In 1839, a treaty was made between the United States and Mexico
providing for the "adjustment of claims of citizens of the United
States on the Mexican Republic."
Under this treaty, a sum of money was awarded to be paid to the
members of the Baltimore Mexican Company, who had subscribed money
to fit out an expedition against Mexico under General Mina in 1816.
See the case of
Gill v. Oliver's
Executors, 11 How. 529.
The proceeds of one of the shares of this company were claimed
by two parties, one as being the second permanent trustee of the
insolvent owner of the share, and the other as being the assignee
of the first permanent trustee.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland decided that the plaintiff,
viz., the second permanent trustee, did not take the claim
under the insolvent laws of Maryland.
This decision is not reviewable by this Court under the 25th
section of the Judiciary Act, and the case is similar to that of
Gill v. Oliver's
Executors, 11 How. 529.
Nor does jurisdiction accrue in this case in consequence of the
additional fact that the Legislature of Maryland passed a law
curing certain defects in the assignment to Oliver, the validity of
which law was drawn into question as impairing the obligation of a
contract, because if there had been no such law, the decision of
the state court would have been the same.
Page 53 U. S. 112
This was a branch of the case of
Gill v.
Oliver's Executors, 11 How. 529, although it
differed from that case in some particulars which will be
mentioned. The history of the Baltimore Mexican Company was given
in the report of that case, and need not be repeated.
James Williams was the owner of one of the shares of the
company, and applied for the benefit of the Insolvent Laws of
Maryland on 24 June, 1819. George Winchester was appointed
provisional trustee, and gave bond as such, and James Williams
conveyed and assigned to him, as provisional trustee, all his
property whatever for the benefit of his creditors. On 2 August,
1819, Winchester executed a bond without security, reciting that he
had been appointed permanent trustee, and the bond was conditioned
for the faithful performance of his duties as such. The laws of
Maryland required security to be given when such a bond was
executed.
At March term, 1825, Baltimore County Court passed the following
order:
"
In Baltimore County Court, March Term
1825"
"
In the case of James Williams, an Insolvent
Debtor:"
"Ordered by the court that the trustee dispose of any part of
the personal estate of the said insolvent debtor remaining unsold
at public or private sale, as he may judge best."
"WM. H. WARD"
On the 2d of April, 1825, Winchester assigned to Robert Oliver
the share in the Mexican Company belonging to Williams, and signed
a receipt for $2,000 as the consideration for the sale.
Winchester having died, Nathaniel Williams, the plaintiff in
error, was appointed permanent trustee of James Williams, the
insolvent, on 15 November, 1841, and gave bond with security, as
required by law.
In the report of the case of
Gill v. Oliver's
Executors, it was stated in what manner the money came into
the hands of Glenn and Perine as trustees, and how it came to be
deposited in court for claimants to make out their title.
On the 29 January, 1842, Nathaniel Williams filed his petition,
claiming the amount which belonged to the share of his insolvent,
James Williams.
Page 53 U. S. 113
On 9 March, 1842, the Legislature of Maryland passed an act
(December Session, 1841, chapter 309), entitled "An act to confirm
the titles of purchasers in the cases therein mentioned," which act
was passed on the memorial of Oliver's representatives, and was
alleged to cure the defects resulting from Winchester's assignment
without his having given security upon his bond as permanent
trustee.
On 2 May, 1842, the executors of Oliver and the trustees filed
their answer to the petition of Nathaniel Williams. They claimed
the share of James Williams on two grounds: 1st, under the purchase
from Winchester; 2d, because the award of the commissioners was a
full and complete bar of all right and title on the part of
Nathaniel Williams.
On 5 December, 1846, Baltimore County Court decreed in favor of
the executors of Oliver, holding the act of 1841 to be
constitutional. On the second point the court decided that the
award of the commissioners was not conclusive.
Williams prosecuted an appeal to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.
At June term, 1843, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of
the County court, three judges sitting. One of them, Judge Martin,
filed the following reasons,
viz.:
"I think that George Winchester is to be considered, upon the
facts exhibited in this record, as duly and legally appointed the
permanent trustee of James Williams; that the sale by him of the
shares in controversy to Robert Oliver, was fairly and
bona
fide made within the meaning of the Act of Assembly of 1841,
ch. 309, and that that statute being, in my opinion, neither
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States nor the
Constitution of the State of Maryland, is to [be] regarded as a
valid exercise of legislative power."
The other two judges,
viz., Chief Justice Dorsey and
Judge Spence, stated that the grounds upon which they affirmed the
judgment were first, the reasons assigned by the majority of this
Court for the reversal of the decree in
Oliver's Executors v.
Gill, and because, under the proceedings based on or
originating from, the insolvent petition of James Williams and the
act of assembly applicable thereto, Robert Oliver acquired a valid
title to all the interest of said James Williams in the fund in
controversy.
The reasons assigned by the majority of the Court for the
reversal of the decree in
Oliver's Executors v. Gill and
which are adopted as above and made part of the reasons for the
decision given in the present case of
Williams v. Oliver's
Executors were published in the report of the case of
Gill v. Oliver's
Executors, 11 How. 529. They are here repeated:
Page 53 U. S. 114
"The majority of this Court, who sat in the trial of this cause,
and by which was decreed the reversal of the decree of the county
court, at the instance of the solicitors of the appellees, briefly
state the following as their reasons for such reversal: they are of
opinion that the entire contract, upon which the claim of the
appellees is founded, is so fraught with illegality and turpitude
as to be utterly null and void, and conferring no rights or
obligations upon any of the contracting parties, which can be
sustained or countenanced by any court of law or equity in this
state or of the United States. That it has no legal or moral
obligation to support it, and that therefore, under the insolvent
laws of Maryland, such a claim does not pass to or vest in the
trustee of an insolvent petitioner. It forms no part of his
property or estate, within the meaning of the legislative
enactments constituting our insolvent system. It bears no analogy
to the cases decided in Maryland and elsewhere of claims not
recoverable in a court of justice, which nevertheless have been
held to vest in the trustees of an insolvent or the assignees of a
bankrupt. In the cases referred to, the claims, as concerned those
asserting them, were, on their part, tainted by no principle of
illegality or immorality; on the contrary, were sustained by every
principle of national law and natural justice, and nothing was
wanting to render them recuperable but a judicial tribunal
competent to take cognizance thereof. Wholly dissimilar is the
claim before us. Such is its character that it cannot be presented
to a court of justice but by a disclosure of its impurities, and if
anything is conclusively settled or ought to be so regarded, it is
that a claim, thus imbued with illegality and corruption, will
never be sanctioned or enforced by a court either of law or
equity."
"Entertaining this view of the case, it is unnecessary to
examine the various minor points which were raised in the argument
before us."
These reasons, as has been before remarked, are made applicable
to the present case of
Williams v. Oliver's Executors.
Williams sued out a writ of error and brought his case up to
this Court.
Page 53 U. S. 119
MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is not distinguishable from the case decided at the
last term of
Gill v. Oliver's Executors, and which was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Page 53 U. S. 120
It is reported in
52 U. S. 11 How.
529. That case involved the right to the share of Lyde Goodwin as a
member of the "Baltimore Mexican Company" in the fund that had been
awarded to the members of that company by the commissioners under
the convention of 1839 with Mexico. Gill claimed it as permanent
trustee under the insolvent laws of Maryland, the benefit of which
Goodwin had obtained in 1817, on the assignment of all his property
for the use of his creditors.
The executors of Oliver claimed the right of Goodwin to this
fund under an assignment made by himself 30 May, 1829.
The money awarded by the commissioners to this company under the
treaty, had, by the agreement of all parties claiming an interest
in the same, been deposited in the Mechanics' Bank of Baltimore, to
be distributed according to the rights of the respective parties
claiming it.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland decided against the right of
Gill as the permanent trustee of Goodwin, under the insolvent
proceedings, and in favor of the right of the executors of
Oliver.
The case was brought here by writ of error for review, and was
dismissed as we have stated for want of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland had decided against the right
of Gill on the ground that the contract made by the "Baltimore
Mexican Company" with General Mina, in 1816, by which means were
furnished him to carry on a military expedition against the
territories and dominions of the King of Spain, a foreign prince
with whom the United States were at peace, was in violation of our
Neutrality act of 1794, and consequently illegal and void, and
could not be the foundation of any right of property, or interest
existing in Goodwin in 1817, the date of the insolvent proceedings,
and hence that no interest in the subject matter passed to the
permanent trustees, setting up a title under them.
After the revolutionary party in Mexico had achieved their
independence, and about the year 1825 the public authorities, under
the new government, recognized this claim of the Baltimore Company,
as valid and binding upon it, and as such it was brought before the
board of commissioners, under the convention of 1839, and
allowed.
It was not denied on the argument, and indeed could not have
been successfully, that the contract with General Mina in 1816 was
illegal and void, having been made in express violation of law, and
hence that no interest in, or right of property arising out of it,
legal or equitable, could pass, in 1817, the date of the insolvent
proceedings of Goodwin, to the trustee, for the benefit of his
creditors. But it was urged that the subsequent
Page 53 U. S. 121
recognition and adoption of the obligation by the new
government, had relation back, so as to confirm and legalize the
original transaction, and thereby give operation and effect to the
title of the trustee at the date mentioned.
And upon this ground it was insisted that the decision of the
court below, denying the right of Gill the permanent trustee, was a
decision against a right derived under the treaty and award of the
commissioners, which therefore brought the case within the 25th
section of the Judiciary Act.
Undoubtedly, upon this aspect of the case, and assuming that
there was any well founded ground to be found in the record for
maintaining it, jurisdiction might have been very properly
entertained, and the question as to the effect of the recognition
of the obligation by Mexico, and award under the treaty in
pursuance thereof, upon the right claimed by the trustee under the
insolvent proceedings, examined and decided. The decision below, in
this aspect of the case, must have involved the effect and
operation of the treaty and award of the commissioners under
it.
But a majority of the court were of opinion that no such
question existed in the case, or was decided by the court below,
and that the only one properly arising, or that was decided, was
the one growing out of the contract with General Mina of 1816, and
of the effect and operation to be given to it under the insolvent
laws of Maryland.
The money awarded to the Mexican Company was a fund in court,
and had been brought in by the consent of all parties concerned,
for distribution according to their respective rights. The
plaintiff in error claimed the share of Goodwin, under the
insolvent proceedings of 1817, as trustee for the creditors through
the contract with Mina, the defendants by virtue of an assignment
from Goodwin himself in 1829, after Mexico had recognized and
acknowledged the claim as valid. The money had been awarded to
certain persons "in trust for whom it may concern," without
undertaking to settle the rights of the several claimants. The
court, in giving effect and operation to the insolvent laws of
Maryland, as to the vesting of the property and estate of the
insolvent in the hands of the trustee, for the benefit of the
creditors, held, that no interest or right could be claimed under
them through the contract of 1816, but that the right of Goodwin to
the fund passed by his assignment in 1829 to the defendants.
MR. JUSTICE GRIER, in delivering the opinion of the majority of
the Court, speaking of that decision, observes, that in deciding
the question, the courts of Maryland have put no construction on
the treaty or award asserted by one party to be the true one, and
denied by the other. It was before them as a fact only, and
Page 53 U. S. 122
not for the purpose of construction. Whether this money paid
into the court under the award, and first acknowledged by Mexico as
a debt in 1825, existed as a debt transferable by the Maryland
insolvent laws in 1817, or whether it, for the first time, assumed
the nature of a chose in action transferable by assignment after
1825, when acknowledged of record by Mexico, and passed by the
assignment of Lyde Goodwin to Robert Oliver, was a question wholly
dehors the treaty and award, and involving the construction of the
laws of Maryland only, and not of any treaty, or statute, or
commission, under the United States. And Mr. Justice Woodbury, who
dissented on the question of jurisdiction, observes, that the
claim, so far as it regards the enforcement of the treaty with
Mexico, does not seem to have been overruled in terms by the state
court. That court did not decide that the treaty was corrupt or
illegal, or in any way a nullity, when they held that the original
contract violated the laws of neutrality. So far, too, as regards
the award made by the commissioners, that the Baltimore Mexican
Company, and their legal representatives, had a just claim under
the treaty for the amount awarded, it was not overruled at all.
Again, he observes that all must concede that the state court
speaks in language against the Mina contract alone as illegal, and
in terms do not impugn either the treaty or the award, and it is
merely a matter of inference or argument that either of these was
assailed, or any right properly claimed under them overruled. But
it is true the court held that Oliver's executors, rather than the
appellant, were entitled to the fund furnished by Mexico, and long
subsequent to Mina's contract, but in coming to that conclusion,
they seem to have been governed by their own views as to their own
laws and the principles of general jurisprudence. The treaty or
award contained nothing as to the point whether Gill or Oliver's
executors had the better right to his share, but only that the
Mexican Company and their legal representatives should receive the
fund. This last the court did not question.
The decision of the court below therefore, not involving the
validity of the treaty or award of the commissioner, or lawfulness
or character of the fund, but simply the right and title to the
respective shares claimed in it, after the fund had been paid over
by the government, and brought into court for distribution
according to the agreement of all concerned, and which distribution
depended upon the laws of the state, a majority of the court,
taking this view of the case, held that there was a want of
jurisdiction, and dismissed the writ of error, and that the
decision, whether right or wrong, could not be the subject of
review under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, as it
involved
Page 53 U. S. 123
no question, either directly or by necessary intendment, arising
upon the treaty or award, or connected with the validity of either,
and if this Court were right in the view thus taken of the case,
there can be no doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion
arrived at. A different view of the case might, of course, lead to
a different conclusion.
Now in the case before us, the plaintiff in error claims the
share of John Gooding, one of the members of the Mexican Company,
as permanent trustee under the insolvent laws of Maryland, having
been appointed 29 January, 1842, Gooding having taken the benefit
of these acts, and assigned his property for the benefit of the
creditors as early as 1819.
George Winchester had been previously appointed provisional
trustee on 23 June, 1810, to whom all property had been assigned,
and on 2 May, 1823, had been appointed permanent trustee, and gave
a bond for the faithful execution of his duties without surety, and
on 2 April, 1825, sold the interest of Gooding in this share to
Robert Oliver, under an order of sale made by the Baltimore County
Court, having jurisdiction in the matter, for the consideration of
$2,000. And in 1841 the Legislature of Maryland passed a law
confirming this sale, a doubt having been suggested as to its
validity, for want of a surety to the official bond of the
trustee.
In this state of the case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that the interest of Gooding in the Mexican contract did not pass,
under their insolvent laws, to the plaintiff in error as permanent
trustee, for the reasons assigned in the previous case of
Gill
v. Oliver's Executors. And that if it did or could have passed
under these laws, it passed to Winchester, the previous trustee, in
connection with the confirming act of the legislature of 1841.
It is apparent, therefore, if the decision in the case of
Gill v. Oliver's Executors involved no question that gave
to this Court jurisdiction to revise it here, as has already been
decided, none exists in the case before us, for as it respects the
question of jurisdiction, the two stand upon the same footing and
involve precisely the same principles.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error sought to distinguish
this case from the previous one, and to maintain the jurisdiction
of the court, upon the ground that the act of the Legislature of
Maryland of 1841, confirming the authority of Winchester, the
permanent trustee, was in contravention of a provision of the
Constitution of the United States as a "law impairing the
obligation of contracts."
But, admitting this to be so, which we do not, still the
admission would not affect the result. For the decision upon
the
Page 53 U. S. 124
previous branch of the case denied to the plaintiff any right
to, or interest in, the fund in question, as claimed under the
insolvent proceedings, as permanent trustee, and hence he was
deemed disabled from maintaining any action founded upon that
claim.
It was of no importance, therefore, as it respected the
plaintiff in the distribution of the fund, whether it was
rightfully or wrongfully awarded to Oliver's executors. He had no
longer any interest in the question.
In order to give jurisdiction to this Court to revise the
judgment of a state court under the 25th section of the Judiciary
Act, a question must not only exist on the record, actually or by
necessary intendment, as mentioned in that section and the decision
of the court as there stated, but the decision must be controlling
in the disposition of the case, or, in the language of some of the
cases on the subject,
"the judgment of the state court would not have been what it is
if there had not been a misconstruction of some act of Congress or
a decision against the validity of the right, title, privilege, or
exemption set up under it."
28 U. S. 3 Pet.
292,
28 U. S. 302.
Or, as stated by Mr. Justice Story in
Crowell v.
Randell, 10 Pet. 392, where he reviewed all the
cases, it must appear
"from the facts stated by just and necessary inference that the
question was made and that the court below must, in order to have
arrived at the judgment pronounced by it, have come to the vary
decision of that question as indispensable to that judgment."
And in a recent case,
46 U. S. 5 How.
341, following out the doctrine of the previous cases,
"It is not enough that the record shows that the plaintiff in
error contended and claimed that the judgment of the court impaired
the obligation of a contract and violated the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States and that this claim was overruled
by the court, but it must appear by clear and necessary intendment
that the question must have been raised and must have been decided
in order to induce the judgment."
It is not intended nor to be understood from these cases that
the question thus material to the decision arrived at must be
confined exclusively and specially to the construction of the
treaty, act of Congress &c., on order to give the jurisdiction,
as this would be too narrow a view of it. Points may arise growing
out of and connected with the general question and so blended with
it as not to be separated, and therefore falling equally within the
decision contemplated by the 25th section. The cases of
Smith v.
Maryland, 6 Cranch 281, and
Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 305,
14 U. S. 355,
afford illustrations of this principle.
Now as the decision of the question involving the right and
Page 53 U. S. 125
title of the plaintiff in error to Gooding's interest in this
fund under the insolvent proceedings was against him in the court
below, and was one which in our judgment involved only a question
of state law, and therefore not the subject of revision here, and
was conclusive upon his rights and decisive of the case, it follows
that we have no jurisdiction within the principle of the cases to
which we have referred, for the determination of the court upon the
validity of the act of the legislature of 1841 in no way controlled
the judgment at which the court arrived, as respected the
plaintiff. That turned upon the decision as to the right of the
plaintiff to the fund under the insolvent proceedings, as permanent
trustee of Gooding, and whatever might have been the opinion of the
court upon the other question, the result of their judgment would
have been the same.
For the reason, therefore, that this case falls directly within
the decision of
Gill v. Oliver's Executors and is not
distinguishable from it, the case must take the same direction, and
be
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland for the Western
Shore, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is
now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that this cause be and
the same is hereby dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.
