Where a complainant alleged that a school tax, which was levied
upon his land, was contrary to the spirit and meaning of a law of
the State of Ohio which exempted his property from all state taxes,
and conflicted also with the terms and conditions of the leases by
which he held his land, and the state court dismissed the bill,
this decision of the state court cannot be reviewed by this Court
by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the
Judiciary Act.
The rules which regulate cases brought up to this Court under
that section again examined and affirmed.
The facts were these:
By the fourth section of the Act of Congress of 3 March, 1803,
to enable the State of Ohio to form a state constitution, 2 Stat.
226, a township of land, to be laid off in the Cincinnati Land
District, was granted to the State of Ohio for the purpose of
establishing an academy.
On 17 February, 1809, the Legislature of the State of Ohio
passed an act entitled "An act to establish the Miami University."
Pamphlet acts of 1809, page 184.
That act incorporated the university, provided for its support,
government &c. Section tenth vested the above-mentioned
township in the corporation, for the use and support of the
university, and authorized the corporation to divide the township
into lots, and lease them out for the term of ninety-nine years,
renewable forever, subject to a valuation every fifteen years. The
thirteenth section exempts the township from all state taxes. It
reads in these words:
"That the lands appropriated and vested in the corporation, with
the buildings which may be erected thereon for the accommodation of
the president, professors, and other officers, students, and
servants of the university, and any buildings appertaining thereto,
and also the dwelling house and other buildings which may be built
and erected on the lands,
Page 48 U. S. 739
shall be exempt from all state taxes."
Under this act the university lands were divided into lots and
leased out, the plaintiff in error being the lessee of a part of
them.
On 16 March, 1839, the Legislature of Ohio passed an act
entitled "An act providing for the levying of a school tax in
Oxford Township, in Butler County." Local Laws of Ohio 235 of
Pamphlet acts.
The township here named is the university township. The first
section of the act directs the county commissioners of that county
to appoint appraisers in the Township of Oxford "to appraise the
lands held under permanent leases in said township at their true
value in money, considered in their natural state," taking into
view the rent encumbrance upon the same, payable to the
university.
The second section of the act is in these words:
"Said commissioners shall, in addition to the levying of a tax
on personal property in said township, authorize the levying of a
school tax annually upon the
ad valorem amount of
appraisement in said township, the property of blacks and mulattoes
excepted, not exceeding one mill on the dollar, which assessment
shall be made by the county auditor, and collected by the county
treasurer, in the same manner as other county, township, or state
taxes are levied and collected."
The third section provides that
"The taxes so levied and collected under the provisions of this
act shall be appropriated exclusively for the support of common
schools in the respective districts in the Township of Oxford; and
in the disbursement of the same, the provisions of the act entitled
'An act for the support and better regulation of common schools,
and to create permanently the office of superintendent,' passed
March 7, 1838, shall be conformed to, at least so far as it is
practicable to carry out the objects of this act, having in view
the support of common schools in the said Township of Oxford."
Under this last-named act, a tax for the support of common
schools in Butler township was levied on the university lands, and,
among others, on the lands of the plaintiff in error. Whereupon he
filed his bill in chancery in the Court of Common Pleas for said
County of Butler, setting out in substance the facts as above
stated, and praying that the treasurer and auditor of the county
might be enjoined from collecting said tax on the ground that it
was imposed in contravention of the terms of his lease, and of the
Act of 17 February, 1809, to establish the Miami University.
The defendants demurred to this bill, and on the hearing the
demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed. From this decree of
the common pleas the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Page 48 U. S. 740
Court of Ohio, where, upon hearing on the demurrer, the bill was
again dismissed. From this last decree the plaintiff sued out a
writ of error into this Court.
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Ohio, prosecuted
under the twenty-fifth section of the act to establish the judicial
courts of the United States, and arises out of the following facts
and proceedings.
By the fourth section of an Act of Congress of 3 March, 1803, 2
Stat. 226, a township of land in the Cincinnati land district was
granted to the State of Ohio for the purpose of establishing a
university.
On 17 February, 1809, the Legislature of Ohio, by law,
incorporated and established the Miami University, and, by the
tenth section of this law, vested the township above mentioned in
the corporation, for the support of the university, and authorized
it to divide the township into lots, and to make leases of these
lots for the term of ninety-nine years, renewable forever, but
subject to a valuation at intervals of fifteen years. The
thirteenth section of the law contains the following provision:
"That the lands appropriated and vested in the corporation, with
the buildings which may be erected thereon for the accommodation of
the president, professors, and other officers, students, and
servants of the university, and any buildings
Page 48 U. S. 741
appertaining thereto, and also the dwelling house and other
buildings which may be built and erected on the lands, shall be
exempt from all state taxes."
Under the authority of this law of Ohio, the lands vested in the
university were divided into lots and leased out, and the plaintiff
in error became the lessee of a part of them. On 16 March, 1839,
the Legislature of Ohio passed an act entitled "An act providing
for the levying of a school tax in Oxford Township, in Butler
County." The Township of Oxford is the same which was vested in the
Miami University by the law of 17 February, 1809. The first section
of the law of 1839 provided that the County Commissioners of Butler
County should appoint one or more appraisers in the Township of
Oxford whose duty it should be to appraise the lands held under
permanent leases in said township at their true value in money,
considered in their natural state, and that, in making such
appraisement, they should take into view the rent encumbrance upon
the same annually or otherwise payable to the Miami University by
reason of the condition of the leases under which such lands are
holden. The third section of the act of 1839 appropriates the taxes
thereby ordered to be assessed and levied on the lands in Butler
County exclusively to the support of the common schools in the
school districts of the Township of Oxford, and directs the
disbursement of the amount of these taxes in conformity with the
provisions of a statute of Ohio for the regulation of common
schools, passed on 7 March, 1838. The lease under which the
plaintiff in error claims sets out specially the extent of his
tenure, with the privilege of perpetual renewal, and, in general
terms, refers to all the privileges and immunities granted to the
lessees of the university by the several acts and laws of the
state. In consequence of a demand made by the Auditor and Treasurer
of Oxford Township for the taxes assessed on the lands held by the
plaintiff for the use of the common schools of that township, the
plaintiff filed his bill in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler
County, making defendants thereto the auditor and treasurer of the
township and the trustees of the Miami University, and praying that
the auditor and treasurer and their successors might be perpetually
enjoined from collecting of the plaintiff any taxes whatsoever
enacted by the state and imposed on the lands held by him under
leases from the president and directors of the Miami University.
The plaintiff claims an exemption from the payment of all taxes,
under the provision of the tenth section of the act of 1809, and
insists that the law of 1839 is inconsistent with the privilege or
exemption secured to him by the former law. The bill was demurred
to by the defendants; the demurrer was sustained by the court of
common
Page 48 U. S. 742
pleas, and the bill directed to be dismissed; and upon an appeal
to the supreme court of the state, the decree of the court of
common pleas was in all respects affirmed.
In considering this case, a difficulty meets us at the threshold
in the question of jurisdiction. This being neither an appeal from,
nor writ of error to, a court of the United States, but a case
brought hither under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act,
it must fall within some of the categories prescribed by that
section in order to justify the cognizance of it by this Court, and
this must appear too in the modes and to the extent which this
Court has repeatedly and distinctly announced. It is contended in
the argument on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the Act of
the Legislature of Ohio of March 6, 1839, is an invasion of his
right to exemption from taxes, or rather
from all
taxation, alleged to have been conferred by the act of 1809,
and therefore an infringement of that portion of the tenth section
of the first article of the Constitution of the United States,
which prohibits the passing of laws by the states impairing the
obligation of contracts. On the other hand, it is insisted for the
defendants that the phrase "state taxes," contained in the law of
1809, was and is applicable to a well known distinction between
taxes for general revenue, and payable as a portion of the public
fisc, and county or township dues levied by local power, and
applicable only to purposes which were local and limited in their
character. The latter would seem to be the interpretation adopted
by the courts of Ohio of the two laws in question; they must have
been regarded as reconcilable and consistent with each other, to
justify the dismission of plaintiff's bill on the merits. But
whether these statutes of Ohio be reconcilable with each other or
in conflict with themselves and with the above-cited article of the
Constitution is a matter into which, according to the record before
us, we do not think it material to inquire. The pleadings in this
cause nowhere allege any right, title, or interest derived from or
under any authority of the United States, nor the violation of any
right, title, or interest so derived, nor any violation of the
Constitution, nor of any right guaranteed thereby. Nothing of this
kind is apparent either on the face of the decree of the court of
common pleas, or of that of the Supreme Court of Ohio. The course
of decision here, as to the requisites apparent upon the record to
invest this Court with jurisdiction under the twenty-fifth section
of the Judiciary Act, would seem too clear and too well established
to be misunderstood; but whether understood or regarded by parties
or by counsel, this Court cannot permit the disturbance of a
settled rule of practice, whereby great confusion and
inconvenience
Page 48 U. S. 743
would of necessity be induced. Some of the positions ruled by
this Court upon the subject of jurisdiction under the twenty-fifth
section will be here adverted to. In
Montgomery
v. Hernandez, 12 Wheat. 129, it is said that
"The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction under the twenty-fifth
section of the Judiciary Act unless the right, title, privilege, or
exemption under a statute or commission of the United States be
specially set up by the party claiming it in the state
court and the decision be against the same."
In the case of
Crowell v.
Randell, 10 Pet. 392, the Court, after reviewing
all the previous cases touching the question of jurisdiction under
the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, some of which cases
were calculated to shed doubt upon the meaning of the statute, lays
down these clear and well defined propositions. That to give this
Court jurisdiction, two things should have occurred and be apparent
on the record -- first, that someone of the questions stated in the
section
did arise in the court below, and secondly that a
decision was actually made thereon by the same court, in the manner
required by the section. That if both these do not appear on the
record, the appellate jurisdiction fails. It is not sufficient to
show that such a question
might have occurred, or such a
decision might have been made in the court below. It must be
demonstrable
that they did exist, and were decided. In the
case of
McKinney v.
Carroll, 12 Pet. 66, it is said, two things must be
apparent on the record to give the Supreme Court
jurisdiction under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act --
first, that someone of the questions stated in that section did
arise in the state court, and secondly that a decision was actually
made thereon in the manner required by the section.
The same positions are ruled, almost in the identical words, in
the cases of
Coons v.
Gallaher, 15 Pet. 18, and of
Fulton v.
McAffee, 16 Pet. 149.
In the last case which will be here cited, that of
Armstrong v. Treasurer of
Athens County, reported in 16 Pet. 281, this
subject of jurisdiction under the twenty-fifth section of the
Judiciary Act appears to have been still more elaborately treated
than it had been previously done, and the law concerning it
propounded in a series of six plain propositions; they are as
follow. That to give jurisdiction, it must appear on the record
itself that the case is one embraced by the section -- first,
either by express averment or by necessary intendment in the
pleadings in the case; secondly, by directions given by the court
and stated in the exceptions; or, thirdly, when the proceedings are
according to the laws of Louisiana, by the statement of the facts,
and of the decision as is usually made in
Page 48 U. S. 744
such cases by the court; fourthly, it must be entered on the
record of the proceedings of the appellate court in cases where the
record shows that such a point may have arisen and may have been
decided, that it was a fact raised and decided, and this entry must
appear to have been made by order of the court or by the presiding
judge by order of the court, and certified by the clerk as part of
the record in the state court; or, fifthly, in proceedings in
equity, it may be stated in the body of the final decree of the
state court; or, sixthly, it must appear from the record that the
question was necessarily involved in the decision and that the
state court could not have given the judgment or decree without
deciding it.
Thus, with respect to the construction proper to be given to the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act and with respect also to
the modes of presenting upon the records from the state courts the
questions arising under that section which can properly draw the
decisions of those courts within the cognizance of this tribunal,
we find a series of adjudications embracing and settling the law as
to both these subjects. The rules and principles settled by those
adjudications are entirely approved, and could not be disturbed
without much inconvenience and mischief. Recurring to the record of
the case under consideration and regarding it as deficient in all
the requisites to give jurisdiction according to the express
demands of the authorities cited, we therefore adjudge and order
that the writ of error in this case be
Dismissed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
of the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio and was argued by
counsel. On consideration whereof, and it appearing to the Court
here, from an inspection of the transcript of the record, that
there is nothing upon its face to give this Court jurisdiction in
the case, it is thereupon now here ordered and adjudged by this
Court that this cause be and the same is hereby dismissed for the
want of jurisdiction.
