Where a petition for the seizure and sale of the mortgaged
property of a deceased person was filed in the Circuit Court of the
United States for Louisiana against the executor of that deceased
person, which petition alleged the plaintiff to be a citizen of
Tennessee and the defendant to be a citizen of Louisiana, and the
proceedings went on to a sale without any objection to the
jurisdiction of the court being made by the executor upon the
ground of residence of parties, it is too late for a curator,
appointed in the place of the executor, to raise the objection in a
state court against a purchaser at the sale and attempt to prove
that the circuit court had no jurisdiction over the case because
the executor was not a citizen of Louisiana. Evidence
dehors the record cannot be introduced to disprove it.
Where a lien existed on property by a special mortgage before
the debtor's death, and
Page 48 U. S. 173
the property passed, with the lien attached, into the hands of
an executor, and was in the course of administration in the probate
court, the circuit court of the United States had jurisdiction,
notwithstanding, to proceed against the property, enforce the
creditor's lien, and decree a sale of the property. And such sale
was valid.
The circuit court of the United States, having jurisdiction over
the parties and subject matter and having issued an order of
seizure and sale, the presumption must be, in favor of a purchaser,
that the facts which were necessary to be proved in order to confer
jurisdiction were proved. No other court can inquire into those
facts.
Although the marshal did not give the notice required by law to
the executor against whom the petition was filed, yet if the
executor was served with process on the spot where the property was
situated and where the advertisements were posted up, was present
at the sale and named one of the appraisers, and requested that the
land and negroes should be sold together, he cannot afterwards
impeach the sale because formal steps were not strictly complied
with. Nor can the curator who subsequently represented the same
estate.
Where the court below ordered that a sum of money should be paid
over by the party in whose favor they decided to the losing party,
the reception of this money by the losing party, before the writ of
error was sued out, will not be a sufficient cause for dismissing
the writ of error.
In the beginning of the year 1835, Dawson and Nutt were the
owners of some land situated in the Parish of Carroll, in the State
of Louisiana, on the waters of the Walnut Bayou, amounting to 640
acres, and also of a number of slaves. On 8 January, 1835, they
sold the land and slaves to Alexander McNeill, of the State of
Mississippi, for one hundred and five thousand dollars, payable in
five payments; the first four of twenty-five thousand dollars each,
and the last of five thousand. McNeill gave a mortgage upon the
land and slaves to secure the last four payments.
Whether notes were given for all these payments, and when they
were to be made, the record did not show. But by an endorsement
upon the mortgage under date of January 15, 1838, it appeared that
all the payments had been made except the fourth.
About 28 May, 1839, Alexander McNeill died in Mississippi.
By his will, which contains several legacies of small value, he
bequeathed the mass of his estate to Hector McNeill, also a
resident and citizen of Mississippi, whom he appointed his
testamentary executor. On 6 June, 1839, this executor, stating
himself to be a citizen of Coahoma County, in Mississippi,
presented a petition to the judge of probates of the Parish of
Madison, in which, after stating that his testator had died on the
date above stated, in Mississippi, and left a will, in which he was
appointed sole executor and principal legatee, an authenticated
copy of which was annexed to the petition, he proceeds
Page 48 U. S. 174
to say, that two large estates were in the possession of his
testator, situated in this parish.
He says further that, by the laws of Mississippi, as executor of
the will, he was bound to present it for probate in Warren County
in that state, without delay, but as the court would not sit for
some weeks, he could not then have the will proved and recorded,
nor could he then present a duly certified copy of it to be
recorded in the said Probate Court of Madison. He says he is
"desirous of taking on himself the succession of his deceased
brother's estate, according to the terms of his last will and
testament and the laws of the state; he therefore prays that an
inventory of all the property in the parish, belonging to the
estate of said Alexander McNeill, deceased, be taken."
And he prays the judge to grant him the succession of the
deceased Alexander McNeill according to the terms of the will and
the laws of the state, and that he will grant any other and
whatever order may be necessary to entitle him (Hector) to the
possession and succession of the property left by the deceased.
Upon this petition no order or judgment was given by the probate
judge, but on 2 July following, he proceeded to make an inventory
of the property composing Alexander McNeill's succession, which is
signed by Hector McNeill as executor. The will was probated in
Warren County, Mississippi, on 24 June, 1839, and a copy of it, and
the proceedings in the aforesaid court, recorded in the Probate
court of Madison on 1 July, 1839, one day before the taking of the
inventory, but no order taken on it further than to record it.
By the inventory and appraisement, the whole property of the
deceased in that parish amounted to $245,317.
On 1 November, 1839, Hector McNeill presented the following
petition:
"To the Honorable Richard Charles Downes, Parish Judge in and
for the Parish of Madison, State of Louisiana."
"Hector McNeill, heretofore a resident of Warren County, State
of Mississippi, respectfully represents to your honor, that he is
the owner of large possessions in this parish, consisting of
plantations, negroes &c.; that he is desirous of acquiring
residence, and to be entitled to the privileges &c., of a
resident of this parish; that he is aged thirty-one years; that he
is from the State of Mississippi, as aforesaid, and that he desires
to pursue planting in this parish, and to reside and make his
permanent domicile and home on the Walnut Bayou, Parish of Madison,
Louisiana. Wherefore he prays this notice may be duly filed and
recorded."
"H. McNEILL"
"
Walnut Bayou, La., Nov. 1, 1839 "
Page 48 U. S. 175
On 23 May, 1840, Andrew Erwin filed the following petition in
the circuit court of the United States:
"To the Honorable the Judges of the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Ninth circuit of Louisiana."
"The petition of Andrew Erwin, a citizen of the State of
Tennessee, therein residing, respectfully shows:"
"That Hector McNeill, testamentary executor of Alexander
McNeill, a citizen of the State of Louisiana, residing in the
Parish of Madison, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
is justly indebted to your petitioner in the sum of seventeen
thousand five hundred dollars, besides interest on the promissory
notes hereto annexed for reference and greater certainty, drawn on
8 January, 1835, and payable four years after date, and duly
protested when due for want of payment, as will further appear from
the protests thereof hereunto annexed for reference, one of which
notes was payable to the order of Conway R. Nutt, a citizen of the
State of Mississippi, and by him duly endorsed to your petitioner,
and the other to Henry S. Dawson, also a citizen of the State of
Mississippi, and by him duly endorsed to your petitioner, who avers
that the assignors of said notes could have maintained an action in
your Honorable Court on the said notes against the said Alexander
McNeill, previously to the assignment thereof; that on the balance
of one of said notes, seven thousand five hundred dollars interest
is due at the rate of ten percent per annum, from 11 January, 1839,
until paid, and on the balance of the other five thousand dollars,
interest is due from the same date, 11 January, 1839, until paid,
and which, though amicably requested, the said Alexander McNeill,
as well as his testamentary executor, has neglected to pay."
"Your petitioner further shows that said notes were given in
purchase of a plantation situated in the Parish of Madison
aforesaid and certain slaves, and for securing the payment thereof,
the said plantation and slaves were duly mortgaged, as will further
appear from a certified copy thereof hereto annexed to make part
and parcel of this present petition, and to which for greater
certainty your petitioner refers, and thence your petitioner is
entitled to an order of seizure and sale for the payment of the
balance aforesaid of seventeen thousand five hundred dollars, with
the interest from 11 January, 1839, of ten percent on the sum of
seven thousand five hundred dollars, and on ten thousand dollars
interest at the rate of five percent until paid, and the costs of
the protests of said notes, ten dollars and fifty cents. Wherefore
your petitioner prays that an order of seizure and sale may
issue
Page 48 U. S. 176
against the said plantation, and the negroes mentioned and
described in the act of sale and mortgage aforesaid, hereunto
annexed, to pay and satisfy said sum of seventeen thousand five
hundred dollars, with interest as aforesaid, from 11 January, 1839,
until paid, with $10.50 costs of protest and the costs of suit. And
your petitioner prays for all such other and further relief as the
nature of the case may require and to equity and justice may
appertain, and as in duty bound will ever pray your petitioner.
(Seventeen thousand and five hundred dollars, besides interest and
costs, claimed.)"
"ALFRED HENNEN,
Attorney for Petitioner"
On the day of the filing of the petition, the following order
was issued,
viz.:
"Inasmuch as the mortgage within mentioned imports a confession
of judgment, let an order of seizure and sale issue for the sale of
the property mortgaged, if the sum within claimed is not paid after
legal notice."
"P. K. LAWRENCE,
U.S. Judge"
"New Orleans, 23 May, 1840"
Afterwards, to-wit, on 23 May, 1840, the following writ of
seizure and sale was issued:
"
United States of America:"
"The President of the United States to the Marshal of the
Eastern District of Louisiana or his lawful deputy, greeting: "
"You are hereby commanded to seize and sell, after legal demand,
for cash, the following described property, to-wit: [then followed
a list of the property, namely, land and slaves]."
The return of the marshal was as follows:
"Received this order of seizure and sale on 25 May, 1840, and on
29 May I delivered the order of court and copy of mortgage issued
by the clerk of this Court to the defendant; also a copy of a
notice of demand, which notice is herewith returned (marked A). On
1 June, I seized the land and fifty-seven slaves, mentioned in this
order of seizure and sale, and delivered to said defendant a copy
of notice of said seizure, which is also herewith returned (marked
B). On 4 June, 1840, I affixed copies of an advertisement (marked
C), and herewith filed, to the door of the courthouse, the door of
the parish judge's office, and at other places, in the Parish of
Madison and State of Louisiana, in which the said
Page 48 U. S. 177
property is situated, announcing that the said property would be
offered for sale on the said premises, to the highest bidder for
cash on Monday, 6 July, 1840, being full thirty days, exclusive of
the day on which the advertisements were posted up,
viz.,
4 June, 1840, and the day of sale. On the said 6 July, 1840, I
repaired to the premises aforesaid, and after the appraisers, James
Brooks and Jesse Couch, duly qualified citizens of Louisiana,
selected by the plaintiff and defendant in this case for that
purpose, were duly sworn, they proceeded to appraise the said land
and forty-four of the negroes in this order of seizure and sale,
and the same conveyed by deed from the marshal to the purchaser,
bearing date 7 July, 1840, and of record of this Court. Thirteen of
the said fifty-seven negroes which were seized by me, proving to be
others than those named in this process, were not appraised,
neither could the said thirteen be found, as reported by the said
appraisers in their report, now filed in the court, and marked D.
The said land was appraised at $13 per acre; the 640 acres at $13,
amount $8,320. The said forty-four negroes were appraised
separately and in families and the amount of the whole when added
was $15,525, making the aggregate amount for the land and negroes
$23,845. After said appraisement was completed and between the
hours of 12 A.M. and 1 P.M., I offered the said land and forty-four
negroes for sale; after making all the declarations required by law
in relation to the nature and description of the same, and after
exhibiting and reading, in an audible voice, a certificate of the
recorder of mortgages of the said Parish of Madison; and after
repeatedly crying the said property, James Erwin, Esq. bid the sum
of $16,000, which being the highest and last bid, and more than
two-thirds of the appraisement thereof, the said land and negroes
were adjudged to him, and on 7 July, 1840, were conveyed by deed,
now of record in this Court."
On 7 July, 1840, the marshal executed a deed of the above
property to James Erwin, reciting the circumstances attending the
public sale.
On 23 March, 1841, the Court of Probate in the Parish of Madison
appointed Alfred J. Lowry curator of the vacant succession of
Alexander McNeill.
On 16 August, 1841, Lowry, the curator, filed a petition in the
Ninth Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of Madison
(state court). It represented that McNeill, at his death, was the
owner of the estate, and that James Erwin had illegally, and by
fraud and collusion, taken possession of it. It then prayed for a
restoration of the property, and an account of the rents and
profits.
Page 48 U. S. 178
On 5 May, 1842, Erwin filed his answer, reciting the above facts
and claiming title under the sale.
Evidence having been taken, the district court, at December
term, 1842, pronounced a judgment in favor of the petitioner, the
curator.
An appeal was taken by Erwin from this judgment to the supreme
court of the state, which, in October, 1843, affirmed the judgment
of the court below. A writ of error, sued out under the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, brought the case up to
this Court.
MR. JUSTICE CATRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Alfred J. Lowry sued James Erwin in the district court for the
Ninth District of Louisiana, for a tract of land of about six
hundred acres, and forty-four slaves, who were employed in
cultivating the land by growing cotton thereon. The property was
situate in the Parish of Madison in that state. The suit was
commenced in 1841 by petition which alleges that about July, 1840,
one James Erwin, illegally and by fraud and collusion and without
any legal title thereto, took possession of
Page 48 U. S. 179
all the above described property, and is still in possession of
the same, has appropriated and wrongfully converted to his own use
all the fruits and revenues of said property, and pretends to be
the owner thereof and refuses to deliver to the petitioner the
possession. The property was not claimed by Lowry in his own right,
but as curator of the estate of Alexander McNeill.
To this petition Erwin answered, among other things not within
the cognizance of this Court, that on 6 July, 1840, he became the
purchaser of the property at public auction at a sale made thereof
by the marshal of the United States, who sold the same under a
judgment and on a writ of seizure and sale, issued from the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana in
a case wherein Andrew Erwin was plaintiff and Hector McNeill,
testamentary executor of Alexander McNeill, deceased, was
defendant, and that he paid the sum of sixteen thousand dollars in
cash therefor, which was applied to the payment of a debt due by
mortgage by the succession of Alexander McNeill, and he exhibited a
copy of the proceedings on which the sale was founded, and his bill
of sale made by the marshal for the land and negroes. These
proceedings and the marshal's deed were given in evidence by the
defendant on the trial before the state district court. A judgment
was there given against Erwin, and the property decreed to Lowry as
curator, from which Erwin appealed to the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, where the judgment of the district court was affirmed;
and to this judgment Erwin prosecuted a writ of error out of this
Court under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
on the ground that there was drawn in question the validity of an
authority exercised under the United States and that the decision
of the Supreme Court of Louisiana was against its validity. That
such was the fact, and that this Court has jurisdiction, is not and
cannot be controverted. The judgment ordering the seizure and sale
was declared void for several reasons. Such of them as are subject
to our cognizance we will proceed to consider.
The whole proceeding, commencing with the petition of Andrew
Erwin demanding a seizure and sale to James Erwin's deed from the
marshal, was the exercise of one authority, and the question
submitted for our consideration is whether the marshal's sale was
void on any legal ground -- that is to say whether the deed by the
marshal to James Erwin was void for the reason that it was not
supported by a lawful judgment or that, for want of a compliance
with any legal requirements in conducting the seizure and sale, the
deed was void. If void on anyone ground, it would be altogether
useless to reverse
Page 48 U. S. 180
the judgment because an error had been committed on some other
ground, as, on the cause's being remanded, the state court would
pronounce the deed void a second time on the true ground. This
Court was compelled so to hold in
Collier v.
Stanbrough, 6 How. 14.
The deed in the case before us was held void by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana first because Hector McNeill was not a citizen
of that state when Andrew Erwin's petition was filed. This fact the
court ascertained by proof dehors the record. The petition alleges
that Andrew Erwin was a citizen of the State of Tennessee, therein
residing, and that Hector McNeill was a citizen of the State of
Louisiana, residing in the Parish of Madison and within the
jurisdiction of the court. On being served with process, Hector
McNeill did not dispute the fact nor make any defense; the
purchaser found the fact established by the record, nor could it be
called in question in a collateral action and disproved, and the
purchaser's title defeated by inferior evidence. On this question
the case of
McCormick v.
Sullivan, 10 Wheat. 192, is entitled to great
weight. There, neither party was averred to be a citizen of any
state, and the attempt was made by a second suit to treat the
purchaser's title as a nullity because of this defect in the
proceeding on which the purchase was founded, but it was held that
the purchaser took a good title. In the case before us, the record
on its face was perfect, and evidence was let in to contradict and
to overthrow it which we deem to be wholly inadmissible in any
collateral proceeding. Hector McNeill was estopped to deny the
fact, and so is the present party, his successor.
The next question decided below was that the property, when it
was seized and sold, was part of a succession, and, being in the
course of administration in the probate court, could not be seized
and sold by an execution founded on a proceeding in another court.
This question we declined to decide in the case of
Collier v.
Stanbrough, and ruled that cause on another ground. That a
special mortgage, where no succession has occurred, may be
foreclosed by this mode of proceeding -- that is, by an order of
seizure and sale in the Circuit Court of the United States held in
Louisiana -- we have no doubt. But the question here is whether
jurisdiction could be exercised over mortgaged property whilst it
was in a course of administration. That no jurisdiction existed in
the United States circuit court was held in the case before us, and
so it had been held by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in previous
cases. But in 1847 that court reviewed its previous decisions, in
the case of
Dupuy v. Bemiss. In the opinion there
given,
Page 48 U. S. 181
the jurisdiction of the federal court held in Louisiana is so
accurately and cogently set forth, and the relative powers and
duties of the state and federal judiciaries are so justly
appreciated, as to relieve us from all further anxiety and
embarrassment on the delicate question of conflict arising in the
case of
Collier v. Stanbrough and again in this cause. It
was held in the case of
Dupuy v. Bemiss that where a lien
existed on property by a special mortgage before the debtor's death
and the property passed by death and succession, with the lien
attached, into the hands of a curator and was in the course of
administration in the probate court, the circuit court of the
United States had jurisdiction, notwithstanding, to proceed against
the property and to enforce the creditor's lien, and to decree a
sale of the property, and that such sale was valid. We accord to
this adjudication our decided approbation, but take occasion to say
that had we unfortunately been compelled to decide the question
without this aid, our judgment would have been, that the decision
of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the cause under consideration
was erroneous. It was also assumed by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana
"that no explanation was given how the notes secured by the
mortgage got into Andrew Erwin's hands in Tennessee, and that no
transfer of the mortgage was proved to have been made to him,
without which no state judge could have granted an order of seizure
and sale without a violation of law."
We hold that wherever a judgment is given by a court having
jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, the exercise
of jurisdiction warrants the presumption, in favor of a purchaser,
that the facts which were necessary to be proved to confer
jurisdiction were proved. It was so held by this Court in the case
of
Grignon's Lessee v.
Astor, 2 How. 319, and to the principles there laid
down we refer for the true rule. The circuit court may have erred
in granting the order of seizure and sale, but this does not affect
the purchaser's title.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana next held that
"It is well settled in our jurisprudence that in forced
alienations of property there must be a reasonable diligence in and
compliance with the forms of the law, under a penalty of nullity.
When a party resorts to the summary and more severe remedies
allowed by law, he is then held to a stricter compliance with every
legal formality, and the executory process of seizure and sale may
be considered as one of severity. It is obtained
ex parte,
and all the proceedings under it are to be scrutinized closely. It
necessarily follows that if the law has not been complied with, the
property is not transferred and the purchaser acquires no
title."
This was the doctrine adopted by
Page 48 U. S. 182
us in the case of
Collier v. Stanbrough, and is no more
open to question in the Circuit Court of Louisiana than it is in
the state courts of that state, and the question is how far the
marshal complied with the legal formalities in conducting the
seizure and sale. He was bound to give three days' notice to the
debtor before the seizure if he resided on the spot, and if he did
not, to count in addition a day for every twenty miles between the
residence of the debtor and the residence of the judge to whom the
petition was presented. (Code of Practice 735.) The notice was
given to Hector McNeill on 29 May, 1840, requiring him to pay
within three days; the property was seized on 1 June; the
advertisements were posted up on 4 June, and the property sold on 6
July following. The notice was given in the Parish of Carroll,
about four hundred miles from New Orleans, where the judge resided,
so that more than twenty days less than the due time required by
law was allowed to the defendant, Hector McNeill, to appear before
the judge, obtain an injunction, and make opposition to the
proceeding instituted by Andrew Erwin; and for this reason the sale
would be void, if the defendant, McNeill, had not acted in the
matter. But the marshal's returns are required by the practice in
Louisiana to show the various steps in the proceedings, and are
part of the record on which James Erwin's title depends; these
returns show that McNeill was served with process on the spot where
the property was, and where the advertisements were posted. When
the sale come on, the marshal returns that
"by agreement of the plaintiff and defendant in the suit -- that
is, Andrew Erwin and Hector McNeill -- the following individuals
were selected as appraisers, to-wit: James Brooks was selected by
the plaintiff, and Jesse Couch was selected by the defendant, who,
being duly sworn, proceeded to appraise all the property mentioned
in the order of seizure and sale; that they appraised the negroes
and the land -- that is, each slave separately, and the land
separately."
Both land and slaves being immovable property, if two-thirds of
the appraised value had not been bid at the sale, a second was
necessary by the laws of Louisiana. Code of Practice 670, 671. And
by Art. 676,
"Slaves seized must be appraised either by the head or by
families, and the other effects must be appraised with such
minuteness that they may be sold together or separately, to the
best advantage of the debtor, and as he may direct."
The marshal's deed to James Erwin recites in general terms all
the necessary steps required to be taken previous to the sale, and
after describing in detail all the property, the deed says,
that
"the marshal proceeded to cry the aforesaid land and
Page 48 U. S. 183
negroes to go together, at the request of the defendant, Hector
McNeill, and that James Erwin became the purchaser for the sum of
sixteen thousand dollars, being more than two-thirds the appraised
value of the land and negroes."
The general principle as respects third persons is that where
one having title stands by and knowingly permits another to
purchase and expend money on land under the erroneous impression
that he is acquiring a good title, and the one who stands by does
not make his title known, he shall not afterwards be allowed to set
it up against the purchaser. We understand the decisions in
Louisiana to conform to this principle, and that it is applicable
there in cases of execution sales, and, as lands and slaves stand
on the same footing in Louisiana, the rule applies equally to
both.
Testing the sale by this principle, how does it stand? The
purchaser saw the debtor and the marshal select the appraisers, and
saw the appraised value, so that bidders could regulate their bids
by it; he heard the debtor order the marshal to sell the plantation
and slaves together, and they were so sold. Nor did the debtor make
any objection to the sale, but by his acts and presence sanctioned
it, and therefore it cannot be impeached because formal steps were
not strictly complied with.
In our opinion, the order of seizure and sale, and the steps
taken in its execution, were such as to support the sale
adjudicated to James Erwin by the marshal; but we only adjudge the
force and effect of the legal proceeding. As to any other questions
involved in the cause (if there be any), this Court has no
jurisdiction, and consequently leaves them with the state
courts.
At October term, 1843, the curator, Lowry, had judgment, but the
court below ordered
"That no writ of possession issue in this case to put the
plaintiff in possession of the plantation and slaves until he pay
the defendant, or deposit in the hands of the sheriff of the parish
to the credit of the defendant, $436.55, with interest thereon, at
the rate of five percent, per annum, from 18 March in the year 1843
until the day of payment or deposit."
In August, 1844, Lowry paid over the money to the Sheriff of the
Parish of Madison, and the sheriff paid it over to Erwin in
November, 1844. The writ of error was sued out in May, 1845, and
there accompanied the record an assignment of errors. The defendant
in error now comes forward and asks to have the writ of error
dismissed on production of a copy of Erwin's receipt to the sheriff
on the ground that, by receiving the money, Erwin released the
errors complained of.
In the first place, we think the motion comes too late to be
Page 48 U. S. 184
heard, but that if it could be heard, it is no bar. The
proceeding was of a mixed character, partaking more of the nature
of a proceeding in equity than one at law, and although it can only
come here by writ of error, yet his does not change its character.
A writ of error in equity proceedings is not peculiar. The
twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave a writ of
error in chancery cases, and so the law continued until 1803. Ch.
4. And we take the rule to be that although a decree in equity is
fully executed at the instance of the successful party, he cannot
complain of his own voluntary acts if he does perform a condition
imposed upon him before he can have the fruits of the decree,
although the other party derives a benefit from such performance.
If it was otherwise, a writ of error in such a case as the present,
or an appeal in equity, might be defeated after the writ of error
or appeal was sued out, where there was no supersedeas, and here
there was none.
Five years is the time allowed for prosecuting appeals to and
writs of error out of this Court, and in many cases decrees and
judgments are executed before any step is taken to bring the case
here; yet in no instance within our knowledge has an appeal or writ
of error been dismissed on the assumption that a release of errors
was implied from the fact that money or property had changed hands
by force of the judgment or decree. If the judgment is reversed, it
is the duty of the inferior court, on the cause's being remanded,
to restore the parties to their rights.
For the reasons above stated, we order the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana to be
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE WAYNE and MR. JUSTICE DANIEL dissented.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Supreme Court for the Western District of Louisiana, and
was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said
supreme court in this cause be and the same is hereby reversed with
costs, and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to
the said supreme court with directions to proceed therein in
conformity to the opinion of this Court.
