Because preexisting federal law failed to deal adequately with
the national problem of shrinking rail trackage, Congress enacted
the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (Amendments) to
the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), which authorize the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) to preserve for
possible future railroad use rights-of-way not currently in service
and to allow interim use of the land as recreational trails.
Section 8(d) of this so-called "rails-to-trails" statute provides
that a railroad wishing to cease operations along a particular
route may negotiate with a State, municipality, or private group
prepared to assume financial and managerial responsibility for the
right-of-way. If the parties reach agreement, the land may, subject
to ICC-imposed terms and conditions, be transferred to the trail
operator for interim trail use notwithstanding whatever
reversionary interests may exist in the property under state law.
If no agreement is reached, the railroad may abandon the line
entirely, thereby allowing the property to revert to abutting
landowners if the terms of applicable easements and state law
provide for such reversion. After Vermont Railway, Inc., stopped
using a right-of-way adjacent to petitioners' land in Vermont,
petitioners brought a state court quiet title action, alleging that
the railroad's easement had been abandoned and thus extinguished,
and that the right-of-way had therefore reverted to them under
state law. Holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the ICC had
not authorized
Page 494 U. S. 2
abandonment of the route, and therefore still exercised
exclusive jurisdiction over it, the court dismissed the action, and
the State Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioners then sought a
certificate of abandonment from the ICC, but the Commission granted
a petition to permit the railroad to discontinue rail service and
transfer the right-of-way to the city of Burlington for interim
trail use under § 8(d). The Federal Court of Appeals affirmed,
rejecting petitioners' contentions that § 8(d) is unconstitutional
on its face because it takes private property without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment and because it is
not a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power.
Held:
1. Even if the rails-to-trails statute gives rise to a taking,
compensation is available under the Tucker Act, and the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment are therefore satisfied. Since
the Amendments and their legislative history do not mention the
Tucker Act -- which provides Claims Court jurisdiction over claims
against the Government to recover damages founded on,
inter
alia, the Constitution -- the Amendments do not exhibit the
type of "unambiguous intention" to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy
that is necessary to preclude a claim under that Act.
See
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986,
467 U. S.
1019. Section 101 of the Amendments -- which provides
that
"authority to . . . make payments . . . under this Act shall be
effective only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in
advance in appropriation Acts"
does not, as petitioners claim, indirectly manifest the
necessary intent by rendering "unauthorized," as not approved by
Congress for payment in advance, any rail-to-trail conversion that
could result in Claims Court litigation. Since § 8(d) speaks in
capacious terms of interim use of
any right-of-way, it
clearly authorizes conversions giving rise to just compensation
claims, and therefore does not support petitioners' contention.
That there is no explicit promise to pay for any takings is
irrelevant, since the Tucker Act constitutes an implied promise to
pay just compensation which individual laws need not reiterate.
Moreover, § 101 speaks only to payments under the Amendments
themselves, and not to takings claims that "arise" under the Fifth
Amendment and for which payments are made "under" the Tucker Act
from the separately appropriated Judgment Fund. Nor do statements
in the legislative history indicating Congress' desire that the
Amendments operate at "low cost" demonstrate an unambiguous intent
to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy, since a generalized desire to
protect the public fisc is insufficient for that purpose,
see,
e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.
S. 102,
419 U. S.
127-128, and since the statements might simply reflect
Congress' rejection of a more ambitious program of federally owned
and managed trails. Because petitioners' failure to make use of the
available Tucker Act remedy
Page 494 U. S. 3
renders their takings challenge to the ICC's order premature,
there is no need to determine whether a taking occurred. Pp.
494 U. S.
11-17.
2. The Amendments are a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce
Clause power. The stated congressional purposes -- (1) to encourage
the development of additional recreational trails on an interim
basis and (2) to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for
future reactivation of rail service -- are valid objectives to
which the Amendments are reasonably adapted. Even if petitioners
were correct that the rail banking purpose is a sham concealing a
true purpose of preventing reversion of rights-of-way to property
owners after abandonment, the Amendments would still be valid
because they are reasonably adapted to the goal of encouraging the
development of additional trails. There is no requirement that a
law serve more than one legitimate purpose. Moreover, this Court is
not free under the applicable rational basis standard of review to
hold the Amendments invalid simply because the rail banking purpose
might be advanced more completely by measures more Draconian than §
8(d) -- such as a program of mandatory conversions or a prohibition
of
all abandonments. The long history of congressional
attempts to address the problem of rail abandonments provides
sufficient reason to defer to the legislative judgment that § 8(d)
is an appropriate answer. Furthermore, in light of that history,
Congress was entitled to make the judgment that every line is a
potentially valuable national asset meriting preservation even if
no future rail use for it is currently foreseeable, so that the
fact that the ICC must certify that public convenience and
necessity permit abandonment before granting an interim trail use
permit does not indicate that the statute fails to promote its
purpose of preserving rail corridors. Pp.
494 U. S.
17-19.
853 F.2d 145 (CA2 1988), affirmed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SCALIA and
KENNEDY, JJ., joined,
post, p.
494 U. S. 20.
Page 494 U. S. 4
OPINION
Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is the constitutionality of a federal
"rails-to-trails" statute, under which unused railroad
rights-of-way are converted into recreational trails
notwithstanding whatever reversionary property interests may exist
under state law. Petitioners contend that the statute violates both
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the Commerce Clause, Art. I,
§ 8. We find it unnecessary to evaluate the merits of the taking
claim because we hold that, even if the rails-to-trails statute
gives rise to a taking, compensation is available to petitioners
under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
Page 494 U. S. 5
§ 1491(a)(1) (1982 ed.), and the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment are satisfied. We also hold that the statute is a valid
exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
I
A
The statute at issue in this case, the National Trails System
Act Amendments of 1983 (Amendments), Pub.L. 98-11, 97 Stat. 48, to
the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), Pub.L. 90-543, 82
Stat. 919 (
codified, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1241
et
seq.), is the culmination of congressional efforts to preserve
shrinking rail trackage by converting unused rights-of-way to
recreational trails. [
Footnote
1] In 1920, the Nation's railway system reached its peak of
272,000 miles; today only about 141,000 miles are in use, and
experts predict that 3,000 miles will be abandoned every year
through the end of this century. [
Footnote 2] Concerned about the loss of trackage, Congress
included in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
of 1976 (4-R Act), Pub.L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 144,
as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 10906 (1982 ed.), several provisions
aimed at promoting the conversion of abandoned [
Footnote 3] lines
Page 494 U. S. 6
to trails. Section 809(a) of the 4-R Act required the Secretary
of Transportation to prepare a report on alternative uses for
abandoned railroad rights-of-way. Section 809(b) authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to encourage conversion of abandoned
rights-of-way to recreational and conservational uses through
financial, educational, and technical assistance to local, state,
and federal agencies.
See note following 49 U.S.C. § 10906
(1982 ed.). Section 809(c) authorized the ICC to delay the
disposition of rail property for up to 180 days after the effective
date of an order permitting abandonment, unless the property had
first been offered for sale on reasonable terms for public
purposes, including recreational use.
See 49 U.S.C. §
10906.
By 1983, Congress recognized that these measures
"ha[d] not been successful in establishing a process through
which railroad rights-of-way which are not immediately necessary
for active service can be utilized for trail purposes."
H.R.Rep. No. 98-28, p. 8 (1983) (H.R.Rep.); S.Rep. No. 98-1, p.
9 (1983) (S.Rep.) (same), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1983, pp.
112, 119. Congress enacted the Amendments to the Trails Act, which
authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) to
preserve for possible future railroad use rights-of-way not
currently in service and to allow interim use of the land as
recreational trails. Section 8(d) provides that a railroad wishing
to cease operations along a particular route may negotiate with a
State, municipality, or private group that is prepared to
assume
Page 494 U. S. 7
financial and managerial responsibility for the right-of-way.
[
Footnote 4] If the parties
reach agreement, the land may be transferred to the trail operator
for interim trail use, subject to ICC-imposed terms and conditions;
if no agreement is reached, the railroad may abandon the line
entirely and liquidate its interest. [
Footnote 5]
Page 494 U. S. 8
Section 8(d) of the amended Trails Act provides that interim
trail use
"shall not be treated, for any purposes of any law or rule of
law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for
railroad purposes."
16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). This language gives rise to a taking
question in the typical rails-to-trails case because many railroads
do not own their rights-of-way outright, but rather hold them under
easements or similar property interests. While the terms of these
easements and applicable state law vary, frequently the easements
provide that the property reverts to the abutting landowner upon
abandonment of rail operations. State law generally governs the
disposition of reversionary interests, subject of course to the
ICC's "exclusive and plenary" jurisdiction to regulate
abandonments,
Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo
Brick & Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311,
450 U. S. 321
(1981), and to impose conditions affecting post-abandonment use of
the property.
See Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago &
North Western Transp. Co., 467 U. S. 622,
467 U. S. 633
(1984). By deeming interim trail use to be like discontinuance,
rather than abandonment,
see n 3,
supra, Congress prevented property interests
from reverting under state law:
"The key finding of this amendment is that interim use of a
railroad right-of-way for trail use, when the route itself remains
intact for future railroad purposes, shall not constitute an
abandonment of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. This
finding alone should eliminate many of the problems with this
program. The concept of attempting to establish trails only after
the formal abandonment of a railroad right-of-way is
self-defeating; once a right-of-way is abandoned for railroad
purposes there may be nothing left for trail use. This amendment
would ensure that potential interim trail use will be considered
prior to abandonment."
H.R.Rep. at 8-9.
Page 494 U. S. 9
See S.Rep. at 9 (same). The primary issue in this case
is whether Congress has violated the Fifth Amendment by precluding
reversion of state property interests.
B
Petitioners claim a reversionary interest in a railroad
right-of-way adjacent to their land in Vermont. In 1962, the State
of Vermont acquired the Rutland-Canadian Railway Company's interest
in the right-of-way and then leased the right-of-way to Vermont
Railway, Inc. Vermont Railway stopped using the route more than a
decade ago, and has since removed all railroad equipment, including
switches, bridges, and track, from the portion of the right-of-way
claimed by petitioners. In 1981, petitioners brought a quiet-title
action in the Superior Court of Chittenden County, alleging that
the easement had been abandoned and was thus extinguished, and that
the right-of-way had reverted to them by operation of state
property law. In August, 1983, the Superior Court dismissed the
action, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the ICC had not
authorized abandonment of the route, and therefore still exercised
exclusive jurisdiction over it. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed.
Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510,
496 A.2d 151
(1985).
Petitioners then sought a certificate of abandonment of the rail
line from the ICC. The State of Vermont intervened, claiming title
in fee simple to the right-of-way and arguing in the alternative
that, even if the State's interest were an easement, the land could
not revert while it was still being used for a public purpose.
Vermont Railway and the State then petitioned the ICC to permit the
railroad to discontinue rail service and transfer the right-of-way
to the City of Burlington for interim use as a public trail under §
8(d) of the Trails Act. By a Notice of Exemption decided January 2,
1986, the ICC allowed the railroad to discontinue service and
approved the agreement between the State and the City for interim
trail use.
See 51 Fed.Reg. 454-455. On February 4, 1986,
the
Page 494 U. S. 10
ICC Chairman denied petitioners' application for a stay pending
administrative review, [
Footnote
6] and the decision became effective on February 5, 1986.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration and/or clarification was
denied on July 17. 1987. The Commission noted that
"[i]nevitably, interim trail use will conflict with the
reversionary rights of adjacent landowners, but that is the very
purpose of the Trails Act."
State of Vermont and Vermont Railway, Inc. -- Discontinuance
of Service Exemption in Chittenden County, 3 I.C.C.2d 903,
908.
Petitioners sought review of the ICC's order in the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that § 8(d) of the Trails
Act is unconstitutional on its face because it takes private
property without just compensation and because it is not a valid
exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power. The Court of Appeals
rejected both arguments. 853 F.2d 145 (1988). It reasoned that the
ICC has "plenary and exclusive authority" over abandonments,
id. at 151, and that federal law must be considered in
determining the property right held by petitioners.
"For as long as it determines that the land will serve a
'railroad purpose,' the ICC retains jurisdiction over railroad
rights-of-way; it does not matter whether that purpose is immediate
or in the future."
Ibid. Because the court believed that no reversionary
interest could vest until the ICC determined that abandonment was
appropriate, the court concluded that the Trails Act did not result
in a taking. Next, the court found that the Trails Act was
reasonably adapted to two legitimate congressional purposes under
the commerce Clause: "preserving rail corridors for future railroad
use" and "permitting public recreational use of trails."
Id. at 150. The Court of Appeals therefore dismissed
petitioners' Commerce Clause challenge. We granted certiorari. 490
U.S. 1034 (1989).
Page 494 U. S. 11
II
The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." The Amendment "does not prohibit the taking of
private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of
that power."
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304,
482 U. S. 314
(1987). It is designed
"not to limit the governmental interference with property rights
per se, but rather to secure
compensation in the
event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking."
See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172,
473 U. S. 194
(1985). All that is required is the existence of a "
reasonable,
certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensation'" at the
time of the taking. Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U. S. 102,
419 U. S.
124-125 (1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern
Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641,
135 U. S. 659
(1890)).
"If the government has provided an adequate process for
obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process 'yield[s]
just compensation,' then the property owner 'has no claim against
the Government' for the taking."
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at
473 U. S.
195-195 (quoting
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U. S. 986,
467 U. S.
1013,
467 U. S.
1018, n. 21 (1984)).
For this reason,
"taking claims against the Federal Government are premature
until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided
by the Tucker Act."
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at
473 U. S. 195;
see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U. S. 121,
474 U. S.
127-128, (1985);
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
1016;
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59,
438 U. S. 94, n.
39 (1978). The Tucker Act provides jurisdiction
Page 494 U. S. 12
in the United States Claims Court for any claim against the
Federal Government to recover damages founded on the Constitution,
a statute, a regulation, or an express or implied-in-fact contract.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982 ed.);
see also §
1346(a)(2) (Little Tucker Act, which creates concurrent
jurisdiction in the district courts for such claims not exceeding
$10,000 in amount).
"If there is a taking, the claim is 'founded upon the
Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the [Claims Court] to
hear and determine."
United States v. Causby, 328 U.
S. 256,
328 U. S. 267
(1946).
The critical question in this case, therefore, is whether a
Tucker Act remedy is available for claims arising out of takings
pursuant to the Amendments. The proper inquiry is not whether the
statute "expresses an affirmative showing of congressional intent
to permit recourse to a Tucker Act remedy," but rather
"whether Congress has in the [statute]
withdrawn the
Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction to the [Claims Court] to hear a
suit involving the [statute] 'founded . . . upon the
Constitution.'"
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at
419 U. S. 126
(emphasis in original). Under this standard, we conclude that the
Amendments did not withdraw the Tucker Act remedy. Congress did not
exhibit the type of "unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker
Act remedy,"
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
1019, that is necessary to preclude a Tucker Act claim.
See Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.
Co., 685 F.
Supp. 1108, 1120-1121 (E.D.Mo.1988),
aff'd, 879 F.2d
316, 324-325 (CA8 1989).
Neither the statute nor its legislative history mentions the
Tucker Act. As indirect evidence of Congress' intent to prevent
recourse to the Tucker Act, petitioners point to § 101 of the
Amendments, which, although it was not codified into law, provides
in relevant part that:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, authority to
enter into contracts, and to make payments, under this Act shall be
effective only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in
advance in appropriation
Page 494 U. S. 13
Acts."
97 Stat. 42, note following 16 U.S.C. § 1249. Petitioners
contend that this section limits the ICC's authority for
conversions to those not requiring the expenditure of any funds and
to those others for which funds had been appropriated in advance.
Thus, any conversion that could result in Claims Court litigation
was not authorized by Congress, since payment for such an
acquisition would not have been approved by Congress in advance.
Petitioners insist that such
unauthorized government
actions cannot create Tucker Act liability, citing
Hooe v.
United States, 218 U. S. 322,
218 U. S. 335
(1910), and
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419
U.S. at
419 U. S. 127,
n. 16.
We need not decide what types of official authorization, if any,
are necessary to create federal liability under the Fifth
Amendment, because we find that rail-to-trail conversions giving
rise to just compensation claims are clearly authorized by § 8(d).
That section speaks in capacious terms of trail "interim use of
any established railroad rights-of-way" (emphasis added)
and does not support petitioners' proposed distinction between
conversions that might result in a taking and those that do not.
Although Congress did not explicitly promise to pay for any
takings, we have always assumed that the Tucker Act is an
"implie[d] promis[e]" to pay just compensation which individual
laws need not reiterate.
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction
Co., 309 U. S. 18,
309 U. S. 21
(1940). Petitioners' argument that specific congressional
authorization is required for those conversions that might result
in takings is a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the established
method for determining whether Tucker Act relief is available for
claims arising out of takings pursuant to a federal statute. We
reaffirm that a Tucker Act remedy exists unless there are
unambiguous indications to the contrary.
Section 101, moreover, speaks only to appropriations under the
Amendments themselves, and not to relief available
Page 494 U. S. 14
under the Tucker Act, as evidenced by § 101's opening clause --
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
this Act"
(emphasis added) -- which refers to the 1983 Amendments. The
section means simply that payments made pursuant to the Amendments,
such as funding for scenic trails, markers, and similar purposes,
see Amendments § 209(5)(c), 97 Stat. 49 (
codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 1249(c)(2)) (authorizing appropriations for the
development and administration of certain National Scenic and
National Historic Trails), are effective only "in such amounts as
are provided in advance in appropriation Acts," a concept that
mirrors Art. 1, § 9, of the Constitution ("No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law"). Payments for takings claims are not affected by this
language, because such claims "arise" under the Fifth Amendment,
see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at
482 U. S.
315-316. Payments for takings would be made "under" the
Tucker Act, not the Trails Act, and would be drawn from the
Judgment Fund, which is a separate appropriated account,
see 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1982 ed.). Section 101 does not
manifest the type of clear and unmistakable congressional intent
necessary to withdraw Tucker Act coverage.
Petitioners next assert that Congress' desire that the
Amendments operate at "low cost," H.R.Rep., at 3, U.S.Code Cong.
& Admin.News 1983, p. 114, somehow indicates that Congress
withdrew the Tucker Act remedy. There is no doubt that Congress
meant to keep the costs of the Amendments to a minimum. [
Footnote 7] This intent, however, has
little bearing on the Tucker Act question. We
Page 494 U. S. 15
have previously rejected the argument that a generalized desire
to protect the public fisc is sufficient to withdraw relief under
the Tucker Act. In the
Railroad Reorganization Act Cases,
we recognized that the Rail Act established "[m]aximum" funding
authorizations, 419 U.S. at
419 U. S.
127-128, but we nevertheless held that those limits were
not an unambiguous repeal of the Tucker Act remedy. We reasoned
that the maximum limits might "support the inference that Congress
was so convinced that the huge sums provided would surely equal or
exceed the required constitutional minimum that it never focused
upon the possible need for a suit in the Court of Claims."
Id. at
419 U. S. 128.
In
Monsanto, we stated that:
"Congress in [the statute] did not address the liability of the
Government to pay just compensation should a taking occur.
Congress' failure specifically to mention or provide for recourse
against the Government may reflect a congressional belief that use
of data by [the Government] in the ways authorized by [the statute]
effects no Fifth Amendment taking or it may reflect Congress'
assumption that the general grant of jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act would provide the necessary remedy for any taking that may
occur. In any event, the failure cannot be construed to reflect an
unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy."
467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
1018-1019. Similar logic applies to the instant case.
The statements made in Congress during the passage of the Trails
Act Amendments might reflect merely the decision not to create a
program of direct federal purchase, [
Footnote 8] construction, and
Page 494 U. S. 16
maintenance of trails, and instead to allow state and local
governments and private groups to establish and manage trails. The
alternative chosen by Congress is less costly than a program of
direct federal trail acquisition because, under any view of takings
law, only some rail-to-trail conversions will amount to takings.
Some rights-of-way are held in fee simple.
See National
Wildlife Federation v. ICC, 271 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 10, 850 F.2d
694, 703 (1988). Others are held as easements that do not even as a
matter of state law revert upon interim use as nature trails.
[
Footnote 9] In addition, under
§ 8(d) the Federal Government neither incurs the costs of
constructing and maintaining the trails nor assumes legal liability
for the transfer or use of the right-of-way. In contrast, the costs
of acquiring and administering National Scenic and National
Historic Trails are borne directly by the Federal Government.
See n. 1,
supra. Thus, the "low cost" language
might reflect Congress' rejection of a more ambitious program of
federally owned and managed trails, rather than withdrawal of a
Tucker Act remedy. The language does not amount to the "unambiguous
intention" required by our prior cases. [
Footnote 10]
Page 494 U. S. 17
In sum, petitioners' failure to make use of the available Tucker
Act remedy renders their taking challenge to the ICC's order
premature. We need not decide whether a taking occurred in this
case.
III
Petitioners also contend that the Amendments to the Trails Act
are not a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, Art. I, § 8, because the true purpose of § 8(d) is to
prevent reversion of railroad rights-of-way to property owners
after abandonment and to create recreational trails, rather than to
preserve rail corridors for future railroad use. We evaluate this
claim under the traditional rationality standard of review: we must
defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce "if there is any rational basis for such a
finding,"
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264,
452 U. S. 276
(1981), and we must ensure only that the means selected by Congress
are "
reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the
Constitution.'" Ibid. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241,
379 U. S. 262
(1964)); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.
S. 314, 452 U. S.
323-324 (1981). The Amendments clearly pass
muster.
Two congressional purposes are evident. First, Congress intended
to "encourage the development of additional trails" and to "assist
recreation[al] users by providing opportunities for trail use on an
interim basis." H.R.Rep. at 8, 9; S.Rep. at 9, 10 (same), U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1983, p. 119;
see also 16 U.S.C. §
1241(a) (Trails Act "promote[s] the preservation of, public access
to, travel within, and enjoyment and appreciation of the open-air,
out-door
Page 494 U. S. 18
areas and historic resources of the Nation"). Second, Congress
intended
"to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future
reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation
corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation
use."
H.Rep. at 8; S.Rep. at 9, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1983,
p. 119;
see also 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). These are valid
congressional objectives to which the Amendments are reasonably
adapted.
Petitioners contend that the Amendments do not reasonably
promote the latter purpose because the ICC cannot authorize trail
use until it has found that the right-of-way at issue is not
necessary for "present
or future public convenience and
necessity." 49 U.S.C. § 10903(a) (1982 ed.) (emphasis added). The
ICC has explained that:
"In every Trails Act case, we will already have found that the
public convenience and necessity permit abandonment (or that
regulatory approval is not required under 49 U.S.C. 10505)."
54 Fed.Reg. 8012, n. 3 (1989). Thus, trail conversion is
permitted only
after the Commission determines that rail
service will not be not needed in the foreseeable future. This,
according to petitioners, reveals that the rail banking rationale
is a sham. If Congress really wished to address the problem of
shrinking trackage, it would not have left conversions to voluntary
agreements between railroads and State and local agencies or
private groups. Rather, petitioners suggest, Congress would have
created a mandatory program administered directly by the ICC.
We note at the outset that, even under petitioners' reading, the
Amendments would still be a valid exercise of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause because they are reasonably adapted to
the goal of encouraging the development of additional recreational
trails. There is no requirement that a law serve more than one
legitimate purpose. Moreover, we are not at liberty under the
rational basis standard of review to hold the Amendments invalid
merely
Page 494 U. S. 19
because more Draconian measures -- such as a program of
mandatory conversions or a prohibition of all abandonments -- might
advance more completely the rail banking purpose. The process of
legislating often involves tradeoffs, compromises, and imperfect
solutions, and our ability to imagine ways of redesigning the
statute to advance one of Congress' ends does not render it
irrational.
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U. S. 456,
449 U. S. 469
(1981). The history of congressional attempts to address the
problem of rail abandonments,
see supra at 918-919,
provides sufficient reason to defer to the legislative judgment
that § 8(d) is an appropriate answer. Here, as in
Hodel,
"Congress considered the effectiveness of existing,legislation and
concluded that additional measures were necessary." 452 U.S. at
452 U. S.
283.
Petitioners' argument that § 8(d) does not serve the rail
banking purpose, moreover, is not well taken. That the ICC must
certify that public convenience and necessity permit abandonment
before granting a CITU or NITU does not indicate that the statute
fails to promote its purpose of preserving rail corridors. Congress
did not distinguish between short-term and long-term rail banking,
nor did it require that the Commission develop a specific
contingency plan for reactivation of a line before permitting
conversion. To the contrary, Congress apparently believed that
every line is a potentially valuable national asset that merits
preservation even if no future rail use for it is currently
foreseeable. Given the long tradition of congressional regulation
of railroad abandonments,
see, e.g., Colorado v. United
States, 271 U. S. 153
(1926), that is a judgment that Congress is entitled to make.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Page 494 U. S. 20
[
Footnote 1]
Many nature trails are operated directly by the Federal
Government pursuant to the Trails Act, in which Congress reserved
to itself the right to designate scenic and historic trails and
delegated to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Agriculture authority to designate recreational trails and to
develop and administer the entire trails system.
See 16
U.S.C. §§ 1242-1246. Section 7(e) of the Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1246(e), provides that the land necessary for a designated scenic
or historic trail may be acquired by state or local governments or
by federal authorities, either through cooperative agreements with
landowners or by purchase. In the event that all voluntary means
for acquiring the property fail, the appropriate Secretary is given
limited power to obtain private lands through condemnation
proceedings.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1246(g).
[
Footnote 2]
See authorities cited in Comment, Rails to Trails:
Converting America's Abandoned Railroads Into Nature Trails, 22
Akron L.Rev. 645, 645 (1989);
see also 102 ICC Ann.Rep.
44-45 (1988); 101 ICC Ann.Rep. 37-38 (1987).
[
Footnote 3]
There Is an important distinction in the Interstate Commerce Act
between "abandonment" of a rail line and "discontinuance" of
service.
See 49 U.S.C. § 10903 (1982 ed.). Once a carrier
"abandons" a rail line pursuant to authority granted by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the line is no longer part of the
national transportation system, and although the Commission is
empowered to impose conditions on abandonments,
see, e.g.,
49 U.S.C. §§ 10905(f)(4); 10906 (1982 ed.), as a general
proposition ICC jurisdiction terminates.
See Hayfield Northern
R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co.,
467 U. S. 622,
467 U. S.
633-634 (1984); 54 Fed.Reg. 8011-8012 (1989). In
contrast, "discontinuance" authority allows a railroad to cease
operating a line for an indefinite period while preserving the rail
corridor for possible reactivation of service in the future.
[
Footnote 4]
Section 8(d),
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d),
provides:
"The Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, and the Secretary of the Interior, in
administering the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
of 1976, shall encourage State and local agencies and private
interests to establish appropriate trails using the provisions of
such programs. Consistent with the purposes of that Act, and in
furtherance of the national policy to preserve established railroad
rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to protect
rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient
transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established
railroad rights-of-way pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale,
or otherwise in a manner consistent with this chapter [the Trails
Act], if such interim use is subject to restoration or
reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be
treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment
of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. If a State,
political subdivision, or qualified private organization is
prepared to assume full responsibility for management of such
rights-of-way and for any legal liability arising out of such
transfer or use, and for the payment of any and all taxes that may
be levied or assessed against such rights-of-way, then the
Commission shall impose such terms and conditions as a requirement
of any transfer or conveyance for interim use in a manner
consistent with this chapter, and shall not permit abandonment or
discontinuance inconsistent or disruptive of such use."
[
Footnote 5]
Under implementing regulations promulgated by the ICC, a
railroad may apply to the ICC for either a Certificate of Interim
Trail Use or Abandonment (CITU) or, in a proceeding involving the
exemption of a route from ICC regulation, a Notice of Interim Trail
Use or Abandonment (NITU).
See Rail Abandonments -- Use of
Rights-of-Way as Trails, 2 I.C.C.2d 591, 628 (1986); 49 CFR §
1152.29 (1988). A CITU or NITU provides a 180-day period during
which the railroad may discontinue service, cancel tariffs, and
salvage track and other equipment, and also negotiate a voluntary
agreement for interim trail use with a qualified trail operator. If
agreement is reached, interim trail use is thereby authorized. If
not, the CITU or NITU automatically converts into an effective
certificate or notice of abandonment. Because the ICC had not yet
promulgated its final regulations implementing section 8(d) at the
time of its decision in the instant case, the Commission did not
issue a CITU or NITU.
[
Footnote 6]
State of Vermont and Vermont Railway, Inc. -- Discontinuance
of Service Exemption in Chittenden County, Docket No. AB-265
(Sub-No. IX) (Feb. 4, 1986).
[
Footnote 7]
See H.R.Rep. at 2, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
1983, p. 113 (noting that the Committee "eliminated most of the
items which could require future Federal expenditures"); S.Rep. at
3 (same), H.R.Rep. at 11, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1983, p.
122 (reporting required funding for the bill to be
"insignificant"); 129 Cong.Rec. 5219 (1983) (remarks of floor
manager Rep. Seiberling) ("[T]he committee recommended a revised
text which eliminated most of the items which would require future
Federal expenditures. . . . Additional recommendations reflect
continuing efforts to encourage the expansion of trail recreation
opportunities across the Nation at a low cost").
[
Footnote 8]
We note that the ICC has construed § 8(d) as not providing
federal power to condemn railroad rights-of-way for interim trail
use.
See Rail Abandonments, 2 I.C.C.2d at 596-598;
see
also National Wildlife Federation v. ICC, 271 U.S.App.D.C. 1,
4, n. 4, 6-9, 850 F.2d 694, 697, n. 4, 699-702 (1988);
Connecticut Trust for Historic Preservation v. ICC, 841
F.2d 479, 482-483 (CA2 1988);
Washington State Dept. of Game v.
ICC, 829 F.2d 877, 879-882 (CA9 1987).
[
Footnote 9]
Some state courts have held that trail use does not constitute
abandonment of a right-of-way for public travel so as to trigger
reversionary rights.
See State by Washington Wildlife
Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d
543, 545-548 (Minn.),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209
(1983);
Reiger v. Penn Central Corp., No. 85-CA-11
(Ct.App. Greene County, Ohio, May 21, 1985).
[
Footnote 10]
Petitioners also claim that a floor statement by Senator
Domenici that
"the Federal Government has acquired too much land from
landowners using condemnation procedures that in essence
shortchanged the property rights of the landowners,"
129 Cong.Rec. 1607 (1983), means that Tucker Act relief is
unavailable. We disagree. The Senator spoke in the context of
praising the statute for "encourag[ing] cooperation" rather than
resorting automatically to condemnation.
Ibid. As
administered by the ICC, the conversion process begins when a
railroad voluntarily seeks a CITU or NITU; it then negotiates with
a qualified trail operator to establish interim trail use. The ICC
does not set up trails on its own, and has interpreted § 8(d) to
exclude the type of condemnation power vested in the Secretaries of
Interior and Agriculture by 16 U.S.C. § 1246(g).
See
n 8,
supra. This
limitation on ICC condemnation authority is not relevant to the
question whether compensation under the Tucker Act is available for
takings resulting from the conversions that do occur, and it
certainly is not an unambiguous sign that Congress meant to
withdraw Tucker Act relief.
Justice O'CONNOR, with whom Justice SCALIA and Justice KENNEDY
join, concurring.
Petitioners assert that the Interstate Commerce Commission's
(ICC) actions prevent them from enjoying property rights secured by
Vermont law, and thereby have effected a compensable taking. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that, no matter
what Vermont law might provide, the ICC's actions forestalled
petitioners from possessing the asserted reversionary interest, and
thus that no takings claim could arise. Today the Court affirms the
Second Circuit's judgment on quite different grounds. I join the
Court's opinion, but write separately to express my view that state
law determines what property interest petitioners possess, and that
traditional takings doctrine will determine whether the Government
must compensate petitioners for the burden imposed on any property
interest they possess.
As the Court acknowledges,
ante at
494 U. S. 8-9,
494 U. S. 15-16,
state law creates and defines the scope of the reversionary or
other real property interests affected by the ICC's actions
pursuant to Section 208 of the National Trails System Act
Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). In determining whether a
taking has occurred,
"we are mindful of the basic axiom that '[p]roperty interests .
. . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.'"
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.
S. 986,
467 U. S.
1001 (1984), quoting
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155,
440 U. S. 161
(1980) (internal quotation omitted). Although original federal
grants of railway easements may influence certain disputes over
interests in land,
see Great Northern R. Co. v. United
States, 315 U. S. 262
(1942);
Idaho v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 617 F.
Supp. 207 (Idaho 1985), no such federal role is present in this
case. Rather, the parties sharply dispute what interest, according
to Vermont law, the State of
Page 494 U. S. 21
Vermont acquired from the Rutland Railway Corporation and,
correspondingly, whether petitioners possess the property interest
that they claim has been taken.
See Brief for Petitioners
15, and n. 14; Brief for Respondents State of Vermont
et
al. 22-25; Reply Brief for Petitioners 2-4. Similar reference
to state law has guided other courts seeking to determine whether a
railway right of way lapsed upon the conversion to trail use.
Compare State by Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v.
State, 329 N.W.2d
543, 545-548 (Minn.) (trail use within original interest, thus
reversionary rights have not matured),
cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1209 (1983),
with Lawson v. State, 107 Wash. 2d
444,
730 P.2d
1308 (1986) (change in use would give effect to reversionary
interests);
McKinley v. Waterloo R. Co., 368 N.W.2d 131,
133-136 (Iowa 1985) (lack of railway use triggered period leading
to reversion);
Schnabel v. County of DuPage, 101
Ill.App.3d 553, 57 Ill.Dec. 121, 428 N.E.2d 671 (1981) (easement
lapsed). Determining what interest petitioners would have enjoyed
under Vermont law, in the absence of the ICC's recent actions, will
establish whether petitioners possess the predicate property
interest that must underlie any takings claim.
See Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., supra, 467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
1001-1004. We do not attempt to resolve that issue.
It is also clear that the Interstate Commerce Act, and the ICC's
actions pursuant to it, preempt the operation and effect of certain
state laws that "conflict with or interfere with federal authority
over the same activity."
Chicago & North Western Transp.
Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.
S. 311,
450 U. S. 319
(1981);
see id. at
450 U. S.
318-319. States may not impose obligations upon carriers
at odds with those governed through the ICC's "exclusive" and
"plenary authority to regulate . . . rail carriers' cessations of
service on their lines."
Id. at
450 U. S. 323;
see id. at
450 U. S.
324-327. A State may again exercise its regulatory
powers once the ICC authorizes a carrier's abandonment of service,
and, thus, unless the Commission attaches post-abandonment
conditions to the abandonment certificate,
Page 494 U. S. 22
"brings [the Commission's] regulatory mission to an end."
Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp.
Co., 467 U. S. 622,
467 U. S. 633
(1984). As the Vermont Supreme Court recognized, state courts
cannot enforce or give effect to asserted reversionary interests
when enforcement would interfere with the Commission's
administration of the Interstate Commerce Act.
See Trustees of
the Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510,
496 A.2d 151
(1985). These results are simply routine and well established
consequences of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl.
2.
The scope of the Commission's authority to regulate
abandonments, thereby delimiting the ambit of federal power, is an
issue quite distinct from whether the Commission's exercise of
power over matters within its jurisdiction effected a taking of
petitioners' property.
Cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U. S. 164,
444 U. S. 174
(1979) ("[T]here is no question but that Congress could assure the
public a free right of access. . . . Whether a statute or
regulation that went so far amounted to a
taking,' however, is
an entirely separate question"). Although the Commission's actions
may preempt the operation and effect of certain state laws, those
actions do not displace state law as the traditional source of the
real property interests. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
supra, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S.
1003-1004, 467 U. S.
1012 (state law creates property right in trade secrets
for purposes of Fifth Amendment, and regulatory regime does not
preempt state property law). The Commission's actions may delay
property owners' enjoyment of their reversionary interests, but
that delay burdens and defeats the property interest rather than
suspends or defers the vesting of those property rights. See
National Wildlife Federation v. ICC, 271 U.S.App.D.C. 1,
11-12, and n. 16, 850 F.2d 694, 704-705, and n. 16 (1988). Any
other conclusion would convert the ICC's power to preempt
conflicting state regulation of interstate commerce into the power
to preempt the rights guaranteed by state property law, a result
incompatible with the Fifth Amendment. See
Ruckelshaus
Page 494 U. S. 23
v. Monsanto Co., supra, 467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
1012 ("If Congress can `preempt' state property law in
the manner advocated by EPA, then the Taking Clause has lost all
vitality. [A] sovereign, `by
ipse dixit, may not transform
private property into public property without compensation. . . .
This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was meant to prevent'"), quoting
Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, supra, 449 U.S. at
449 U. S.
164.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted just this
unjustified interpretation of the effect of the ICC's exercise of
federal power. The court concluded that, even if petitioners held
the reversionary interest they claim, no taking occurred because
"no reversionary interest can or would vest" until the ICC
determines that abandonment is appropriate.
See 853 F.2d
145, 151 (1988). This view conflates the scope of the ICC's power
with the existence of a compensable taking and threatens to read
the Just Compensation Clause out of the Constitution. The ICC may
possess the power to postpone enjoyment of reversionary interests,
but the Fifth Amendment and well established doctrine indicate
that, in certain circumstances, the Government must compensate
owners of those property interests when it exercises that power.
See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304,
482 U. S.
314-315 (1987) (The Taking Clause "does not prohibit the
taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the
exercise of that power," and the Clause "is designed not to limit
the governmental interference with property rights
per se,
but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking"). Nothing in the Court's
opinion disavows these principles. The Court's conclusion that
section 8(d) authorizes rails-to-trails conversions that amount to
takings,
ante at
494 U. S. 13, and
its conclusion that "under any view of takings law, only some
rail-to-trail conversions will amount to takings,"
ante at
494 U. S. 16, are
inconsistent with the Second Circuit's view. Indeed, if the Second
Circuit's
Page 494 U. S. 24
approach were adopted, discussion of the availability of the
Tucker Act remedy would be unnecessary. Even the federal respondent
acknowledges that the existence of a taking will rest upon the
nature of the state-created property interest that petitioners
would have enjoyed absent the federal action and upon the extent
that the federal action burdened that interest.
See Brief
for Federal Respondents 23-24.
Well established principles will govern analysis of whether the
burden the ICC's actions impose upon state-defined real property
interests amounts to a compensable taking. We recently concluded in
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.
S. 825,
483 U. S.
831-832 (1987), that a taking would occur if the
Government appropriated a public easement.
See also Kaiser
Aetna, supra, 444 U.S. at
444 U. S.
179-180 ("[T]he
right to exclude,' so universally
held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls
within this category of interests that the Government cannot take
without compensation") (footnote omitted). In such a case, a
"permanent physical occupation" of the underlying property
"has occurred . . . where individuals are given a permanent and
continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may
continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is
permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises."
Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at
483 U. S. 832;
see also, Kaiser Aetna, supra, 444 U.S. at 180 ("[E]ven if
the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it
must nonetheless pay just compensation"). The Government's
appropriation of other, lesser servitudes may also impose a burden
requiring payment of just compensation.
See United States v.
Causby, 328 U. S. 256
(1946);
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U. S. 327
(1922). And the Court recently concluded that the Government's
burdening of property for a distinct period, short of a permanent
taking, may nevertheless mandate compensation.
See First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church, supra, 482 U.S. at
482 U. S.
318-319. Of course, a party may gain the benefit of
these principles only after establishing possession of a property
interest
Page 494 U. S. 25
that has been burdened. As today's decision indicates,
petitioners and persons similarly situated will have ample
opportunity to make that showing.
With this understanding, and for the reasons set forth in the
Court's opinion, I agree that the judgment below should be
affirmed.