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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 10–1001
_________________
LUIS MARIANO MARTINEZ, PETITIONER
v.
CHARLES L. RYAN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 20, 2012]
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The State of Arizona does not permit a convicted
person alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel to raise
that claim on direct review. Instead, the prisoner must bring the
claim in state collateral proceedings. In the instant case,
however, petitioner’s postconviction counsel did not raise
the ineffective-assistance claim in the first collateral
proceeding, and, indeed, filed a statement that, after reviewing
the case, she found no meritorious claims helpful to petitioner. On
federal habeas review, and with new counsel, petitioner sought to
argue he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial
and in the first phase of his state collateral proceeding. Because
the state collateral proceeding was the first place to challenge
his con- viction on grounds of ineffective assistance, petitioner
maintained he had a constitutional right to an effective attorney
in the collateral proceeding. While petitioner frames the question
in this case as a constitutional one, a more narrow, but still
dispositive, formulation is whether a federal habeas court may
excuse a procedural default of an ineffective-assistance claim when
the claim was not properly presented in state court due to an
attorney’s errors in an initial-review collateral
proceeding.
I
A jury convicted petitioner, Luis Mariano
Martinez, of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor under the
age of 15. The prosecution introduced a videotaped forensic
interview with the victim, Martinez’s 11-year-old
stepdaughter. It also put in evidence the victim’s nightgown,
with traces of Martinez’s DNA. As part of his defense,
Martinez introduced evidence of the victim’s recantations,
including testimony from the victim’s grandmother and mother
and a second videotaped interview in which the victim denied any
abuse. The victim also denied any abuse when she testified at
trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a–39a. To explain the
inconsistencies, a prosecution expert testified that recantations
of child-abuse accusations are caused often by reluctance on the
part of the victim’s mother to lend support to the
child’s claims. Pet. for Cert. 3. After considering the
conflicting evidence, the jury convicted Martinez. He was sentenced
to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment with no possibility
of parole for 35 years. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a.
The State appointed a new attorney to represent
Martinez in his direct appeal.
Ibid.; Pet. for Cert. 4. She
made numerous arguments on Martinez’s behalf, including a
claim that the evidence was insufficient and that newly discovered
evidence warranted a new trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. Arizona
law, however, did not permit her to argue on direct appeal that
trial counsel was ineffective.
State v.
Spreitz, 202
Ariz. 1, 3, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002). Arizona instead requires
claims of ineffective assistance at trial to be reserved for state
collateral proceedings.
While Martinez’s direct appeal was
pending, the attorney began a state collateral proceeding by filing
a “Notice of Post-Conviction Relief.”
Martinez
v.
Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 733–734 (CA9 2010); Ariz.
Rule Crim. Proc. 32.4(a) (2011). Despite initiating this
proceeding, counsel made no claim trial counsel was ineffective and
later filed a statement asserting she could find no colorable
claims at all. 623 F. 3d, at 734. Cf.
State v.
Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 459,
910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996).
The state trial court hearing the collateral
proceeding gave Martinez 45 days to file a
pro se
petition in support of postconviction relief and to raise any
claims he believed his counsel overlooked. 623 F. 3d, at 734;
see
Smith,
supra, at 459, 910 P. 2d, at 4.
Martinez did not respond. He later alleged that he was unaware of
the ongoing collateral proceedings and that counsel failed to
advise him of the need to file a
pro se petition to
preserve his rights. The state trial court dismissed the action for
postconviction relief, in effect affirming counsel’s
determination that Martinez had no meritorious claims. 623
F. 3d, at 734. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed
Martinez’s conviction, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied
review.
Id., at 733.
About a year and a half later, Martinez, now
represented by new counsel, filed a second notice of postconviction
relief in the Arizona trial court.
Id., at 734. Martinez
claimed his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to
challenge the prosecution’s evidence. He argued, for example,
that his trial counsel should have objected to the expert testimony
explaining the victim’s recantations or should have called an
expert witness in rebuttal. Martinez also faulted trial counsel for
not pursuing an exculpatory explanation for the DNA on the
nightgown. App. to Brief in Opposition B–6 to B–12.
Martinez’s petition was dismissed, in part in reliance on an
Arizona Rule barring relief on a claim that could have been raised
in a previous collateral proceeding.
Id., at B–27; see
Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(3). Martinez, the theory went,
should have asserted the claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel in his first notice for postconviction relief. The Arizona
Court of Appeals agreed. It denied Martinez relief because he
failed to raise his claims in the first collateral proceeding. 623
F. 3d, at 734. The Arizona Supreme Court declined to review
Martinez’s appeal.
Martinez then sought relief in United States
District Court for the District of Arizona, where he filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, again raising the
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. Martinez
acknowledged the state courts denied his claims by relying on a
well-established state procedural rule, which, under the doctrine
of procedural default, would prohibit a federal court from reaching
the merits of the claims. See,
e.g., Wainwright v.
Sykes,
433 U.S.
72, 84–85, 90–91 (1977). He could overcome this
hurdle to federal review, Martinez argued, because he had cause for
the default: His first postconviction counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise any claims in the first notice of postconviction
relief and in failing to notify Martinez of her actions. See
id., at 84–85.
On the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation,
the District Court denied the petition, ruling that Arizona’s
preclusion rule was an adequate and independent state-law ground to
bar federal review. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a. Martinez had not
shown cause to excuse the procedural default, the District Court
reasoned, because under
Coleman v.
Thompson,
501 U.S.
722, 753–754 (1991), an attorney’s errors in a
postconviction proceeding do not qualify as cause for a default.
See
id., at 754–755.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. The Court of Appeals relied on general statements in
Coleman that, absent a right to counsel in a collateral
proceeding, an attorney’s errors in the proceeding do not
establish cause for a procedural default. Expanding on the District
Court’s opinion, the Court of Appeals, citing
Coleman,
noted the general rule that there is no constitutional right to
counsel in collateral proceedings. 623 F. 3d, at 736. The
Court of Appeals recognized that
Coleman reserved ruling on
whether there is “an exception” to this rule in those
cases “where ‘state collateral review is the first
place a prisoner can present a challenge to his
conviction.’ ” 623 F. 3d, at 736 (quoting
Coleman,
supra, at 755). It concluded, nevertheless,
that the controlling cases established no basis for the exception.
Certiorari was granted. 563 U. S. ___ (2011).
II
Coleman v.
Thompson,
supra, left open, and the Court of Appeals in this case
addressed, a question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has
a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which
provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance at trial. These proceedings can be called, for purposes
of this opinion, “initial-review collateral
proceedings.”
Coleman had sug- gested, though without
holding, that the Constitution may require States to provide
counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings because “in
[these] cases . . . state collateral review is the first
place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.”
Id., at 755. As
Coleman noted, this makes the
initial-review collateral proceeding a prisoner’s “one
and only appeal” as to an ineffective-assistance claim,
id., at 756 (emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks
omitted), and this may justify an exception to the constitutional
rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings.
See
id., at 755;
Douglas v.
California,
372 U.S.
353, 357 (1963) (holding States must appoint counsel on a
prisoner’s first appeal).
This is not the case, however, to resolve
whether that exception exists as a constitutional matter. The pre-
cise question here is whether ineffective assistance in an
initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of ineffective
assistance at trial may provide cause for a procedural default in a
federal habeas proceeding. To protect prisoners with a potentially
legitimate claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it is
necessary to modify the unqualified statement in
Coleman
that an attorney’s ignorance or inadvertence in a
postconviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to excuse a
procedural default. This opinion qualifies
Coleman by
recognizing a narrow exception: Inadequate assistance of counsel at
initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a
prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective
assistance at trial.
A
Federal habeas courts reviewing the
constitutionality of a state prisoner’s conviction and
sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court
judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to
preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of
federalism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural default,
under which a federal court will not review the merits of claims,
including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to
hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural
rule. See,
e.g., Coleman, supra, at 747–748;
Sykes,
supra, at 84–85. A state court’s
invocation of a procedural rule to deny a prisoner’s claims
precludes federal review of the claims if, among other requisites,
the state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to
support the judgment and the rule is firmly established and
consistently followed. See,
e.g., Walker v.
Martin, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 7–8);
Beard v.
Kindler, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2009)
(slip op., at 7). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted
claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may
obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the
default and prejudice from a violation of federal law. See
Coleman, 501 U. S., at 750. There is no dispute that
Arizona’s procedural bar on successive petitions is an
independent and adequate state ground. Thus, a federal court can
hear Martinez’s ineffective-assistance claim only if he can
establish cause to excuse the procedural default.
Coleman held that “[n]egligence on
the part of a prisoner’s postconviction attorney does not
qualify as ‘cause.’ ”
Maples v.
Thomas, 565 U. S ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12).
Coleman reasoned that “because the attorney is the
prisoner’s agent . . . under
‘well-settled principles of agency law,’ the principal
bears the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his
agent.”
Maples,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at
12).
Coleman, however, did not present the
occasion to apply this principle to determine whether attorney
errors in initial-review collateral proceedings may qualify as
cause for a procedural default. The alleged failure of counsel in
Coleman was on appeal from an initial-review collateral
proceeding, and in that proceeding the prisoner’s claims had
been addressed by the state habeas trial court. See 501 U. S.,
at 755.
As
Coleman recognized, this marks a key
difference between initial-review collateral proceedings and other
kinds of collateral proceedings. When an attorney errs in
initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state
court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim. This Court
on direct review of the state proceeding could not consider or
adjudicate the claim. See,
e.g., Fox Film Corp. v.
Muller,
296 U.S.
207 (1935);
Murdock v.
Memphis, 20 Wall. 590
(1875); cf.
Coleman,
supra, at 730–731. And if
counsel’s errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding
do not establish cause to excuse the procedural default in a
federal habeas proceeding, no court will review the
prisoner’s claims.
The same is not true when counsel errs in other
kinds of postconviction proceedings. While counsel’s errors
in these proceedings preclude any further review of the
prisoner’s claim, the claim will have been addressed by one
court, whether it be the trial court, the appellate court on direct
review, or the trial court in an initial-review collateral
proceeding. See,
e.g., Coleman,
supra, at
756.
Where, as here, the initial-review collateral
proceeding is the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to
raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, the collateral
proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s
direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim. This is
because the state habeas court “looks to the merits of the
clai[m]” of ineffective assistance, no other court has
addressed the claim, and “defendants pursuing first-tier
review . . . are generally ill equipped to represent
themselves” because they do not have a brief from counsel or
an opinion of the court addressing their claim of error.
Halbert v.
Michigan,
545 U.S.
605, 617 (2005); see
Douglas, 372 U. S., at
357–358.
As
Coleman recognized, an
attorney’s errors during an appeal on direct review may
provide cause to excuse a procedural default; for if the attorney
appointed by the State to pursue the direct appeal is ineffective,
the prisoner has been denied fair process and the opportunity to
comply with the State’s procedures and obtain an adjudication
on the merits of his claims. See 501 U. S., at 754;
Evitts v.
Lucey,
469 U.S.
387, 396 (1985);
Douglas,
supra, at
357–358. Without the help of an adequate attorney, a prisoner
will have similar difficulties vindicating a substantial
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Claims of
ineffective assistance at trial often require investigative work
and an understanding of trial strategy. When the issue cannot be
raised on direct review, more- over, a prisoner asserting an
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in an initial-review
collateral proceeding cannot rely on a court opinion or the prior
work of an attorney addressing that claim.
Halbert, 545
U. S., at 619. To present a claim of ineffective assistance at
trial in accordance with the State’s procedures, then, a
prisoner likely needs an effective attorney.
The same would be true if the State did not
appoint an attorney to assist the prisoner in the initial-review
collateral proceeding. The prisoner, unlearned in the law, may not
comply with the State’s procedural rules or may misapprehend
the substantive details of federal constitutional law. Cf.,
e.g., id., at 620–621 (describing the
educational background of the prison population). While confined to
prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop the evidentiary
basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns on
evidence outside the trial record.
A prisoner’s inability to present a claim
of trial error is of particular concern when the claim is one of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The right to the effective
assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our
justice system. It is deemed as an “obvious truth” the
idea that “any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.”
Gideon v.
Wainwright,
372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963). Indeed, the right to counsel is the foundation
for our adversary system. Defense counsel tests the pros-
ecution’s case to ensure that the proceedings serve the
function of adjudicating guilt or innocence, while protecting the
rights of the person charged. See,
e.g., Powell v.
Alabama,
287 U.S.
45, 68–69 (1932) (“[The defendant] requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence”). Effective trial counsel preserves claims to be
considered on appeal, see,
e.g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc.
52(b), and in federal habeas proceedings,
Edwards v.
Carpenter,
529 U.S.
446 (2000).
This is not to imply the State acted with any
impropri- ety by reserving the claim of ineffective assistance for
a collateral proceeding. See
Massaro v.
United
States,
538 U.S.
500, 505 (2003). Ineffective-assistance claims often depend on
evidence outside the trial record. Direct appeals, without
evidentiary hearings, may not be as effective as other proceedings
for developing the factual basis for the claim.
Ibid.
Abbreviated deadlines to expand the record on direct appeal may not
allow adequate time for an attorney to investigate the
ineffective-assistance claim. See Primus, Structural Reform in
Criminal Defense, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 679, 689, and n. 57
(2004) (most rules give between 5 and 30 days from the time of
conviction to file a request to expand the record on appeal). Thus,
there are sound reasons for deferring consideration of
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims until the
collateral-review stage, but this decision is not without
consequences for the State’s ability to assert a procedural
default in later proceedings. By deliberately choosing to move
trial-ineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-appeal process,
where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the State
significantly diminishes prisoners’ ability to file such
claims. It is within the context of this state procedural framework
that counsel’s ineffectiveness in an initial-review
collateral proceeding qualifies as cause for a procedural
default.
The rules for when a prisoner may establish
cause to excuse a procedural default are elaborated in the exercise
of the Court’s discretion.
McCleskey v.
Zant,
499 U.S.
467, 490 (1991); see also
Coleman,
supra, at
730–731;
Sykes, 433 U. S., at 83;
Reed v.
Ross,
468 U.S.
1, 9 (1984);
Fay v.
Noia,
372
U.S. 391, 430 (1963), overruled in part by
Sykes,
supra. These rules reflect an equitable judgment that only
where a prisoner is impeded or obstructed in complying with the
State’s established procedures will a federal habeas court
excuse the prisoner from the usual sanction of default. See,
e.g., Strickler v.
Greene,
527 U.S.
263, 289 (1999);
Reed,
supra, at 16. Allowing a
federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the absence of an
attorney) caused a procedural default in an initial-review
collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that
the initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without
counsel or with ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient
to ensure that proper consideration was given to a substantial
claim. From this it follows that, when a State requires a prisoner
to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a
collateral proceeding, a prisoner may establish cause for a default
of an ineffective-assistance claim in two circumstances. The first
is where the state courts did not appoint counsel in the
initial-review collateral proceeding for a claim of ineffective
assistance at trial. The second is where appointed counsel in the
initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have
been raised, was ineffective under the standards of
Strickland v.
Washington,
466
U.S. 668 (1984). To overcome the default, a prisoner must also
demonstrate that the underlying
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one,
which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim
has some merit. Cf.
Miller-El v.
Cockrell,
537 U.S.
322 (2003) (describing standards for certificates of
appealability to issue).
Most jurisdictions have in place procedures to
ensure counsel is appointed for substantial ineffective-assistance
claims. Some States, including Arizona, appoint counsel in every
first collateral proceeding. See,
e.g., Alaska Stat.
18.85.100(c) (2010); Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.4(c)(2) (2011);
Conn. Gen. Stat. §51–296(a) (2011); Me. Rules Crim.
Proc. 69, 70(c) (2010); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§7A–451(a)(2) (2009); N. J. Ct. Rule
3:22–6(b) (2012); R. I. Gen. Laws
§10–9.1–5 (Lexis 1997); Tenn. Code Ann.
§8–14–205 (2011). Some States appoint counsel if
the claims require an evidentiary hearing, as claims of ineffective
assistance often do. See,
e.g., Ky. Rule Crim.
Proc. 11.42(5) (2011); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art.
930.7(C) (West 2008); Mich. Rule Crim. Proc. 6.505(A) (2011);
S. C. Rule Civ. Proc. 71.1(d) (2011). Other States appoint
counsel if the claims have some merit to them or the state habeas
trial court deems the record worthy of further development. See,
e.g., Ark. Rule Crim. Proc. 37.3(b) (2011); Colo. Rule Crim.
Proc. 35(b) (2011); Del. Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. 61(e)(1)
(2011); Indiana Rule Post-Conviction Remedies Proc. 1, §9(a)
(rev. 2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. §22–4506 (2007); N. M.
Dist. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. 5–802 (2011);
Hust v.
State, 147 Idaho 682, 683–684, 214 P.3d 668,
669–670 (2009);
Hardin v.
Arkansas, 350 Ark.
299, 301, 86 S.W.3d 384, 385 (2007)
(per curiam);
Jensen v.
State, 2004 ND 200, ¶13,
688 N.W.2d 374, 378;
Wu v.
United States, 798
A.2d 1083, 1089 (D. C. 2002);
Kostal v.
People,
167 Colo. 317
, 447
P.2d 536 (1968). It is likely that most of the attorneys
appointed by the courts are qualified to per- form, and do perform,
according to prevailing professional norms; and, where that is so,
the States may enforce a procedural default in federal habeas
proceedings.
B
This limited qualification to
Coleman
does not implicate the usual concerns with upsetting reliance
interests protected by
stare decisis principles. Cf.,
e.g., Montejo v.
Louisiana,
556
U.S. 778, 792–793 (2009).
Coleman held that an
attorney’s negligence in a postconviction proceeding does not
establish cause, and this remains true except as to initial-review
collateral proceedings for claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial.
Coleman itself did not involve an occasion
when an attorney erred in an initial-review collateral proceeding
with respect to a claim of ineffective trial counsel; and in the 20
years since
Coleman was decided, we have not held
Coleman applies in circumstances like this one.
The holding here ought not to put a significant
strain on state resources. When faced with the question whether
there is cause for an apparent default, a State may answer that the
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is in- substantial,
i.e., it does not have any merit or that it is wholly
without factual support, or that the attorney in the initial-review
collateral proceeding did not perform below constitutional
standards.
This is but one of the differences between a
constitutional ruling and the equitable ruling of this case. A
constitutional ruling would provide defendants a freestanding
constitutional claim to raise; it would require the appointment of
counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings; it would impose
the same system of appointing counsel in every State; and it would
require a reversal in all state collateral cases on direct review
from state courts if the States’ system of appointing counsel
did not conform to the constitutional rule. An equitable ruling, by
contrast, permits States a variety of systems for appointing
counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings. And it permits a
State to elect between appointing counsel in initial-review
collateral proceedings or not asserting a procedural default and
raising a defense on the merits in federal habeas proceedings. In
addition, state collateral cases on direct review from state courts
are unaffected by the ruling in this case.
The rule of
Coleman governs in all but
the limited circumstances recognized here. The holding in this case
does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings,
including appeals from initial-review collateral proceedings,
second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions for
discretionary review in a State’s appellate courts. See 501
U. S.
, at 754;
Carrier, 477 U. S., at 488.
It does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the
first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of
ineffective assistance at trial, even though that initial-review
collateral proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.
In addition, the limited nature of the
qualification to
Coleman adopted here reflects the
importance of the right to the effective assistance of trial
counsel and Arizona’s decision to bar defendants from raising
ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. Our holding here
addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this case,
where the State barred the defendant from raising the claims on
direct appeal.
Arizona contends that the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C.
§2254, bars Martinez from asserting attorney error as cause
for a procedural default. AEDPA refers to attorney error in
collateral proceedings, but it does not speak to the question
presented in this case. Section 2254(i) provides that “the
ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State
collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for
relief.” “Cause,” however, is not synonymous with
“a ground for relief.” A finding of cause and prejudice
does not entitle the prisoner to habeas relief. It merely allows a
federal court to consider the merits of a claim that otherwise
would have been procedurally de- faulted. In this case, for
example, Martinez’s “ground for relief” is his
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, a claim that AEDPA
does not bar. Martinez relies on the ineffectiveness of his
postconviction attorney to excuse his failure to comply with
Arizona’s procedural rules, not as an independent basis for
overturning his conviction. In short, while §2254(i) precludes
Martinez from relying on the ineffectiveness of his postconviction
attorney as a “ground for relief,” it does not stop
Martinez from using it to establish “cause.”
Holland v.
Florida, 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010)
(slip op., at 18).
III
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review
collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal
habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective
assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral
proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was
ineffective.
In this case Martinez’s attorney in the
initial-review collateral proceeding filed a notice akin to an
Anders brief, in effect conceding that Martinez lacked any
meritorious claim, including his claim of ineffective assistance at
trial. See
Anders v.
California,
386 U.S.
738 (1967). Martinez argued before the federal habeas court
that filing the
Anders brief constituted ineffective
assistance. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether that was
so. Rather, it held that because Martinez did not have a right to
an attorney in the initial-review collateral proceeding, the
attorney’s errors in the initial-review collateral proceeding
could not establish cause for the failure to comply with the
State’s rules. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not determine
whether Martinez’s attorney in his first collateral
proceeding was ineffective or whether his claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel is substantial. And the court did not
address the question of prejudice. These issues remain open for a
decision on remand.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.