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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 11–1327
_________________
LAMAR EVANS, PETITIONER
v. MICHIGAN
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
michigan
[February 20, 2013]
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the
Court.
When the State of Michigan rested its case at
petitioner Lamar Evans’ arson trial, the court entered a
directed verdict of acquittal, based upon its view that the State
had not provided sufficient evidence of a particular element of the
offense. It turns out that the unproven “element” was
not actually a required element at all. We must de- cide whether an
erroneous acquittal such as this nevertheless constitutes an
acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, which would mean that Evans
could not be retried. This Court has previously held that a
judicial acquittal premised upon a “misconstruction” of
a criminal statute is an “acquittal on the merits
. . . [that] bars retrial.”
Arizona v.
Rumsey,
467 U.S.
203, 211 (1984). Seeing no meaningful constitutional
distinction between a trial court’s
“misconstruction” of a statute and its erroneous
addition of a statutory element, we hold that a midtrial acquittal
in these circumstances is an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes
as well.
I
The State charged Evans with burning
“other real property,” a violation of Mich. Comp. Laws
§750.73 (1981). The State’s evidence at trial suggested
that Evans had burned down an unoccupied house. At the close of the
State’s case, however, Evans moved for a directed ver- dict
of acquittal. He pointed the court to the applicable Michigan
Criminal Jury Instructions, which listed as the
“Fourth” element of the offense “that the
building was not a dwelling house.” 3 Mich. Crim. Jury Instr.
§31.3, p. 31–7 (2d ed., Supp. 2006/2007). And the
commentary to the Instructions emphasized, “an essential
element is that the structure burned is
not a dwelling
house.”
Id., at 31–8. Evans argued that Mich.
Comp. Laws §750.72 criminal- izes common-law arson, which
requires that the structure burned be a dwelling, while the
provision under which he was charged, §750.73, covers all
other real property.[
1]
Persuaded, the trial court granted the motion. 491 Mich. 1, 8, 810
N.W.2d 535, 539 (2012). The court explained that the
“ ‘testimony [of the homeowner] was this was a
dwelling house,’ ” so the nondwelling requirement
of §750.73 was not met.
Ibid.
On the State’s appeal, the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded. 288 Mich. App. 410, 794 N.W.2d
848 (2010). Evans had conceded, and the court held, that under
controlling precedent, burning “other real property” is
a lesser included offense under Michigan law, and disproving the
greater offense is not required.
Id., at 416, 794 N. W.
2d, at 852 (citing
People v.
Antonelli, 66 Mich. App.
138, 140, 238 N.W.2d 551, 552 (1975) (on rehearing)).[
2] The court thus explained it was
“undisputed that the trial court misperceived the elements of
the offense with which [Evans] was charged and erred by directing a
verdict.” 288 Mich. App., at 416, 794 N. W. 2d, at
852. But the court rejected Evans’ argument that the Double
Jeopardy Clause barred retrial.
Id., at 421–422, 794
N. W. 2d, at 856.
In a divided decision, the Supreme Court of
Michigan affirmed. It held that “when a trial court grants a
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the basis of an
error of law that did not resolve any factual element of the
charged offense, the trial court’s ruling does not constitute
an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy and re- trial is
therefore not barred.” 491 Mich., at 4, 810 N. W. 2d, at
536–537.
We granted certiorari to resolve the
disagreement among state and federal courts on the question whether
retrial is barred when a trial court grants an acquittal be- cause
the prosecution had failed to prove an “element” of the
offense that, in actuality, it did not have to prove.[
3] 567 U. S. ___ (2012). We now
reverse.
II
A
In answering this question, we do not write on
a clean slate. Quite the opposite. It has been half a century since
we first recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial
following a court-decreed acquittal, even if the ac- quittal is
“based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.”
Fong Foo v.
United States,
369
U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (
per curiam). A mistaken acquittal
is an acquittal nonetheless, and we have long held that “[a]
verdict of acquittal . . . could not be reviewed, on
error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in
jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.”
United
States v.
Ball,
163 U.S.
662, 671 (1896).
Our cases have applied
Fong Foo’s
principle broadly. An acquittal is unreviewable whether a judge
directs a jury to return a verdict of acquittal,
e.g., Fong
Foo, 369 U. S., at 143, or forgoes that formality by
entering a judgment of acquittal herself. See
Smith v.
Massachusetts,
543 U.S.
462, 467–468 (2005) (collecting cases). And an acquittal
precludes retrial even if it is premised upon an erroneous decision
to exclude evidence,
Sanabria v.
United States,
437 U.S.
54, 68–69, 78 (1978); a mistaken understanding of what
evidence would suffice to sustain a conviction,
Smith, 543
U. S., at 473; or a “misconstruction of the stat-
ute” defining the requirements to convict,
Rumsey, 467
U. S., at 203, 211; cf.
Smalis v.
Pennsylvania,
476 U.S.
140, 144–145, n. 7 (1986). In all these
circumstances, “the fact that the acquittal may result from
erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of
governing legal principles affects the accuracy of that
determination, but it does not alter its essential
character.”
United States v.
Scott,
437 U.S.
82, 98 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Most relevant here, our cases have defined an
acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s
proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an
offense. See
ibid., and n. 11;
Burks v.
United States,
437 U.S.
1, 10 (1978);
United States v.
Martin Linen Supply
Co.,
430 U.S.
564, 571 (1977). Thus an “acquittal” includes
“a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to
convict,” a “factual finding [that] necessarily
establish[es] the criminal defendant’s lack of criminal
culpability,” and any other “rulin[g] which relate[s]
to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.”
Scott, 437 U. S., at 91, 98, and n. 11 (internal
quotation marks omitted). These sorts of substantive rulings stand
apart from procedural rulings that may also terminate a case
midtrial, which we generally refer to as dismissals or mistrials.
Procedural dismissals include rulings on questions that “are
unrelated to factual guilt or innocence,” but “which
serve other purposes,” including “a legal judgment that
a defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be
punished” because of some problem like an error with the
indictment.
Id., at 98, and n. 11.
Both procedural dismissals and substantive
rulings result in an early end to trial, but we explained in
Scott that the double jeopardy consequences of each differ.
“[T]he law attaches particular significance to an
acquittal,” so a merits-related ruling concludes proceedings
absolutely.
Id., at 91. This is because “[t]o permit a
second trial after an acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may
have been, would present an unacceptably high risk that the
Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the
defendant so that ‘even though innocent he may be found
guilty,’ ”
ibid. (quoting
Green v.
United States,
355 U.S.
184, 188 (1957)). And retrial following an acquittal would
upset a defendant’s ex- pectation of repose, for it would
subject him to additional “embarrassment, expense and
ordeal” while “compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity.”
Id., at 187. In
contrast, a “termination of the proceedings against [a
defendant] on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of
the offense of which he is accused,” 437 U. S.
,
at 98–99,
i.e., some procedural ground, does not pose
the same concerns, because no expectation of finality attaches to a
properly granted mistrial.
Here, “it is plain that the [trial court]
. . . evaluated the [State’s] evidence and
determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a
conviction.”
Martin Linen, 430 U. S., at 572. The
trial court granted Evans’ motion under a rule that requires
the court to “direct a verdict of acquittal on any charged
offense as to which the evidence is insufficient to support
conviction.” Mich. Rule Crim. Proc. 6.419(A) (2012). And the
court’s oral ruling leaves no doubt that it made its
determination on the basis of “ ‘[t]he
testimony’ ” that the State had presented. 491
Mich., at 8, 810 N. W. 2d, at 539. This ruling was not a
dismissal on a procedural ground “unrelated to factual guilt
or innocence,” like the question of “preindictment
delay” in
Scott, but rather a determination that the
State had failed to prove its case. 437 U. S., at 98, 99.
Under our precedents, then, Evans was acquitted.
There is no question the trial court’s
ruling was wrong; it was predicated upon a clear misunderstanding
of what facts the State needed to prove under State law. But that
is of no moment.
Martin Linen,
Sanabria,
Rumsey,
Smalis, and
Smith all instruct that an
acquittal due to insufficient evidence precludes retrial, whether
the court’s evaluation of the evidence was “correct or
not,”
Martin Linen, 430 U. S., at 571, and
regardless of whether the court’s decision flowed from an
incorrect antecedent ruling of law. Here Evans’ acquittal was
the product of an “erroneous interpretatio[n] of governing
legal principles,” but as in our other cases, that error
affects only “the accuracy of [the] determination” to
acquit, not “its essential character.”
Scott,
437 U. S., at 98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
B
The court below saw things differently. It
identified a “constitutionally meaningful difference”
between this case and our previous decisions. Those cases, the
court found, “involve[d] evidentiary errors regarding the
proof needed to establish a factual element of the . . .
crimes at issue,” but still ultimately involved “a
resolution regarding the sufficiency of the factual elements of the
charged offense.” 491 Mich., at 14–15, 810
N. W. 2d, at 542–543. When a court mistakenly
“identifie[s] an extraneous element and dismisse[s] the case
solely on that basis,” however, it has “not resolve[d]
or even address[ed] any factual element necessary to
establish” the offense.
Id., at 15, 20, 810
N. W. 2d, at 543, 546. As a result, the court below
reasoned, the case terminates “based on an error of law
unrelated to [the] defendant’s guilt or innocence on the
ele-ments of the charged offense,” and thus falls outside the
definition of an acquittal.
Id., at 21, 810
N. W. 2d, at 546.
We fail to perceive the difference. This case,
like our previous ones, involves an antecedent legal error that led
to an acquittal because the State failed to prove some fact it was
not actually required to prove. Consider
Rumsey. There the
trial court, sitting as sentencer in a capital case involving a
murder committed during a robbery, mistakenly held that
Arizona’s statutory aggravating factor describing killings
for pecuniary gain was limited to murders for hire. Accordingly, it
found the State had failed to prove the killing was for pecuniary
gain and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. After the
State successfully appealed and obtained a death sentence on
remand, we held that retrial on the penalty phase question was a
double jeopardy violation.[
4]
The only relevant difference between that
situation and this one is that in
Rumsey the trial
court’s error was called a “misinterpretation”
and a “misconstruction of the statute,” 467 U. S.,
at 207, 211, whereas here the error has been designated the
“erroneous addition of [an] extraneous element to the charged
offense.” 491 Mich., at 3–4, 810 N. W. 2d, at
536. But we have emphasized that labels do not control our analysis
in this context; rather, the substance of a court’s decision
does. See
Smalis, 476 U. S., at 144, n. 5;
Scott, 437 U. S., at 96–97;
Martin Linen,
430 U. S., at 571. The error in
Rumsey could just as
easily have been characterized as the erroneous addition of an
element of the statutory aggravating circumstance: that the
homicide be a murder-for-hire. Conversely, the error here could be
viewed as a misinterpretation of the statute’s phrase
“building or other real property” to exclude
dwellings.[
5] This is far too
fine a distinction to be meaningful, and we reject the notion that
a defendant’s constitutional rights would turn on the
happenstance of how an appellate court chooses to describe a trial
court’s error.
Echoing the Michigan Supreme Court, the State
and the United States, as well as the dissent, emphasize
Martin
Linen’s description of an acquittal as the
“resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual
elements of the
offense charged.” 430
U. S., at 571 (emphasis added); see Brief for Respondent
11–17; see Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae
11–15 (hereinafter U. S. Brief); see
post, at
6–8. They observe that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same
“offence,” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5, cl. 2, and
they note that an offense comprises constituent parts called
elements, which are facts that must be proved to sustain a
conviction. See,
e.g., United States v.
Dixon,
509 U.S.
688, 696–697 (1993). Consequently, they argue, only if an
actual element of the offense is resolved can it be said that there
has been an acquittal of the offense, because
“ ‘innocence of the charged offense’ cannot
turn on something that is concededly not an element of the
offense.” U. S. Brief 15. Because Evans’ trial
ended without resolution of even one actual element, they conclude,
there was no acquittal.
This argument reads
Martin Linen too
narrowly, and it is inconsistent with our decisions since then. Our
focus in
Martin Linen was on the significance of a judicial
acquittal under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29. The District Court in
that case had “evaluated the Government’s evidence and
determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a
con-viction.” 430 U. S., at 572. That determination of
nonculpability was enough to make the acquittal akin to a jury
verdict; our holding did not depend upon defining the
“elements” of the offense. As we have explained,
supra, at 5–6,
Scott confirms that the relevant
distinction is between judicial determinations that go to
“the criminal defendant’s lack of criminal
culpability,” and those that hold “that a defendant,
although criminally culpable, may not be punished because of a
supposed” procedural error. 437 U. S., at 98.
Culpability (
i.e., the “ultimate question of guilt or
innocence”) is the touchstone, not whether any particular
elements were resolved or whether the determination of
nonculpability was legally correct.
Id., at 98, n. 11
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Perhaps most inconsistent with the State’s
and United States’ argument is
Burks. There we held
that when a defendant raises insanity as a defense, and a court
decides the “Government ha[s] failed to come forward with
sufficient proof of [the defendant’s] capacity to be
responsible for criminal acts,” the defendant has been
acquitted because the court decided that “criminal
culpability ha[s] not been established.” 437 U. S., at
10. Lack of insanity was not an “element” of
Burks’ offense, bank robbery by use of a dangerous weapon.
See 18 U. S. C. §2113(d) (1976 ed.). Rather,
insanity was an affirmative defense to criminal liability. Our
conclusion thus depended upon equating a judicial acquittal with an
order finding insufficient evidence of culpability, not
insufficient evidence of any particular element of the
offense.[
6]
In the end, this case follows those that have
come before it. The trial court’s judgment of acquittal
resolved the question of Evans’ guilt or innocence as a
matter of the sufficiency of the evidence, not on unrelated
procedural grounds. That judgment, “however erroneous”
it was, precludes reprosecution on this charge, and so should have
barred the State’s appeal as well.
Sanabria, 437
U. S., at 69.
III
A
The State, supported by the United States,
offers three other reasons why the distinction drawn by the court
be- low should be maintained. None persuades us.
To start, the State argues that unless an actual
element of the offense is resolved by the trial court, the only way
to know whether the court’s ruling was an
“acquittal” is to rely upon the label used by the
court, which would wrongly allow the form of the trial
court’s action to control. Brief for Respondent 17–18,
21–22. We disagree. Our decision turns not on the form of the
trial court’s action, but rather whether it
“serve[s]” substantive “purposes” or
procedural ones.
Scott, 437 U. S., at 98, n. 11.
If a trial court were to announce, midtrial, “The defendant
shall be acquitted because he was prejudiced by preindictment
delay,” the Double Jeopardy Clause would pose no barrier to
reprosecution, notwithstanding the “acquittal” label.
Cf.
Scott,
437 U.S.
82. Here we know the trial court acquitted Evans, not because
it incanted the word “acquit” (which it did not), but
because it acted on its view that the prosecution had failed to
prove its case.
Next, the State and the United States fear that
if the grounds for an acquittal are untethered from the actual
elements of the offense, a trial court could issue an unreviewable
order finding insufficient evidence to convict for any reason at
all, such as that the prosecution failed to prove “that the
structure burned [was] blue.” Brief for Respondent
16–17; U. S. Brief 15. If the concern is that there is
no limit to the magnitude of the error that could yield an
acquittal, the response is that we have long held as much. See
supra, at 4. If the concern is instead that our holding will
make it easier for courts to insulate from review acquittals that
are granted as a form of nullifi- cation, see Brief for Respondent
30, n. 58, we reject the premise. We presume here, as in other
contexts, that courts exercise their duties in good faith. Cf.
Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011)
(slip op., at 13).
Finally, the State suggests that because Evans
induced the trial court’s error, he should not be heard to
complain when that error is corrected and the State wishes to retry
him. Brief for Respondent 32–33; cf.
id., at
5–9. But we have recognized that “most [judgments of
acquittal] re- sult from defense motions,” so “[t]o
hold that a defendant waives his double jeopardy protection
whenever a trial court error in his favor on a midtrial motion
leads to an acquittal would undercut the adversary assumption on
which our system of criminal justice rests, and would vitiate one
of the fundamental rights established by the Fifth
Amendment.”
Sanabria, 437 U. S., at 78 (citation
omitted).[
7] It is true that
when a defendant persuades the court to declare a mistrial,
jeopardy continues and retrial is generally allowed. See
United
States v.
Dinitz,
424 U.S.
600 (1976). But in such circumstances the defendant consents to
a disposition that contemplates reprosecution, whereas when a
defendant moves for acquittal he does not. See
Sanabria, 437
U. S., at 75.
The United States makes a related argument. It
contends that Evans could have asked the court to resolve whether
nondwelling status is an element of the offense before jeopardy
attached, so having elected to wait until trial was underway to
raise the point, he cannot now claim a double jeopardy violation.
U. S. Brief 22–25. The Government relies upon
Lee
v.
United States,
432 U.S.
23 (1977), in which the District Court dismissed an indictment
midtrial because it had failed to allege the required intent
element of the offense. We held that retrial on a corrected
indictment was not barred, because the dismissal was akin to a
mistrial, not an acquittal. This was clear because the District
Court had separately denied the defendant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal, explaining that the defendant
“ ‘has been proven [guilty] beyond any reasonable
doubt in the world,’ ” while acknowledging that
the error in the indictment required dismissal.
Id., at
26–27. Because the defendant “invited the court to
interrupt the proceedings before formalizing a finding on the
merits” by raising the indictment issue so late, we held the
principles governing a defendant’s consent to mistrial should
apply.
Id., at 28 (citing
Dinitz, 424 U. S.
600).
The Government suggests the situation here is
“functionally similar,” because “identifying the
elements of an offense is a necessary step in determining the
sufficiency of a charging document.” U. S. Brief 23. But
we can- not ignore the fact that what the trial court actually did
here was rule on the sufficiency of the State’s proof, not
the sufficiency of the information filed against him.
Lee
demonstrates that the two need not rise or fall together. And even
if the Government is correct that Evans could have challenged the
charging document on the same legal theory he used to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence, it matters that he made only the
latter motion, a motion that necessarily may not be made until
trial is underway. Evans cannot be penalized for requesting from
the court a ruling on the merits of the State’s case, as the
Michigan Rules entitled him to do; whether he could have also
brought a distinct procedural objection earlier on is beside the
point.
B
In the alternative, the State and the United
States ask us to reconsider our past decisions. Brief for
Respondent 34–56 (suggesting overruling our cases since at
least
Fong Foo); U. S. Brief 27–32 (suggesting
overruling
Smith,
Rumsey, and
Smalis).[
8] We declined
to revisit our cases when the United States made a similar request
in
Smalis. 476 U. S., at 144; see Brief for United
States as
Amicus Curiae in
Smalis v.
Pennsylvania, O. T. 1985, No. 85–227,
pp. 19–25. And we decline to do so here.
First, we have no reason to believe the existing
rules have become so “unworkable” as to justify
overruling precedent.
Payne v.
Tennessee,
501 U.S.
808, 827 (1991). The distinction drawn in
Scott has
stood the test of time, and we expect courts will continue to have
little “difficulty in distinguishing between those rulings
which relate to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence and
those which serve other purposes.” 437 U. S., at 98,
n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). See,
e.g.,
United States v.
Dionisio, 503 F.3d 78, 83–88
(CA2 2007) (collecting cases); 6 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King,
& O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure §25.3(a), p. 629 (3d ed.
2007) (same).
Second, the logic of these cases still holds.
There is no question that a jury verdict of acquittal precludes
retrial, and thus bars appeal of any legal error that may have led
to that acquittal. See
Ball, 163 U. S., at 671. So, had
the trial court here instructed the jury that it must find the
burned structure was not a dwelling in order to convict, the jury
would have acquitted Evans accordingly; “ ‘[a]
jury is presumed to follow its instructions.’ ”
Blueford v.
Arkansas, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012)
(slip op., at 6) (quoting
Weeks v.
Angelone,
528 U.S.
225, 234 (2000)). And that would have been the end of the
matter. From that premise,
Fong Foo’s holding follows:
If a trial court instead exercises its discretion to direct a jury
to return a verdict of acquittal, jeopardy also terminates
notwithstanding any legal error, because there too it is the jury
that returns an acquittal. And from there,
Martin
Linen’s conclusion is unavoidable: It should make no
difference whether the court employs the formality of directing the
jury to return an acquittal or whether the court enters an
acquittal itself.
Sanabria,
Rumsey,
Smalis,
and
Smith merely apply
Fong Foo and
Martin
Linen in tandem: If a trial court makes an antecedent legal
error (as in
Fong Foo), and then grants a judgment of
acquittal rather than directing the jury to acquit (as in
Martin
Linen), the result is an acquittal all the same.
In other words, there is no way for antecedent
legal errors to be reviewable in the context of judicial acquittals
unless those errors are also reviewable when they give rise to jury
acquittals (contrary to the settled understanding that a jury
verdict of acquittal is unreviewable), or unless we distinguish
between juries that acquit pursuant to their instructions and
judicial acquittals (notwithstand- ing that this is a purely formal
distinction). Neither option has become more attractive with time.
We therefore reiterate: “any contention that the Double
Jeopardy Clause must itself . . . leave open a way of
correcting legal errors is at odds with the well-established rule
that the bar will attach to a preverdict acquittal that is patently
wrong in law.”
Smith, 543 U. S., at 473.
Finally, the State and the United States object
that this rule denies the prosecution a full and fair opportunity
to present its evidence to the jury, while the defendant reaps a
“windfall” from the trial court’s unreviewable
error. Brief for Respondent 6; U. S. Brief 31–32. But
sovereigns are hardly powerless to prevent this sort of situation,
as we observed in
Smith, 543 U. S., at 474. Nothing
obligates a jurisdiction to afford its trial courts the power to
grant a midtrial acquittal, and at least two States disallow the
practice. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §175.381(1) (2011);
State
v.
Parfait, 96, 1814 (La. App. 1 Cir. 05/09/97), 693 So. 2d
1232, 1242. Many jurisdictions, including the federal system, allow
or encourage their courts to defer consideration of a motion to
acquit until after the jury returns a verdict, which mitigates
double jeopardy concerns.[
9]
See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29(b). And for cases such as this, in
which a trial court’s interpretation of the relevant criminal
statute is likely to prove dispositive, we see no reason why
jurisdictions could not provide for mandatory continuances or
expedited interlocutory appeals if they wished to prevent misguided
acquittals from being entered.[
10] But having chosen to vest its courts with the power
to grant midtrial acquittals, the State must bear the corresponding
risk that some acquittals will be granted in error.
* * *
We hold that Evans’ trial ended in an
acquittal when the trial court ruled the State had failed to
produce sufficient evidence of his guilt. The Double Jeopardy
Clause thus bars retrial for his offense and should have barred the
State’s appeal. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan
is
Reversed.