Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Rel. Comm'n,
479 U.S. 511 (1987)

Annotate this Case
  • Syllabus  | 
  • Case

U.S. Supreme Court

Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987)

Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission of Missouri

No. 85-129

Argued December 9, 1986

Decided January 21, 1987

479 U.S. 511


Petitioner, who had been on pregnancy leave from her employment pursuant to the employer's policy that she would be rehired only if a position was available when she was ready to return to work, was told when she notified the employer that she wanted to return to work that there were no positions open. She then filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Missouri Division of Employment Security, which denied the claim pursuant to a Missouri statute that disqualifies a claimant who "has left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer." After the denial was upheld on administrative appeal, petitioner sought review in a Missouri Circuit Court, which held that the Missouri statute was inconsistent with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12). The federal statute provides that no State, such as Missouri, participating in the federal-state unemployment compensation program shall deny any compensation "solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed.

Held: The Missouri statute is consistent with the federal statute. The plain import of § 3304(a)(12)'s language is that Congress intended only to prohibit States from singling out pregnancy for unfavorable treatment, and not to mandate preferential treatment. This is confirmed by both the legislative history and the Labor Department's interpretation of the statute. The focus of the statutory language is on the State's treatment of pregnancy, not the claimant's reason for leaving her job. To apply the Missouri statute, under which all persons who leave work for reasons not causally connected to the work or the employer are disqualified from receiving benefits, it is not necessary to know that petitioner left because of pregnancy. All that is relevant is that she stopped work for a reason having no causal connection to her work or her employer. Under the State's unemployment compensation scheme, pregnancy was not the "sole basis" for the decision under a natural reading of § 3304(a)(12)'s language. Pp. 479 U. S. 514-522.

688 S.W.2d 344, affirmed.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except BLACKMUN, J., who took no part in the decision of the case.

Page 479 U. S. 512

Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.