A Colorado statute allows a proposed state constitutional
amendment to be placed on a general election ballot if its
proponents can obtain the signatures of at least 5 percent of the
total number of qualified voters on an "initiative petition" within
a 6-month period, but makes it a felony to pay petition
circulators. Concluding that they would need the assistance of paid
personnel to obtain the required signatures within the allotted
time, appellee proponents of a constitutional amendment that would
remove motor carriers from the Colorado Public Utilities
Commission's jurisdiction brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against appellant state officials, seeking a declaration that the
statutory payment prohibition violated their First Amendment
rights. The District Court upheld the statute, but the Court of
Appeals ultimately reversed, holding that the statute violates the
First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
The statutory prohibition against the use of paid
circulators abridges appellees' right to engage in political speech
in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp.
486 U. S.
(a) The statute is subject to exacting scrutiny, since the
circulation of an initiative petition seeking to deregulate the
Colorado trucking industry necessarily constitutes "core political
speech," for which First Amendment protection is at its zenith. The
statute burdens such speech in two ways: First, it limits the
number of voices who will convey appellees' message and the hours
they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they
can reach. Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will
garner the number of necessary signatures, thus limiting their
ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion. The
statute's burden on speech is not relieved by the fact that other
avenues of expression remain open to appellees, since the use of
paid circulators is the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps
economical means of achieving direct, one-on-one communication, and
appellees' right to utilize that means is itself protected by the
First Amendment. Nor is the statutory burden rendered acceptable by
the State's claimed authority to impose limitations on the scope of
the state-created right to legislate by initiative; the power to
ban initiatives entirely does not include
Page 486 U. S. 415
the power to limit discussion of political issues raised in
initiative petitions. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328
distinguished. Pp. 486 U. S.
(b) The State has failed to sustain its burden of justifying the
statutory prohibition. The argument that justification is found in
the State's interest in assuring that an initiative has sufficient
grass roots support to be placed on the ballot is not persuasive,
since that interest is adequately protected by the requirement that
the specified number of signatures be obtained. Nor does the
State's claimed interest in protecting the integrity of the
initiative process justify the prohibition, because the State has
failed to demonstrate the necessity of burdening appellees' ability
to communicate in order to meet its concerns. It cannot be assumed
that a professional circulator -- whose qualifications for similar
future assignments may well depend on a reputation for competence
and integrity -- is any more likely to accept false signatures than
a volunteer motivated entirely by an interest in having the
proposition placed on the ballot. Moreover, other statutory
provisions dealing expressly with the potential danger of false
signatures are adequate to minimize the risk of improper
circulation conduct. Pp. 486 U. S.
828 F.2d 1446, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Colorado, the proponents of a new law, or an amendment to the
State Constitution, may have their proposal placed on the ballot at
a general election if they can obtain enough signatures of
qualified voters on an "initiative petition" within
Page 486 U. S. 416
a 6-month period. One section of the state law regulating the
initiative process makes it a felony to pay petition circulators.
] The question in
this case is whether that provision is unconstitutional. The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the
statute abridged appellees' right to engage in political speech,
and therefore violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution. We agree.
Colorado is one of several States that permits its citizens to
place propositions on the ballot through an initiative process.
Colo.Const., Art. V, § 1; Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 1-40-101 to 1-40-119
(1980 and Supp.1987). Under Colorado law, proponents of an
initiative measure must submit the measure to the State Legislative
Council and the Legislative Drafting Office for review and comment.
The draft is then submitted to a three-member title board, which
prepares a title, submission clause, and summary. After approval of
the title, submission clause, and summary, the proponents of the
measure then have six months to obtain the necessary signatures,
which must be in an amount equal to at least five percent of the
total number of voters who cast votes for all candidates for the
Office of Secretary of State at the last preceding general
election. If the signature requirements are met, the petitions may
be filed with the Secretary of State, and the measure will appear
on the ballot at the next general election. Colo.Rev.Stat. §§
1-40-101 to 1-40-105 (1980 and Supp.1987).
Page 486 U. S. 417
State law requires that the persons who circulate the approved
drafts of the petitions for signature be registered voters.
Colo.Const., Art. V, § 1(6). Before the signed petitions are filed
with the Secretary of State, the circulators must sign affidavits
attesting that each signature is the signature of the person whose
name it purports to be and that, to the best of their knowledge and
belief, each person signing the petition is a registered voter.
Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-40-109 (Supp.1987). The payment of petition
circulators is punished as a felony. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-40-110
(1980), n. 1, supra.
Appellees are proponents of an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution that would remove motor carriers from the jurisdiction
of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission. In early 1984, they
obtained approval of a title, submission clause, and summary for a
measure proposing the amendment, and began the process of obtaining
the 46,737 signatures necessary to have the proposal appear on the
November, 1984, ballot. Based on their own experience as petition
circulators, as well as that of other unpaid circulators, appellees
concluded that they would need the assistance of paid personnel to
obtain the required number of signatures within the allotted time.
They then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General of Colorado, seeking a
declaration that the statutory prohibition against the use of paid
circulators violates their rights under the First Amendment.
Page 486 U. S. 418
After a brief trial, the District Judge entered judgment
upholding the statute on alternative grounds. First, he concluded
that the prohibition against the use of paid circulators did not
burden appellees' First Amendment rights because it did not place
any restraint on their own expression or measurably impair efforts
to place initiatives on the ballot. [Footnote 3
] The restriction on their ability to hire paid
circulators to speak for them was not significant, because they
remained free to use their money to employ other spokesmen who
could advertise their cause. Second, even assuming,
that the statute burdened appellees' right to
engage in political speech, the District Judge concluded that the
burden was justified by the State's interests in (a) making sure
Page 486 U. S. 419
initiative measure has a sufficiently broad base to warrant its
placement on the ballot, and (b) protecting the integrity of the
initiative process by eliminating a temptation to pad
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons
stated by the District Court. After granting rehearing en banc,
however, the court reversed. The en banc majority concluded that
the record demonstrated that petition circulators engage in the
communication of ideas while they are obtaining signatures, and
that the available pool of circulators is necessarily smaller if
only volunteers can be used.
"Thus, the effect of the statute's absolute ban on compensation
of solicitors is clear. It impedes the sponsors' opportunity to
disseminate their views to the public. It curtails the discussion
of issues that normally accompanies the circulation of initiative
petitions. And it shrinks the size of the audience that can be
reached. . . . In short, like the campaign expenditure limitations
struck down in Buckley,
the Colorado statute imposes a
direct restriction which 'necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression. . . .' Buckley,
424 U.S. at 424 U. S.
828 F.2d 1446, 1453-1454 (CA10 1987) (citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals then rejected the State's asserted
justifications for the ban. It first rejected the suggestion that
the ban was necessary either to prevent fraud or to protect the
public from circulators that might be too persuasive:
"The First Amendment is a value-free provision whose protection
is not dependent on 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of
the ideas and beliefs which are offered.' NAACP v.
, 371 U. S. 445
"The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public
authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind. . . . In
this field, every person must be his
Page 486 U. S. 420
own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust
any government to separate the true from the false for us."
"Thomas v. Collins,
, 323 U. S. 545
(Jackson, J., concurring)."
at 1455. The court then rejected the suggestion
that the ban was needed to assure that the initiative had a broad
base of public support because, in the court's view, that interest
was adequately protected by the requirement that the petition be
signed by five percent of the State's eligible voters. Finally, the
Court of Appeals rejected an argument advanced by a dissenting
judge that, since Colorado had no obligation to afford its citizens
an initiative procedure, it could impose this condition on its use.
Having decided to confer the right, the State was obligated to do
so in a manner consistent with the Constitution, because, unlike
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, 478 U. S. 328
(1986), which involved only commercial speech, this case involves
"core political speech."
We fully agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this
case involves a limitation on political expression subject to
exacting scrutiny. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
, 424 U. S. 45
(1976). The First Amendment provides that Congress
"shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
The Fourteenth Amendment makes that prohibition applicable to
the State of Colorado. As we explained in Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88
310 U. S. 95
"[t]he freedom of speech and of the press, which are secured by
the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are
among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are
secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against
abridgment by a State. "
Page 486 U. S. 421
Unquestionably, whether the trucking industry should be
deregulated in Colorado is a matter of societal concern that
appellees have a right to discuss publicly without risking criminal
"The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous
restraint or fear of subsequent punishment."
at 310 U. S.
-102. The First Amendment "was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United
States, 354 U. S. 476
354 U. S. 484
(1957). Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in
Colorado; their right freely to engage in discussions concerning
the need for that change is guarded by the First Amendment.
The circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves
both the expression of a desire for political change and a
discussion of the merits of the proposed change. Although a
petition circulator may not have to persuade potential signatories
that a particular proposal should prevail to capture their
signatures, he or she will at least have to persuade them that the
matter is one deserving of the public scrutiny and debate that
would attend its consideration by the whole electorate. This will
in almost every case involve an explanation of the nature of the
proposal and why its advocates support it. [Footnote 4
] Thus, the circulation of a petition
involves the type of
Page 486 U. S. 422
interactive communication concerning political change that is
appropriately described as "core political speech." [Footnote 5
The refusal to permit appellees to pay petition circulators
restricts political expression in two ways: First, it limits the
number of voices who will convey appellees' message and the
Page 486 U. S. 423
hours they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the
audience they can reach. [Footnote
] Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner
the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the
ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of
statewide discussion. The Colorado Supreme Court has itself
recognized that the prohibition against the use of paid circulators
has the inevitable effect of reducing the total quantum of speech
on a public issue. When called upon to consider the
constitutionality of the statute at issue here in another context
in Urevich v. Woodard, 667 P.2d
, 763 (Colo.1983), that court described the burden the
statute imposes on First Amendment expression:
"As mentioned previously, statutes that limit the power of the
people to initiate legislation are to be closely scrutinized and
narrowly construed. That the statute in question acts as a
limitation on ACORN's ability to circulate petitions cannot be
doubted. We can take judicial notice of the fact that it is often
more difficult to get people to work without compensation than it
is to get them to work for pay. As the dissent in State v.
Conifer Enterprises, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d
, [104,] 508 P.2d 149[, 155] (1973) (Rosellini, J.,
" The securing of sufficient signatures to place an initiative
measure on the ballot is no small undertaking. Unless the
proponents of a measure can find a large number of volunteers, they
must hire persons to solicit signatures or abandon the project. I
think we can take judicial notice of the fact that the solicitation
of signatures on petitions is work. It is time-consuming and it is
Page 486 U. S. 424
-- so much so that it seems that few but the young have the
strength, the ardor and the stamina to engage in it, unless, of
course, there is some remuneration."
Appellants argue that, even if the statute imposes some
limitation on First Amendment expression, the burden is permissible
because other avenues of expression remain open to appellees, and
because the State has the authority to impose limitations on the
scope of the state-created right to legislate by initiative.
Neither of these arguments persuades us that the burden imposed on
appellees' First Amendment rights is acceptable.
That appellees remain free to employ other means to disseminate
their ideas does not take their speech through petition circulators
outside the bounds of First Amendment protection. Colorado's
prohibition of paid petition circulators restricts access to the
most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of
political discourse, direct one-on-one communication. That it
leaves open "more burdensome" avenues of communication, does not
relieve its burden on First Amendment expression. FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.
(1986). Cf. Citizens Against Rent Control v.
Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290
454 U. S. 296
454 U. S. 299
(1981). The First Amendment protects appellees' right not only to
advocate their cause, but also to select what they believe to be
the most effective means for so doing.
Relying on Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Co., 478 U. S. 328
(1986), Colorado contends that, because the power of the initiative
is a state-created right, it is free to impose limitations on the
exercise of that right. That reliance is misplaced. In
the Court concluded that
"the greater power to
Page 486 U. S. 425
completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser
power to ban advertising of casino gambling."
at 478 U. S.
-346. The Court of Appeals quite properly pointed out
the logical flaw in Colorado's attempt to draw an analogy between
the present case and Posadas.
The decision in
does not suggest that
"the power to ban casino gambling entirely would include the
power to ban public discussion of legislative proposals regarding
the legalization and advertising of casino gambling."
828 F.2d at 1456. Thus it does not support the position that the
power to ban initiatives entirely includes the power to limit
discussion of political issues raised in initiative petitions. And,
as the Court of Appeals further observed:
is inapplicable to the present case for a more
fundamental reason -- the speech restricted in Posadas
merely "commercial speech which does no more than propose a
commercial transaction. . . .'" Posadas, [478 U.S. at
478 U. S.
340], (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Board v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
748, 425 U. S. 762
(1976)]). . . . Here, by contrast, the speech at issue is "at the
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms,"
Buckley, [424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 39
(quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S.
23, 393 U. S. 32
(1968))] -- an area of public policy where protection of robust
discussion is at its zenith."
We agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the statute
trenches upon an area in which the importance of First Amendment
protections is "at its zenith." For that reason the burden that
Colorado must overcome to justify this criminal law is well nigh
We are not persuaded by the State's arguments that the
prohibition is justified by its interest in making sure that an
initiative has sufficient grass roots support to be placed on the
ballot, or by its interest in protecting the integrity of the
initiative process. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the
former interest is adequately protected by the requirement that no
initiative proposal may be placed on the ballot
Page 486 U. S. 426
unless the required number of signatures has been obtained.
at 1455. [Footnote
The State's interest in protecting the integrity of the
initiative process does not justify the prohibition because the
State has failed to demonstrate that it is necessary to burden
appellees' ability to communicate their message in order to meet
its concerns. The Attorney General has argued that the petition
circulator has the duty to verify the authenticity of signatures on
the petition and that compensation might provide the circulator
with a temptation to disregard that duty. No evidence has been
offered to support that speculation, however, and we are not
prepared to assume that a professional circulator -- whose
qualifications for similar future assignments may well depend on a
reputation for competence and integrity -- is any more likely to
accept false signatures than a volunteer who is motivated entirely
by an interest in having the proposition placed on the ballot.
Other provisions of the Colorado statute deal expressly with the
potential danger that circulators might be tempted
Page 486 U. S. 427
to pad their petitions with false signatures. It is a crime to
forge a signature on a petition, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-13-106 (1980),
to make false or misleading statements relating to a petition,
Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-40-119 (Supp.1987), or to pay someone to sign a
petition, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-40-110 (1980). Further, the top of
each page of the petition must bear a statement printed in red ink
warning potential signatories that it is a felony to forge a
signature on a petition or to sign the petition when not qualified
to vote and admonishing signatories not to sign the petition unless
they have read and understand the proposed initiative. [Footnote 8
] These provisions seem
adequate to the task of minimizing the risk of improper conduct in
the circulation of a petition, especially since the risk of fraud
or corruption, or the appearance thereof, is more remote at the
petition stage of an initiative than at the time of balloting.
Cf. 435 U. S.
Page 486 U. S. 428
U.S. 765, 435 U. S. 790
(1978) ("The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving
candidate elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote
on a public issue").
"[L]egislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or
defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the
guarantees of the First Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 50
That principle applies equally to "the discussion of political
policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of
at 424 U. S. 48
Colorado statute prohibiting the payment of petition circulators
imposes a burden on political expression that the State has failed
to justify. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the statute
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Its judgment is
It is so ordered.
Colorado Rev.Stat. § 1-40-110 (1980) provides:
"Any person, corporation, or association of persons who directly
or indirectly pays to or receives from or agrees to pay to or
receive from any other person, corporation, or association of
persons any money or other thing of value in consideration of or as
an inducement to the circulation of an initiative or referendum
petition or in consideration of or as an inducement to the signing
of any such petition commits a class 5 felony and shall be punished
as provided in section 18-1-105, C.R.S. (1973)."
Although the November, 1984, election in which appellees had
first hoped to present their proposal to the citizens of Colorado
is long past, we note that this action is not moot. Neither party
suggests that the action is moot. Rather, both assert that the
controversy between them is one capable of repetition, yet evading
We may exercise jurisdiction over this action if
"'(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be
fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there
[is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would
be subjected to the same action again.'"
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U. S. 478
455 U. S. 482
(1982) (per curiam), quoting Weinstein v. Bradford,
423 U. S. 147
423 U. S. 149
(1975) (per curiam). We are satisfied that both elements are
present in this case. Colorado grants the proponents of an
initiative only six months in which to obtain the necessary
signatures. The likelihood that a proponent could obtain a
favorable ruling within that time, much less act upon such a ruling
in time to obtain the needed signatures, is slim, at best. Further,
the initiative sought by appellees has not been enacted. Appellees,
however, continue to advocate its adoption, and plan future
attempts to obtain the signatures necessary to place the issue on
the ballot. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. Consequently, it is reasonable to
expect that the same controversy will recur between these two
parties, yet evade meaningful judicial review. See First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.
, 435 U. S.
-775 (1978); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.
In support of its conclusion that the prohibition against the
use of paid circulators did not inhibit the placement of initiative
measures on the general ballot, the District Court compared
Colorado's experience with that of 20 States which have an
initiative process, but do not prohibit paid circulators. It noted
that, since 1910, Colorado has ranked fourth in the total number of
initiatives placed on the ballot. This statistic, however, does not
reject the possibility that even more petitions would have been
successful if paid circulators had been available, or, more
narrowly, that these appellees would have had greater success if
they had been able to hire extra help. As the District Court itself
noted, "the evidence indicates [appellees'] purposes would be
enhanced if the corps of volunteers could be augmented by a cadre
of paid workers." 741 F.2d 1210, 1212 (CA10 1984) (Appendix).
The record in this case demonstrates that the circulation of
appellees' petition involved political speech. Paul Grant, one of
the appellees, testified about the nature of his conversations with
voters in an effort to get them to sign the petition:
"[T]he way we go about soliciting signatures is that you ask the
person -- first of all, you interrupt the person in their walk or
whatever they are doing. You intrude upon them and ask them, 'Are
you a registered voter?'"
"* * * *"
"If you get a yes, then you tell the person your purpose, that
you are circulating a petition to qualify the issue on the ballot
in November, and tell them what about, and they say, 'Please let me
know a little bit more.' Typically, that takes maybe a minute or
two, the process of explaining to the persons that you are trying
to put the initiative on the ballot to exempt Colorado
transportation from [State Public Utilities Commission]
"Then you ask the person if they will sign your petition. If
they hesitate, you try to come up with additional arguments to get
them to sign."
"* * * *"
"[We try] to explain the -- not just deregulation in this
industry, that it would free up to industry from being cartelized,
allowing freedom from moral choices, price competition for the
first time, lowering price costs, which we estimate prices in
Colorado to be $150 million a year in monopoly benefits. We have
tried to convey the unfairness and injustice of the existing
system, where some businesses are denied to go into business simply
to protect the profits of existing companies."
"We tried to convey the unfairness of the existing system, which
has denied individuals the right to start their own businesses. In
many cases, individuals have asked for an authority and been turned
down because huge corporate organizations have opposed them."
2 Record 10-11. This testimony provides an example of advocacy
of political reform that falls squarely within the protections of
the First Amendment.
Our recognition that the solicitation of signatures for a
petition involves protected speech follows from our recognition in
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
444 U. S. 620
(1980), that the solicitation of charitable contributions often
involves speech protected by the First Amendment, and that any
attempt to regulate solicitation would necessarily infringe that
"Prior authorities, therefore, clearly establish that charitable
appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety
of speech interests -- communication of information, the
dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy
of causes -- that are within the protection of the First Amendment.
Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable
regulation, but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for
the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined
with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for
particular causes or for particular views on economic, political,
or social issues, and for the reality that, without solicitation,
the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease."
at 444 U. S.
Paul Grant testified that compensation resulted in more people
being "able and willing" to circulate petitions. 2 Record 19-20. As
he succinctly concluded: "[M]oney either enables people to forego
leaving a job, or enables them to have a job." Ibid.
Colorado also seems to suggest that it is permissible to mute
the voices of those who can afford to pay petition circulators.
Brief for Appellants 17.
"But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1
424 U. S. 48
(1976). The concern that persons who can pay petition circulators
may succeed in getting measures on the ballot when they might
otherwise have failed cannot defeat First Amendment rights. As we
said in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
U.S. at 435 U. S.
-791, paid advocacy
"may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its
purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is
hardly a reason to suppress it. . . ."
"[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. . . ."
424 U.S. at 424 U. S.
-49. . . . [T]he people in our democracy are entrusted
with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative
merits of conflicting arguments."
Cf. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U. S.
, 456 U. S. 60
(1982) ("The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised
choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification
for limiting speech").
Section 1-40-106 provides in part:
"(1) At the top of each page of every initiative or referendum
petition shall be printed, in plain red letters no smaller than the
impression of ten-point, boldface type, the following:"
"IT IS A FELONY:"
"For anyone to sign any initiative or referendum petition with
any name other than his or her own or to knowingly sign his or her
name more than once for the same measure or to sign such petition
when not a qualified elector."
"DO NOT SIGN THIS PETITION UNLESS YOU ARE
"TO BE A QUALIFIED ELECTOR, YOU MUST BE:"
"(a) At least eighteen years of age."
"(b) A citizen of the United States."
"(c) A resident of the state of Colorado and have resided in the
state at least thirty-two days."
"(d) A resident of the precinct in which you live for at least
"Do not sign this petition unless you have read or had read to
you the proposed initiative or referred measure or the summary of
an initiated measure in its entirety and understand its