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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 10–1024
_________________
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, et al.,
PETITIONERS
v. STANMORE CAWTHON COOPER
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 28, 2012]
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Privacy Act of 1974, codified in part at 5
U. S. C. §552a, contains a comprehensive and
detailed set of requirements for the management of confidential
records held by Executive Branch agencies. If an agency fails to
comply with those requirements “in such a way as to have an
adverse effect on an individual,” the Act authorizes the
individual to bring a civil action against the agency.
§552a(g)(1)(D). For violations found to be “intentional
or willful,” the United States is liable for “actual
damages.” §552a(g)(4)(A). In this case, we must decide
whether the term “actual damages,” as used in the
Privacy Act, includes damages for mental or emotional distress. We
hold that it does not.
I
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
requires pilots to obtain a pilot certificate and medical
certificate as a precondition for operating an aircraft. 14 CFR
§§61.3(a), (c) (2011). Pilots must periodically renew
their medical certificates to ensure compliance with FAA medical
standards. See §61.23(d). When applying for renewal, pilots
must disclose any illnesses, disabilities, or surgeries they have
had, and they must identify any medications they are taking. See 14
CFR pt. 67.
Respondent Stanmore Cooper has been a private
pilot since 1964. In 1985, he was diagnosed with a human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV) infection and began taking
antiretroviral medication. At that time, the FAA did not issue
medical certificates to persons with respondent’s condition.
Knowing that he would not qualify for renewal of his medical
certificate, respondent initially grounded himself and chose not to
apply. In 1994, however, he ap- plied for and received a medical
certificate, but he did so without disclosing his HIV status or his
medication. He renewed his certificate in 1998, 2000, 2002, and
2004, each time intentionally withholding information about his
condition.
When respondent’s health deteriorated in
1995, he applied for long-term disability benefits under Title II
of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §401
et seq. To substantiate his claim, he disclosed his HIV
status to the Social Security Administration (SSA), which awarded
him benefits for the year from August 1995 to August 1996.
In 2002, the Department of Transportation (DOT),
the FAA’s parent agency, launched a joint criminal
investigation with the SSA, known as “Operation Safe
Pilot,” to identify medically unfit individuals who had
obtained FAA certifications to fly. The DOT gave the SSA a list of
names and other identifying information of 45,000 licensed pilots
in northern California. The SSA then compared the list with its own
records of benefit recipients and compiled a spreadsheet, which it
gave to the DOT.
The spreadsheet revealed that respondent had a
current medical certificate but had also received disability
benefits. After reviewing respondent’s FAA medical file and
his SSA disability file, FAA flight surgeons determined in 2005
that the FAA would not have issued a medical cer- tificate to
respondent had it known his true medical condition.
When investigators confronted respondent with
what had been discovered, he admitted that he had intention- ally
withheld from the FAA information about his HIV status and other
relevant medical information. Because of these fraudulent
omissions, the FAA revoked respondent’s pilot certificate,
and he was indicted on three counts of making false statements to a
Government agency, in violation of 18
placecountry-regionU. S. C. §1001. Respondent
ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of making and delivering a
false official writing, in violation of §1018. He was
sentenced to two years of probation and fined $1,000.[
1]
Claiming that the FAA, DOT, and SSA (hereinafter
Government) violated the Privacy Act by sharing his records with
one another, respondent filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California. He alleged that the
unlawful disclosure to the DOT of his confidential medical
information, including his HIV status, had caused him
“humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, fear of social
ostracism, and other severe emotional distress.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 120a. Notably, he did not allege any pecuniary or
economic loss.
The District Court granted summary judgment
against respondent. 816 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (2008). The court
concluded that the Government had violated the Privacy Act and that
there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the violation was
intentional or willful.[
2] But
the court held that respondent could not recover damages because he
alleged only mental and emotional harm, not economic loss. Finding
that the term “actual damages” is “facially
ambiguous,”
id., at 791, and relying on the sovereign
immunity canon, which provides that waivers of sovereign immunity
must be strictly construed in favor of the Government, the court
concluded that the Act does not authorize the recovery of damages
from the Government for nonpecuniary mental or emotional harm.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded. 622 F.3d 1016, 1024 (2010). The
court acknowledged that the term “actual damages” is a
“ ‘chameleon’ ” in that
“its meaning changes with the specific statute in which it is
found.”
Id., at 1029. But the court nevertheless held
that, as used in the Privacy Act, the term includes damages for
mental and emotional distress. Looking to what it described as
“[i]ntrinsic” and “[e]xtrinsic” sources,
id., at 1028, 1031, the court concluded that the meaning of
“actual damages” in the Privacy Act is not ambiguous
and that “a construction that limits recovery to pecuniary
loss” is not “plausible,”
id., at
1034.
The Government petitioned for rehearing or
rehearing en banc, but a divided court denied the petition.
Id., at 1019. The Government then petitioned for certiorari,
and we granted review. 564 U. S. ___ (2011).
II
Because respondent seeks to recover monetary
compensation from the Government for mental and emotional harm, we
must decide whether the civil remedies provision of the Privacy Act
waives the Government’s sovereign immunity with respect to
such a recovery.
A
We have said on many occasions that a waiver
of sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally expressed”
in statutory text. See,
e.g., Lane v.
Peña,
518 U.S.
187, 192 (1996);
United States v.
Nordic Village,
Inc.,
503 U.S.
30, 33 (1992);
Irwin v.
Department of Veterans
Affairs,
498 U.S.
89, 95 (1990). Legislative history cannot supply a waiver that
is not clearly evident from the language of the statute.
Lane,
supra, at 192. Any ambiguities in the statutory
language are to be construed in favor of immu- nity,
United
States v.
Williams,
514 U.S.
527, 531 (1995), so that the Government’s consent to be
sued is never en- larged beyond what a fair reading of the text
requires,
Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club,
463 U.S.
680, 685–686 (1983) (citing
Eastern Transp. Co. v.
United States,
272 U.S.
675, 686 (1927)). Ambiguity exists if there is a plausible
interpretation of the statute that would not authorize money
damages against the Government.
Nordic Village,
supra, at 34, 37.
The question that confronts us here is not
whether Congress has consented to be sued for damages under the
Privacy Act. That much is clear from the statute, which expressly
authorizes recovery from the Government for “actual
damages.” Rather, the question at issue concerns the
scope of that waiver. For the same reason that we refuse to
enforce a waiver that is not unambiguously expressed in the
statute, we also construe any ambiguities in the scope of a waiver
in favor of the sovereign.
Lane,
supra, at 192.
Although this canon of interpretation requires
an unmistakable statutory expression of congressional intent to
waive the Government’s immunity, Congress need not state its
intent in any particular way. We have never required that Congress
use magic words. To the contrary, we have observed that the
sovereign immunity canon “is a tool for interpreting the
law” and that it does not “displac[e] the other
traditional tools of statutory construction.”
Richlin
Security Service Co. v.
Chertoff,
553 U.S.
571, 589 (2008). What we thus require is that the scope of
Congress’ waiver be clearly discernable from the statutory
text in light of traditional interpretive tools. If it is not, then
we take the interpretation most favorable to the Government.
B
The civil remedies provision of the Privacy
Act provides that, for any “intentional or willful”
refusal or failure to comply with the Act, the United States shall
be liable for “actual damages sustained by the individual as
a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person
entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.” 5
U. S. C. §552a(g)(4)(A). Because Congress did not
define “actual damages,” respondent urges us to rely on
the ordinary meaning of the word “actual” as it is
defined in standard general-purpose dictionaries. But as the Court
of Appeals explained, “actual damages” is a legal term
of art, 622 F. 3d, at 1028, and it is a “cardinal rule
of statutory construction” that, when Congress employs a term
of art, “ ‘it presumably knows and adopts the
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the
body of learning from which it was taken,’ ”
Molzof v.
United States,
502
U.S. 301, 307 (1992) (quoting
Morissette v.
United
States,
342 U.S.
246, 263 (1952)).
Even as a legal term, however, the meaning of
“actual damages” is far from clear. The latest edition
of Black’s Law Dictionary available when Congress enacted the
Privacy Act defined “actual damages” as “[r]eal,
substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a
complainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury,
as opposed on the one hand to ‘nominal’ damages, and on
the other to ‘exemplary’ or ‘punitive’
damages.” Black’s Law Dictionary 467 (rev. 4th ed.
1968). But this general (and notably circular) definition is of
little value here because, as the Court of Appeals accurately
observed, the precise meaning of the term “changes with the
specific statute in which it is found.” 622 F. 3d, at
1029.
The term is sometimes understood to include
nonpecuniary harm. Take, for instance, some courts’
interpretations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42
U. S. C. §3613(c), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), 15 U. S. C. §§1681n, 1681
o. A
number of courts have construed “actual” damages in the
remedial provisions of both statutes to include compensation for
mental and emotional distress. See,
e.g., Seaton v.
Sky
Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 636–638 (CA7 1974) (authorizing
compensatory damages under the FHA, 42 U. S. C.
§3612, the predecessor to §3613, for humiliation);
Steele v.
Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384 (CA10
1973) (stating that damages under the FHA “are not limited to
out-of-pocket losses but may include an award for emotional
distress and humiliation”);
Thompson v.
San Antonio
Retail Merchants Assn., 682 F.2d 509, 513–514 (CA5 1982)
(per curiam) (explaining that, “[e]ven when there
are no out-of-pocket expenses, humiliation and mental distress do
constitute recoverable elements of damage” under the FCRA);
Millstone v.
O’Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d
829, 834–835 (CA8 1976) (approving an award of damages under
the FCRA for “loss of sleep, nervousness, frustration and
mental anguish”).
In other contexts, however, the term has been
used or construed more narrowly to authorize damages for only
pecuniary harm. In the wrongful-death provision of the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), for example, Congress authorized “actual
or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries
resulting from such death.” 28 U. S. C. §2674,
¶2. At least one court has defined “actual
damages” in the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U. S. C.
§101(b) (1970 ed.), as “the extent to which the market
value of a copyrighted work has been injured or destroyed by an
infringement.”
Frank Music Corp. v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 512 (CA9 1985); see
also
Mackie v.
Rieser,
296 F.3d 909,
917 (CA9 2002) (holding that “ ‘hurt
feelings’ over the nature of the infringement” have no
place in the actual damages calculus). And some courts have
construed “actual damages” in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78bb(a), to mean
“some form of economic loss.”
Ryan v.
Foster
& Marshall, Inc., 556 F.2d 460, 464 (CA9 1977); see also
Osofsky v.
Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (CA2 1981)
(stating that the purpose of §78bb(a) “is to compensate
civil plaintiffs for economic loss suffered as a result of wrongs
committed in violation of the 1934 Act”);
Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 810 (CA5 1970) (noting that the
“gist” of an action for damages under the Act is
“economic injury”).[
3]
Because the term “actual damages”
has this chameleon-like quality, we cannot rely on any all-purpose
definition but must consider the particular context in which the
term appears.[
4]
C
The Privacy Act directs agencies to establish
safeguards to protect individuals against the disclosure of
confiden- tial records “which could result in substantial
harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any indi-
vidual on whom information is maintained.” 5
U. S. C. §552a(e)(10); see also §2(b), 88Stat.
1896 (stating that the “purpose of this Act is to provide
certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of
personal privacy”). Because the Act serves interests similar
to those protected by defamation and privacy torts, there is good
reason to infer that Congress relied upon those torts in drafting
the Act.
In
Doe v.
Chao,
540 U.S.
614 (2004), we held that the Privacy Act’s remedial
provision authorizes plaintiffs to recover a guaranteed minimum
award of $1,000 for violations of the Act, but only if they prove
at least some “actual damages.”
Id., at 620,
627; see §552a(g)(4)(A). Although we did not address the
meaning of “actual damages,”
id., at 622,
n. 5, 627, n. 12, we observed that the provision
“parallels” the remedial scheme for the common-law
torts of libel
per quod and slander, under which plaintiffs
can recover “general damages,” but only if they prove
“special harm” (also known as “special
damages”),
id., at 625; see also 3 Restatement of
Torts §575, Comments
a and
b (1938) (hereinafter
Restatement); D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §7.2, pp.
511–513 (1973) (hereinafter Dobbs).[
5] “Special damages” are limited to actual
pecuniary loss, which must be specially pleaded and proved. 1 D.
Haggard, Cooley on Torts §164, p. 580 (4th ed. 1932)
(hereinafter Cooley).[
6]
“General damages,” on the other hand, cover “loss
of reputation, shame, mortification, injury to the feelings and the
like and need not be alleged in detail and require no proof.”
Id., §164, at 579.[
7]
This parallel between the Privacy Act and the
common-law torts of libel
per quod and slander suggests the
possibility that Congress intended the term “actual
damages” in the Act to mean special damages. The basic idea
is that Privacy Act victims, like victims of libel
per quod
or slander, are barred from any recovery unless they can first show
actual—that is, pecuniary or material—harm. Upon
showing some pecuniary harm, no matter how slight, they can recover
the statutory minimum of $1,000, presumably for any unproven harm.
That Congress would choose to use the term “actual
damages” instead of “special damages” was not
without precedent. The terms had occasionally been used
interchangeably. See,
e.g., Wetzel v.
Gulf Oil Corp.,
455 F.2d 857, 862 (CA9 1972) (holding that plaintiff could not
establish libel
per quod because he “did not introduce
any valid and sufficient evidence of actual damage”);
Electric Furnace Corp. v.
Deering Milliken Research
Corp., 325 F.2d 761, 765 (CA6 1963) (stating that “libel
per quod standing alone without proof of actual damages
. . . will not support a verdict for the
plaintiff”);
M & S Furniture
Sales Co. v.
Edward J. De Bartolo Corp., 249 Md. 540,
544, 241 A.2d 126, 128 (1968) (“In the case of words or
conduct actionable only
per quod, the injurious effect must
be established by allegations and proof of special damage and in
such cases it is not only necessary to plead and show that the
words or actions were defamatory, but it must also appear that such
words or conduct caused actual damage”);
Clementson v.
Minnesota Tribune Co., 45 Minn. 303, 47 N.W. 781 (1891)
(distinguishing “actual, or, as they are sometimes termed,
‘special,’ damages” from “general
damages—that is, damages not pecuniary in their
nature”).[
8]
Any doubt about the plausibility of construing
“actual damages” in the Privacy Act synonymously with
“special damages” is put to rest by Congress’
refusal to authorize “general damages.” In an
uncodified section of the Act, Congress established the Privacy
Protection Study Commission to consider, among other things,
“whether the Federal Government should be liable for general
dam- ages.” §5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88Stat. 1907, note
following 5 U. S. C. §552a, p. 712. As we explained
in
Doe, “Congress left the question of general damages
. . . for another day.” 540 U. S., at 622.
Although the Commission later recom- mended that general damages be
allowed,
ibid., n. 4, Congress never amended the Act to
include them. For that reason, we held that it was “beyond
serious doubt” that general damages are not available for
violations of the Privacy Act.
Id., at 622.
By authorizing recovery for “actual”
but not for “general” damages, Congress made clear that
it viewed those terms as mutually exclusive. In actions for
defamation and related dignitary torts, two categories of compensa-
tory damages are recoverable: general damages and special damages.
Cooley §164, at 579; see also 4 Restatement §867, Comment
d (1939) (noting that damages for interference with privacy
“can be awarded in the same way in which general damages are
given for defamation”).[
9] Because Congress declined to authorize “general
damages,” we think it likely that Congress intended
“actual dam- ages” in the Privacy Act to mean special
damages for proven pecuniary loss.
Not surprisingly, this interpretation was
accepted by the Privacy Protection Study Commission, an expert body
authorized by Congress and highly sensitive to the Act’s
goals. The Commission understood “actual damages” in
the Act to be “a synonym for special damages as that term is
used in defamation cases.” Personal Privacy in an Information
Society: The Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission 530
(July 1977); see also
ibid. (“The legislative history
and language of the Act suggest that Congress meant to restrict
recovery to specific pecuniary losses until the Commission could
weigh the propriety of extending the standard of recovery”).
Although we are not bound in any way by the Commission’s
report, we think it confirms the reasonableness of interpreting
“actual damages” in the unique context of the Privacy
Act as the equivalent of special damages.
D
We do not claim that the contrary reading of
the statute accepted by the Court of Appeals and advanced now by
respondent is inconceivable. But because the Privacy Act waives the
Federal Government’s sovereign immunity, the question we must
answer is whether it is plausible to read the statute, as the
Government does, to authorize only damages for economic loss.
Nordic Village, 503 U. S., at 34, 37. When waiving the
Government’s sovereign immunity, Congress must speak
unequivocally.
Lane, 518 U. S., at 192. Here, we
conclude that it did not. As a consequence, we adopt an
interpretation of “actual damages” limited to proven
pecuniary or economic harm. To do otherwise would expand the scope
of Congress’ sovereign immunity waiver beyond what the
statutory text clearly requires.
III
None of respondent’s contrary arguments
suffices to overcome the sovereign immunity canon.
A
Respondent notes that the term “actual
damages” has often been defined broadly in common-law cases,
and in our own, to include all compensatory damages. See Brief for
Respondent 18–25. For example, in
Birdsall v.
Coolidge,
93 U.S. 64
(1876), a patent infringement case, we observed that
“[c]ompensatory damages and actual damages mean the same
thing.”
Ibid. And in
Gertz v.
Robert Welch,
Inc.,
418 U.S.
323 (1974), we wrote that actual injury in the defamation
context “is not limited to out-of-pocket loss” and that
it customarily includes “impairment of reputation and
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish
and suffering.”
Id., at 350.
These cases and others cited by respondent stand
for the unremarkable point that the term “actual
damages”
can include nonpecuniary loss. But this
generic meaning does not establish with the requisite clarity that
the Privacy Act, with its distinctive features, authorizes damages
for mental and emotional distress. As we already explained, the
term “actual damages” takes on different meanings in
different contexts.
B
Respondent’s stronger argument is that
the exclusion of “general damages” from the statute
simply means that there can be no recovery for presumed damages.
Privacy Act victims can still recover for mental and emotional
distress, says respondent, so long as it is proved. See Brief for
Respondent 54–56.[
10]
This argument is flawed because it suggests that
proven mental and emotional distress does not count as
general damages. The term “general damages” is not
limited to compensation for unproven injuries; it includes
compensation for proven injuries as well. See 3 Restatement
§621, Comment
a (noting that general damages compensate
for “harm which . . . is proved, or, in the absence
of proof, is assumed to have caused to [the plaintiff’s]
reputation”). To be sure, specific proof of emotional harm is
not required to recover general damages for dignitary torts. Dobbs
§7.3, at 529. But it does not follow that general damages
cannot be recovered for emotional harm that is actually proved.
Aside from the fact that general damages need
not be proved, what distinguishes those damages, whether proved or
not, from the only other category of compensa- tory damages
available in the relevant common-law suits is the
type of
harm. In defamation and privacy cases, “the affront to the
plaintiff’s dignity and the emotional harm done” are
“called general damages, to distinguish them from proof of
actual economic harm,” which is called “special
damages.”
Id., §3.2, at 139; see also
supra, at 10, 12–13, and nn. 6, 7, 9. Therefore,
the converse of general damages is special damages, not all proven
damages, as respondent would have it. Because Congress removed
“general damages” from the Act’s remedial
provision, it is reasonable to infer that Congress foreclosed
recovery for nonpecuniary harm, even if such harm can be proved,
and instead waived the Government’s sovereign immunity only
with respect to harm compensable as special damages.
C
Looking beyond the Privacy Act’s text,
respondent points to the use of the term “actual”
damages in the remedial provisions of the FHA, 42
U. S. C. §3613(c), and the FCRA, 15
U. S. C. §§1681n, 1681
o. As previously
mentioned, courts have held that “actual” damages
within the meaning of these statutes include compensation for
mental and emotional distress.
Supra, at 7. Citing the rule
of construction that Congress intends the same language in similar
statutes to have the same meaning, see
Northcross v.
Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools,
412 U.S.
427, 428 (1973)
(per curiam), respondent argues
that the Privacy Act should also be interpreted as authorizing
damages for mental and emotional distress. See Brief for Respondent
25–32.
Assuming for the sake of argument that these
lower court decisions are correct, they provide only weak support
for respondent’s argument here. Since the term “actual
damages” can mean different things in different contexts,
statutes other than the Privacy Act provide only limited
interpretive aid, and that is especially true here. Neither the FHA
nor the FCRA contains text that precisely mirrors the Privacy
Act.[
11] In neither of those
statutes did Congress specifically decline to authorize recovery
for general damages as it did in the Privacy Act.
Supra, at
12–13. And most importantly, none of the lower court cases
interpreting the statutes, which respondent has cited, see Brief
for Respondent 29–31, involves the sovereign immunity
canon.
Respondent also points to the FTCA, but the
FTCA’s general liability provision does not even use the term
“actual damages.” It instead provides that the
“United States shall be liable” for certain tort claims
“in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual” under relevant state law. 28 U. S. C.
§2674, ¶1. For that reason alone, the FTCA’s
general liability provision is not a reliable source for
interpreting the term “actual damages” in the Privacy
Act. Nor does the FTCA’s wrongful- death
provision—which authorizes “actual or compensa- tory
damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such
death,” §2674, ¶2—prove that Congress
understood the term “actual damages” in the Privacy Act
to include nonpecuniary mental and emotional harm. To the contrary,
it proves that actual damages can be understood to entail only
pecuniary harm depending on the context. Because the FTCA, like the
FHA and FCRA, does not share the same text or design as the Privacy
Act, it is not a fitting analog for construing the Act.
D
Finally, respondent argues that excluding
damages for mental and emotional harm would lead to absurd results.
Persons suffering relatively minor pecuniary loss would be entitled
to recover $1,000, while others suffering only severe and
debilitating mental or emotional distress would get nothing. See
Brief for Respondent 33–35.
Contrary to respondent’s suggestion,
however, there is nothing absurd about a scheme that limits the
Government’s Privacy Act liability to harm that can be
substantiated by proof of tangible economic loss. Respondent
insists that such a scheme would frustrate the Privacy Act’s
remedial purpose, but that ignores the fact that, by deliberately
refusing to authorize general damages, Congress intended to cabin
relief, not to maximize it.[
12]
* * *
In sum, applying traditional rules of
construction, we hold that the Privacy Act does not unequivocally
authorize an award of damages for mental or emotional distress.
Accordingly, the Act does not waive the Federal Government’s
sovereign immunity from liability for such harms. We therefore
reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.