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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 11–159
_________________
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY, PETITIONER
v. KAREN K. CAPATO, on behalf of
B. N. C., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit
[May 21, 2012]
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Karen and Robert Capato married in 1999. Robert
died of cancer less than three years later. With the help of in
vitro fertilization, Karen gave birth to twins 18 months after her
husband’s death. Karen’s application for Social Security survivors
benefits for the twins, which the Social Security Administration
(SSA) denied, prompted this lit-igation. The technology that made
the twins’ conception and birth possible, it is safe to say, was
not contemplated by Congress when the relevant provisions of the
Social Security Act (Act) originated (1939) or were amended to read
as they now do (1965).
Karen Capato, respondent here, relies on the
Act’s initial definition of “child” in 42 U. S. C.
§416(e): “ ‘[C]hild’ means . . . the child or
legally adopted child of an [insured] individual.” Robert was an
insured individual, and the twins, it is uncontested, are the
biological children of Karen and Robert. That satisfies the Act’s
terms, and no further inquiry is in order, Karen maintains. The
SSA, however, identifies subsequent provisions, §§416(h)(2) and
(h)(3)(C), as critical, and reads them to entitle biological
children to benefits only if they qualify for inheritance from the
decedent under state intestacy law, or satisfy one of the statutory
alternatives to that requirement.
We conclude that the SSA’s reading is better
attuned to the statute’s text and its design to benefit primarily
those supported by the deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime.
And even if the SSA’s longstanding interpretation is not the only
reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction that
garners the Court’s respect under
Chevron U. S. A.
Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467
U.S. 837 (1984).
I
Karen Capato married Robert Capato in May
1999. Shortly thereafter, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal
cancer and was told that the chemotherapy he required might render
him sterile. Because the couple wanted children, Robert, before
undergoing chemotherapy, deposited his semen in a sperm bank, where
it was frozen and stored. Despite Robert’s aggressive treatment
regime, Karen conceived naturally and gave birth to a son in August
2001. The Capatos, however, wanted their son to have a sibling.
Robert’s health deteriorated in late 2001, and
he died in Florida, where he and Karen then resided, in March 2002.
His will, executed in Florida, named as beneficiaries the son born
of his marriage to Karen and two children from a previous marriage.
The will made no provision for children conceived after Robert’s
death, although the Capatos had told their lawyer they wanted
future offspring to be placed on a par with existing children.
Shortly after Robert’s death, Karen began in vitro fertilization
using her husband’s frozen sperm. She conceived in January 2003 and
gave birth to twins in September 2003, 18 months after Robert’s
death.
Karen Capato claimed survivors insurance
benefits on behalf of the twins. The SSA denied her application,
and the U. S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
affirmed the agency’s decision. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a
(decision of the Administrative Law Judge);
id., at 15a
(District Court opinion). In accord with the SSA’s construction of
the statute, the District Court determined that the twins would
qualify for benefits only if, as §416(h)(2)(A) specifies, they
could inherit from the deceased wage earner under state intestacy
law. Robert Capato died domiciled in Florida, the court found.
Under that State’s law, the court noted, a child born posthu-mously
may inherit through intestate succession only if conceived during
the decedent’s lifetime.
Id., at 27a–28a.[
1]
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed. Under §416(e), the appellate court concluded, “the
undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and his
widow” qualify for survivors benefits without regard to state
intestacy law. 631 F.3d 626, 631 (2011).[
2] Courts of Appeals have divided on the statutory
interpretation question this case presents. Compare
ibid.
and
Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart,
371 F.3d 593, 596–597 (CA9 2004) (biological but posthumously
conceived child of insured wage earner and his widow qualifies for
benefits), with
Beeler v.
Astrue, 651 F.3d 954,
960–964 (CA8 2011), and
Schafer v.
Astrue, 641 F.3d
49, 54–63 (CA4 2011) (posthumously conceived child’s qualification
for benefits depends on intestacy law of State in which wage earner
was domiciled). To resolve the conflict, we granted the
Commissioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
565 U. S. ___ (2011).
II
Congress amended the Social Security Act in
1939 to provide a monthly benefit for designated surviving fam- ily
members of a deceased insured wage earner. “Child’s insurance
benefits” are among the Act’s family-protective measures. 53Stat.
1364, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §402(d). An applicant
qualifies for such benefits if she meets the Act’s definition of
“child,” is unmarried, is below specified age limits (18 or 19) or
is under a disability which began prior to age 22, and was
dependent on the insured at the time of the insured’s death.
§402(d)(1).[
3]
To resolve this case, we must decide whether the
Capato twins rank as “child[ren]” under the Act’s definitional
provisions. Section 402(d) provides that “[e]very child (as defined
in section 416(e) of this title)” of a deceased insured individual
“shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit.” Section 416(e),
in turn, states: “The term ‘child’ means (1) the child or legally
adopted child of an individ-ual, (2) a stepchild [under certain
circumstances], and (3) . . . the grandchild or
stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse [who meets certain
conditions].”
The word “child,” we note, appears twice in
§416(e)’s opening sentence: initially in the prefatory phrase,
“[t]he term ‘child’ means . . . ,” and, immediately
thereafter, in subsection (e)(1) (“child or legally adopted
child”), deline-ating the first of three beneficiary categories.
Unlike §§416(e)(2) and (3), which specify the circumstances under
which stepchildren and grandchildren qualify for benefits,
§416(e)(1) lacks any elaboration. Compare §416(e)(1) (referring
simply to “the child . . . of an individual”) with,
e.g., §416(e)(2) (applicant must have been a stepchild for
at least nine months before the insured individual’s death).
A subsequent definitional provision further
addresses the term “child.” Under the heading “Determination of
family status,” §416(h)(2)(A) provides: “In determining whether an
applicant is the child or parent of [an] insured individual for
purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security
shall apply [the intestacy law of the insured individual’s
domiciliary State].”[
4]
An applicant for child benefits who does not
meet §416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy-law criterion may nonetheless
qualify for benefits under one of several other criteria the Act
prescribes. First, an applicant who “is a son or daughter” of an
insured individual, but is not determined to be a “child” under the
intestacy-law provision, nevertheless ranks as a “child” if the
insured and the other parent went through a marriage ceremony that
would have been valid but for certain legal impediments.
§416(h)(2)(B). Further, an applicant is deemed a “child” if, before
death, the insured acknowledged in writing that the applicant is
his or her son or daughter, or if the insured had been decreed by a
court to be the father or mother of the applicant, or had been
ordered to pay child support. §416(h)(3)(C)(i). In addition, an
applicant may gain “child” status upon proof that the insured
individual was the applicant’s pa- rent and “was living with or
contributing to the support of the applicant” when the insured
individual died. §416(h)(3)(C)(ii).[
5]
The SSA has interpreted these provisions in
regulations adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The
regulations state that an applicant may be entitled to benefits “as
a natural child, legally adopted child, stepchild, grandchild,
stepgrandchild, or equitably adopted child.” 20 CFR §404.354.
Defining “[w]ho is the insured’s natural child,” §404.355, the
regulations closely track 42 U. S. C. §§416(h)(2)
and (h)(3). They state that an applicant may qualify for insurance
benefits as a “natural child” by meeting any of four conditions:
(1) the applicant “could inherit the insured’s personal property as
his or her natural child under State inheritance laws”; (2) the
applicant is “the insured’s natural child and [his or her parents]
went through a ceremony which would have resulted in a valid
marriage between them except for a legal impediment”; (3) before
death, the insured acknowledged in writing his or her parentage of
the applicant, was decreed by a court to be the applicant’s parent,
or was ordered by a court to contribute to the applicant’s support;
or (4) other evidence shows that the insured is the applicant’s
“natural father or mother” and was either living with, or
contributing to the support of, the applicant. 20 CFR
§404.355(a) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As the SSA reads the statute, 42
U. S. C. §416(h) governs the meaning of “child” in
§416(e)(1). In other words, §416(h) is a gateway through which all
applicants for in-surance benefits as a “child” must pass. See
Beeler, 651 F. 3d, at 960 (“The regulations make clear
that the SSA interprets the Act to mean that the provisions of
§416(h) are the exclusive means by which an applicant can establish
‘child’ status under §416(e) as a natural child.”).[
6]
III
Karen Capato argues, and the Third Circuit
held, that §416(h), far from supplying the governing law, is
irrelevant in this case. Instead, the Court of Appeals determined,
§416(e) alone is dispositive of the controversy. 631 F. 3d, at
630–631. Under §416(e), “child” means “child of an [insured]
individual,” and the Capato twins, the Third Circuit observed,
clearly fit that definition: They are undeniably the children of
Robert Capato, the insured wage earner, and his widow, Karen
Capato. Section 416(h) comes into play, the court reasoned, only
when “a claimant’s status as a deceased wage-earner’s child is in
doubt.”
Id., at 631. That limitation, the court suggested,
is evident from §416(h)’s caption: “Determination of family
status.” Here, “there is no family status to determine,” the court
said,
id., at 630, so §416(h) has no role to play.
In short, while the SSA regards §416(h) as
completing §416(e)’s sparse definition of “child,” the Third
Circuit considered each subsection to control different situations:
§416(h) governs when a child’s family status needs to be
determined; §416(e), when it does not. When is there no need to
determine a child’s family status? The answer that the Third
Circuit found plain: whenever the claimant is “the biological child
of a married couple.”
Id., at 630.[
7]
We point out, first, some conspicuous flaws in
the Third Circuit’s and respondent Karen Capato’s reading of the
Act’s provisions, and then explain why we find the SSA’s
interpretation persuasive.
A
Nothing in §416(e)’s tautological definition
(“ ‘child’ means . . . the child . . . of
an individual”) suggests that Congress understood the word “child”
to refer only to the children of married parents. The dictionary
definitions offered by respondent are not so confined. See
Webster’s New International Dictionary 465 (2d ed. 1934) (defining
“child” as,
inter alia, “[i]n
Law, legitimate
offspring; also, sometimes, esp. in wills, an adopted child, or an
illegitimate offspring, or any direct descendant, as a grandchild,
as the intention may appear”); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 214 (11th ed. 2003) (“child” means “son or daughter,” or
“descendant”). See also Restatement (Third) of Property §2.5(1)
(1998) (“[a]n individual is the child of his or her genetic
parents,” and that may be so “whether or not [the parents] are
married to each other”). More-over, elsewhere in the Act, Congress
expressly limited the category of children covered to offspring of
a marital union. See §402(d)(3)(A) (referring to the “legitimate
. . . child” of an individual). Other contemporaneous
statutes similarly differentiate child of a marriage (“legitimate
child”) from the unmodified term “child.” See,
e.g.,
Servicemen’s Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, ch. 443, §120,
56Stat. 385 (defining “child” to include “legitimate child,” “child
legally adopted,” and, under certain conditions, “stepchild” and
“illegitimate child” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Nor does §416(e) indicate that Congress intended
“biological” parentage to be prerequisite to “child” status under
that provision. As the SSA points out, “[i]n 1939, there was no
such thing as a scientifically proven biological relationship
between a child and a father, which is . . . part of the
reason that the word ‘biological’ appears nowhere in the Act.”
Reply Brief 6. Notably, a biological parent is not necessarily a
child’s parent under law. Ordinarily, “a parent-child relationship
does not exist between an adoptee and the adoptee’s genetic
parents.” Uniform Probate Code §2–119(a), 8 U. L. A. 55
(Supp. 2011) (amended 2008). Moreover, laws directly addressing use
of today’s assisted reproduction technology do not make biological
parentage a universally determinative criterion. See,
e.g.,
Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §7613(b) (West Supp. 2012) (“The donor of semen
. . . for use in artificial insemination or in vitro
fertilization of a woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in
law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived, unless otherwise agreed to in a writing signed by the
donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child.”); Mass.
Gen. Laws, ch. 46, §4B (West 2010) (“Any child born to a married
woman as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of
her husband, shall be considered the legitimate child of the mother
and such husband.”).
We note, in addition, that marriage does not
ever and always make the parentage of a child certain, nor does the
absence of marriage necessarily mean that a child’s parentage is
uncertain. An unmarried couple can agree that a child is theirs,
while the parentage of a child born during a marriage may be
uncertain. See Reply Brief 11 (“Respondent errs in treating
‘marital’ and ‘undisputed’ as having the same meaning.”).
Finally, it is far from obvious that Karen
Capato’s proposed definition—“biological child of married parents,”
see Brief for Respondent 9—would cover the posthumously conceived
Capato twins. Under Florida law, a marriage ends upon the death of
a spouse. See
Price v.
Price, 114 Fla. 233, 235, 153
So. 904, 905 (1934). If that law applies, rather than a
court-declared preemptive federal law, the Capato twins, conceived
after the death of their father, would not qualify as
“marital” children.[
8]
B
Resisting the importation of words not found
in §416(e)—“child” means “the biological child of married parents,”
Brief for Respondent 9—the SSA finds a key textual cue in
§416(h)(2)(A)’s opening instruction: “In determining whether an
applicant is the child . . . of [an] insured individual
for purposes of this subchapter,” the Commissioner shall
apply state intestacy law. (Emphasis added.) Respondent notes the
absence of any cross-reference in §416(e) to §416(h). Brief for
Respondent 18. She overlooks, however, that §416(h) provides the
crucial link. The “subchapter” to which §416(h) refers is
Subchapter II of the Act, which spans §§401 through 434. Section
416(h)’s reference to “this subchapter” thus includes both §§402(d)
and 416(e). Having explicitly complemented §416(e) by the
definitional provisions contained in §416(h), Congress had no need
to place a redundant cross-reference in §416(e). See
Schafer, 641 F. 3d, at 54 (Congress, in §416(h)(2)(A),
provided “plain and explicit instruction on how the determination
of child status should be made”; on this point, the statute’s text
“could hardly be more clear.”).
The original version of today’s §416(h) was
similarly drafted. It provided that, “[i]n determining whether an
applicant is the . . . child . . . of [an]
insured individual
for purposes of sections 401–409 of this
title, the Board shall apply [state intestacy law].” 42 U. S. C.
§409(m) (1940 ed.) (emphasis added). Sections 401–409 embraced
§§402(c) and 409(k), the statutory predecessors of 42
U. S. C. §§402(d) and 416(e) (2006 ed.),
respectively.
Reference to state law to determine an
applicant’s status as a “child” is anything but anomalous. Quite
the opposite. The Act commonly refers to state law on matters of
family status. For example, the Act initially defines “wife” as
“the wife of an [insured] individual,” if certain conditions are
satisfied. §416(b). Like §416(e), §416(b) is, at least in part,
tautological (“ ‘wife’ means the [insured’s] wife”). One must
read on, although there is no ex-press cross-reference, to §416(h)
(rules on “[d]etermination of family status”) to complete the
definition. Section §416(h)(1)(A) directs that, “
for purposes of
this subchapter,” the law of the insured’s domicile determines
whether “[the] applicant and [the] insured individual were validly
married,” and if they were not, whether the applicant would
nevertheless have “the same status” as a wife under the State’s
intestacy law. (Emphasis added.) The Act similarly defines the
terms “widow,” “husband,” and “widower.” See §§416(c), (f), (g),
(h)(1)(A).
Indeed, as originally enacted, a single
provision mandated the use of state intestacy law for “determining
whether an applicant is the wife, widow, child, or parent of [an]
insured individual.” 42 U. S. C. §409(m) (1940 ed.). All
wife, widow, child, and parent applicants thus had to satisfy the
same criterion. To be sure, children born during their parents’
marriage would have readily qualified under the 1939 formulation
because of their eligibility to inherit under state law. But
requiring all “child” ap-plicants to qualify under state intestacy
law installed a simple test, one that ensured benefits for persons
plainly within the legislators’ contemplation, while avoiding
con-gressional entanglement in the traditional state-law realm of
family relations.
Just as the Act generally refers to state law to
determine whether an applicant qualifies as a wife, widow, husband,
widower, 42 U. S. C. §416(h)(1) (2006 ed.), child or
parent, §416(h)(2)(A), so in several sections (§§416(b), (c),
(e)(2), (f), (g)), the Act sets duration-of-relationship
limitations. See
Weinberger v.
Salfi,
422 U.S.
749, 777–782 (1975) (discussing §416(e)(2)’s requirement that,
as a check against deathbed marriages, a parent-stepchild
relationship must exist “not less than nine months immediately
preceding [insured’s death]”). Time limits also qualify the
statutes of several States that accord inheritance rights to
posthumously conceived children. See Cal. Prob. Code Ann. §249.5(c)
(West Supp. 2012) (allowing inheritance if child is in utero within
two years of parent’s death); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §15–11–120(11)
(2011) (child in utero within three years or born within 45
months); Iowa Code Ann. §633.220A(1) (West Supp. 2012) (child born
within two years); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:391.1(A) (West 2008)
(child born within three years); N. D. Cent. Code Ann.
§30.1–04–19(11) (Lexis 2001) (child in utero within three years or
born within 45 months). See also Uniform Probate Code §2–120(k), 8
U. L. A. 58 (Supp. 2011) (treating a posthumously
conceived child as “in gestation at the individual’s death,” but
only if specified time limits are met). No time constraints attend
the Third Circuit’s ruling in this case, under which the biological
child of married parents is eligible for survivors benefits, no
matter the length of time between the father’s death and the
child’s conception and birth. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37 (counsel
for Karen Capato acknowledged that, under the preemptive federal
rule he advocated, and the Third Circuit adopted, a child born four
years after her father’s death would be eligible for benefits).
The paths to receipt of benefits laid out in the
Act and regulations, we must not forget, proceed from Congress’
perception of the core purpose of the legislation. The aim was not
to create a program “generally benefiting needy persons”; it was,
more particularly, to “provide . . . dependent members of
[a wage earner’s] family with protection against the hardship
occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.”
Califano v.
Jobst,
434 U.S.
47, 52 (1977). We have recognized that “where state intestacy
law provides that a child may take personal property from a
father’s estate, it may reasonably be thought that the child will
more likely be dependent during the parent’s life and at his
death.”
Mathews v.
Lucas,
427
U.S. 495, 514 (1976). Reliance on state intestacy law to
determine who is a “child” thus serves the Act’s driving objective.
True, the intestacy criterion yields benefits to some children
outside the Act’s central concern. Intestacy laws in a number of
States, as just noted, do provide for inheritance by posthumously
conceived children, see
supra, at 12,[
9] and under federal law, a child conceived
shortly before her father’s death may be eligible for benefits even
though she never actually received her father’s support. It was
nonetheless Congress’ prerogative to legislate for the generality
of cases. It did so here by employing eligibility to inherit under
state intestacy law as a workable substitute for bur-densome
case-by-case determinations whether the child was, in fact,
dependent on her father’s earnings.
Respondent argues that on the SSA’s reading,
natural children alone must pass through a §416(h) gateway. Adopted
children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and step-grandchildren, it
is true, are defined in §416(e), and are not further defined in
§416(h). Respondent overlooks, however, that although not touched
by §416(h), beneficiaries described in §§416(e)(2) and (e)(3) must
meet
other statutorily prescribed criteria. In short, the
Act and regulations set
different eligibility requirements
for adopted children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and
stepgrandchildren, see 20 CFR §§404.356–404.358, but it hardly
follows that applicants in those categories are treated more
advantageously than are children who must meet a §416(h)
criterion.
The SSA’s construction of the Act, respondent
charges, raises serious constitutional concerns under the equal
pro-tection component of the Due Process Clause. Brief for
Respondent 42; see
Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S.
636, 638, n. 2 (1975). She alleges: “Under the government’s
interpretation . . . , posthumously conceived
children are treated as an inferior subset of natural children who
are ineligible for government benefits simply because of their date
of birth and method of conception.” Brief for Respondent 42–43.
Even the Courts of Appeals that have accepted
the reading of the Act respondent advances have rejected this
argument. See 631 F. 3d, at 628, n. 1 (citing
Vernoff v.
Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1112 (CA9 2009)).
We have applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to laws
“burden[ing] illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the
illicit relations of their parents, because ‘visiting this
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and
unjust.’ ”
Clark v.
Jeter,
486 U.S.
456, 461 (1988) (quoting
Weber v.
Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.,
406
U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). No showing has been made that
posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that
prompted our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children
of unwed parents. We therefore need not decide whether heightened
scrutiny would be appropriate were that the case.[
10] Under rational-basis review, the regime
Congress adopted easily passes inspection. As the Ninth Circuit
held, that regime is “reasonably related to the government’s twin
interests in [reserving] benefits [for] those children who have
lost a parent’s support, and in using reasonable presumptions to
minimize the administrative burden of proving dependency on a
case-by-case basis.”
Vernoff, 568 F. 3d, at 1112
(citing
Mathews, 427 U. S., at 509).
IV
As we have explained, §416(e)(1)’s statement,
“[t]he term ‘child’ means . . . the child . . .
of an individual,” is a definition of scant utility without aid
from neighboring provisions. See
Schafer, 641 F. 3d, at
54. That aid is supplied by §416(h)(2)(A), which completes the
definition of “child” “for purposes of th[e] subchapter” that
includes §416(e)(1). Under the completed definition, which the SSA
employs, §416(h)(2)(A) refers to state law to determine the status
of a posthumously conceived child. The SSA’s interpretation of the
relevant provisions, adhered to without deviation for many decades,
is at least reasonable; the agency’s reading is therefore entitled
to this Court’s deference under
Chevron,
467
U.S. 837.
Chevron deference is appropriate “when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally
to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise
of that authority.”
United States v.
Mead Corp.,
533 U.S.
218, 226–227 (2001). Here, as already noted, the SSA’s
longstanding interpretation is set forth in regu-lations published
after notice-and-comment rulemaking. See
supra, at 6–7.
Congress gave the Commissioner authority to promulgate rules
“necessary or appropriate to carry out” the Commissioner’s
functions and the relevant statutory provisions. See 42
U. S. C. §§405(a), 902(a)(5). The Commissioner’s
regulations are neither “arbitrary or capricious in substance,
[n]or manifestly contrary to the statute.”
Mayo Foundation for
Medical Ed. and Research v.
United States, 562
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation
marks omitted). They thus warrant the Court’s approbation. See
Barnhart v.
Walton,
535 U.S.
212, 217–222, 225 (2002) (deferring to the Commissioner’s
“considerable authority” to interpret the Social Security Act).
V
Tragic circumstances—Robert Capato’s death
before he and his wife could raise a family—gave rise to this case.
But the law Congress enacted calls for resolution of Karen Capato’s
application for child’s insurance benefits by reference to state
intestacy law. We cannot replace that reference by creating a
uniform federal rule the statute’s text scarcely supports.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
