Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650 (2012)
Docket No.
11-1053
Decided:
May 29, 2012
Granted:
May 29, 2012
Opinions
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BRIAN COLEMAN, SUPERINTENDENT, STATE COR-
RECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT FAYETTE, et al. v. LORENZO
JOHNSON
on petition for writ of certiorari to the
united states court of appeals for the third circuit
No. 11–1053. Decided May 29,
2012
Per Curiam.
Respondent Lorenzo Johnson was convicted as an
accomplice and co-conspirator in the murder of Taraja Williams, who
was killed by a shotgun blast to the chest in the early morning
hours of December 15, 1995, in Har- risburg, Pennsylvania. After
his conviction was affirmed in state court, Johnson exhausted his
state remedies and sought a writ of habeas corpus in Federal
District Court pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254. The
District Court denied habeas relief but the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence
at trial was insufficient to support Johnson’s conviction
under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S.
307 (1979).
We have made clear that Jackson claims
face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are
subject to two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct
appeal, “it is the responsibility of the jury—not the
court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn from
evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the
jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if
no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.”
Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S.
1, ___ (2011) (per curiam) (slip op., at 1). And
second, on habeas review, “a federal court may not overturn a
state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state
court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court
decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S.
___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5)).
Because the Court of Appeals failed to afford
due respect to the role of the jury and the state courts of
Pennsylvania, we now grant certiorari and reverse the judgment
below.
* * *
The parties agree that Williams was shot and
killed by Corey Walker, who was subsequently convicted of
first-degree murder. Johnson was with Walker on the night of the
crime, and the two were tried jointly. Johnson was charged as an
accomplice and co-conspirator. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §2502
(2008) (defining first-degree murder as “willful, deliberate
and premeditated” killing); §306(c) (imposing accomplice
liability for anyone who, “with the intent of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense . . . aids or
agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or
committing it”); Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 598
Pa. 263, 274, 956 A.2d 926, 932 (2008) (criminal conspiracy
liability for anyone who takes an overt act in furtherance of a
crime he has agreed to abet or commit).
At trial, the Commonwealth called Victoria
Doubs, who testified that she, Johnson, and Walker were
“close friends” who “ran the streets
together.” Tr. 213. On the morning of December 14, the three
of them awoke at the same residence, bought marijuana, and then
went to a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, where they encountered
Williams. Walker announced that he was going to “holler
at” Williams about a debt Williams owed. Id., at 217.
According to Doubs, Walker and Williams “were talking about
the money that [Williams] had owed us,” with Walker
“asking [Williams], confronting him, about his money and
what’s up with the money and why is it taking you so long to
give us the money.” Id., at 217–218. Williams
was “cussing [Walker] out, telling him he’d give it to
him when he felt like it and he ain’t scared of
[Walker].” Id., at 218. A fight ensued, which ended
when Williams beat Walker with a broomstick in front of the crowd
of people that had gathered.
After the fight, Doubs testified, Walker
“was mad, because he got beat by a
crackhead. . . . He was saying, yo, that crackhead
beat me. I’m going to kill that crackhead. I’m going to
kill that kid. . . . He was hot. He was
heated.” Id., at 220–221. Johnson was present
when Walker made these statements. Later that afternoon, Doubs
recounted the beating to others, who laughed at Walker. Walker
“repeated it for a while that I’m going to kill that
kid. That kid must think I’m some type of joke. I’m
going to kill that kid. Who he think he is[?]” Id., at
222. Once again, Johnson was present for these statements.
Another witness was Carla Brown, a friend of the
victim, who testified that she was at the Midnight Special Bar on
the night of December 14–15, where she saw Walker, Johnson,
and Williams engaged in a heated argument. Although she could not
hear what they were saying, she could tell they were arguing
because they were making “a lot of arm movements.”
Id., at 104. The bouncer soon told them to leave, and Brown
followed them into the street because she “wanted to know
what was going on.” Ibid. Brown observed the three men
walking in a single-file line, with Walker in front, Williams in
the middle, and Johnson in the back. Walker was wearing a long
leather coat, walking as if he had something concealed underneath
it. Brown followed the three men to an alleyway, at which point
Williams recognized Brown and told her to “go ahead”
and pass. Id., at 107. Walker then entered the alleyway,
followed by Williams, while Johnson remained standing at the
entrance. As Brown walked past the alley, she heard a loud
“boom,” causing her to run away. Id., at 143. On
cross-examination, Brown stated: “They walked [Williams] in
that alley. He stood inside the alley. He walked him in the alley.
I heard a boom.” Ibid.
The Commonwealth also called Aaron Dews, who
testified that he was in a building bordering the alleyway at 12:45
a.m. on the morning of December 15. He heard a loud boom that
caused him to look out into the alley from his second-story window,
where he saw two silhouettes fleeing.
After Dews the Commonwealth called Brian Ramsey,
who had been selling cocaine on a nearby street corner at the time
of the murder. He testified that he saw Williams walking toward an
alleyway with two males and a female, and he heard a loud boom
shortly after Williams entered the alley. When pressed on
cross-examination, he stated: “I would say that [Williams]
was forced in that alley.” Id., at 189.
The jury also heard testimony from police who
searched the alley shortly after the murder and found a shotgun
with the barrel missing. A medical examiner who examined
Williams’ body testified that the cause of death was a
shotgun wound to the chest.
After the jury convicted Johnson, he filed a
post-trial motion arguing that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction. The court denied his motion, and the
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the conviction on direct
appeal. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 726 A.2d 1079
(1998). After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition
for review, Johnson unsuccessfully sought state postconviction
relief. He then filed a habeas petition in Federal District Court,
which denied his claims. See Johnson v. Mechling, 541
F. Supp. 2d 651 (MD Pa. 2008). Finally, Johnson appealed to the
Third Circuit, which reversed the District Court and ordered his
conviction overturned.
Under Jackson, evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” 443 U. S., at 319.
In light of the testimony at Johnson’s
trial, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “[a] trier of
fact could reasonably infer . . . that Johnson and Walker
shared a common intent to confront, threaten or harass
Williams.” Johnson v. Mechling, 446 Fed. Appx.
531, 540 (CA3 2011). As for the notion that “Johnson shared
Walker’s intent to kill Williams,” however, the court
concluded that was “mere speculation” that no rational
factfinder could accept as true. Ibid. The court stated that
“a reasonable inference is one where the fact inferred is
‘more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which
it is made to depend.’ ” Id., at
539–540 (quoting Commonwealth v. McFarland, 452
Pa. 435, 439, 308 A.2d 592, 594 (1973)). In order for a
jury’s inferences to be permissible, the court reasoned, they
must “ ‘flow from facts and circumstances proven
in the record’ ” that are “ ‘of
such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of
innocence.’ ” 446 Fed. Appx., at 539 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 560 (Pa.
Super. 2008)).
At the outset, we note that it was error for the
Court of Appeals to look to Pennsylvania law in determining what
distinguishes a reasoned inference from “mere
speculation.” Under Jackson, federal courts must look
to state law for “the substantive elements of the criminal
offense,” 443 U. S., at 324, n. 16, but the minimum
amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause requires to prove
the offense is purely a matter of federal law.
Under the deferential federal standard, the
approach taken by the Court of Appeals was flawed because it un-
duly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder.
Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what
inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring
only that jurors “draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts.” Id., at 319. This deferential
standard does not permit the type of fine-grained factual parsing
in which the Court of Appeals engaged. For example, in addressing
Brown and Ramsey’s testimony that Williams was
“walked” and “forced” into the alleyway,
the court objected that the witnesses did not describe any
“physical action” supporting the conclusion that force
was used. 446 Fed. Appx., at 541. Absent some specific testimony
that “Johnson actively pushed, shoved, ordered or otherwise
forced the victim into the alley, or prevented him from leaving
it,” ibid., the court could see no reason- able basis
for the jury’s conclusion that Johnson had a specific intent
to help kill Williams.
That analysis is flawed for two reasons. First,
the coercive nature of Johnson and Walker’s behavior could be
inferred from other circumstances not involving the direct use of
force: Walker was noticeably concealing a weapon, and he had been
heatedly threatening to kill Williams after a violent confrontation
earlier in the day. Johnson and Walker kept Williams between them
in a single-file line on the way to the alley, where Johnson stood
at the entrance while the other two entered, suggesting that
Johnson may have been prepared to prevent Williams from fleeing.
And second, even if Williams was not coerced into the alley, the
jury still could have concluded that Johnson helped lead or lure
him there to facilitate the murder.
Taken in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the trial testimony revealed that Johnson and Walker
“ran the streets together,” and had attempted to
collect a debt from Williams earlier on the day of the murder.
Williams resisted the collection, managing to humiliate Walker in
the process by giving him a public thrashing with a broomstick.
This enraged Walker to the point that he repeatedly declared over
the course of the day in Johnson’s presence that he intended
to kill Williams. Then, while Walker was noticeably concealing a
bulky object under his trenchcoat, Johnson helped escort Williams
into an alley, where Johnson stood at the entryway while Walker
pulled out a shotgun and shot Williams in the chest.
On the basis of these facts, a rational jury
could infer that Johnson knew that Walker was armed with a shotgun;
knew that he intended to kill Williams; and helped usher Williams
into the alleyway to meet his fate. The jury in this case was
convinced, and the only question under Jackson is whether
that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of
bare rationality. The state court of last review did not think so,
and that determination in turn is entitled to considerable
deference under AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. §2254(d).
Affording due respect to the role of the jury
and the state courts, we conclude that the evidence at
Johnson’s trial was not nearly sparse enough to sustain a due
process challenge under Jackson. The evidence was sufficient
to convict Johnson as an accomplice and a co-conspirator in the
murder of Taraja Williams. The Commonwealth’s petition for
certiorari and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis are
granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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