Respondent Garner filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code, listing a fraud judgment in petitioners'
favor as a dischargeable debt. Petitioners then filed a complaint
in the proceeding requesting a determination that their claim
should be exempted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a), which
provides that a debtor may not be discharged from,
inter
alia, obligations for money obtained by "actual fraud."
Presented with portions of the fraud case record, the Bankruptcy
Court found that the elements of actual fraud under § 523 were
proved and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel required a
holding that the debt was not dischargeable. It and the District
Court rejected Garner's argument that collateral estoppel does not
apply because the fraud trial's jury instructions required that
fraud be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas § 523
requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that the clear-and-convincing evidence
standard applies in fraud cases, since Congress would not have
silently changed pre-§ 523(a) law, which generally applied the
higher standard in common law fraud litigation and in resolving
dischargeability issues, and since the Code's general "fresh start"
policy militated in favor of a broad construction favorable to the
debtor.
Held: Preponderance of the evidence is the standard of
proof for § 523(a)'s dischargeability exceptions. Neither § 523 and
its legislative history nor the legislative history of § 523's
predecessor prescribes a standard of proof, a silence that is
inconsistent with the view that Congress intended to require a
clear-and-convincing evidence standard. The preponderance standard
is presumed to be applicable in civil actions between private
parties unless particularly important individual interests or
rights are at stake, and, in the context of the discharge exemption
provisions, a debtor's interest in discharge is insufficient to
require a heightened standard. Such a standard is not required to
effectuate the Code's "fresh start" policy. Since the Code limits
the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the
honest but unfortunate debtor by exempting certain debts from
discharge, it is unlikely that Congress would have fashioned a
proof standard that favored an interest in giving the perpetrators
of fraud a fresh start over an interest in protecting the victims
of fraud. It is also fair to infer from § 523(a)'s structure
that
Page 498 U. S. 280
Congress intended the preponderance standard to apply to all of
the discharge exceptions. That they are grouped together in the
same subsection with no suggestion that any particular exception is
subject to a special standard implies that the same standard should
govern all of them, and it seems clear that a preponderance
standard is sufficient to establish nondischargeability of some
claims. The fact that many States required proof of fraud by clear
and convincing evidence at the time the current Code was enacted
does not mean that Congress silently endorsed such a rule for the
fraud discharge exception. Unlike many States, Congress has chosen
a preponderance standard when it has created substantive causes of
action for fraud. In addition, it amended the Bankruptcy Act in
1970 to make nondischargeability a question of federal law
independent of the issue of the underlying claim's validity, which
is determined by state law. Moreover, both before and after 1970,
courts were split over the appropriate proof standard for the fraud
discharge exception. Application of the preponderance standard will
also permit exception from discharge of all fraud claims creditors
have reduced to judgment, a result that accords with the historical
development of the discharge exceptions, which have been altered to
broaden the coverage of the fraud exceptions. Pp.
498 U. S.
283-291.
881 F.2d 579 (CA8 1989), reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a discharge
in bankruptcy shall not discharge an individual debtor from certain
kinds of obligations, including those for money
Page 498 U. S. 281
obtained by "actual fraud." [
Footnote 1] The question in this case is whether the
statute requires a defrauded creditor to prove his claim by clear
and convincing evidence in order to preserve it from discharge.
Petitioners brought an action against respondent alleging that
he had defrauded them in connection with the sale of certain
corporate securities. App. 16-25. Following the trial court's
instructions that authorized a recovery based on the preponderance
of the evidence, a jury returned a verdict in favor of petitioners
and awarded them actual and punitive damages.
Id. at
28-29. Respondent appealed from the judgment on the verdict, and,
while his appeal was pending, he filed a petition for relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, listing the fraud judgment as a
dischargeable debt.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reduced the damages
award, but affirmed the fraud judgment as modified.
Grogan v.
Garner, 806 F.2d 829 (1986). Petitioners then filed a
complaint in the bankruptcy proceeding requesting a determination
that their claim based on the fraud judgment should be exempted
from discharge pursuant to § 523. App. 3-4. In support of their
complaint, they introduced portions of the record in the fraud
case. The Bankruptcy Court found that all of the elements required
to establish actual fraud under § 523 had been proved, and that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel required a holding that the debt
was therefore not dischargeable.
In re Garner, 73 B.R. 26
(WD Mo.1987).
Page 498 U. S. 282
Respondent does not challenge the conclusion that the elements
of the fraud claim proved in the first trial are sufficient to
establish "fraud" within the meaning of § 523. [
Footnote 2] Instead, he has consistently argued
that collateral estoppel does not apply because the jury
instructions in the first trial merely required that fraud be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas § 523 requires
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Both the Bankruptcy Court
[
Footnote 3] and the District
Court [
Footnote 4] rejected
this argument.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed.
In re Garner,
881 F.2d 579 (CA8 1989). It recognized that the "Bankruptcy Code is
silent as to the burden of proof necessary to establish an
exception to discharge under section 523(a), including the
exception for fraud,"
id. at 581, but concluded that two
factors supported the imposition of a "clear and convincing"
standard, at least in fraud cases. First, the court stated that the
higher standard had generally been applied in both common law fraud
litigation and in resolving dischargeability
Page 498 U. S. 283
issues before § 523(a) was enacted, and reasoned that it was
unlikely that Congress had intended silently to change settled law.
[
Footnote 5] Second, the court
opined that the general "fresh start" policy that undergirds the
Bankruptcy Code militated in favor of a broad construction
favorable to the debtor. [
Footnote
6]
The Eighth Circuit holding is consistent with rulings in most
other Circuits, [
Footnote 7]
but conflicts with recent decisions by the Third and Fourth
Circuits. [
Footnote 8] The
conflict, together with the importance of the issue, prompted us to
grant certiorari, 495 U.S. 918. We now reverse.
I
At the outset, we distinguish between the standard of proof that
a creditor must satisfy in order to establish a valid claim against
a bankrupt estate and the standard that a creditor who has
established a valid claim must still satisfy in order to avoid
dischargeability. The validity of a creditor's claim is determined
by rules of state law.
See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm.
v. Green, 329 U. S. 156,
329 U. S.
161
Page 498 U. S. 284
(1946). [
Footnote 9] Since
1970, however, the issue of nondischargeability has been a matter
of federal law governed by the terms of the Bankruptcy Code.
See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U. S. 127,
442 U. S.
129-130,
442 U. S. 136
(1979). [
Footnote 10]
This distinction is the wellspring from which cases of this kind
flow. In this case, a creditor who reduced his fraud claim to a
valid and final judgment in a jurisdiction that requires proof of
fraud by a preponderance of the evidence seeks to minimize
additional litigation by invoking collateral estoppel. If the
preponderance standard also governs the question of
nondischargeability, a bankruptcy court could properly give
collateral estoppel effect to those elements of the claim that are
identical to the elements required for discharge and which were
actually litigated and determined in the prior action.
See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). [
Footnote 11] If, however, the
clear-and-convincing standard applies
Page 498 U. S. 285
to nondischargeability, the prior judgment could not be given
collateral estoppel effect. § 28(4). A creditor who successfully
obtained a fraud judgment in a jurisdiction that requires proof of
fraud by clear and convincing evidence would, however, be
indifferent to the burden of proof regarding nondischargeability,
because he could invoke collateral estoppel in any event. [
Footnote 12]
In sum, if nondischargeability must be proved only by a
preponderance of the evidence, all creditors who have secured fraud
judgments, the elements of which are the same as those of the fraud
discharge exception, will be exempt from discharge under collateral
estoppel principles. If, however, nondischargeability must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, creditors who secured
fraud judgments based only on the preponderance standard would not
be assured of qualifying for the fraud discharge exception.
Page 498 U. S. 286
II
With these considerations in mind, we begin our inquiry into the
appropriate burden of proof under § 523 by examining the language
of the statute and its legislative history. The language of § 523
does not prescribe the standard of proof for the discharge
exceptions. The legislative history of § 523 and its predecessor,
11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976 ed.), is also silent. This silence is
inconsistent with the view that Congress intended to require a
special, heightened standard of proof.
Because the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard results in a
roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants, we
presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between
private litigants unless "particularly important individual
interests or rights are at stake."
Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375,
459 U. S.
389-390 (1983);
see also Addington v. Texas,
441 U. S. 418,
441 U. S. 423
(1979). We have previously held that a debtor has no constitutional
or "fundamental" right to a discharge in bankruptcy.
See United
States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434,
409 U. S.
445-446 (1973). We also do not believe that, in the
context of provisions designed to exempt certain claims from
discharge, a debtor has an interest in discharge sufficient to
require a heightened standard of proof.
We are unpersuaded by the argument that the clear-and-convincing
standard is required to effectuate the "fresh start" policy of the
Bankruptcy Code. This Court has certainly acknowledged that a
central purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which
certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace
with their creditors, and enjoy "a new opportunity in life with a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt."
Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U. S. 234,
292 U. S. 244
(1934). But in the same breath that we have invoked this "fresh
start" policy, we have been careful to explain that the Act
Page 498 U. S. 287
limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new
beginning to the "honest but unfortunate debtor."
Ibid.
The statutory provisions governing nondischargeability reflect a
congressional decision to exclude from the general policy of
discharge certain categories of debts -- such as child support,
alimony, and certain unpaid educational loans and taxes, as well as
liabilities for fraud. Congress evidently concluded that the
creditors' interest in recovering full payment of debts in these
categories outweighed the debtors' interest in a complete fresh
start. We think it unlikely that Congress, in fashioning the
standard of proof that governs the applicability of these
provisions, would have favored the interest in giving perpetrators
of fraud a fresh start over the interest in protecting victims of
fraud. Requiring the creditor to establish by a preponderance
Page 498 U. S. 288
of the evidence that his claim is not dischargeable reflects a
fair balance between these conflicting interests.
III
Our conviction that Congress intended the preponderance standard
to apply to the discharge exceptions is reinforced by the structure
of § 523(a), [
Footnote 13]
which groups together in the same subsection a variety of
exceptions without any indication that any particular exception is
subject to a special standard of proof. The omission of any
suggestion that different exemptions have different burdens of
proof implies that the legislators intended the same standard to
govern the nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2) of fraud claims
and, for example, the nondischargeability under § 523(a)(5) of
claims for child support and alimony. Because it seems clear that a
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to establish the
nondischargeability of some of the types of claims covered by §
523(a), [
Footnote 14] it is
fair to infer that Congress intended the ordinary preponderance
standard to govern the applicability of all the discharge
exceptions.
We are therefore not inclined to accept respondent's contention
that application of the ordinary preponderance standard to the
fraud exception is inappropriate because, at the time Congress
enacted the current Bankruptcy Code, the majority of states
required proof of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. [
Footnote 15] Even if we believed
that Congress had contemplated the application of different burdens
of proof for different exceptions, the fact that most States
required fraud claims to be proved by clear and convincing evidence
would not support the conclusion that Congress intended to adopt
the clear-and-convincing standard for the fraud discharge
exception.
Unlike a large number, and perhaps the majority, of the States,
Congress has chosen the preponderance standard when it has created
substantive causes of action for fraud.
See, e.g., 31
U.S.C. § 3731(c) (False Claims Act); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1833a(e) (civil
penalties for fraud involving financial institutions); 42 CFR §
1003.114(a) (1989) (Medicare and Medicaid fraud under 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7a);
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at
459 U. S.
388-390 (civil enforcement of the antifraud provisions
of
Page 498 U. S. 289
the securities laws);
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U. S.
91,
450 U. S. 96
(1981) (administrative proceedings concerning violation of
antifraud provisions of the securities laws);
SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344,
320 U. S. 355
(1943) (§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933);
First National
Monetary Corp. v. Weinberger, 819 F.2d 1334, 1341-1342 (CA6
1987) (civil fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act).
Cf. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.
S. 479,
473 U. S. 491
(1985) (suggesting that the preponderance standard applies to civil
actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act). Most notably, Congress chose the preponderance standard to
govern determinations under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4), which denies a
debtor the right to discharge altogether if the debtor has
committed a fraud on the bankruptcy court.
See H.R.Rep.
No. 95-595, p. 384 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978,
pp. 5787, 6340 ("The fourth ground for denial of discharge is the
commission of a bankruptcy crime, though the standard of proof is
preponderance of the evidence"); S.Rep. No. 95-989, p. 98 (1978),
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 5884 (same). [
Footnote 16]
Moreover, as we explained in Part I,
supra, Congress
amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1970 to make nondischargeability a
question of federal law independent of the issue of the validity of
the underlying claim. Even before 1970, many courts imposed the
preponderance burden on creditors invoking the fraud discharge
exception.
See, e.g., Sweet v. Ritter Finance
Co., 263 F.
Supp. 540, 543 (WD Va.1967);
Nickel Plate Cloverleaf
Federal Credit Union v. White, 120 Ill.App.2d 91, 93-94, 256
N.E.2d 119, 120-121 (1970);
Gonzales v. Aetna Finance Co.,
86 Nev. 271, 275,
468 P.2d 15, 18
(1970);
Beneficial Finance Co. of Manchester v. Machie, 6
Conn.Cir. 37, 41, 263 A.2d 707, 710 (1969);
Budget Finance Plan
v. Haner, 92 Idaho 56, 59, 436 P.2d 722, 725
Page 498 U. S. 290
(1968);
Atlas Credit Corp. v. Miller, 216 So. 2d 100,
101 (La.Ct.App.1968);
Household Finance Corp. v.
Altenberg, 5 Ohio St.2d 190, 193, 214 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1966);
MAC Finance Plan of Nashua, Inc. v. Stone, 106 N.H. 517,
521-522, 214 A.2d 878, 882 (1965). And, following the 1970
amendments, but prior to the enactment of § 523 in 1978, the courts
continued to be nearly evenly split over the appropriate standard
of proof.
Compare, e.g., Fierman v.
Lazarus, 361 F.
Supp. 477, 480 (ED Pa.1973);
In re Scott, 1 BCD 581,
583 (Bkrtcy.Ct. WD Mich.1975)
with Brown v.
Buchanan, 419 F.
Supp. 199,
203 (ED
Va.1975);
In re Arden, 75 B.R. 707, 710
(Bkrtcy.Ct.R.I.1975). Thus, it would not be reasonable to conclude
that in enacting § 523 Congress silently endorsed a background rule
that clear-and-convincing evidence is required to establish
exemption from discharge.
IV
A final consideration supporting our conclusion that the
preponderance standard is the proper one is that, as we explained
in
498 U. S.
supra, application of that standard will permit exception
from discharge of all fraud claims creditors have successfully
reduced to judgment. This result accords with the historical
development of the discharge exceptions. As we explained in
Brown v. Felsen, the 1898 Bankruptcy Act provided that
"judgments" sounding in fraud were exempt from discharge. 30 Stat.
550. In the 1903 revisions, Congress substituted the term
"liabilities" for "judgments." 32 Stat. 798. This alteration was
intended to broaden the coverage of the fraud exceptions.
See
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 138.
Absent a clear indication from Congress of a change in policy, it
would be inconsistent with this earlier expression of congressional
intent to construe the exceptions to allow some debtors facing
fraud judgments to have those judgments discharged.
Page 498 U. S. 291
For these reasons, we hold that the standard of proof for the
dischargeability exceptions in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) is the ordinary
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Title 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) provides, in pertinent part:
"Exceptions to discharge."
"(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt -- "
"
* * * *"
"(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by -- "
"(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,
other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's
financial condition; . . . ."
[
Footnote 2]
We therefore do not consider the question whether § 523(a)(2)(A)
excepts from discharge that part of a judgment in excess of the
actual value of money or property received by a debtor by virtue of
fraud.
See In re Rubin, 875 F.2d 755, 758, n. 1 (CA9
1989). Arguably, fraud judgments in cases in which the defendant
did not obtain money, property, or services from the plaintiffs and
those judgments that include punitive damages awards are more
appropriately governed by § 523(a)(6).
See 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(6) (excepting from discharge debts "for willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property
of another entity");
In re Rubin, 875 F.2d at 758, n.
1.
[
Footnote 3]
The Bankruptcy Court concluded that "there is no real
distinction between
preponderance of the evidence' and `clear
and convincing' as regards Section 523 litigation." In re
Garner, 73 B.R. 26, 29 (WD Mo.1987).
[
Footnote 4]
The District Court explained:
"A relitigation of this case in Bankruptcy Court on the
identical fact issues would be to permit the party who loses at a
jury trial to have a second day in court on the same issue he and
his opponent were fully heard previously. It permitted, all like
cases would result in duplicitous litigation resulting in an
unreasonable burden on the bankruptcy court."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a.
[
Footnote 5]
"While the legislative history is scant on this issue, we feel
that it is fair to presume that Congress was aware that the
prevailing view at the time of adoption was that fraud, for both
section 523 and state common law purposes, had to be proved by
clear and convincing evidence."
In re Garner, 881 F.2d at 582.
[
Footnote 6]
"This Circuit concluded that the stricter standard was
appropriate, since the general policy of bankruptcy is to provide
the debtor with the opportunity for a fresh start and the courts
should, thereby, construe provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
favoring the debtor broadly.
Matter of Van Horne, 823 F.2d
[1285, 1287 (CA8 1987).]"
Ibid.
[
Footnote 7]
See In re Phillips, 804 F.2d 930, 932 (CA6 1986);
In re Kimzey, 761 F.2d 421, 423-424 (CA7 1985);
In re
Black, 787 F.2d 503, 505 (CA10 1986);
Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1262 (CA11 1988);
In re
Hunter, 780 F.2d 1577, 1579 (CA11 1986);
In re
Dougherty, 84 B.R. 653 (CA9 BAP 1988).
[
Footnote 8]
In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621 (CA3 1990);
Combs v.
Richardson, 838 F.2d 112 (CA4 1988).
[
Footnote 9]
We use the term "state law" expansively herein to refer to all
nonbankruptcy law that creates substantive claims. We thus mean to
include in this term claims that have their source in substantive
federal law, such as federal securities law or other federal
antifraud laws. As the
amici point out, many federal
antifraud laws that may give rise to nondischargeable claims
require plaintiffs to prove their right to recover only by a
preponderance of the evidence.
See Brief for United States
et al. as
Amici Curiae 1-3, and n. 2.
[
Footnote 10]
Before 1970, the bankruptcy courts had concurrent jurisdiction
with the state courts to decide whether debts were excepted from
discharge. In practice, however, bankruptcy courts generally
refrained from deciding whether particular debts were excepted, and
instead allowed those questions to be litigated in the state
courts.
See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 129;
1A Collier on Bankruptcy � 17.28, pp. 1726 1727 (14th ed. 1978).
The state courts therefore determined the applicable burden of
proof, often applying the same standard of proof that governed the
underlying claim. The 1970 amendments took jurisdiction over
certain dischargeability exceptions, including the exceptions for
fraud, away from the state courts and vested jurisdiction
exclusively in the bankruptcy courts.
See Brown v. Felsen,
442 U.S. at
442 U. S.
135-136; S.Rep. No. 91-1173, pp. 2-3 (1970); H.R.Rep.
No. 91-1502, p. 1 (1970), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1970, p.
4156.
[
Footnote 11]
Our prior cases have suggested, but have not formally held, that
the principles of collateral estoppel apply in bankruptcy
proceedings under the current Bankruptcy Code.
See, e.g., Kelly
v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36,
479 U. S. 48, n.
8 (1986);
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 139,
n. 10.
Cf. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.
S. 726,
327 U. S. 736
(1946) (applying collateral estoppel under an earlier version of
the bankruptcy laws). Virtually every court of appeals has
concluded that collateral estoppel.is applicable in discharge
exception proceedings.
See In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 630
(CA3 1990);
Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112, 115 (CA4
1988);
Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1295 (CA7
1987);
In re Shuler, 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (CA5),
cert.
denied sub nom. Harold V. Simpson & Co. v. Shuler, 469
U.S. 817 (1984);
Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 604 (CA10
1983);
Lovell v. Mixon, 719 F.2d 1373, 1376 (CA8 1983);
Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 228 (CA6 1981).
Cf.
In re Rahm, 641 F.2d 755, 757 (CA9) (prior judgment
establishes only a
prima facie case of
nondischargeability),
cert. denied, sub nom. Gregg v.
Rahm, 454 U.S. 860 (1981). We now clarify that collateral
estoppel principles do indeed apply in discharge exception
proceedings pursuant to § 523(a).
[
Footnote 12]
This indifference would not be shared, however, by a creditor
who either did not try, or tried
unsuccessfully, to prove
fraud in a jurisdiction requiring clear and convincing evidence,
but who nonetheless established a valid claim by proving, for
example, a breach of contract involving the same transaction.
See, e.g., In re Black, 787 F.2d 503 (CA10 1986);
In
re Rubin, 875 F.2d at 758, n. 1.
[
Footnote 13]
See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.
S. 152,
494 U. S. 158
(1990) ("In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not
only to the particular statutory language but to the design of the
statute as a whole and to its object and policy");
K Mart Corp.
v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281,
486 U. S. 291
(1988) ("In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the
court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as
well as the language and design of the statute as a whole").
[
Footnote 14]
For example, § 523(a) provides for the nondischargeability of
debts not only for child support and alimony, but also for certain
fines and penalties, educational loans, and tax obligations.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1); § 523(a)(5); § 523(a)(7); §
523(a)(8).
[
Footnote 15]
Respondent claims that the vast majority of States applied the
heightened standard.
See Brief for Respondent 8-14.
Petitioners and the
amici acknowledge that the
clear-and-convincing standard applied in many jurisdictions, but
contend that respondent overstates the number of States that
required the heightened standard.
See Brief for
Petitioners 17-20, and n. 1; Brief for United States
et
al. as
Amici Curiae 21-25. Resolution of this dispute
is not necessary for our decision.
[
Footnote 16]
Prior to the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the courts
of appeals had held that the preponderance standard applied in this
situation.
See, e.g., In re Robinson, 506 F.2d 1184, 1187
(CA2 1974);
Union Bank v. Blum, 460 F.2d 197, 200-201 (CA9
1972).