Freeman, et al. v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,
Annotate this Case
566 U.S. 624 (2012)
A provision of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2607(b), prohibited giving and accepting "any portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement service... other than for services actually performed." Petitioners, three couples who obtained mortgage loans from respondent, filed separate state-court actions, alleging that respondent had violated section 2607(b) by charging them fees for which no services were provided in return. At issue was whether, to establish a violation of section 2607(b), a plaintiff must demonstrate that a charge was divided between two or more persons. The Court held that, in order to establish a violation of section 2607(b), a plaintiff must demonstrate that a charge for settlement services was divided between two or more persons. Because petitioners did not contend that respondent split the challenged charges with anyone else, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of respondent. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
- Syllabus |
- Opinion (Antonin Scalia)
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FREEMAN et al. v. QUICKEN LOANS, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
No. 10–1042. Argued February 21, 2012—Decided May 24, 2012
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), provides, as relevant here, that “[n]o person shall give and no person shall accept any portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement service . . . other than for services actually performed.” 12 U. S. C. §2607(b). Petitioners, three couples who obtained mortgage loans from respondent, filed separate state-court actions, alleging that respondent had violated §2607(b) by charging them fees for which no services were provided in return. After the cases were removed to federal court and consolidated, respondent sought summary judgment, arguing that petitioners’ claims were not cognizable under §2607(b) because the allegedly unearned fees were not split with another party. The District Court agreed; and because petitioners had not alleged any splitting of fees, it granted respondent summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Held: In order to establish a violation of §2607(b), a plaintiff must demonstrate that a charge for settlement services was divided between two or more persons. Pp. 3–13.
(a) Section 2607(b) unambiguously covers only a settlement-service provider’s splitting of a fee with one or more other persons; it cannot be understood to reach a single provider’s retention of an unearned fee. Pp. 3–11.
(1) Section 2607(b) clearly describes two distinct exchanges. First, a “charge” is “made” to or “received” from a consumer by a settlement-service provider. That provider then “give[s],” and another person “accept[s],” a “portion, split, or percentage” of the charge. Congress’s use of different sets of verbs, with distinct tenses, to distinguish between the consumer-provider transaction and the fee-sharing one would be pointless if, as petitioners contend, the two transactions could be collapsed into one. Their reading—that a settlement-service provider can “make” a charge and then “accept” the portion of the charge consisting of 100 percent—does not avoid collapsing the sequential relationship of the two stages and would destroy the tandem character of activities that the text envisions at stage two (i.e., a giving and accepting). And if the consumer were the person who “give[s]” a “portion, split, or percentage” of the charge to the provider who “accepts” it, consumers would become lawbreakers themselves. Pp. 3–8.
(2) The normal usage of the terms “portion,” “split,” and “percentage”—which, when referring to a portion or percentage of a whole, usually mean less than 100 percent—reinforces the conclusion that §2607(b) does not apply where a settlement-service provider retains the entirety of a fee received from a consumer. The meaning is also confirmed by the “commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis, which counsels that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285 . This connation is not undermined by the canon against surplusage. “Portion,” “split,” and “percentage” may all mean the same thing, but the canon merely favors that interpretation which avoids surplusage, see Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564 U. S. ___, ___, and petitioners’ interpretation no more achieves that end than the Court’s does. Pp. 8–11.
(b) Petitioners’ arguments in favor of their contrary interpretation are unpersuasive. Section 2607(b), as interpreted here, is not rendered surplusage by §2607(a)’s express prohibition of kickbacks, for each subsection reaches conduct that the other does not. RESPA’s gen- eral purpose—to protect consumers from “certain abusive practices,” §2601(a)—also provides no warrant for expanding §2607(b)’s pro- hibition beyond the field to which it is unambiguously limited: the splitting of fees paid for settlement services. And giving §2607(b) its natural meaning would not lead to absurd results. Pp. 11–13.
626 F. 3d 799, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.