FLORIDA v. BURR
Annotate this Case
496 U.S. 914 (1990)
U.S. Supreme Court
FLORIDA v. BURR , 496 U.S. 914 (1990)
496 U.S. 914
Charles Lewis BURR. No. 89-1320.
Former decision, 487 U.S. 1201; 487 U.S. 1250, 109 S. Ct. 13.
Case below, 518 So.2d 903; 550 So.2d 444.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida.
June 11, 1990. The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for further consideration in light of Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
Opinion on remand, 576 So.2d 278.
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.
For the reasons stated by Justice STEVENS, I agree that the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court should not be vacated.
In any event, adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 2950 (1976), I would direct that the proceedings on remand be circumscribed such that the State may not impose the death sentence.
Justice BLACKMUN dissents.
Justice STEVENS, dissenting.
Respondent was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with a firearm. To establish respondent's identity, at the guilt phase of the trial the prosecution relied on "collateral crimes evidence"-three witnesses testified that respondent had committed similar crimes after the fatal shooting involved in this case. At the sentencing phase of his trial, the prosecutor offered no additional evidence; the jury recommended that respondent be sentenced to imprisonment for life with no possibility of parole for 25 years.
The trial judge overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced respondent to death. He unequivocally stated that his decision to impose the death sentence was based on the collateral crimes evidence that had been received for the limited purpose of proving respondent's identity at the guilt phase of the trial. [Footnote 1]
Respondent was later tried and acquitted of one of the collateral crimes, and the State abandoned its prosecution of a second. Thereafter, in state collateral-review proceedings, respondent sought to set aside his conviction on the ground that the subsequent acquittal of one of the collateral crimes demonstrated that the evidence had been improperly admitted. [Footnote 2] Over the dissent of Justice Barkett, the Florida Supreme Court rejected that conten- [496 U.S. 914 , 916]