SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 12–96
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SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA, PETITIONER v. ERIC H.
HOLDER, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit
[June 25, 2013]
Justice Ginsburg,
with whom Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan
join, dissenting.
In the Court’s
view, the very success of §5 of the Voting Rights Act demands
its dormancy. Congress was of another mind. Recognizing that large
progress has been made, Congress determined, based on a voluminous
record, that the scourge of discrimination was not yet extirpated.
The question this case presents is who decides whether, as
currently operative, §5 remains justifiable, [
1 ] this Court, or a Congress charged with
the obligation to enforce the post-Civil War Amendments “by
appropriate legislation.” With overwhelming support in both
Houses, Congress concluded that, for two prime reasons, §5
should continue in force, unabated. First, continuance would
facilitate completion of the impressive gains thus far made; and
second, continuance would guard against backsliding. Those
assessments were well within Congress’ province to make and
should elicit this Court’s unstinting approbation.
I
“[V]oting
discrimination still exists; no one doubts that.” Ante, at 2.
But the Court today terminates the remedy that proved to be best
suited to block that discrimination. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA) has worked to combat voting discrimination where other
remedies had been tried and failed. Particularly effective is the
VRA’s requirement of federal preclearance for all changes to
voting laws in the regions of the country with the most aggravated
records of rank discrimination against minority voting rights.
A century after the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments guaranteed citizens the right
to vote free of discrimination on the basis of race, the
“blight of racial discrimination in voting” continued
to “infec[t] the electoral process in parts of our
country.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,
308 (1966) . Early attempts to cope with this vile infection
resembled battling the Hydra. Whenever one form of voting
discrimination was identified and prohibited, others sprang up in
its place. This Court repeatedly encountered the remarkable
“variety and persistence” of laws disenfranchising
minority citizens. Id., at 311. To take just one example, the
Court, in 1927, held unconstitutional a Texas law barring black
voters from participating in primary elections, Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U. S. 536 ; in 1944, the Court struck down a
“reenacted” and slightly altered version of the same
law, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 ; and in 1953, the
Court once again confronted an attempt by Texas to
“circumven[t]” the Fifteenth Amendment by adopting yet
another variant of the all-white primary, Terry v. Adams, 345
U. S. 461 .
During this era, the
Court recognized that discrimination against minority voters was a
quintessentially political problem requiring a political solution.
As Justice Holmes explained: If “the great mass of the white
population intends to keep the blacks from voting,”
“relief from [that] great political wrong, if done, as
alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be
given by them or by the legislative and political department of the
government of the United States.” Giles v. Harris, 189
U. S. 475, 488 (1903) .
Congress learned from
experience that laws targeting particular electoral practices or
enabling case-by-case litigation were inadequate to the task. In
the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, Congress authorized
and then expanded the power of “the Attorney General to seek
injunctions against public and private interference with the right
to vote on racial grounds.” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at
313. But circumstances reduced the ameliorative potential of these
legislative Acts:
“Voting suits are unusually onerous
to prepare, sometimes requiring as many as 6,000 man-hours spent
combing through registration records in preparation for trial.
Litigation has been exceedingly slow, in part because of the ample
opportunities for delay afforded voting officials and others
involved in the proceed-ings. Even when favorable decisions have
finally been obtained, some of the States affected have merely
switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal
decrees or have enacted difficult new tests designed to prolong the
existing disparity between white and Negro registration.
Alternatively, certain local officials have defied and evaded court
orders or have simply closed their registration offices to freeze
the voting rolls.” Id., at 314 (footnote omitted).
Patently, a new approach was needed.
Answering that need,
the Voting Rights Act became one of the most consequential,
efficacious, and amply justified exercises of federal legislative
power in our Nation’s his-tory. Requiring federal
preclearance of changes in voting laws in the covered
jurisdictions—those States and localities where opposition to
the Constitution’s commands were most virulent—the VRA
provided a fit solution for minority voters as well as for States.
Under the preclearance regime established by §5 of the VRA,
covered jurisdictions must submit proposed changes in voting laws
or procedures to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which has 60 days
to respond to the changes. 79Stat. 439, codified at 42
U. S. C. §1973c(a). A change will be approved unless
DOJ finds it has “the purpose [or] . . . the effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color.” Ibid. In the alternative, the covered jurisdiction
may seek approval by a three-judge District Court in the District
of Columbia.
After a century’s
failure to fulfill the promise of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, passage of the VRA finally led to signal improvement on
this front. “The Justice Department estimated that in the
five years after [the VRA’s] passage, almost as many blacks
registered [to vote] in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana,
North Carolina, and South Carolina as in the entire century before
1965.” Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in
Controversies in Minority Voting 7, 21 (B. Grofman & C.
Davidson eds. 1992). And in assessing the overall effects of the
VRA in 2006, Congress found that “[s]ignificant progress has
been made in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by
minority voters, including increased numbers of registered minority
voters, minority voter turnout, and minority representation in
Congress, State legislatures, and local elected offices. This
progress is the direct result of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.” Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006
(hereinafter 2006 Reauthorization), §2(b)(1), 120Stat. 577. On
that matter of cause and effects there can be no genuine doubt.
Although the VRA
wrought dramatic changes in the realization of minority voting
rights, the Act, to date, surely has not eliminated all vestiges of
discrimination against the exercise of the franchise by minority
citizens. Jurisdictions covered by the preclearance requirement
continued to submit, in large numbers, proposed changes to voting
laws that the Attorney General declined to approve, auguring that
barriers to minority voting would quickly resurface were the
preclearance remedy elimi-nated. City of Rome v. United States, 446
U. S. 156, 181 (1980) . Congress also found that as
“registration and voting of minority citizens increas[ed],
other measures may be resorted to which would dilute increasing
minority voting strength.” Ibid. (quoting H. R. Rep. No.
94–196, p. 10 (1975)). See also Shaw v. Reno, 509
U. S. 630, 640 (1993) (“[I]t soon became apparent that
guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root
out other racially discriminatory voting practices” such as
voting dilution). Efforts to reduce the impact of minority votes,
in contrast to direct attempts to block access to the bal- lot, are
aptly described as “second-generation barriers” to
minority voting.
Second-generation
barriers come in various forms. One of the blockages is racial
gerrymandering, the redrawing of legislative districts in an
“effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting.”
Id., at 642. Another is adoption of a system of at-large voting in
lieu of district-by-district voting in a city with a sizable black
minority. By switching to at-large voting, the overall majority
could control the election of each city council member, effectively
eliminating the potency of the minority’s votes. Grofman
& Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election Structure on Black
Representation in Eight Southern States, in Quiet Revolution in the
South 301, 319 (C. Davidson & B. Grofman eds. 1994)
(hereinafter Quiet Revolution). A similar effect could be achieved
if the city engaged in discriminatory annexation by incorporating
majority-white areas into city limits, thereby decreasing the
effect of VRA-occasioned increases in black voting. Whatever the
device employed, this Court has long recognized that vote dilution,
when adopted with a discriminatory purpose, cuts down the right to
vote as certainly as denial of access to the ballot. Shaw, 509
U. S., at 640–641; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U. S. 544, 569 (1969) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533,
555 (1964) . See also H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, p. 6
(2006) (although “[d]iscrimination today is more subtle than
the visible methods used in 1965,” “the effect and
results are the same, namely a diminishing of the minority
community’s ability to fully participate in the electoral
process and to elect their preferred candidates”).
In response to evidence
of these substituted barriers, Congress reauthorized the VRA for
five years in 1970, for seven years in 1975, and for 25 years in
1982. Ante, at 4–5. Each time, this Court upheld the
reauthorization as a valid exercise of congressional power. Ante,
at 5. As the 1982 reauthorization approached its 2007 expiration
date, Congress again considered whether the VRA’s
preclearance mechanism remained an appropriate response to the
problem of voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions.
Congress did not take
this task lightly. Quite the opposite. The 109th Congress that took
responsibility for the renewal started early and conscientiously.
In October 2005, the House began extensive hearings, which
continued into November and resumed in March 2006. S. Rep. No.
109–295, p. 2 (2006). In April 2006, the Senate followed
suit, with hearings of its own. Ibid. In May 2006, the bills that
became the VRA’s reauthorization were introduced in both
Houses. Ibid. The House held further hearings of considerable
length, as did the Senate, which continued to hold hearings into
June and July. H. R. Rep. 109–478, at 5; S. Rep.
109–295, at 3–4. In mid-July, the House considered and
rejected four amendments, then passed the reauthorization by a vote
of 390 yeas to 33 nays. 152 Cong. Rec. H5207 (July 13, 2006);
Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117
Yale L. J. 174, 182–183 (2007) (hereinafter Persily).
The bill was read and debated in the Senate, where it passed by a
vote of 98 to 0. 152 Cong. Rec. S8012 (July 20, 2006). President
Bush signed it a week later, on July 27, 2006, recognizing the need
for “further work . . . in the fight against
injustice,” and calling the reauthorization “an example
of our continued commitment to a united America where every person
is valued and treated with dignity and respect.” 152 Cong.
Rec. S8781 (Aug. 3, 2006).
In the long course of
the legislative process, Congress “amassed a sizable
record.” Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 205 (2009) . See also 679 F. 3d
848, 865–873 (CADC 2012) (describing the “extensive
record” supporting Congress’ determina-tion that
“serious and widespread intentional discrimination persisted
in covered jurisdictions”). The House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held 21 hearings, heard from scores of witnesses,
received a number of investigative reports and other written
documentation of continuing discrimina-tion in covered
jurisdictions. In all, the legislative record Congress compiled
filled more than 15,000 pages. H. R. Rep. 109–478, at 5,
11–12; S. Rep. 109–295, at 2–4, 15. The
compilation presents countless “examples of fla-grant racial
discrimination” since the last reauthoriza-tion; Congress
also brought to light systematic evidence that “intentional
racial discrimination in voting remains so serious and widespread
in covered jurisdictions that section 5 preclearance is still
needed.” 679 F. 3d, at 866.
After considering the
full legislative record, Congress made the following findings: The
VRA has directly caused significant progress in eliminating
first-generation barriers to ballot access, leading to a marked
increase in minority voter registration and turnout and the number
of minority elected officials. 2006 Reauthorization §2(b)(1).
But despite this progress, “second generation barriers
constructed to prevent minority voters from fully participating in
the electoral process” continued to exist, as well as
racially polarized voting in the covered jurisdictions, which
increased the political vulnerability of racial and language
minorities in those jurisdictions. §§2(b)(2)–(3),
120Stat. 577. Extensive “[e]vidence of continued
discrimination,” Congress concluded, “clearly show[ed]
the continued need for Federal oversight” in covered
jurisdictions. §§2(b)(4)–(5), id., at
577–578. The overall record demonstrated to the federal
lawmakers that, “without the continuation of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 protections, racial and language minority
citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise their
right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, undermining the
significant gains made by minorities in the last 40 years.”
§2(b)(9), id., at 578.
Based on these
findings, Congress reauthorized preclearance for another 25 years,
while also undertaking to reconsider the extension after 15 years
to ensure that the provision was still necessary and effective. 42
U. S. C. §1973b(a)(7), (8) (2006 ed., Supp. V). The
question before the Court is whether Congress had the authority
under the Constitution to act as it did.
II
In answering this
question, the Court does not write on a clean slate. It is well
established that Congress’ judgment regarding exercise of its
power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments warrants
substantial deference. The VRA addresses the combination of race
discrimination and the right to vote, which is “preservative
of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370
(1886) . When confronting the most constitutionally invidious form
of discrimination, and the most fundamental right in our democratic
system, Congress’ power to act is at its height.
The basis for this
deference is firmly rooted in both constitutional text and
precedent. The Fifteenth Amendment, which targets precisely and
only racial discrimination in voting rights, states that, in this
domain, “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.” [
2 ] In choosing this language, the Amendment’s
framers invoked Chief Justice Marshall’s formulation of the
scope of Congress’ powers under the Necessary and Proper
Clause:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added).
It cannot tenably be
maintained that the VRA, an Act of Congress adopted to shield the
right to vote from racial discrimination, is inconsistent with the
letter or spirit of the Fifteenth Amendment, or any provision of
the Constitution read in light of the Civil War Amendments. Nowhere
in today’s opinion, or in Northwest Austin, [
3 ] is there clear recognition of the
transformative effect the Fifteenth Amendment aimed to achieve.
Notably, “the Founders’ first successful amendment told
Congress that it could ‘make no law’ over a certain
domain”; in contrast, the Civil War Amendments used
“language [that] authorized transformative new federal
statutes to uproot all vestiges of unfreedom and inequality”
and provided “sweeping enforcement powers . . . to
enact ‘appropriate’ legislation targeting state
abuses.” A. Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography
361, 363, 399 (2005). See also McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 153, 182 (1997) (quoting Civil War-era framer that
“the remedy for the violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments was expressly not left to the courts. The remedy was
legislative.”).
The stated purpose of
the Civil War Amendments was to arm Congress with the power and
authority to protect all persons within the Nation from violations
of their rights by the States. In exercising that power, then,
Congress may use “all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted” to the constitutional ends declared by these
Amendments. McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 421. So when Congress acts to
enforce the right to vote free from racial discrimination, we ask
not whether Congress has chosen the means most wise, but whether
Congress has rationally selected means appropriate to a legitimate
end. “It is not for us to review the congressional resolution
of [the need for its chosen remedy]. It is enough that we be able
to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the
conflict as it did.” Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S.
641, 653 (1966) .
Until today, in
considering the constitutionality of the VRA, the Court has
accorded Congress the full measure of respect its judgments in this
domain should garner. South Carolina v. Katzenbach supplies the
standard of review: “As against the reserved powers of the
States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the
constitu-tional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting.” 383 U. S., at 324. Faced with subsequent
reauthorizations of the VRA, the Court has reaffirmed this
standard. E.g., City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 178. Today’s
Court does not purport to alter settled precedent establishing that
the dispositive question is whether Congress has employed
“rational means.”
For three reasons,
legislation reauthorizing an existing statute is especially likely
to satisfy the minimal requirements of the rational-basis test.
First, when reauthorization is at issue, Congress has already
assembled a legislative record justifying the initial legislation.
Congress is en-titled to consider that preexisting record as well
as the record before it at the time of the vote on reauthorization.
This is especially true where, as here, the Court has repeatedly
affirmed the statute’s constitutionality and Congress has
adhered to the very model the Court has upheld. See id., at 174
(“The appellants are asking us to do nothing less than
overrule our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach
. . . , in which we upheld the constitutionality of the
Act.”); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U. S. 266, 283
(1999) (similar).
Second, the very fact
that reauthorization is necessary arises because Congress has built
a temporal limitation into the Act. It has pledged to review, after
a span of years (first 15, then 25) and in light of contemporary
evidence, the continued need for the VRA. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U. S. 306, 343 (2003) (anticipating, but not guaranteeing,
that, in 25 years, “the use of racial preferences [in higher
education] will no longer be necessary”).
Third, a reviewing
court should expect the record supporting reauthorization to be
less stark than the record originally made. Demand for a record of
violations equivalent to the one earlier made would expose Congress
to a catch-22. If the statute was working, there would be less
evidence of discrimination, so opponents might argue that Congress
should not be allowed to renew the statute. In contrast, if the
statute was not working, there would be plenty of evidence of
discrimination, but scant reason to renew a failed regulatory
regime. See Persily 193–194.
This is not to suggest
that congressional power in this area is limitless. It is this
Court’s responsibility to ensure that Congress has used
appropriate means. The question meet for judicial review is whether
the chosen means are “adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S.
339, 346 (1880) . The Court’s role, then, is not to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress, but to determine
whether the legislative record sufficed to show that
“Congress could rationally have determined that [its chosen]
provisions were appropriate methods.” City of Rome, 446
U. S., at 176–177.
In summary, the
Constitution vests broad power in Congress to protect the right to
vote, and in particular to combat racial discrimination in voting.
This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Congress’ prerogative to
use any rational means in exercise of its power in this area. And
both precedent and logic dictate that the rational-means test
should be easier to satisfy, and the burden on the statute’s
challenger should be higher, when what is at issue is the
reauthorization of a remedy that the Court has previously affirmed,
and that Congress found, from contemporary evidence, to be working
to advance the legislature’s legitimate objective.
III
The 2006
reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act fully satisfies the
standard stated in McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 421: Congress may choose
any means “appropriate” and “plainly adapted
to” a legitimate constitutional end. As we shall see, it is
implausible to suggest otherwise.
A
I begin with the
evidence on which Congress based its decision to continue the
preclearance remedy. The surest way to evaluate whether that remedy
remains in order is to see if preclearance is still effectively
preventing discriminatory changes to voting laws. See City of Rome,
446 U. S., at 181 (identifying “information on the
number and types of submissions made by covered jurisdictions and
the number and nature of objections interposed by the Attorney
General” as a primary basis for upholding the 1975
reauthorization). On that score, the record before Congress was
huge. In fact, Congress found there were more DOJ objections
between 1982 and 2004 (626) than there were between 1965 and the
1982 reauthorization (490). 1 Voting Rights Act: Evidence of
Continued Need, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess., p.
172 (2006) (hereinafter Evidence of Continued Need).
All told, between 1982
and 2006, DOJ objections blocked over 700 voting changes based on a
determination that the changes were discriminatory. H. R. Rep.
No. 109–478, at 21. Congress found that the majority of DOJ
objections included findings of discriminatory intent, see 679
F. 3d, at 867, and that the changes blocked by preclearance
were “calculated decisions to keep minority voters from fully
participating in the political process.” H. R. Rep.
109–478, at 21. On top of that, over the same time period the
DOJ and private plaintiffs succeeded in more than 100 actions to
enforce the §5 preclearance requirements. 1 Evidence of
Continued Need 186, 250.
In addition to blocking
proposed voting changes through preclearance, DOJ may request more
information from a jurisdiction proposing a change. In turn, the
jurisdiction may modify or withdraw the proposed change. The number
of such modifications or withdrawals provides an indication of how
many discriminatory proposals are deterred without need for formal
objection. Congress received evidence that more than 800 proposed
changes were altered or withdrawn since the last reauthorization in
1982. H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 40–41. [
4 ] Congress also received empirical
studies finding that DOJ’s requests for more information had
a significant effect on the degree to which covered jurisdictions
“compl[ied] with their obligatio[n]” to protect
minority voting rights. 2 Evidence of Continued Need 2555.
Congress also received
evidence that litigation under §2 of the VRA was an inadequate
substitute for preclearance in the covered jurisdictions.
Litigation occurs only after the fact, when the illegal voting
scheme has already been put in place and individuals have been
elected pursuant to it, thereby gaining the advantages of
incumbency. 1 Evidence of Continued Need 97. An illegal scheme
might be in place for several election cycles before a §2
plaintiff can gather sufficient evidence to challenge it. 1 Voting
Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, and Purpose:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 92 (2005)
(hereinafter Section 5 Hearing). And litigation places a heavy
financial burden on minority voters. See id., at 84. Congress also
received evidence that preclearance lessened the litigation burden
on covered jurisdictions themselves, because the preclearance
process is far less costly than defending against a §2 claim,
and clearance by DOJ substantially reduces the likelihood that a
§2 claim will be mounted. Reauthorizing the Voting Rights
Act’s Temporary Provisions: Policy Perspectives and Views
From the Field: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 13,
120–121 (2006). See also Brief for States of New York,
California, Mississippi, and North Carolina as Amici Curiae
8–9 (Section 5 “reduc[es] the likelihood that a
jurisdiction will face costly and protracted Section 2
litigation”).
The number of
discriminatory changes blocked or deterred by the preclearance
requirement suggests that the state of voting rights in the covered
jurisdictions would have been significantly different absent this
remedy. Sur-veying the type of changes stopped by the preclearance
procedure conveys a sense of the extent to which §5 continues
to protect minority voting rights. Set out below are characteristic
examples of changes blocked in the years leading up to the 2006
reauthorization:
In 1995, Mississippi sought to reenact a dual
voter registration system, “which was initially enacted in
1892 to disenfranchise Black voters,” and for that reason,
was struck down by a federal court in 1987. H. R. Rep. No.
109–478, at 39.
Following the 2000 census, the City of Albany,
Georgia, proposed a redistricting plan that DOJ found to be
“designed with the purpose to limit and retrogress the
increased black voting strength . . . in the city as a
whole.” Id., at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In 2001, the mayor and all-white five-member
Board of Aldermen of Kilmichael, Mississippi, abruptly canceled the
town’s election after “an unprecedented number”
of African-American can-didates announced they were running for
office. DOJ required an election, and the town elected its first
black mayor and three black aldermen. Id., at 36–37.
In 2006, this Court found that Texas’
attempt to redraw a congressional district to reduce the strength
of Latino voters bore “the mark of intentional discrimination
that could give rise to an equal protection violation,” and
ordered the district redrawn in compliance with the VRA. League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 440
(2006) . In response, Texas sought to undermine this Court’s
order by curtailing early voting in the district, but was blocked
by an action to enforce the §5 preclearance requirement. See
Order in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Texas, No.
06–cv–1046 (WD Tex.), Doc. 8.
In 2003, after African-Americans won a majority
of the seats on the school board for the first time in history,
Charleston County, South Carolina, proposed an at-large voting
mechanism for the board. The proposal, made without consulting any
of the African-American members of the school board, was found to
be an “ ‘exact replica’ ” of an
earlier voting scheme that, a federal court had determined,
violated the VRA. 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 483 (DDC 2011). See
also S. Rep. No. 109–295, at 309. DOJ invoked §5 to
block the proposal.
In 1993, the City of Millen, Georgia, proposed
to delay the election in a majority-black district by two years,
leaving that district without representation on the city council
while the neighboring majority-white district would have three
representatives. 1 Section 5 Hearing 744. DOJ blocked the proposal.
The county then sought to move a polling place from a predominantly
black neighborhood in the city to an inaccessible location in a
predominantly white neighborhood outside city limits. Id., at
816.
In 2004, Waller County, Texas, threatened to
prosecute two black students after they announced their intention
to run for office. The county then attempted to reduce the
availability of early voting in that election at polling places
near a historically black university. 679 F. 3d, at
865–866.
In 1990, Dallas County, Alabama, whose county
seat is the City of Selma, sought to purge its voter rolls of many
black voters. DOJ rejected the purge as discriminatory, noting that
it would have disquali-fied many citizens from voting “simply
because they failed to pick up or return a voter update form, when
there was no valid requirement that they do so.” 1 Section 5
Hearing 356.
These examples, and
scores more like them, fill the pages of the legislative record.
The evidence was indeed sufficient to support Congress’
conclusion that “racial discrimination in voting in covered
jurisdictions [remained] serious and pervasive.” 679
F. 3d, at 865. [
5 ]
Congress further
received evidence indicating that formal requests of the kind set
out above represented only the tip of the iceberg. There was what
one commentator described as an “avalanche of case studies of
voting rights violations in the covered jurisdictions,”
ranging from “outright intimidation and violence against
minority voters” to “more subtle forms of voting rights
deprivations.” Persily 202 (footnote omitted). This evidence
gave Congress ever more reason to conclude that the time had not
yet come for relaxed vigilance against the scourge of race
discrimination in voting.
True, conditions in the
South have impressively improved since passage of the Voting Rights
Act. Congress noted this improvement and found that the VRA was the
driving force behind it. 2006 Reauthorization §2(b)(1). But
Congress also found that voting discrimination had evolved into
subtler second-generation barriers, and that eliminating
preclearance would risk loss of the gains that had been made.
§§2(b)(2), (9). Concerns of this order, the Court
previously found, gave Congress adequate cause to reauthorize the
VRA. City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 180–182 (congressional
reauthorization of the preclearance requirement was justified based
on “the number and nature of objections interposed by the
Attorney General” since the prior reauthorization; extension
was “necessary to pre-serve the limited and fragile
achievements of the Act and to promote further amelioration of
voting discrimination”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Facing such evidence then, the Court expressly rejected the
argument that disparities in voter turnout and number of elected
officials were the only metrics capable of justifying
reauthorization of the VRA. Ibid.
B
I turn next to the
evidence on which Congress based its decision to reauthorize the
coverage formula in §4(b). Because Congress did not alter the
coverage formula, the same jurisdictions previously subject to
preclearance continue to be covered by this remedy. The evidence
just described, of preclearance’s continuing efficacy in
blocking constitutional violations in the covered jurisdictions,
itself grounded Congress’ conclusion that the remedy should
be retained for those jurisdictions.
There is no question,
moreover, that the covered jurisdictions have a unique history of
problems with racial discrimination in voting. Ante, at
12–13. Consideration of this long history, still in living
memory, was altogether appropriate. The Court criticizes Congress
for failing to recognize that “history did not end in
1965.” Ante, at 20. But the Court ignores that
“what’s past is prologue.” W. Shakespeare, The
Tempest, act 2, sc. 1. And “[t]hose who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it.” 1 G. Santayana, The Life of
Reason 284 (1905). Congress was especially mindful of the need to
reinforce the gains already made and to prevent backsliding. 2006
Reauthorization §2(b)(9).
Of particular
importance, even after 40 years and thousands of discriminatory
changes blocked by preclearance, conditions in the covered
jurisdictions demonstrated that the formula was still justified by
“current needs.” Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at
203.
Congress learned of
these conditions through a report, known as the Katz study, that
looked at §2 suits between 1982 and 2004. To Examine the
Impact and Effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing before
the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 964–1124 (2005)
(hereinafter Impact and Effectiveness). Because the private right
of action authorized by §2 of the VRA applies nationwide, a
comparison of §2 lawsuits in covered and noncovered
jurisdictions provides an appropriate yardstick for measuring
differences between covered and noncovered jurisdictions. If
differences in the risk of voting discrimination between covered
and noncovered jurisdictions had disappeared, one would expect that
the rate of successful §2 lawsuits would be roughly the same
in both areas. [
6 ] The
study’s findings, however, indicated that racial
discrimination in voting remains “concentrated in the
jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.” Northwest
Austin, 557 U. S., at 203.
Although covered
jurisdictions account for less than 25 percent of the
country’s population, the Katz study revealed that they
accounted for 56 percent of successful §2 litigation since
1982. Impact and Effectiveness 974. Controlling for population,
there were nearly four times as many successful §2 cases in
covered jurisdictions as there were in noncovered jurisdictions.
679 F. 3d, at 874. The Katz study further found that §2
lawsuits are more likely to succeed when they are filed in covered
jurisdictions than in noncovered jurisdictions. Impact and
Effectiveness 974. From these findings—ignored by the
Court—Congress reasonably concluded that the coverage formula
continues to identify the jurisdictions of greatest concern.
The evidence before
Congress, furthermore, indicated that voting in the covered
jurisdictions was more racially polarized than elsewhere in the
country. H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 34–35. While
racially polarized voting alone does not signal a constitutional
violation, it is a factor that increases the vulnerability of
racial minorities to dis-criminatory changes in voting law. The
reason is twofold. First, racial polarization means that racial
minorities are at risk of being systematically outvoted and having
their interests underrepresented in legislatures. Second,
“when political preferences fall along racial lines, the
natural inclinations of incumbents and ruling parties to entrench
themselves have predictable racial effects. Under circumstances of
severe racial polarization, efforts to gain political advantage
translate into race-specific disadvantages.” Ansolabehere,
Persily, & Stewart, Regional Differences in Racial Polarization
in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the
Constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 Harv.
L. Rev. Forum 205, 209 (2013).
In other words, a
governing political coalition has an incentive to prevent changes
in the existing balance of voting power. When voting is racially
polarized, efforts by the ruling party to pursue that incentive
“will inevitably discriminate against a racial group.”
Ibid. Just as buildings in California have a greater need to be
earthquake-proofed, places where there is greater racial
polarization in voting have a greater need for prophylactic
measures to prevent purposeful race discrimination. This point was
understood by Congress and is well recognized in the academic
literature. See 2006 Reauthorization §2(b)(3), 120Stat. 577
(“The continued evidence of racially polarized voting in each
of the jurisdictions covered by the [preclearance requirement]
demonstrates that racial and language minorities remain politically
vulnerable”); H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 35;
Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting
Racial and Language Minorities, in Quiet Revolution 21, 22.
The case for retaining
a coverage formula that met needs on the ground was therefore
solid. Congress might have been charged with rigidity had it
afforded covered jurisdictions no way out or ignored jurisdictions
that needed superintendence. Congress, however, responded to this
concern. Critical components of the congressional design are the
statutory provisions allowing jurisdictions to “bail
out” of preclearance, and for court-ordered “bail
ins.” See Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 199. The VRA
permits a jurisdiction to bail out by showing that it has complied
with the Act for ten years, and has engaged in efforts to eliminate
intimidation and harassment of vot-ers. 42 U. S. C.
§1973b(a) (2006 ed. and Supp. V). It also authorizes a court
to subject a noncovered jurisdiction to federal preclearance upon
finding that violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
have occurred there. §1973a(c) (2006 ed.).
Congress was satisfied
that the VRA’s bailout mechanism provided an effective means
of adjusting the VRA’s coverage over time. H. R. Rep.
No. 109–478, at 25 (the success of bailout “illustrates
that: (1) covered status is neither permanent nor over-broad; and
(2) covered status has been and continues to be within the control
of the jurisdiction such that those jurisdictions that have a
genuinely clean record and want to terminate coverage have the
ability to do so”). Nearly 200 jurisdictions have
successfully bailed out of the preclearance requirement, and DOJ
has consented to every bailout application filed by an eligible
jurisdiction since the current bailout procedure became effective
in 1984. Brief for Federal Respondent 54. The bail-in mechanism has
also worked. Several jurisdictions have been subject to federal
preclearance by court orders, including the States of New Mexico
and Arkansas. App. to Brief for Federal Respondent 1a–3a.
This experience exposes
the inaccuracy of the Court’s portrayal of the Act as static,
unchanged since 1965. Congress designed the VRA to be a dynamic
statute, capable of adjusting to changing conditions. True, many
covered jurisdictions have not been able to bail out due to recent
acts of noncompliance with the VRA, but that truth reinforces the
congressional judgment that these jurisdictions were rightfully
subject to preclearance, and ought to remain under that regime.
IV
Congress approached
the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA with great care and
seriousness. The same cannot be said of the Court’s opinion
today. The Court makes no genuine attempt to engage with the
massive legislative record that Congress assembled. Instead, it
relies on increases in voter registration and turnout as if that
were the whole story. See supra, at 18–19. Without even
identifying a standard of review, the Court dismissively brushes
off arguments based on “data from the record,” and
declines to enter the “debat[e about] what [the] record
shows.” Ante, at 20–21. One would expect more from an
opinion striking at the heart of the Nation’s signal piece of
civil-rights legislation.
I note the most
disturbing lapses. First, by what right, given its usual restraint,
does the Court even address Shelby County’s facial challenge
to the VRA? Second, the Court veers away from controlling precedent
regarding the “equal sovereignty” doctrine without even
acknowledging that it is doing so. Third, hardly showing the
respect ordinarily paid when Congress acts to implement the Civil
War Amendments, and as just stressed, the Court does not even deign
to grapple with the legislative record.
A
Shelby County
launched a purely facial challenge to the VRA’s 2006
reauthorization. “A facial challenge to a legislative
Act,” the Court has other times said, “is, of course,
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481
U. S. 739, 745 (1987) .
“[U]nder our
constitutional system[,] courts are not roving commissions assigned
to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws.”
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 –611 (1973).
Instead, the “judicial Power” is limited to deciding
particular “Cases” and “Controversies.”
U. S. Const., Art. III, §2. “Embedded in the
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the
principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be
applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground
that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in
other situations not before the Court.” Broadrick, 413
U. S., at 610. Yet the Court’s opinion in this case
contains not a word explaining why Congress lacks the power to
subject to preclearance the particular plaintiff that initiated
this lawsuit—Shelby County, Alabama. The reason for the
Court’s silence is apparent, for as applied to Shelby County,
the VRA’s preclearance requirement is hardly contestable.
Alabama is home to
Selma, site of the “Bloody Sunday” beatings of
civil-rights demonstrators that served as the catalyst for the
VRA’s enactment. Following those events, Martin Luther King,
Jr., led a march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama’s capital,
where he called for passage of the VRA. If the Act passed, he
foresaw, progress could be made even in Alabama, but there had to
be a steadfast national commitment to see the task through to
completion. In King’s words, “the arc of the moral
universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” G. May,
Bending Toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the
Transformation of American Democracy 144 (2013).
History has proved King
right. Although circumstances in Alabama have changed, serious
concerns remain. Between 1982 and 2005, Alabama had one of the
highest rates of successful §2 suits, second only to its
VRA-covered neighbor Mississippi. 679 F. 3d, at 897 (Williams,
J., dissenting). In other words, even while subject to the
restraining effect of §5, Alabama was found to have
“deni[ed] or abridge[d]” voting rights “on
account of race or color” more frequently than nearly all
other States in the Union. 42 U. S. C. §1973(a).
This fact prompted the dissenting judge below to concede that
“a more narrowly tailored coverage formula” capturing
Alabama and a handful of other jurisdictions with an established
track record of racial discrimination in voting “might be
defensible.” 679 F. 3d, at 897 (opinion of Williams,
J.). That is an understatement. Alabama’s sorry history of
§2 violations alone provides sufficient justification for
Congress’ determination in 2006 that the State should remain
subject to §5’s preclearance requirement. [
7 ]
A few examples suffice
to demonstrate that, at least in Alabama, the “current
burdens” imposed by §5’s preclearance requirement
are “justified by current needs.” Northwest Austin, 557
U. S., at 203. In the interim between the VRA’s 1982 and
2006 reauthorizations, this Court twice confronted purposeful
racial discrimination in Alabama. In Pleasant Grove v. United
States, 479 U. S. 462 (1987) , the Court held that Pleasant
Grove—a city in Jefferson County, Shelby County’s
neighbor—engaged in purposeful discrimination by annexing
all-white areas while rejecting the annexation request of an
adjacent black neighborhood. The city had “shown unambiguous
opposition to racial integration, both before and after the passage
of the fed-eral civil rights laws,” and its strategic
annexations appeared to be an attempt “to provide for the
growth of a monolithic white voting block” for “the
impermissible purpose of minimizing future black voting
strength.” Id., at 465, 471–472.
Two years before
Pleasant Grove, the Court in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U. S.
222 (1985) , struck down a provision of the Alabama Constitution
that prohibited individuals convicted of misdemeanor offenses
“involving moral turpitude” from voting. Id., at 223
(internal quotation marks omitted). The provision violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Court
unanimously concluded, because “its original enactment was
motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of
race[,] and the [provision] continues to this day to have that
effect.” Id., at 233.
Pleasant Grove and
Hunter were not anomalies. In 1986, a Federal District Judge
concluded that the at-large election systems in several Alabama
counties violated §2. Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 640
F. Supp. 1347, 1354–1363 (MD Ala. 1986). Summarizing its
findings, the court stated that “[f ]rom the late
1800’s through the present, [Alabama] has consistently
erected barriers to keep black persons from full and equal
participation in the social, economic, and political life of the
state.” Id., at 1360.
The Dillard litigation
ultimately expanded to include 183 cities, counties, and school
boards employing discriminatory at-large election systems. Dillard
v. Baldwin Cty. Bd. of Ed., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (MD Ala.
1988). One of those defendants was Shelby County, which eventually
signed a consent decree to resolve the claims against it. See
Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 748 F. Supp. 819 (MD Ala. 1990).
Although the Dillard
litigation resulted in overhauls of numerous electoral systems
tainted by racial discrimination, concerns about backsliding
persist. In 2008, for example, the city of Calera, located in
Shelby County, requested preclearance of a redistricting plan that
“would have eliminated the city’s sole majority-black
district, which had been created pursuant to the consent decree in
Dillard.” 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 443 (DC 2011). Although
DOJ objected to the plan, Calera forged ahead with elections based
on the unprecleared voting changes, resulting in the defeat of the
incumbent African-American councilman who represented the former
majority-black district. Ibid. The city’s defiance required
DOJ to bring a §5 enforcement action that ultimately yielded
appropriate redress, including restoration of the majority-black
district. Ibid.; Brief for Respondent-Intervenors Earl Cunningham
et al. 20.
A recent FBI
investigation provides a further window into the persistence of
racial discrimination in state politics. See United States v.
McGregor, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1344–1348 (MD Ala.
2011). Recording devices worn by state legislators cooperating with
the FBI’s investigation captured conversations between
members of the state legislature and their political allies. The
recorded conversations are shocking. Members of the state Senate
derisively refer to African-Americans as “Aborigines”
and talk openly of their aim to quash a particular gambling-related
referendum because the referendum, if placed on the ballot, might
increase African-American voter turnout. Id., at 1345–1346
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also id., at 1345
(legislators and their allies expressed concern that if the
referendum were placed on the ballot, “ ‘[e]very
black, every illiterate’ would be ‘bused [to the polls]
on HUD financed buses’ ”). These conversations
oc-curred not in the 1870’s, or even in the 1960’s,
they took place in 2010. Id., at 1344–1345. The District
Judge presiding over the criminal trial at which the recorded
conversations were introduced commented that the “recordings
represent compelling evidence that political exclusion through
racism remains a real and enduring problem” in Alabama. Id.,
at 1347. Racist sentiments, the judge observed, “remain
regrettably entrenched in the high echelons of state
government.” Ibid.
These recent episodes
forcefully demonstrate that §5’s preclearance
requirement is constitutional as applied to Alabama and its
political subdivisions. [
8 ]
And under our case law, that conclusion should suffice to resolve
this case. See United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 –25
(1960) (“[I]f the complaint here called for an application of
the statute clearly constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment,
that should have been an end to the question of
constitutionality.”). See also Nevada Dept. of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (where, as here, a state or local government raises a
facial challenge to a federal statute on the ground that it exceeds
Congress’ enforcement powers under the Civil War Amendments,
the challenge fails if the opposing party is able to show that the
statute “could constitutionally be applied to some
jurisdictions”).
This Court has
consistently rejected constitutional challenges to legislation
enacted pursuant to Congress’ enforcement powers under the
Civil War Amendments upon finding that the legislation was
constitutional as applied to the particular set of circumstances
before the Court. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U. S. 151,
159 (2006) (Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) validly abrogates state sovereign immunity “insofar as
[it] creates a private cause of action . . . for conduct
that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment”); Tennessee
v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509 –534 (2004) (Title II of the ADA
is constitutional “as it applies to the class of cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts”);
Raines, 362 U. S., at 24–26 (federal statute proscribing
deprivations of the right to vote based on race was constitutional
as applied to the state officials before the Court, even if it
could not constitutionally be applied to other parties). A similar
approach is warranted here. [
9
]
The VRA’s
exceptionally broad severability provision makes it particularly
inappropriate for the Court to allow Shelby County to mount a
facial challenge to §§4(b) and 5 of the VRA, even though
application of those provisions to the county falls well within the
bounds of Congress’ legislative authority. The severability
provision states:
“If any provision of [this Act] or
the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held
invalid, the remainder of [the Act] and the application of the
provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.” 42
U. S. C. §1973p.
In other words, even if the VRA could not
constitutionally be applied to certain States—e.g., Arizona
and Alaska, see ante, at 8—§1973p calls for those
unconstitutional applications to be severed, leaving the Act in
place for juris-dictions as to which its application does not
transgress constitutional limits.
Nevertheless, the Court
suggests that limiting the jurisdictional scope of the VRA in an
appropriate case would be “to try our hand at updating the
statute.” Ante, at 22. Just last Term, however, the Court
rejected this very argument when addressing a materially identical
severability provision, explaining that such a provision is
“Congress’ explicit textual instruction to leave
unaffected the remainder of [the Act]” if any particular
“application is unconstitutional.” National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. __, __ (2012)
(plurality opinion) (slip op., at 56) (internal quotation marks
omitted); id., at __ (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring
in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 60)
(agreeing with the plurality’s severability analysis). See
also Raines, 362 U. S., at 23 (a statute capable of some
constitutional applications may nonetheless be susceptible to a
facial challenge only in “that rarest of cases where this
Court can justifiably think itself able confidently to discern that
Congress would not have desired its legislation to stand at all
unless it could validly stand in its every application”).
Leaping to resolve Shelby County’s facial challenge without
considering whether application of the VRA to Shelby County is
constitutional, or even addressing the VRA’s severability
provision, the Court’s opinion can hardly be described as an
exemplar of restrained and moderate decisionmaking. Quite the
opposite. Hubris is a fit word for today’s demolition of the
VRA.
B
The Court stops any
application of §5 by holding that §4(b)’s coverage
formula is unconstitutional. It pins this result, in large measure,
to “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty.”
Ante, at 10–11, 23. In Katzenbach, however, the Court held,
in no uncertain terms, that the principle “applies only to
the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to
the remedies for local evils which have subsequently
appeared.” 383 U. S., at 328–329 (emphasis
added).
Katzenbach, the Court
acknowledges, “rejected the notion that the [equal
sovereignty] principle operate[s] as a bar on differential
treatment outside [the] context [of the admission of new
States].” Ante, at 11 (citing 383 U. S., at
328–329) (emphasis omitted). But the Court clouds that once
clear understanding by citing dictum from Northwest Austin to
convey that the principle of equal sovereignty “remains
highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of
States.” Ante, at 11 (citing 557 U. S., at 203). See
also ante, at 23 (relying on Northwest Austin’s
“emphasis on [the] significance” of the
equal-sovereignty principle). If the Court is suggesting that
dictum in Northwest Austin silently overruled Katzenbach’s
limitation of the equal sovereignty doctrine to “the
admission of new States,” the suggestion is untenable.
Northwest Austin cited Katzenbach’s holding in the course of
declining to decide whether the VRA was constitutional or even what
standard of review applied to the question. 557 U. S., at
203–204. In today’s decision, the Court ratchets up
what was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing breadth to
the equal sovereignty principle in flat contradiction of
Katzenbach. The Court does so with nary an explanation of why it
finds Katzenbach wrong, let alone any discussion of whether stare
decisis nonetheless counsels adherence to Katzenbach’s ruling
on the limited “significance” of the equal sovereignty
principle.
Today’s
unprecedented extension of the equal sover-eignty principle outside
its proper domain—the admission of new States—is
capable of much mischief. Federal statutes that treat States
disparately are hardly novelties. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C.
§3704 (no State may operate or permit a sports-related
gambling scheme, unless that State conducted such a scheme
“at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and
ending August 31, 1990”); 26 U. S. C. §142(l)
(EPA required to locate green building project in a State meeting
specified population criteria); 42 U. S. C. §3796bb
(at least 50 percent of rural drug enforcement assistance funding
must be allocated to States with “a population density of
fifty-two or fewer persons per square mile or a State in which the
largest county has fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand
people, based on the decennial census of 1990 through fiscal year
1997”); §§13925, 13971 (similar population criteria
for funding to combat rural domestic violence); §10136
(specifying rules applicable to Nevada’s Yucca Mountain
nuclear waste site, and providing that “[n]o State, other
than the State of Nevada, may receive financial assistance under
this subsection after December 22, 1987”). Do such provisions
remain safe given the Court’s expansion of equal
sovereignty’s sway?
Of gravest concern,
Congress relied on our pathmarking Katzenbach decision in each
reauthorization of the VRA. It had every reason to believe that the
Act’s limited geographical scope would weigh in favor of, not
against, the Act’s constitutionality. See, e.g., United
States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 –627 (2000) (confining
preclearance regime to States with a record of discrimination
bolstered the VRA’s constitutionality). Congress could hardly
have foreseen that the VRA’s limited geographic reach would
render the Act constitutionally suspect. See Persily 195
(“[S]upporters of the Act sought to develop an evidentiary
record for the principal purpose of explaining why the covered
jurisdictions should remain covered, rather than justifying the
coverage of certain jurisdictions but not others.”).
In the Court’s
conception, it appears, defenders of the VRA could not prevail upon
showing what the record overwhelmingly bears out, i.e., that there
is a need for continuing the preclearance regime in covered States.
In addition, the defenders would have to disprove the existence of
a comparable need elsewhere. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62
(suggesting that proof of egregious episodes of racial
discrimination in covered jurisdictions would not suffice to carry
the day for the VRA, unless such episodes are shown to be absent
elsewhere). I am aware of no precedent for imposing such a double
burden on defenders of legislation.
C
The Court has time
and again declined to upset legislation of this genre unless there
was no or almost no evidence of unconstitutional action by States.
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 530 (1997)
(legislative record “mention[ed] no episodes [of the kind the
legislation aimed to check] occurring in the past 40 years”).
No such claim can be made about the congressional record for the
2006 VRA reauthorization. Given a record replete with examples of
denial or abridgment of a paramount federal right, the Court should
have left the matter where it belongs: in Congress’
bailiwick.
Instead, the Court
strikes §4(b)’s coverage provision because, in its view,
the provision is not based on “current conditions.”
Ante, at 17. It discounts, however, that one such condition was the
preclearance remedy in place in the covered jurisdictions, a remedy
Congress designed both to catch discrimination before it causes
harm, and to guard against return to old ways. 2006 Reauthorization
§2(b)(3), (9). Volumes of evidence supported Congress’
de-termination that the prospect of retrogression was real.
Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to
work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.
But, the Court insists,
the coverage formula is no good; it is based on “decades-old
data and eradicated practices.” Ante, at 18. Even if the
legislative record shows, as engaging with it would reveal, that
the formula accurately identifies the jurisdictions with the worst
conditions of voting discrimination, that is of no moment, as the
Court sees it. Congress, the Court decrees, must “star[t]
from scratch.” Ante, at 23. I do not see why that should be
so.
Congress’ chore
was different in 1965 than it was in 2006. In 1965, there were a
“small number of States . . . which in most
instances were familiar to Congress by name,” on which
Congress fixed its attention. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 328.
In drafting the coverage formula, “Congress began work with
reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great
majority of the States” it sought to target. Id., at 329.
“The formula [Congress] eventually evolved to describe these
areas” also captured a few States that had not been the
subject of congressional factfinding. Ibid. Nevertheless, the Court
upheld the formula in its entirety, finding it fair “to infer
a significant danger of the evil” in all places the formula
covered. Ibid.
The situation Congress
faced in 2006, when it took up reauthorization of the coverage
formula, was not the same. By then, the formula had been in effect
for many years, and all of the jurisdictions covered by it were
“familiar to Congress by name.” Id., at 328. The
question before Congress: Was there still a sufficient basis to
support continued application of the preclearance remedy in each of
those already-identified places? There was at that point no chance
that the formula might inadvertently sweep in new areas that were
not the subject of congressional findings. And Congress could
determine from the record whether the jurisdictions captured by the
coverage for-mula still belonged under the preclearance regime. If
they did, there was no need to alter the formula. That is why the
Court, in addressing prior reauthorizations of the VRA, did not
question the continuing “relevance” of the formula.
Consider once again the
components of the record before Congress in 2006. The coverage
provision identified a known list of places with an undisputed
history of serious problems with racial discrimination in voting.
Recent evidence relating to Alabama and its counties was there for
all to see. Multiple Supreme Court decisions had upheld the
coverage provision, most recently in 1999. There was extensive
evidence that, due to the preclearance mechanism, conditions in the
covered jurisdictions had notably improved. And there was evidence
that preclearance was still having a substantial real-world effect,
having stopped hundreds of discriminatory voting changes in the
covered jurisdictions since the last reauthorization. In addition,
there was evidence that racial polarization in voting was higher in
covered jurisdictions than elsewhere, increasing the vulnerability
of minority citizens in those jurisdictions. And countless
witnesses, reports, and case studies documented continuing problems
with voting dis-crimination in those jurisdictions. In light of
this rec- ord, Congress had more than a reasonable basis to
conclude that the existing coverage formula was not out of sync
with conditions on the ground in covered areas. And certainly
Shelby County was no candidate for release through the mechanism
Congress provided. See supra, at 22–23, 26–28.
The Court holds
§4(b) invalid on the ground that it is “irrational to
base coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such
tests have been illegal since that time.” Ante, at 23. But
the Court disregards what Congress set about to do in enacting the
VRA. That extraordinary legislation scarcely stopped at the
particular tests and devices that happened to exist in 1965. The
grand aim of the Act is to secure to all in our polity equal
citizenship stature, a voice in our democracy undiluted by race. As
the record for the 2006 reauthorization makes abundantly clear,
second-generation barriers to minority voting rights have emerged
in the covered jurisdictions as attempted substitutes for the
first-generation barriers that originally triggered preclearance in
those jurisdictions. See supra, at 5–6, 8, 15–17.
The sad irony of
today’s decision lies in its utter failure to grasp why the
VRA has proven effective. The Court appears to believe that the
VRA’s success in eliminating the specific devices extant in
1965 means that preclearance is no longer needed. Ante, at
21–22, 23–24. With that belief, and the argument
derived from it, history repeats itself. The same
assumption—that the problem could be solved when particular
methods of voting discrimination are identified and
eliminated—was indulged and proved wrong repeatedly prior to
the VRA’s enactment. Unlike prior statutes, which singled out
particular tests or devices, the VRA is grounded in Congress’
recognition of the “variety and persistence” of
measures designed to impair minority voting rights. Katzenbach, 383
U. S., at 311; supra, at 2. In truth, the evolution of voting
discrimination into more subtle second-generation barriers is
powerful evidence that a remedy as effective as preclearance
remains vital to protect minority voting rights and prevent
backsliding.
Beyond question, the
VRA is no ordinary legislation. It is extraordinary because
Congress embarked on a mission long delayed and of extraordinary
importance: to realize the purpose and promise of the Fifteenth
Amendment. For a half century, a concerted effort has been made to
end racial discrimination in voting. Thanks to the Voting Rights
Act, progress once the subject of a dream has been achieved and
continues to be made.
The record supporting
the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA is also extraordinary. It was
described by the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee as
“one of the most extensive considerations of any piece of
legislation that the United States Congress has dealt with in the
27½ years” he had served in the House. 152 Cong. Rec.
H5143 (July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). After
exhaustive evidence-gathering and deliberative process, Congress
reauthorized the VRA, including the coverage provision, with
overwhelming bipartisan support. It was the judgment of Congress
that “40 years has not been a sufficient amount of time to
eliminate the vestiges of discrimination following nearly 100 years
of disregard for the dictates of the 15th amendment and to ensure
that the right of all citizens to vote is protected as guaranteed
by the Constitution.” 2006 Reauthorization §2(b)(7),
120Stat. 577. That determination of the body empowered to enforce
the Civil War Amendments “by appropriate legislation”
merits this Court’s utmost respect. In my judgment, the Court
errs egregiously by overriding Congress’ decision.
* * *
For the reasons
stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.