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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
Nos. 10–930 and 11–218
_________________
CHARLES L. RYAN, PETITIONER
10–930
v.
ERNEST VALENCIA GONZALES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
TERRY TIBBALS, PETITIONER
11–218
v.
SEAN CARTER
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[January 8, 2013]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
These two cases present the question whether the
incompetence of a state prisoner requires suspension of the
prisoner’s federal habeas corpus proceedings. We hold that
neither 18 U. S. C. §3599 nor 18 U. S. C.
§4241 provides such a right and that the Courts of Appeals for
the Ninth and Sixth Circuits both erred in holding that district
courts must stay federal habeas proceedings when petitioners are
adjudged incompetent.
I
A
Ernest Valencia Gonzales was convicted by an
Arizona jury of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault,
first-degree burglary, and theft. The convictions arose from
Gonzales’ repeated stabbing of Darrel and Deborah Wagner in
front of their 7-year-old son during a burglary of the
Wagners’ home. Darrel Wagner died from the stabbing, while
Deborah Wagner survived but spent five days in intensive care. The
trial court sentenced Gonzales to death on the murder charge and to
various prison terms for the other crimes.
After exhausting state remedies, Gonzales filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court on
November 15, 1999. While the petition was pending, Gonzales’
appointed counsel moved to stay the proceedings, contending that
Gonzales was no longer capable of rationally communicating with or
assisting counsel. He argued that mental incompetence entitled
Gonzales to a stay under Ninth Circuit precedent. See
Rohan
v.
Woodford,
334 F.3d 803 (2003). In
Rohan, the Ninth Circuit held
that the federal statute guaranteeing state capital prisoners a
right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings, 21
U. S. C. §848(q)(4)(B) (2000 ed.) (now codified as
18 U. S. C. §3599(a)(2)), could not “be
faithfully enforced unless courts ensure that a petitioner is
competent,” 334 F. 3d, at 813.
Rohan thus
concluded that “where an incompetent capital habeas
petitioner raises claims that could potentially benefit from his
ability to communicate rationally, refusing to stay proceedings
pending restoration of competence denies him his statutory right to
assistance of counsel, whether or not counsel can identify with
precision the information sought.”
Id., at 819.
Applying
Rohan, the District Court denied
a stay after concluding that the claims properly before it were
record based or resolvable as a matter of law and thus would not
benefit from Gonzales’ input. The court found it unnec-essary
to determine whether Gonzales was incompetent, though it did find
that he possessed “at least a limited capacity for rational
communication.”
Gonzales v.
Schriro, 617 F.
Supp. 2d 849, 863 (Ariz. 2008).
Gonzales thereafter filed an emergency petition
for a writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit. While Gonzales’
petition was pending, the Ninth Circuit decided
Nash v.
Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048 (2009), which held that habeas
petitioners have a right to competence on appeal, even though
appeals are entirely record based.
Id., at 1050
(“While an appeal is record-based, that does not mean that a
habeas petitioner in a capital case is relegated to a nonexistent
role. Meaningful assistance of appellate counsel may require
rational communication between counsel and a habeas
petitioner”). Applying
Nash and
Rohan, the
court granted the writ of mandamus, concluding that even though
Gonzales’ “exhausted claims are record-based or legal
in nature, he is entitled to a stay pending a competency
determination” under 18 U. S. C. §3599.
In re Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242, 1244 (2010).
We granted certiorari to determine whether
§3599 provides a statutory right to competence in federal
habeas proceedings. 565 U. S. ___ (2012).
B
Sean Carter was convicted by an Ohio jury of
aggra-vated murder, aggravated robbery, and rape, and sentenced to
death for anally raping his adoptive grandmother, Veader Prince,
and stabbing her to death. After exhausting his state-court
appeals, Carter initiated federal habeas proceedings on March 19,
2002, in the Northern District of Ohio. Carter eventually filed a
third amended petition, along with a motion requesting a competency
determi-nation and a stay of the proceedings. The District Court
granted the motion.
Following several psychiatric evaluations and a
com-petency determination, the District Court found Carter
incompetent to assist counsel. Applying the Ninth Circuit’s
test in
Rohan, it determined that Carter’s assistance
was required to develop four of his exhausted claims. As a result,
the court dismissed his habeas petition without prejudice and
prospectively tolled the statute of limitations.
Carter v.
Bradshaw, 583 F. Supp. 2d 872, 884 (2008). The State
appealed.
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
“[f]ederal habeas petitioners facing the death penalty for
state criminal convictions do not enjoy a constitutional right to
competence.”
Carter v.
Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329,
332 (2011). It nevertheless located a statutory right to competence
in §4241, relying, in part, on this Court’s decision in
Rees v.
Peyton,
384 U.S.
312 (1966) (
per curiam) (
Rees
I ).[
1] 644
F. 3d, at 332
. The Sixth Circuit explained:
“By applying section 4241 to habeas
actions,
Rees addresses the situation where a habeas
petitioner awaiting the death penalty may seek to forego any
collateral attacks on his conviction or sentence, and defines a
statutory right for the petitioner to be competent enough to (1)
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against
him, and (2) assist properly in his defense.”
Id., at
333.
The court concluded that “[a]nytime a
capital habeas petitioner affirmatively seeks to forego his habeas
petition, whether by action or inaction, . . . a district
court may employ section 4241.”
Id., at 334.
The court therefore amended the District
Court’s judgment and ordered that Carter’s petition be
stayed in-definitely with respect to any claims that required his
assistance.
Id., at 336–337. Judge Rogers dissented,
arguing that there was no constitutional or statutory basis for the
court’s decision.
Id., at 337–342.
We granted certiorari to determine whether
§4241 provides a statutory right to competence in federal
habeas proceedings. 565 U. S. ___ (2012).
II
Both the Ninth and Sixth Circuits have
concluded that death row inmates pursuing federal habeas are
entitled to a suspension of proceedings when found incompetent. The
Ninth Circuit located this right in §3599, while the Sixth
Circuit located it in §4241. Neither section provides such a
right.
A
Section 3599(a)(2) guarantees federal habeas
petitioners on death row the right to federally funded
counsel.[
2] The statute
provides that petitioners who are “financially unable to
obtain adequate representation . . . shall be entitled to
the appointment of one or more attorneys.” Appointed
attorneys are required to have experience in death penalty
litigation, §§3599(b)–(d), and, once appointed, are
directed to “represent the defendant throughout every
subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings,”
§3599(e). The statute also gives district courts the power to
authorize funding for “investigative, expert, or other
services” as are “reasonably necessary for the
representation of the defendant.” §3599(f). But
§3599 does not direct district courts to stay proceedings when
habeas petitioners are found incompetent.[
3]
In addition to lacking any basis in the
statutory text, the assertion that the right to counsel implies a
right to competence is difficult to square with our constitutional
precedents. The right to counsel is located in the Sixth Amendment.
(“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.”) If the right to counsel carried with it an implied
right to competence, the right to competence at trial would flow
from the Sixth Amendment. But “[w]e have repeatedly and
consistently recognized that ‘the criminal trial of an
incompetent defendant violates
due
process,’ ” not the Sixth Amendment.
Cooper v.
Oklahoma,
517 U.S.
348, 354 (1996) (quoting
Medina v.
California,
505 U.S.
437, 453 (1992); emphasis added); see also
Drope v.
Missouri,
420 U.S.
162, 172 (1975) (“[T]he failure to observe procedures
adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or
convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due
process right to a fair trial” (citing
Pate v.
Robinson,
383 U.S.
375, 385 (1966))).
It stands to reason that the benefits flowing
from the right to counsel
at trial could be affected if an
incompe-tent defendant is unable to communicate with his attorney.
For example, an incompetent defendant would be unable to assist
counsel in identifying witnesses and deciding on a trial strategy.
For this reason, “[a] defendant may not be put to trial
unless he ‘ “has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding . . . [and] a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against
him.” ’ ”
Cooper,
supra,
at 354 (quoting
Dusky v.
United States,
362 U.S.
402 (1960) (
per curiam)). Notwithstanding the connection
between the right to competence at trial and the right to counsel
at trial, we have never said that the right to competence
derives from the right to counsel. We will not assume or
infer that Congress intended to depart from our precedents and
locate a right to competence in federal habeas proceedings within
the right to counsel. “We normally assume that, when Congress
enacts statutes, it is aware of relevant judicial precedent.”
Merck & Co. v.
Reynolds, 559 U. S. ___, ___
(2010) (slip op., at 12).
The Ninth Circuit located a statutory right to
competence in §3599. 623 F. 3d, at 1245 (citing
Rohan,
334 F.3d 803, and
Nash, 581 F. 3d 1048). Because
Rohan is the Ninth Circuit’s controlling precedent, we
briefly address that decision.
In
Rohan, a habeas petitioner asserted a
right to com-petency based both on the Due Process Clause and on 21
U. S. C. §848(q)(4)(B) (2000 ed.). After discussing
the history of the common law, which prohibited the indictment,
trial and execution of mentally incompetent defendants,[
4] the Court of Appeals stated that the
petitioner’s due process claim raised
“substantial” “constitutional ques-tions.”
Rohan, 334 F. 3d, at 814. This conclusion is puzzling
in light of the Ninth Circuit’s acknowledgment that there is
“no constitutional right to counsel on habeas,”
id., at 810 (citing
Murray v.
Giarratano,
492 U.S.
1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion)), and that “there is no
due process right to collateral review at all,” 334
F. 3d, at 810 (citing
United States v.
MacCollom,
426 U.S.
317, 323 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The Ninth Circuit was
simply incorrect in suggesting that, in this case, there might be a
constitutional concern—much less a “substantial”
one—raised by the petitioner’s due process claim.
Invoking the canon of constitutional avoidance,
the Ninth Circuit gave the petitioner the practical benefit of a
due process right to competence in federal habeas proceedings
through its interpretation of §848(q)(4)(B).[
5] 334 F. 3d, at 814. In analyzing that
statute, the
Rohan court relied on a Ninth Circuit en banc
opinion in
Calderon v.
United States Dist. Court for
Central Dist. of Cal.,
163 F.3d 530 (1998) (
Kelly V), overruled in unrelated
part,
Woodford v.
Garceau,
538
U.S. 202 (2003), which held that a prisoner’s
incompetence is grounds for equitably tolling the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) 1-year statute
of limitations for filing habeas petitions. The
Rohan court
purported to be bound by the “rationale” of
Kelly
V—that a prisoner’s incompetence could
“eviscerate the statutory right to counsel,”[
6]
Kelly V,
supra, at
541—and concluded that “[i]f a petitioner’s
statutory rights depend on his ability to communicate rationally,
compelling him to pursue relief while incompetent is no less an
infringement than dismissing his late petition.” 334
F. 3d, at 814.
We are not persuaded by the Ninth
Circuit’s assertion that a habeas petitioner’s mental
incompetency could “evis-cerate the statutory right to
counsel” in federal habeas proceedings. Given the
backward-looking, record-based nature of most federal habeas
proceedings, counsel can generally provide effective representation
to a habeas petitioner regardless of the petitioner’s
competence. Indeed, where a claim is “adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings,” 28 U. S. C.
§2254(d) (2006 ed.), counsel should, in most circumstances, be
able to identify whether the “adjudication . . .
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”
§2254(d)(1), without any evi-dence outside the record. See
Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011)
(slip op., at 9) (“[R]eview under [28 U. S. C.]
§2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state
court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. . . . This
backward-looking language requires an examination of the
state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the
record under review is limited to the record in existence at that
same time—
i.e., the record before the state
court”). Attorneys are quite capable of reviewing the
state-court record, identifying legal errors, and marshaling
relevant arguments, even without their clients’
assistance.
Rohan also cited
Rees I,
384 U.S.
312, in support of its conclusion. 334 F. 3d, at 815. In
Rees I, a state inmate on death row filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in District Court, alleging that the
state-court conviction violated his constitutional rights. 384
U. S., at 313. The District Court denied his petition, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Ibid. Shortly after Rees’
counsel filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, Rees
directed his counsel to withdraw the petition and to forgo any
further proceedings. Counsel advised the Court that he could not
accede to these instructions without a psychiatric evaluation of
Rees, because there was some doubt as to Rees’ mental
competency.
Ibid. In response, the Court directed the
District Court to determine Rees’ mental competence.
Id., at 313–314. After the District Court conducted a
hearing and found Rees incompetent, the Court issued a one-sentence
order directing that the petition for certiorari be “held
without action.”
Rees v.
Peyton, 386 U.S. 989
(1967) (
Rees II ).[
7] When Rees died several decades later, the Court
dismissed the petition.
Rees v.
Superintendent of Va.
State Penitentiary, 516 U.S. 802 (1995) (
Rees
III ).
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he
record in
Rees II shows that incompetence is grounds for
staying habeas proceedings.”
Rohan,
supra, at
815. This conclusion is unwarranted.
Rees I concerned
whether an incompetent habeas petitioner may withdraw his
certiorari petition, and it provides no clear answer even to that
question. Likewise, the unique, one-sentence order in
Rees
II offered no rationale for the decision to hold Rees’
petition. As a result,
Rees offers no support for federal
habeas petitioners seeking to stay district court proceedings or
for the Ninth Circuit’s opinions in
Rohan,
Nash, or this case.[
8]
Gonzales barely defends the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of §3599.[
9] He offers a single, halfhearted argument in
support of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion based on our statement
in
McFarland v.
Scott,
512 U.S.
849, 858 (1994), that “the right to counsel necessarily
includes a right for that counsel meaningfully to research and
present a defendant’s habeas claims.” But
McFarland was addressing whether a district court could
issue a
stay of execution after a capital prisoner had filed
a request for counsel but before he had filed his habeas petition.
Id., at 854–858. We held that a district court may
stay a capital prisoner’s execution once the prisoner has
invoked his statutory right to counsel.
Id., at 859.
McFarland has no relevance here where Gonzales is not
seeking a stay of execution, but rather a stay of the District
Court’s proceedings. Moreover, Gonzales moved for a stay more
than six years after initiating his habeas petition. This was
certainly ample time for his attorney to research and present the
claims.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
§3599 does not provide federal habeas petitioners with a
“statutory right” to competence.[
10]
B
The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion
as the Ninth Circuit but located the statutory right to competence
during habeas proceedings in 18 U. S. C. §4241.
Relying largely on
Rees I, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
§4241 provides a statutory right to competence. 644
F. 3d, at 333. But as discussed, Part II–A,
supra,
Rees I did not recognize a statutory right to
competence in federal ha-beas proceedings.[
11] Moreover, §4241 does not even apply to
such proceedings. Section 4241(a) provides:
“At any time after the commencement
of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the
defendant, or at any time after the commencement of probation or
supervised release and prior to the completion of the sentence, the
defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for
a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The
court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its
own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suf-fering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
By its own terms, §4241 applies only to
trial proceedings prior to sentencing and “at any time after
the commencement of probation or supervised release.” Federal
habeas proceedings, however, commence after sentencing, and federal
habeas petitioners, by definition, are incarcerated, not on
probation.
Furthermore, §4241, like the rest of Title
18 generally, applies exclusively to
federal defendants and
probationers subject to prosecution by the United States. Carter is
not, and does not claim to be, a federal defendant. Rather, he is a
state prisoner challenging the basis of his conviction in a
federal civil action. See
Blair v.
Martel, 645 F.3d
1151, 1155 (CA9 2011) (“By its own terms, §4241 does not
apply unless a federal criminal defendant is on trial or is
released on probation”).
Finally, §4241(a) authorizes the district
court to grant a motion for a competency determination if there is
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant’s mental
incompetence renders him “unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his
defense.” (Emphasis added.) See also
§4241(d).[
12] A habeas
proceeding under §2254, however, is not a “proceedin[g]
against” the habeas petitioner; this, on the other hand, is a
civil action
against the warden of the state prison. And, a
federal habeas petitioner does not mount a “defense” to
the government’s prosecution. Rather, the petitioner
collaterally attacks his conviction at an earlier state trial.
Accordingly, the statutory right to competence provided in
§4241 is simply inapplicable to federal habeas
proceedings.
We would address Carter’s arguments in
defense of the Sixth Circuit’s decision, but, there are none.
Carter’s brief informed us that “[t]his Court need not
consider the statutory argument with which the [petitioner’s]
brief begins—i.e., that there is no ‘statutory
right’ under 18 U. S. C. §4241 to be competent in habeas
proceedings.” Brief for Respondent in No. 11–218, p.
15. Apparently, Carter found the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning
indefensible. We agree.
III
Both Gonzales and Carter argued at length in
their briefs and at oral argument that district courts have the
equitable power to stay proceedings when they determine that habeas
petitioners are mentally incompetent.[
13] Neither petitioner disputes that “[d]istrict
courts . . . ordinarily have authority to issue stays, where such a
stay would be a proper exercise of discretion.”
Rhines
v.
Weber,
544 U.S.
269, 276 (2005) (citation omitted); see also
Enelow v.
New York Life Ins. Co.,
293 U.S.
379, 382 (1935) (explaining that a district court may stay a
case “pending before it by virtue of its inherent power to
control the progress of the cause so as to maintain the orderly
processes of justice”). Similarly, both petitioners agree
that “AEDPA does not deprive district courts of [this]
authority.”
Rhines,
supra, at 276. Petitioners
and respondents disagree, however, about the types of situations in
which a stay would be appropriate and about the permissible
duration of a competency-based stay. We do not presume that
district courts need unsolicited advice from us on how to manage
their dockets. Rather, the decision to grant a stay, like the
decision to grant an evidentiary hearing, is “generally left
to the sound discretion of district courts.”
Schriro
v.
Landrigan,
550 U.S.
465, 473 (2007). For pur-poses of resolving these cases, it is
unnecessary to determine the precise contours of the district
court’s discretion to issue stays. We address only its outer
limits.
A
In Gonzales’ case, the District Court
correctly found that all of Gonzales’ properly exhausted
claims were record based or resolvable as a matter of law,
irrespective of Gonzales’ competence.[
14] 617 F. Supp. 2d, at 863; see also
State v.
Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 509–515,
892 P.2d 838, 845–851 (1995) (adjudicating
Gonzales’ claims on the merits). The court therefore denied
Gonzales’ motion for a stay. The District Court did not abuse
its discretion in so holding, because a stay is not generally
warranted when a petitioner raises only record-based claims subject
to 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). As previously noted, review
of such claims “is limited to the record that was before the
state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”
Pin-holster, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).
Accordingly, any evidence that a petitioner might have would be
inadmis-sible.
Ibid. (“[T]he record under review is
limited to the record in existence at that same
time—
i.e., the record before the state court”).
Because federal habeas is “a ‘guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a
substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal,” the
types of errors redressable under §2254(d) should be apparent
from the record.
Harrington v.
Richter, 562
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 13) (quoting
Jackson v.
Virginia,
443 U.S.
307, 332, n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
Counsel can read the record.
B
In Carter’s case, the District Court
concluded that four of Carter’s claims could potentially
benefit from Carter’s assistance.[
15] However, three of these claims were adjudicated on
the merits in state postconviction proceedings and, thus, were
subject to review under §2254(d). See
State v.
Carter, No. 99–T–0133, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS
5935, *5–*13 (Dec. 15, 2000). Any extrarecord evidence that
Carter might have concerning these claims would therefore be
inadmissible.
Pinholster,
supra, at ___.
Consequently, these claims do not warrant a stay.
It is unclear from the record whether Carter
exhausted the fourth claim.[
16] If that claim was exhausted, it too would be record
based. But even if Carter could show that the claim was both
unexhausted and not procedurally defaulted,[
17] an indefinite stay would be inappropriate.
“AEDPA’s acknowledged purpose” is to
“ ‘reduc[e] delays in the execution of state and
federal criminal sentences.’ ”
Schriro,
supra, at 475 (quoting
Woodford, 538 U. S., at
206). “Staying a federal habeas petition frustrates
AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing a
petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal
proceedings.”
Rhines, 544 U. S., at 277. In the
context of discussing stay and abeyance procedures, we
observed:
“[N]ot all petitioners have an
incentive to obtain federal relief as quickly as possible. In
particular, capital petitioners might deliberately engage in
dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution
of the sentence of death. Without time limits [on stays],
petitioners could frustrate AEDPA’s goal of finality by
dragging out indefinitely their federal ha-beas review.”
Id., at 277–278.
The same principle obtains in the context of
competency-based stays. At some point, the State must be allowed to
defend its judgment of conviction.[
18]
If a district court concludes that the
petitioner’s claim could substantially benefit from the
petitioner’s assistance, the district court should take into
account the likelihood that the petitioner will regain competence
in the foreseeable future. Where there is no reasonable hope of
competence, a stay is inappropriate and merely frustrates the
State’s attempts to defend its presumptively valid
judgment.
IV
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
We vacate the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remand the case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
