Respondents, deceased miners' survivors, filed a state law
wrongful death action in Idaho state court against petitioner
Union, the miners' exclusive bargaining agent, alleging that the
miners' deaths in an underground fire were proximately caused by
the Union's fraudulent and negligent acts in connection with mine
safety inspections conducted by its representatives pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement with the mine's operator. On remand
from a State Supreme Court decision that the claims were not
preempted by federal labor law, the trial court granted summary
judgment for the Union. It found that the record was devoid of
evidence supporting the fraud claim, and urged the State Supreme
Court to reconsider its decision that the negligence claim was not
preempted. The State Supreme Court upheld the trial court's summary
judgment on the fraud claim, but again concluded that respondents'
negligence claim was not preempted. Distinguishing this Court's
decision in
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.
S. 202 -- which held that a state law tort action
against an employer may be preempted by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, if the duty to the employee that
was violated by the tort is created by a collective bargaining
agreement and without existence independent of the agreement -- the
court found that the instant agreement's provisions did "not
require interpretation, . . . but rather . . . determine[d] only
the nature and scope of the Union's duty." This Court vacated the
State Supreme Court's judgment and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of
Electrical Workers v. Hechler,
481 U. S. 851,
which extended
Allis-Chalmers to a tort suit by an
employee against her union. On remand, the State Supreme Court
distinguished
Hechler on the ground that, there, the
alleged duty of care arose from the collective bargaining
agreement, whereas, here, the Union's duty to perform the
inspection reasonably arose from the fact of the inspection itself
rather than the fact that the provision for the Union's
participation in the inspection was contained in the labor
contract. Since it was conceded that the Union undertook to
inspect, the court noted, the sole issue was whether that
inspection was negligent under state tort law.
Page 495 U. S. 363
Held:
1. Respondents' tort claim is preempted by § 301. The claim
cannot be described as independent of the collective bargaining
agreement, since the Union's representatives were participating in
the inspection process pursuant to that agreement's provisions.
Thus, if the Union failed to perform a duty in connection with the
inspection, it was a duty arising out of the agreement signed by
the Union as the miners' bargaining agent, not a duty of reasonable
care owed to every person in society. Preemption by federal law
cannot be avoided by characterizing the Union's negligence as a
state law tort. Pp.
495 U. S.
368-372.
2. Respondents may not maintain a § 301 suit against the Union.
Pp.
495 U. S.
372-376.
(a) Mere negligence, even in the enforcement of a collective
bargaining agreement, does not state a claim for breach of the duty
of fair representation, which is a purposely limited check on the
arbitrary exercise of union power. While a union may assume a
responsibility toward employees by accepting a duty of care through
a collective bargaining agreement,
Hechler, supra, at
481 U. S. 860,
if an employee claims that a union owes him a more far-reaching
duty, he must be able to point to language in the agreement
specifically indicating an intent to create obligations enforceable
against the union by the individual employees. Nothing in the
agreement at issue suggests that it creates such obligations, since
the pertinent part of the agreement consists of agreements between
the Union and the employer, and is enforceable only by them. Pp.
495 U. S.
372-375.
(b) Moreover, under traditional principles of contract
interpretation, respondents have no claim, for, as third-party
beneficiaries, they have no greater rights in the agreement than
does the promisee, the employer. Here, the employer has no
enforceable right as promisee. The agreement provisions respondents
rely on are not promises made by the Union to the employer. Rather,
the limited surrender of the employer's exclusive authority over
mine safety is a concession made by the employer to the Union. P.
495 U. S.
375.
(c) Although respondents' claim that the Union had committed
fraud on the membership in violation of state law might implicate
the duty of fair representation, respondents did not cross-petition
for review of the State Supreme Court's holding that summary
judgment was properly entered on this claim. P.
495 U. S.
376.
115 Idaho 785, 770 P.2d 794, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. KENNEDY,
J.,
Page 495 U. S. 364
filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and
SCALIA, J., joined,
post, p.
495 U. S.
376.
Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case because the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Idaho, holding that petitioner may be liable under
state law for the negligent inspection of a mine where respondents'
decedents worked, raised important questions about the operation of
federal and state law in defining the duties of a labor union
acting as a collective bargaining agent.
I
This dispute arises out of an underground fire that occurred on
May 2, 1972, at the Sunshine Mine in Kellogg, Idaho, and caused the
deaths of 91 miners. Respondents, the survivors of four of the
deceased miners, filed this state law wrongful death action in
Idaho state court. Their complaint alleged that the miners' deaths
were proximately caused by fraudulent and negligent acts of
petitioner United Steelworkers of America (Union), the exclusive
bargaining representative of the miners working at the Sunshine
Mine. As to the negligence claim, the complaint specifically
alleged that the Union
"undertook to act as accident prevention representative and
enforcer of an agreement negotiated between [
sic] [the
Union] on behalf of the deceased miners,"
App. 53-54, and
"undertook to provide representatives who inspected
Page 495 U. S. 365
[the Sunshine Mine] and pretended to enforce the contractual
accident prevention clauses,"
id. at 54. Respondents' answers to interrogatories
subsequently made clear that their suit was based on contentions
that the Union had, through a collective bargaining agreement
negotiated with the operator of the Sunshine Mine, caused to be
established a joint management/labor safety committee intended to
exert influence on management on mine safety measures; that members
of the safety committee designated by the Union had been
inadequately trained on mine safety issues; and that the Union,
through its representatives on the safety committee, had
negligently performed inspections of the mine that it had promised
to conduct, failing to uncover obvious and discoverable
deficiencies.
Id. at 82-83.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Union,
accepting the Union's argument that "federal law has preempted the
field of union representation and its obligation to its
membership," App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, and that "[n]egligent
performance of [a union's] contractual duties does not state a
claim under federal law for breach of fair representation,"
id. at 163a. The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed.
Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523,
602 P.2d 21 (1979). In the view of the Supreme Court of Idaho,
although federal law unquestionably imposed on the Union a duty of
fair representation of the miners, respondents' claims were "not
necessarily based on the violation of the duty of fair
representation, and such is not the only duty owed by a union to
its members."
Id. at 526, 602 P.2d at 24. Three of the
five justices concurred specially to emphasize that
"the precise nature of the legal issues raised by [respondents']
wrongful death action is not entirely clear at the present
procedural posture of the case,"
and that "a final decision whether the wrongful death action . .
. is preempted . . . must therefore await a full factual
development."
Id. at 547, 602 P.2d at 25 (Bakes, J.,
specially concurring).
Page 495 U. S. 366
We denied the Union's petition for certiorari.
Steelworkers
v. Dunbar, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).
After extensive discovery, the trial court again granted summary
judgment for the Union. App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a-106a. As to
respondents' fraud claim, the court concluded that the record was
devoid of evidence supporting the contentions that the Union had
made misrepresentations of fact, that the Union had intended to
defraud the miners, or that the miners had relied on Union
representations.
Id. at 96a. On the negligence count, the
trial court first noted that, in its view, respondents' claims
centered on the collective bargaining contract between the Union
and the Sunshine Mine, especially Article IX of the agreement,
which established the joint labor/management safety committee.
Id. at 90a-91a. The trial court urged the State Supreme
Court to reconsider its conclusion that respondents' state law
negligence claim was not preempted by federal labor law, reasoning
that
"[respondents] are complaining about the manner in which the
Union carried out the collective bargaining agreement, essentially
saying the Union advisory committee should have done more,"
and that respondents "are attempting to hold the [Union] liable
on the basis of its representational duties."
Id. at
103a-104a.
The Supreme Court of Idaho originally affirmed the grant of
summary judgment on appeal.
Id. at 49a-88a. On rehearing,
however, the Idaho Supreme Court withdrew its prior opinion and
concluded that respondents had stated a valid claim under Idaho law
that was not preempted by federal labor law.
Rawson v. United
Steelworkers of America, 111 Idaho 630, 726 P.2d 742 (1986).
Distinguishing this Court's decision in
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 471 U. S. 202
(1985), which held that resolution of a state law tort claim must
be treated as a claim arising under federal labor law when it is
substantially dependent on construction of the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court of Idaho stated
that,
"in the instant case, the provisions
Page 495 U. S. 367
of the collective bargaining agreement do not require
interpretation, . . . but rather the provisions determine only the
nature and scope of the Union's duty."
111 Idaho at 640, 726 P.2d at 752. The court continued:
"Our narrow holding today is that the Union, having inspected,
assumed a duty to use due care in inspecting and, from the duty to
use due care in inspecting arose the further duty to advise the
committee of any safety problems the inspection revealed."
Ibid. The court also affirmed the trial court's
conclusion that summary judgment for the Union was proper on
respondents' fraud claim.
Id. at 633, 726 P.2d at 745.
The Union again petitioned for certiorari. While that petition
was pending, we decided
Electrical Workers v. Hechler,
481 U. S. 851
(1987), in which it was held that an individual employee's state
law tort suit against her union for breach of the union's duty of
care to provide the employee with a safe workplace must be treated
as a claim under federal labor law when the duty of care allegedly
arose from the collective bargaining agreement between the union
and the employer. Six days later, we granted the Union's petition,
vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Idaho, and remanded
this case for further consideration in light of
Hechler.
Steelworkers v. Rawson, 482 U.S. 901 (1987).
On remand, the Supreme Court of Idaho "adhere[d] to [its]
opinion as written." 115 Idaho 785, 788, 770 P.2d 794, 797 (1988).
The court also distinguished
Hechler, stressing that there
we had considered a situation where the alleged duty of care arose
from the collective bargaining agreement, whereas in this case,
"the activity was concededly undertaken and the standard of care
is imposed by state law without reference to the collective
bargaining agreement."
115 Idaho at 786, 770 P.2d at 795. The court further stated that
it was
"not faced with looking at the Collective Bargaining Agreement
to determine whether it imposes some new duty upon the union --
rather it is conceded that the union undertook to inspect and,
thus, the issue is solely whether that
Page 495 U. S. 368
inspection was negligently performed under traditional Idaho
tort law."
Id. at 787, 770 P.2d at 796.
We granted certiorari, 493 U.S. 1017 (1990), and we now
reverse.
II
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA),
61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), states:
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
Over 30 years ago, this Court held that § 301 not only provides
the federal courts with jurisdiction over controversies involving
collective bargaining agreements but also authorizes the courts to
fashion "a body of federal law for the enforcement of these
collective bargaining agreements."
Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills of Alabama, 353 U. S. 448,
353 U. S. 451
(1957). Since then, the Court has made clear that § 301 is a potent
source of federal labor law, for though state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over controversies involving collective
bargaining agreements,
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U. S. 502
(1962), state courts must apply federal law in deciding those
claims,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S.
95 (1962), and indeed any state law cause of action for
violation of collective bargaining agreements is entirely displaced
by federal law under § 301,
see Avco Corp. v. Machinists,
390 U. S. 557
(1968). State law is thus "preempted" by § 301 in that only the
federal law fashioned by the courts under § 301 governs the
interpretation and application of collective bargaining
agreements.
Page 495 U. S. 369
In recent cases, we have recognized that the preemptive force of
§ 301 extends beyond state law contract actions. In
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.
S. 202 (1985), we held that a state law tort action
against an employer may be preempted by § 301 if the duty to the
employee of which the tort is a violation is created by a
collective bargaining agreement and without existence independent
of the agreement. Any other result, we reasoned, would "allow
parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by relabeling their
contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract."
Id. at
471 U. S. 211.
We extended this rule of preemption to a tort suit by an employee
against her union in
Electrical Workers v. Hechler, supra.
There Hechler alleged that her union had, by virtue of its
collective bargaining agreement with the employer and its
relationship with her, assumed the duty to ensure that she was
provided with a safe workplace, and that the union had violated
this duty. As in
Allis-Chalmers, the duty relied on by
Hechler was one without existence independent of the collective
bargaining agreement (unions not, under the common law of Florida,
being charged with a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing
a safe workplace,
see 481 U.S. at
481 U. S.
859-860), but was allegedly created by the collective
bargaining agreement, of which Hechler claimed to be a third-party
beneficiary,
see id. at
481 U. S. 861.
Because resolution of the tort claim would require a court to
"ascertain, first, whether the collective bargaining agreement
in fact placed an implied duty of care on the Union . . . and
second, the nature and scope of that duty,"
id. at
481 U. S. 862,
we held that the tort claim was not sufficiently independent of the
collective bargaining agreement to withstand the preemptive force
of § 301.
At first glance it would not appear difficult to apply these
principles to the instant case. Respondents alleged in their
complaint that the Union was negligent in its role as "enforcer of
an agreement negotiated between [
sic] [the Union] on
behalf of the deceased miners," App. 53-54, a plain reference
Page 495 U. S. 370
to the collective bargaining agreement with the operator of the
Sunshine Mine. Respondents' answers to interrogatories gave
substance to this allegation by stating that, "by the contract
language" of the collective bargaining agreement, the Union had
caused the establishment of the joint safety committee with
purported influence on mine safety issues, and that members of the
safety committee had failed reasonably to perform inspections of
the mine or to uncover obvious and discoverable deficiencies in the
mine safety program. App. 82-83. The only possible interpretation
of these pleadings, we believe, is that the duty on which
respondents relied as the basis of their tort suit was one
allegedly assumed by the Union in the collective bargaining
agreement. Prior to our remand, the Supreme Court of Idaho
evidently was of this view as well. The court noted then that the
Union could be liable under state tort law because it allegedly had
contracted to inspect, and had in fact inspected the mine "pursuant
to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement." 111
Idaho at 638, 726 P.2d at 750. Although the Idaho Supreme Court
believed that resolution of the tort claim would not require
interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
it acknowledged that the provisions of that agreement determined
"the nature and scope of the Union's duty,"
id. at 640,
726 P.2d at 752.
The situation is complicated, however, by the Idaho Supreme
Court's opinion after our remand. Although the court stated that it
adhered to its prior opinion as written, 115 Idaho at 788, 770 P.2d
at 797, it also rejected the suggestion that there was any need to
look to the collective bargaining agreement to discern whether it
placed any implied duty on the union. Rather, Idaho law placed a
duty of care on the Union because the Union did, in fact, actively
inspect the mine, and the Union could be held liable for the
negligent performance of that inspection.
Id. at 787, 770
P.2d at 796. According to the Supreme Court of Idaho, the
Page 495 U. S. 371
Union may be liable under state tort law because its duty to
perform that inspection reasonably arose from the fact of the
inspection itself, rather than the fact that the provision for the
Union's participation in mine inspection was contained in the labor
contract.
As we see it, however, respondents' tort claim cannot be
described as independent of the collective bargaining agreement.
This is not a situation where the Union's delegates are accused of
acting in a way that might violate the duty of reasonable care owed
to every person in society. There is no allegation, for example,
that members of the safety committee negligently caused damage to
the structure of the mine, an act that could be unreasonable
irrespective of who committed it and could foreseeably cause injury
to any person who might possibly be in the vicinity.
Nor do we understand the Supreme Court of Idaho to have held
that any casual visitor in the mine would be liable for violating
some duty to the miners if the visitor failed to report obvious
defects to the appropriate authorities. Indeed, the court did not
disavow its previous opinion, where it acknowledged that the
Union's representatives were participating in the inspection
process pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement, and that the agreement determined the nature and scope
of the Union's duty. If the Union failed to perform a duty in
connection with inspection, it was a duty arising out of the
collective bargaining agreement signed by the Union as the
bargaining agent for the miners. Clearly, the enforcement of that
agreement and the remedies for its breach are matters governed by
federal law.
"[Q]uestions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement
agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from
breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to
uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of
a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in
tort."
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. at
471 U. S. 211.
Preemption by federal law cannot be
Page 495 U. S. 372
avoided by characterizing the Union's negligent performance of
what it does on behalf of the members of the bargaining unit
pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining contract as a
state law tort. Accordingly, this suit, if it is to go forward at
all, must proceed as a case controlled by federal, rather than
state, law.
III
The Union insists that the case against it may not go forward
even under federal law. It argues first that only the duty of fair
representation governs the exercise of its representational
functions under the collective bargaining contract, and that a
member may not sue it under § 301 for breach of contract. Second,
the Union submits that, even if it may be sued under § 301, the
labor agreement contains no enforceable promise made by it to the
members of the unit in connection with inspecting the mine. Third,
the Union asserts that, as the case now stands, it is charged with
only negligence, which is insufficient to prove a breach of its
duty of fair representation.
"It is now well established that, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees, . . . the Union had a statutory
duty fairly to represent all of those employees, both in its
collective bargaining . . . and in its enforcement of the resulting
collective bargaining agreement."
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171,
386 U. S. 177
(1967).
"Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory authority
to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory
obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility
or discrimination toward any, and to exercise its discretion with
complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary
conduct."
Ibid. This duty of fair representation is of major
importance, but a breach occurs "only when a union's conduct toward
a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith."
Id. at
386 U. S. 190.
The courts have in general assumed that mere negligence, even in
the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement, would
Page 495 U. S. 373
not state a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation,
and we endorse that view today.
The Union's duty of fair representation arises from the National
Labor Relations Act itself.
See Breininger v. Sheet Metal
Workers, 493 U. S. 67,
493 U. S. 86-87
(1989);
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.
S. 151,
462 U. S. 164
(1983);
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,
451 U. S. 56,
451 U. S. 66
(1981) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). The duty of fair
representation is thus a matter of status, rather than contract. We
have never held, however, that, as a matter of federal law, a labor
union is prohibited from voluntarily assuming additional duties to
the employees by contract. Although at one time it may have
appeared most unlikely that unions would be called upon to assume
such duties,
see Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.
S. 335,
375 U. S.
356-357 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring in result),
nonetheless "it is of the utmost importance that the law reflect
the realities of industrial life and the nature of the collective
bargaining process,"
id. at
375 U. S. 358,
and it may well be that, if unions begin to assume duties
traditionally viewed as the prerogatives of management,
cf.
Breininger, supra, at
493 U. S. 87-88;
Electrical Workers v. Hechler,
481 U.S. at
481 U. S.
859-860, employees will begin to demand that unions be
held more strictly to account in their carrying out those duties.
Nor do we know what the source of law would be for such a
prohibition, for
"when neither the collective bargaining process nor its end
product violates any command of Congress, a federal court has no
authority to modify the substantive terms of a collective
bargaining contract."
United Mine Workers Health & Retirement Funds v.
Robinson, 455 U. S. 562,
455 U. S. 576
(1982);
cf. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S.
99,
397 U. S.
106-108 (1970).
Our decision in
Electrical Workers v. Hechler, supra,
is relevant here. There we were presented with a claim by an
employee that the union had breached its duty to provide her with a
safe workplace. The alleged duty was plainly based on the
collective bargaining agreement that the union
Page 495 U. S. 374
had negotiated with the employer; Hechler argued that she was a
third-party beneficiary of that agreement.
Id., 481 U.S.
at
481 U. S. 861,
481 U. S.
864-865. Hechler carefully distinguished her § 301 claim
from a fair representation claim,
id. at 864, and so did
we, for the distinction had a significant effect: the statutes of
limitations for the two claims are different.
Id. at
481 U. S.
863-865. We therefore accepted, and again accept, that
"a labor union . . . may assume a responsibility towards employees
by accepting a duty of care through a contractual agreement,"
id. at
481 U. S. 860,
even if that contractual agreement is a collective bargaining
contract to which only the union and the employer are
signatories.
But having said as much, we also think it necessary to emphasize
caution, lest the courts be precipitate in their efforts to find
unions contractually bound to employees by collective bargaining
agreements. The doctrine of fair representation is an important
check on the arbitrary exercise of union power, but it is a
purposefully limited check, for a "wide range of reasonableness
must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving
the unit it represents."
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U. S. 330,
345 U. S. 338.
If an employee claims that a union owes him a more far-reaching
duty, he must be able to point to language in the collective
bargaining agreement specifically indicating an intent to create
obligations enforceable against the union by the individual
employees.
Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U. S. 650,
379 U. S. 653
(1965).
Applying this principle to the case at hand, we are quite sure
that respondents may not maintain a § 301 suit against the Union.
Nothing in the collective bargaining agreement suggests that it
creates rights directly enforceable by the individual employees
against the Union. The pertinent part of the collective bargaining
agreement, Article IX, consists entirely of agreements between the
Union and the employer and enforceable only by them. App. 20-22.
Section 2 of the Article provides that "a committee consisting of
two (2) supervisory
Page 495 U. S. 375
personnel and two (2) reliable employees, approved by the Union,
shall inspect" the mine if an employee complains to the shift boss
that he is being forced to work in unusually unsafe conditions but
receives no redress,
id. at 20, but even if this section
might be interpreted as obliging the Union to inspect the mine in
such circumstances, the promise is not one specifically made to, or
enforceable by, individual employees. Nor have respondents placed
anything in the record indicating that any such complaints were
made or that the Union failed to act on them. Section 4 of the
Article states that a Union member may accompany the state mine
safety inspection team on its inspections of the mine, and Section
5 states that a Union designate and the Safety Engineer "shall make
a tour of a section of the mine" once each month,
id. at
22, but again the agreement gives no indication that these
obligations, if such is what they are, may be enforced by an
individual employee.
Moreover, under traditional principles of contract
interpretation, respondents have no claim, for with exceptions
under federal labor law not relevant here,
see Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459,
361 U. S.
468-471 (1960), third-party beneficiaries generally have
no greater rights in a contract than does the promisee. For the
respondents to have an enforceable right as third-party
beneficiaries against the Union, at the very least the employer
must have an enforceable right as promisee. But the provisions in
the collective bargaining agreement relied on by respondents are
not promises by the Union to the employer.
Cf. Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at
369 U. S.
104-106. They are, rather, concessions made by the
employer to the Union, a limited surrender of the employer's
exclusive authority over mine safety. A violation by the employer
of the provisions allowing inspection of the mine by Union
delegates might form the basis of a § 301 suit against the
employer, but we are not presented with such a case.
Page 495 U. S. 376
IV
In performing its functions under the collective bargaining
agreement, the Union did, as it concedes, owe the miners a duty of
fair representation, but we have already noted that respondents'
allegation of mere negligence will not state a claim for violation
of that duty.
Supra, at
495 U. S.
372-373. Indeed, respondents have never specifically
relied on the federal duty of fair representation, nor have they
alleged that the Union improperly discriminated among its members
or acted in arbitrary and capricious fashion in failing to exercise
its duties under the collective bargaining agreement.
Cf. Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 177. Respondents did, of course, allege that
the Union had committed fraud on the membership in violation of
state law, a claim that might implicate the duty of fair
representation. The Supreme Court of Idaho held, however, that
summary judgment was properly entered on this claim because
respondents had failed to demonstrate specific facts showing the
existence of a genuine issue for trial. 111 Idaho at 633, 726 P.2d
at 745. Respondents did not cross-petition to challenge this aspect
of the Idaho Supreme Court's judgment, and we are in no position to
question it.
It follows that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Idaho must
be
Reversed.
Justice KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice SCALIA
join, dissenting.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that summary judgment was improper,
and that Tharon Rawson and the other respondents could proceed to
trial against the United Steelworkers of America on a state law
tort theory. Although the respondents have not yet established
liability under Idaho law, the Union argues that federal law must
govern and bar their suit. To support this position, the Union
relies on both § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185(a), and the duty of fair representation
Page 495 U. S. 377
implicit in § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
49 Stat. 453,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). The Court
accepts the Union's contentions with respect to § 301, and does not
reach the issue of preemption by the duty of fair representation.
With all respect, I dissent. Neither of the Union's arguments for
displacing Idaho law without any trial on the merits has
validity.
I
The Union bases its § 301 argument on our decisions in
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.
S. 399,
486 U. S.
405-406 (1988);
Electrical Workers v. Hechler,
481 U. S. 851,
481 U. S. 854
(1987); and
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.
S. 202,
471 U. S. 211
(1985). These cases hold that § 301 preempts state law causes of
action that require interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement. In my view, they have no application here. The Idaho
Supreme Court, whose determination of state law supersedes that of
the trial court, has declared that the respondents' case rests on
allegations of the Union's active negligence in a voluntary
undertaking, not its contractual obligations.
Adopting verbatim a standard from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 323 (1965), the Idaho Court expressed the law governing the
respondents' claims as follows:
"One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as necessary
for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure
to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if"
"(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of
harm, [or]"
"(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking."
Rawson v. United Steelworkers of America, 111 Idaho
630, 637, 726 P.2d 742, 749 (1986).
Page 495 U. S. 378
According to the Idaho Supreme Court's second opinion, the
respondents can prove the elements of the tort described in § 323
without relying on the Union's collective bargaining agreement. The
Court states:
"In the instant case, we are not faced with looking at the
Collective Bargaining Agreement to determine whether it imposes
some new duty upon the union -- rather, it is conceded the union
undertook to inspect and, thus, the issue is solely whether that
inspection was negligently performed under traditional Idaho tort
law."
115 Idaho 785, 787, 770 P.2d 794, 796 (1989). Placing this
analysis of state law in the context of our precedents, the Idaho
court explains:
"[T]he instant case is clearly distinguishable from
Hechler in that here the state tort basis of the action
was not abandoned, but has been pursued consistently both at the
trial and appellate levels, and the tort exists without reference
to the collective bargaining agreement."
Id. at 787-788, 770 P.2d at 796-797.
The court states further:
"[As in
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.],
no interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is
required to determine whether the union member of the inspection
team committed a tort when he committed various acts and omissions
such as failure to note the self-rescuers were stored in boxes with
padlocks or that the activating valves of the oxygen-breathing
apparatuses were corroded shut. Rather, such alleged acts of
negligence are measured by state tort law."
Id. at 788, 770 P.2d at 797. These statements reveal
that the Idaho Supreme Court understood the federal preemption
standards, and interpreted state law not to implicate them. Because
we have no basis for disputing the construction of state law by a
state supreme court,
see Clemons v. Mississippi,
494 U. S. 738,
494 U. S.
747
Page 495 U. S. 379
(1990), I submit that, at this stage of the proceedings, we must
conclude that § 301 does not govern the respondents' claims. The
Court reaches a different conclusion, because it doubts that the
Idaho Supreme Court means what it seems to have said. The Court
bases its view, to a large extent, on the Idaho court's expressed
intention to "adhere to [its first] opinion as written." 115 Idaho
at 788, 770 P.2d at 797. The first opinion says:
"Because the union, pursuant to the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement, had contracted to inspect and
in fact,
inspected the mine, it owed the (minimal) duty to its members
to exercise due care in inspecting and in reporting the findings of
its inspection."
111 Idaho at 638, 726 P.2d at 750. The Court construes the
remark to negate the unequivocal statements quoted above. I cannot
accept this labored interpretation.
The Idaho Supreme Court's adherence to the first opinion does
not implicate § 301, because it does not require interpretation of
a collective bargaining agreement. The first opinion suggests that
the respondents may refer to the collective bargaining agreement.
It does not eliminate the possibility, identified three times in
the second opinion, that the respondents may prove the elements of
§ 323 without relying on the collective bargaining agreement. Even
the Union concedes:
"After
Hechler, as we understand matters, both
plaintiffs and the Idaho court would locate the source of the
union's duty to inspect [in a non-negligent manner] in the union's
action of accompanying company and state inspectors on inspections
of the mine, and not in any contractual agreement by the union to
inspect."
Brief for Petitioner 27-28. The Court thus reads too much into
the last sentence of the Idaho Supreme Court's second opinion.
I see no reason not to allow this case to go forward with a
simple mandate: the respondents may press their state claims so
long as they do not rest upon the collective-bargaining
Page 495 U. S. 380
agreement. To the extent that any misunderstanding might exist,
this approach would preserve all federal interests. If the Idaho
Supreme Court, after a trial on the merits, were to uphold a
verdict resting on the Union's obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement, we could reverse its decision. But for now,
we must take the case as the Idaho Supreme Court has given it to
us. According to the second opinion, the respondents may prove the
elements of § 323 without relying on the Union's contractual
duties.
The Court also rules against the respondents because it surmises
that § 323 has no general applicability. The Court assumes that
only union members could recover from the Union for its negligence
in inspecting the mine, and that union members could not recover
from anyone else for comparable negligence.
See ante at
495 U. S.
370-371. I agree that a State cannot circumvent our
decisions in
Lingle, Hechler, and,
Allis-Chalmers
by the mere "relabeling" as a tort claim an action that, in law, is
based upon the collective bargaining process.
Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at
471 U. S. 211.
We must have the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether a
state law depends on a collective bargaining agreement for the
purposes of § 301. In this case, however, I see no indication that
the tort theory pressed by the respondents has the limited
application presumed by the Court.
The Idaho Supreme Court did not invent, for the purposes of this
case, the theory underlying the respondents' claims. As Cardozo put
it:
"It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though
gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting
carefully, if he acts at all."
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275,
276 (1922). Restatement § 323, upon which the Idaho Court relies,
embodies this principle and long has guided the interpretation of
Idaho tort law.
See, e.g., Steiner Corp. v. American District
Telegraph, 106 Idaho 787, 791, 683 P.2d 435, 439 (1984) (fire
alarm failure);
S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho
614, 616, 515 P.2d 561, 563 (1973) (boiler explosion);
Page 495 U. S. 381
Fagundes v. State, 116 Idaho 173, 176, 774 P.2d 343,
346 (App.1989) (helicopter crash);
Carroll v. United
Steelworkers of America, 107 Idaho 717, 723, 692 P.2d 361, 367
(1984) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (machinery accident). The Court
has identified no basis for its assumption that § 323 has a
narrower scope than its plain language and these cases indicate. I
thus would not find preemption on the mere supposition that the
Union's duty runs only to the union members:
II
The Union also argues that the duty of fair representation
immunizes it from liability under § 323. Allowing the States to
impose tort liability on labor organizations, it contends, would
upset the balance of rights and duties that federal law has struck
between unions and their members. I disagree, because nothing in
the NLRA supports the Union's position.
Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), grants a duly
elected union the exclusive authority to represent all employees in
a collective bargaining unit. We have reasoned:
"The fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the
organization chosen to represent a craft is chosen to represent all
its members, the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act
for and not against those whom it represents. It is a principle of
general application that the exercise of a granted power to act in
behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to
exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a
grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward
those from whom it is exercised unless so expressed."
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
323 U. S. 192,
323 U. S. 202
(1944) (footnote omitted) (interpretation of § 2(a) of the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982 ed.), adopted for § 9(a) of the
NLRA in
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.
S. 330,
345 U. S. 337
(1953)).
Page 495 U. S. 382
As a result, we have read § 9(a) to establish a duty of fair
representation requiring a union
"to serve the interests of all members without hostility or
discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete
good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct."
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171,
386 U. S. 177
(1967).
Although we have inferred that Congress intended to impose a
duty of fair representation in § 9(a), I see no justification for
the further conclusion that Congress desired to grant unions an
immunity from all state tort law. Nothing about a union's status as
the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit creates a need to
exempt it from general duties to exercise due care to avoid
injuring others. At least to some extent, therefore, I would
conclude that Congress "by silence indicate[d] a purpose to let
state regulation be imposed."
Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U. S. 96,
375 U. S. 104
(1963).
Our decision in
Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.
S. 290 (1977), confirms this view. Farmer held that the
NLRA did not preempt a union member's action against his union for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See id. at
430 U. S. 305.
The union member complained that his union ridiculed him in public
and refused to refer jobs to him in accordance with hiring hall
rules.
See id. at
430 U. S. 293. In analyzing this claim, we ruled that
the NLRA's preemption of state tort law depends on two factors:
"the state interests in regulating the conduct in question and the
potential for interference with the federal regulatory scheme."
Id. at
430 U. S. 297.
Both of these factors militated against preemption in
Farmer. Noting that "our cases consistently have
recognized the historic state interest in
such traditionally
local matters as public safety and order,'" id. at
430 U. S. 299
(quoting Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 315 U. S. 740,
315 U. S. 749
(1942)), we ruled that the tort law addressed proper matters of
state concern. We further observed that, although the tort
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress might
interfere with the federal prohibition against discrimination by
a
Page 495 U. S. 383
union, that
"potential for interference is insufficient to counterbalance
the legitimate and substantial interest of the State in protecting
its citizens."
430 U.S. at
430 U. S.
304.
The
Farmer analysis reveals that Idaho may hold the
union liable for negligence in inspecting the mine. The strength
and legitimacy of the State's interests in mine safety stand beyond
question; the union's failure to exercise due care, according to
the allegations, caused or contributed to the deaths of 91 Idaho
miners. Allowing this case to proceed to trial, moreover, would
pose little threat to the federal regulatory scheme. State courts
long have held unions liable for personal injuries under state law.
See, e.g., DiLuzio v. United Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers of America, 386 Mass. 314, 318,
435
N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (1982) (assault at workplace);
Brawner v.
Sanders, 244 Ore. 302, 307,
417 P.2d
1009,
1012 (1966)
(in banc) (personal injuries);
Marshall v. International
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 57 Cal. 2d
781, 787, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 215, 371 P.2d 987, 991 (1962)
(stumble in union hall parking lot);
Inglis v. Operating
Engineers Local Union No. 12, 58 Cal. 2d
269, 270, 373 P.2d 467, 468 (1962) (assault at union meeting);
Hulahan v. Sheehan, 522 S.W.2d
134, 139-141 (Mo.App.1975) (slip and fall on union hall
stairs). The Union presents no argument that this longstanding
practice has interfered with federal labor regulation. Indeed, as
the Court itself holds, nothing in the federal statutory scheme
addresses the Union's conduct or provides redress for the injuries
that it may have produced.
See ante at
495 U. S.
373-375.
The Union's position also deviates from the well established
position of the courts of appeals. These courts have found
preemption by the duty of fair representation in two situations.
First, the courts have said that the duty of fair representation
preempts state duties that depend on a collective bargaining
agreement or on the union's status as the exclusive collective
bargaining agent.
See, e.g., Richardson v. United Steelworkers
of America, 864 F.2d 1162,
Page 495 U. S. 384
1165-1167 (CA5 1989);
Condon v. Local 2944, United
Steelworkers of America, 683 F.2d 590, 595 (CA1 1982). As
noted above, however, the Union's duties in this case do not stem
from a contract or from its status as a union. Second, other courts
have found the federal duty of fair representation to supplant
equivalent state law duties.
See, e.g., Jones v. Truck Drivers
Local Union No. 299, 838 F.2d 856, 861 (CA6 1988) (sex
discrimination);
Maynard v. Revere Copper Products, 773
F.2d 733, 735 (CA6 1985) (handicapped discrimination);
Peterson
v. Air Line Pilots Assn., International, 759 F.2d 1161, 1170
(CA4 1985) (blacklisting). In this case, state law differs from
federal law in that the duty of fair representation does not
address the conduct in question. The Union, as a result, has shown
no support for its contention that the duty of fair representation
preempts the Idaho tort law. For these reasons, I dissent.