F. 3d 577, 589
(2012). Further observing that “[t]he record in this case contains
no evidence” that Toca fully informed respondent of the possible
consequences of withdrawing the guilty plea, the Sixth Circuit held
that Toca rendered ineffective assistance of counsel that resulted
in respondent’s loss of the benefit of the plea bargain. Id., at
589–592. Citing our decision in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U. S.
___ (2012), the Sixth Circuit remanded this case with instructions
that the prosecution must reoffer the original plea agreement to
respondent, and that the state court should “consul[t]” the plea
agreement and “fashion” a remedy for the violation of respondent’s
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during
plea bargaining. 680 F. 3d, at 592. Chief Judge Batchelder
dissented on the grounds that the Michigan Court of Appeals’
decision was reasonable. Id., at 593.
On remand, the
prosecution followed the Sixth Circuit’s instructions and reoffered
the plea agreement it had offered some 10 years before—even though,
in light of Billie Rogers’ acquittal and subsequent death,
respondent was no longer able to deliver on the promises originally
made to the prosecution. At the plea hearing, however, respondent
balked, refusing to provide a factual basis for the plea which the
court could accept. Respondent admitted to pouring vodka down Don
Rogers’ throat, but denied assisting in killing him or knowing that
pouring vodka down his throat could lead to his death. As at trial,
respondent testified to attempting to prevent Billie Rogers from
harming her husband. Eventually, after conferring with current
counsel (not Toca), respondent admitted to placing Don Rogers in
danger by pouring vodka down his throat with the knowledge that his
death could result. The trial court took the plea under advisement,
where the matter stands at present. We granted certiorari. 568
U. S. ___ (2013).
II
AEDPA instructs that,
when a federal habeas petitioner challenges the factual basis for a
prior state-court decision rejecting a claim, the federal court may
overturn the state court’s decision only if it was “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
pre- sented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U. S. C.
§2254(d)(2). The prisoner bears the burden of rebutting the state
court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing evidence.”
§2254(e)(1). We have not defined the precise relationship between
§2254(d)(2) and §2254(e)(1), and we need not do so here. See Wood
v. Allen, 558 U. S. 290, 293 (2010) . For present purposes, it
is enough to reiterate “that a state-court factual determination is
not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have
reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Id., at 301.
AEDPA likewise imposes a highly deferential standard for reviewing
claims of legal error by the state courts: A writ of habeas corpus
may issue only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by” this Court. §2254(d)(1).
AEDPA recognizes a
foundational principle of our fed- eral system: State courts are
adequate forums for the vindi- cation of federal rights. “[T]he
States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal
Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy
Clause. Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have consist-
ently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus
presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the
laws of the United States.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U. S. 455,
458 (1990) . This principle applies to claimed violations of
constitutional, as well as statutory, rights. See Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434, 443 (1977) . Indeed, “state courts
have the solemn responsibility equally with the federal courts to
safeguard constitutional rights,” and this Court has refused to
sanction any decision that would “reflec[t] negatively upon [a]
state court’s ability to do so.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Especially where a case involves such a common claim as
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland—a claim state
courts have now adjudicated in countless criminal cases for nearly
30 years—“there is no intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a
federal judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or
learned . . . than his neighbor in the state courthouse.” Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 494, n. 35 (1976) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Recognizing the duty
and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate claims of
constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal
habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in
state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the
state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court
was so lacking in justification that there was an error
. . . beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___
(2011) (slip op., at 13). “If this standard is difficult to
meet”—and it is—“that is because it was meant to be.” Id., at ___
(slip op., at 12). We will not lightly conclude that a State’s
criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]”
for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 13) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III
The record readily
supports the Michigan Court of Appeals’ factual finding that Toca
advised withdrawal of the guilty plea only after respondent’s
proclamation of innocence. Respondent passed a polygraph denying
planning to kill Don Rogers or being in the room when he died.
Thereafter, according to an affidavit in the record, respondent
discussed the case with a jailer, who advised against pleading
guilty if respondent was not in fact guilty. App. 298 (affidavit of
William Pierson). [
1 ] That
conversation “set into motion” respondent’s decision to retain
Toca. Ibid., ¶8. Those facts, together with the timing of Toca’s
hiring—on the eve of the trial at which respondent was to
self-incriminate—strongly suggest that respondent had second
thoughts about confessing in open court and proclaimed innocence to
Toca. That conclusion is further bolstered by respondent’s
maintenance of innocence of Don Rogers’ death at trial.
Indeed, reading the
record in any other way is difficult. Respondent’s first lawyer,
Lustig, had negotiated a deal that was quite favorable in light of
the fact, admitted by respondent in open court, that the State’s
evidence could support a conviction for first-degree murder. This
deal involved a guilty plea to manslaughter and a 7- to 15-year
sentence—far less than the mandatory sentence of life in prison
that results from a conviction for first-degree murder under
Michigan law. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §750.316 (West Supp. 2013).
Yet after a jailer advised against pleading guilty if respondent
was not guilty, something caused respondent both to fire Lustig and
hire Toca (who within a few days withdrew the guilty plea), and
then to maintain innocence at trial. If that something was not a
desire to assert innocence, it is difficult to imagine what it was,
and respondent does not offer an alternative theory.
The only evidence the
Sixth Circuit cited for its conclusion that the plea withdrawal was
not based on respondent’s proclamation of innocence was that, when
Toca moved to withdraw the guilty plea, he “did not refer to
Titlow’s claims of innocence,” but instead “explained that the
decision to withdraw [the] plea was based on the fact that the
State’s plea offer was substantially higher than the Michigan
guidelines” for manslaughter. 680 F. 3d, at 589. The Sixth Circuit
believed that this fact “sufficiently rebuts the Michigan Court of
Appeals’ finding that the plea withdrawal was based on Titlow’s
assertion of innocence.” Ibid.
But the Michigan Court
of Appeals was well aware of Toca’s representations to the trial
court, noting in its opinion that respondent “moved to withdraw
[the] plea because the agreed upon sentence exceeded the sentencing
guidelines range.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a. The Michigan Court
of Appeals, however—unlike the Sixth Circuit—also correctly
recognized that there is nothing inconsistent about a defendant’s
asserting innocence on the one hand and refusing to plead guilty to
manslaughter accompanied by higher-than-normal punishment on the
other. Indeed, a defendant convinced of his or her own innocence
may have a particularly optimistic view of the likelihood of
acquittal, and therefore be more likely to drive a hard bargain
with the prosecution before pleading guilty. Viewing the record as
a whole, we conclude that the Sixth Circuit improperly set aside a
“reasonable state-court determinatio[n] of fact in favor of its own
debatable interpretation of the record.” Rice v. Collins, 546
U. S. 333, 335 (2006) .
Accepting as true the
Michigan Court of Appeals’ factual determination that respondent
proclaimed innocence to Toca, the Sixth Circuit’s Strickland
analysis cannot be sustained. Although a defendant’s proclamation
of innocence does not relieve counsel of his normal
responsibilities under Strickland, it may affect the advice counsel
gives. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Toca’s advice
satisfied Strickland fell within the bounds of reasonableness under
AEDPA, given that respondent was claiming innocence and only days
away from offering self-incriminating testimony in open court
pursuant to a plea agreement involving an above-guidelines
sentence. [
2 ] See Florida v.
Nixon, 543 U. S. 175, 187 (2004) (explaining that the
defendant has the “ ‘ultimate authority’ ” to decide
whether to accept a plea bargain); Brookhart v. Janis, 384
U. S. 1 –8 (1966) (observing that a lawyer must not “override
his client’s desire . . . to plead not guilty”). The
Sixth Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary was error.
Even more troubling is
the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that Toca was ineffective because
the “record in this case contains no evidence that” he gave
constitutionally adequate advice on whether to withdraw the guilty
plea. 680 F. 3d, at 590. We have said that counsel should be
“strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment,” Strickland, 466 U. S., at 690, and
that the burden to “show that counsel’s performance was deficient”
rests squarely on the defendant, id., at 687. The Sixth Circuit
turned that presumption of effectiveness on its head. It should go
without saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the
“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id., at 689. As Chief
Judge Batchelder correctly explained in her dissent, “[w]ithout
evidence that Toca gave incorrect advice or evidence that he failed
to give material advice, Titlow cannot establish that his
performance was deficient.” 680 F. 3d, at 595.
The Sixth Circuit
pointed to a single fact in support of its conclusion that Toca
failed to adequately advise respondent: his failure to retrieve
respondent’s file from Lustig before withdrawing the guilty plea.
Id., at 590. But here, too, the Sixth Circuit deviated from
Strickland’s strong presumption of effectiveness. The record does
not reveal how much Toca was able to glean about respondent’s case
from other sources; he may well have obtained copies of the
critical materials from prosecutors or the court. (Indeed, Toca’s
statement at the plea withdrawal hearing that “[t]here’s a lot of
material here” strongly suggests that he did have access to a
source of documentation other than Lustig’s file. App. 71.)
In any event, the same
considerations were relevant to entering and withdrawing the guilty
plea, and respondent admitted in open court when initially pleading
guilty that Lustig had explained the State’s evidence and that this
evidence would support a conviction for first-degree murder. Toca
was justified in relying on this admission to conclude that
respondent understood the strength of the prosecution’s case and
nevertheless wished to withdraw the plea. With respondent having
knowingly entered the guilty plea, we think any confusion about the
strength of the State’s evidence upon withdrawing the plea less
than a month later highly unlikely.
Despite our conclusion
that there was no factual or legal justification for overturning
the state court’s decision, we recognize that Toca’s conduct in
this litigation was far from exemplary. He may well have violated
the rules of professional conduct by accepting respondent’s
publication rights as partial payment for his services, and he
waited weeks before consulting respondent’s first lawyer about the
case. But the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to
perfect counsel; it promises only the right to effective
assistance, and we have held that a lawyer’s violation of ethical
norms does not make the lawyer per se ineffective. See Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U. S. 162, 171 (2002) . Troubling as Toca’s
actions were, they were irrelevant to the narrow question that was
before the Sixth Circuit: whether the state court reasonably
determined that respondent was adequately advised before deciding
to withdraw the guilty plea. Because the Michigan Court of Appeals’
decision that respondent was so advised is reasonable and supported
by the record, the Sixth Circuit’s judgment is reversed. [
3 ]
It is so ordered.
