Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)
U.S. Supreme CourtKaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)
Kaiser Aetna v. United States
Argued October 1, 1979
Decided December 4, 1979
444 U.S. 164
Through dredging and filling operations in developing a marina-style subdivision community, petitioners, the owner and lessee of an area which included Kuapa Pond, a shallow lagoon on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, that was contiguous to a navigable bay and the Pacific Ocean but separated from the bay by a barrier beach, converted the pond into a marina, and thereby connected it to the bay. The Army Corps of Engineers had advised petitioners that they were not required to obtain permits for the development of and operations in the pond, and petitioners ultimately made improvements that allowed boats access to and from the bay. Petitioner lessee controls access to and use of the pond, which, under Hawaii law, was private property, and fees are charged for maintaining the pond. Thereafter, the United States filed suit in Federal District Court against petitioners to resolve a dispute as to whether petitioners were required to obtain the Corps' authorization, in accordance with § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, for future improvements in the marina, and whether petitioners could deny the public access to the pond because, as a result of the improvements, it had become a navigable water of the United States. In examining the scope of Congress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, the District Court held that the pond was "navigable water of the United States," subject to regulation by the Corps, but further held that the Government lacked authority to open the pond to the public without payment of compensation to the owner. The Court of Appeals agreed that the pond fell within the scope of Congress' regulatory authority, but held, reversing the District Court, that, when petitioners converted the pond into a marina and thereby connected it to the bay, it became subject to the "navigational servitude" of the Federal Government, thus giving the public a right of access to what was once petitioners' private pond.
Held: If the Government wishes to make what was formerly Kuapa Pond into a public aquatic park after petitioners have proceeded as far as they have here, it may not, without invoking its eminent domain power and paying just compensation, require them to allow the public free access to the dredged pond. Although the dredged pond falls within
the definition of "navigable waters" as this Court has used that term in delimiting the boundaries of Congress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, this Court has never held that the federal navigational servitude creates a blanket exception to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause authority to promote navigation. Congress, in light of its extensive Commerce Clause authority over this Nation's waters, which does not depend on a stream's "navigability," may prescribe rules governing petitioners' marina and may assure the public a free right of access to the marina if it so chooses, but whether a statute or regulation that goes so far amounts to a "taking" is an entirely separate question. Here the Government's attempt to create a public right of access to the improved land goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation involved in typical riparian condemnation cases as to amount to a taking requiring just compensation. Cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393. Pp. 170-180.
584 F.2d 378, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 444 U. S. 180.