SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
STEVEN LEFEMINE, dba COLUMBIA CHRISTIANS FOR
LIFE
v. DAN WIDEMAN et al.
on petition for writ of certiorari to the
united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 12–168. Decided November 5, 2012
Per Curiam.
This case concerns the award of attorney’s fees
in a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct by government
officials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that a plaintiff who secured a permanent injunction
but no monetary damages was not a “prevailing party” under 42
U. S. C. §1988, and so could not receive fees. That was
error. Because the injunction ordered the defendant officials to
change their behavior in a way that directly benefited the
plaintiff, we vacate the Fourth Cir- cuit’s decision and remand for
further proceedings.
* * *
Petitioner Steven Lefemine and members of
Columbia Christians for Life (CCL) engage in demonstrations in
which they carry pictures of aborted fetuses to protest the
availability of abortions. On November 3, 2005, Lefemine and about
20 other CCL members conducted such a demonstration at a busy
intersection in Greenwood County, South Carolina. Citing complaints
about the graphic signs, a Greenwood County police officer informed
Lefemine that if the signs were not discarded, he would be ticketed
for breach of the peace. Lefemine objected, asserting that the
officer was violating his First Amendment rights, but the threat
eventually caused him to disband the protest. See
Lefemine
v.
Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617–619 (SC 2010).
A year later, an attorney for Lefemine sent a
letter to Dan Wideman, the sheriff of Greenwood County, informing
him that the group intended to return to the same site with the
disputed signs. The letter cautioned that further interference
would cause Lefemine “ ‘to pursue all avail- able legal
remedies.’ ”
Id., at 619. Chief Deputy Mike Frederick
responded that the police had not previously violated Lefemine’s
rights, and warned that “ ‘should we observe any protester or
demonstrator committing the same act, we will again conduct
ourselves in exactly the same manner: order the person(s) to stop
or face criminal sanctions.’ ”
Ibid. Out of fear of
those sanctions, the group chose not to protest in the county for
the next two years. See
ibid.
On October 31, 2008, Lefemine filed a complaint
under 42 U. S. C. §1983 against several Greenwood County
police officers alleging violations of his First Amendment rights.
Lefemine sought nominal damages, a declaratory judgment, a
permanent injunction, and attorney’s fees. See 732 F. Supp.
2d, at 620. Ruling on the parties’ dueling motions for summary
judgment, the District Court determined that the defendants had
infringed Lefemine’s rights. See
id., at 620–625. The court
therefore permanently enjoined the defendants “from engaging in
content-based restrictions on [Lefemine’s] display of graphic
signs” under similar circumstances.
Id., at 627. The court,
however, refused Lefemine’s request for nominal damages, finding
that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the
illegality of their conduct was not clearly established at the
time. See
ibid. The court as well denied Lefemine’s request
for attorney’s fees under §1988, stating that “[u]nder the totality
of the facts in this case the award of attorney’s fees is not
warranted.”
Ibid.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of
attorney’s fees on the ground that the District Court’s judgment
did not make Lefemine a “prevailing party” under §1988. 672 F.3d
292, 302–303 (2012).[
1] The
court reasoned that the relief awarded did not “ ‘alte[r] the
relative positions of the parties’ ”: The injunction
prohibited only “unlawful, but not legitimate, conduct by the
defendant[s],” and merely “ordered [d]efendants to comply with the
law and safeguard [Lefemine’s] constitutional rights in the future.
No other damages were awarded.”
Ibid. Lefemine sought a writ
of certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s determination that he
was not a prevailing party under §1988.
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of
1976, 90Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. §1988, allows “the prevailing
party” in certain civil rights actions, including suits brought
under §1983, to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” A plaintiff
“prevails,” we have held, “when actual relief on the merits of his
claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties
by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly
benefits the plaintiff.”
Farrar v.
Hobby,
506 U.S.
103, 111–112 (1992). And we have repeatedly held that an
injunction or declaratory judgment, like a damages award, will
usually satisfy that test. See,
e.g., Rhodes v.
Stewart,
488 U.S.
1, 4 (1988) (
per curiam).
Under these established standards, Lefemine was
a prevailing party. Lefemine desired to conduct demonstrations in
Greenwood County with signs that the defendant police officers had
told him he could not carry. He brought this suit in part to secure
an injunction to protect himself from the defendants’ standing
threat of sanctions. And he succeeded in removing that threat. The
District Court held that the defendants had violated Lefemine’s
rights and enjoined them from engaging in similar conduct in the
future. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s view, that ruling worked
the requisite material alteration in the parties’ relationship.
Before the ruling, the police intended to stop Lefemine from
protesting with his signs; after the ruling, the police could not
prevent him from demonstrating in that manner. So when the District
Court “ordered [d]efendants to comply with the law,” 672
F. 3d, at 303, the relief given—as in the usual case involving
such an injunction—supported the award of attorney’s fees.
Because Lefemine is a “prevailing party,” he
“should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust.”
Hensley v.
Eckerhart,
461 U.S.
424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of
the courts below addressed whether any special circumstances exist
in this case, and we do not do so; whether there may be other
grounds on which the police officers could contest liability for
fees is not a question before us. Accordingly, the petition for
certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Fourth Circuit is
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.