Petitioner, who had been on pregnancy leave from her employment
pursuant to the employer's policy that she would be rehired only if
a position was available when she was ready to return to work, was
told when she notified the employer that she wanted to return to
work that there were no positions open. She then filed a claim for
unemployment benefits with the Missouri Division of Employment
Security, which denied the claim pursuant to a Missouri statute
that disqualifies a claimant who "has left his work voluntarily
without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer."
After the denial was upheld on administrative appeal, petitioner
sought review in a Missouri Circuit Court, which held that the
Missouri statute was inconsistent with the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12). The federal statute provides that no
State, such as Missouri, participating in the federal-state
unemployment compensation program shall deny any compensation
"solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." The
Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Missouri Supreme Court
reversed.
Held: The Missouri statute is consistent with the
federal statute. The plain import of § 3304(a)(12)'s language is
that Congress intended only to prohibit States from singling out
pregnancy for unfavorable treatment, and not to mandate
preferential treatment. This is confirmed by both the legislative
history and the Labor Department's interpretation of the statute.
The focus of the statutory language is on the State's treatment of
pregnancy, not the claimant's reason for leaving her job. To apply
the Missouri statute, under which all persons who leave work for
reasons not causally connected to the work or the employer are
disqualified from receiving benefits, it is not necessary to know
that petitioner left because of pregnancy. All that is relevant is
that she stopped work for a reason having no causal connection to
her work or her employer. Under the State's unemployment
compensation scheme, pregnancy was not the "sole basis" for the
decision under a natural reading of § 3304(a)(12)'s language. Pp.
479 U. S.
514-522.
688 S.W.2d
344, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except BLACKMUN, J., who took no part in the
decision of the case.
Page 479 U. S. 512
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12), does not prohibit a
State from disqualifying unemployment compensation claimants who
leave their jobs because of pregnancy, when the State imposes the
same disqualification on all claimants who leave their jobs for a
reason not causally connected to their work or their employer.
688 S.W.2d
344 (1985). We granted certiorari,
475 U.
S. 1118 (1986), because the court's decision conflicts
with that of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (1981),
cert.
denied, 459 U. S. 1150
(1983), on a question of practical significance in the
administration of state unemployment compensation laws.
I
In August, 1980, after having been employed by the J. C. Penney
Company for approximately three years, petitioner requested a leave
of absence on account of her pregnancy.
Page 479 U. S. 513
Pursuant to its established policy, the J. C. Penney Company
granted petitioner a "leave without guarantee of reinstatement,"
meaning that petitioner would be rehired only if a position was
available when petitioner was ready to return to work. Petitioner's
child was born on November 5, 1980. On December 1, 1980, when
petitioner notified J. C. Penney that she wished to return to work,
she was told that there were no positions open.
Petitioner then filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The
claim was denied by the Division of Employment Security (Division)
pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 288.050.1(1) (Supp. 1984), which
disqualifies a claimant who "has left his work voluntarily without
good cause attributable to his work or to his employer." A deputy
for the Division determined that petitioner had "quit because of
pregnancy," App. to Pet. for Cert. A53, and therefore had left work
"voluntarily and without good cause attributable to [her] work or
to [her] employer."
Id. at A52. Petitioner appealed the
decision to the Division's appeals tribunal, which, after a full
evidentiary hearing, entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law affirming the deputy's decision. The Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission denied petitioner's petition for review.
Petitioner then sought review in the Circuit Court of Jackson
County, Missouri. The court concluded that § 288.050.1(1) was
inconsistent with 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) as construed in
Brown
v. Porcher, supra, and therefore could not be enforced.
Following
Brown, the Circuit Court held that § 3304(a)(12)
"banned the use of pregnancy or its termination as an excuse for
denying benefits to otherwise eligible women," App. to Pet. for
Cert. A44, and accordingly reversed the Commission's decision and
remanded for entry of an award. The Missouri Court of Appeals
affirmed. Although the Court of Appeals expressed "reservations
concerning the soundness of the ruling in
Brown,"
id. at A39, it
Page 479 U. S. 514
felt constrained to follow the Fourth Circuit's construction of
§ 3304(a)(12).
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, with three judges
dissenting. The court held that previous state appellate decisions
had correctly interpreted Mo.Rev.Stat. § 288.050.1(1) (Supp.1984)
as disqualifying all claimants who, like petitioner, leave work
"for reasons that, while perhaps legitimate and necessary from a
personal standpoint, were not causally connected to the claimant's
work or employer." 688 S.W.2d at 346. Rejecting the notion that it
was bound by
Brown v. Porcher, supra, the court determined
that § 288.050.1(1) was consistent with the federal statute. The
court held that the plain language of § 3304(a)(12) only prohibits
state laws from singling out pregnancy for unfavorable treatment.
The Missouri scheme does not conflict with this requirement, the
court found, because the state law does not expressly refer to
pregnancy; rather, benefits are denied only when claimants leave
work for reasons not attributable to the employer or connected with
the work. The court noted that the Department of Labor, the agency
charged with enforcing the statute, consistently has viewed §
3304(a)(12) as prohibiting discrimination, rather than mandating
preferential treatment. We now affirm.
II
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (Act), 26 U.S.C. § 3301
et
seq., enacted originally as Title IX of the Social Security
Act in 1935, 49 Stat. 639, envisions a cooperative federal-state
program of benefits to unemployed workers.
See St. Martin
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.
S. 772,
451 U. S. 775
(1981). The Act establishes certain minimum federal standards that
a State must satisfy in order for a State to participate in the
program.
See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a). The standard at issue in
this case, § 3304(a)(12), mandates that "no person shall be denied
compensation under such State law solely on the basis of pregnancy
or termination of pregnancy."
Page 479 U. S. 515
Apart from the minimum standards reflected in § 3304(a), the Act
leaves to state discretion the rules governing the administration
of unemployment compensation programs.
See Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548
(1937). State programs, therefore, vary in their treatment of the
distribution of unemployment benefits, although all require a
claimant to satisfy some version of a three-part test. First, all
States require claimants to earn a specified amount of wages or to
work a specified number of weeks in covered employment during a
l-year base period in order to be entitled to receive benefits.
Second, all States require claimants to be "eligible" for benefits,
that is, they must be able to work and available for work. Third,
claimants who satisfy these requirements may be "disqualified" for
reasons set forth in state law. The most common reasons for
disqualification under state unemployment compensation laws are
voluntarily leaving the job without good cause, being discharged
for misconduct, and refusing suitable work.
See Brief for
United States as
Amicus Curiae 2-3; Note, Denial of
Unemployment Benefits to Otherwise Eligible Women on the Basis of
Pregnancy: Section 3304(a)(12) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,
82 Mich.L.Rev. 1925, 1928-1929 (1984).
The treatment of pregnancy-related terminations is a matter of
considerable disparity among the States. Most States regard leave
on account of pregnancy as a voluntary termination for good cause.
Some of these States have specific statutory provisions enumerating
pregnancy-motivated termination as good cause for leaving a job,
while others, by judicial or administrative decision, treat
pregnancy as encompassed within larger categories of good cause
such as illness or compelling personal reasons. [
Footnote 1] A few States, however,
Page 479 U. S. 516
like Missouri, have chosen to define "leaving for good cause"
narrowly. [
Footnote 2] In these
States, all persons who leave their jobs are disqualified from
receiving benefits unless they leave for reasons directly
attributable to the work or to the employer.
Petitioner does not dispute that the Missouri scheme treats
pregnant women the same as all other persons who leave for reasons
not causally connected to their work or their employer, including
those suffering from other types of temporary disabilities. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 8.
See Fifer v. Missouri Division of Employment
Security, 665 S.W.2d 81 (Mo.App.1984);
Duffy v. Labor and
Industrial Relations Comm'n, 556
S.W.2d 195 (Mo.App.1977). She contends, however, that §
3304(a)(12) is not simply an antidiscrimination statute, but rather
that it mandates preferential treatment for women who leave work
because of pregnancy. According to petitioner, § 3304(a)(12)
affirmatively requires States to provide unemployment benefits to
women who leave work because of pregnancy when they are next
available and able to work, regardless of the State's treatment of
other similarly situated claimants.
See Brief for
Petitioner 19-25.
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the plain import of the
language of § 3304(a)(12) is that Congress intended only to
prohibit States from singling out pregnancy for unfavorable
treatment. The text of the statute provides that compensation shall
not be denied under state law "solely on the basis of pregnancy."
The focus of this language is on the basis for the State's
decision, not the claimant's reason for leaving her job. Thus, a
State could not decide to deny benefits to pregnant women while at
the same time allowing benefits to persons who are in other
respects similarly situated: the "sole basis" for such a decision
would be on account of pregnancy.
Page 479 U. S. 517
On the other hand, if a State adopts a neutral rule that
incidentally disqualifies pregnant or formerly pregnant claimants
as part of a larger group, the neutral application of that rule
cannot readily be characterized as a decision made "solely on the
basis of pregnancy." For example, under Missouri law, all persons
who leave work for reasons not causally connected to the work or
the employer are disqualified from receiving benefits. To apply
this law, it is not necessary to know that petitioner left because
of pregnancy: all that is relevant is that she stopped work for a
reason bearing no causal connection to her work or her employer.
Because the State's decision could have been made without ever
knowing that petitioner had been pregnant, pregnancy was not the
"sole basis" for the decision under a natural reading of §
3304(a)(12)'s language.
We have, on other occasions, construed language similar to that
in § 3304(a)(12) as prohibiting disadvantageous treatment, rather
than as mandating preferential treatment. In
Monroe v. Standard
Oil Co., 452 U. S. 549
(1981), for example, the Court considered 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3), a
provision of the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act
of 1974, which provides that a person "shall not be denied
retention in employment . . . because of any obligation" as a
member of the Nation's Reserve Forces. The
Monroe Court
concluded that the intent of the provision was to afford reservists
"the same treatment afforded their coworkers without military
obligations," 452 U.S. at
452 U. S. 560;
it did not create an "employer responsibility to provide
preferential treatment."
Id. at
452 U. S. 562.
Similarly, in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U. S. 397
(1979), we considered § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794, which provides that an "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual" shall not be excluded from a federally
funded program "solely by reason of his handicap." We concluded
that the statutory language was only intended to "eliminate
discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals," and
generally did
Page 479 U. S. 518
not mandate "affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities
caused by handicaps." 442 U.S. at
442 U. S.
410.
Even petitioner concedes that § 3304(a)(12) does not prohibit
States from denying benefits to pregnant or formerly pregnant women
who fail to satisfy neutral eligibility requirements such as
ability to work and availability for work.
See Brief for
Petitioner 24.
See also S.Rep. No. 94-1265, p. 21 (1976)
("Pregnant individuals would . . . continue to be required to meet
generally applicable criteria of availability for work and ability
to work"); H.R.Rep. No. 94-755, p. 50 (1975). Nevertheless, she
contends that the statute prohibits the application to pregnant
women of neutral
disqualification provisions. Reply Brief
for Petitioner 8-9. But the statute's plain language will not
support the distinction petitioner attempts to draw. The statute
does not extend only to disqualification rules. It applies, by its
own terms, to any decision to deny compensation. In both instances,
the scope of the statutory mandate is the same: the State cannot
single out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment, but it is not
compelled to afford preferential treatment.
The legislative history cited by petitioner does not support her
view that § 3304(a)(12) mandates preferential treatment for women
on account of pregnancy. Petitioner contends that § 3304(a)(12), as
originally drafted, was only an antidiscrimination statute, but
that the statute in its final form reaches more broadly. The
original version of § 3304(a)(12) provided:
"[N]o person shall be denied compensation under such State law
solely on the basis of pregnancy
and determinations under any
provision of such State law relating to voluntary termination of
employment, availability for work, active search for work, or
refusal to accept work shall not be made in a manner which
discriminates on the basis of pregnancy."
S. 2079, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(a) (1975); H.R. 8366, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(a) (1975) (emphasis added).
Page 479 U. S. 519
According to petitioner, the deletion of the emphasized
language, particularly the reference to "discrimination," manifests
congressional intent to transform the scope of the statute. But
petitioner can point to nothing in the legislative history that
would support the view that Congress intended such a dramatic
change. It is difficult to see how the deletion of language after
the conjunctive "and" could
expand the scope of the
statute, when what was to become the final version of § 3304(a)(12)
already was present, essentially in its entirety, in the first
clause of the original bill. Indeed, however the first phrase is
interpreted -- either to ban discrimination or to mandate
preference -- the additional antidiscrimination language would have
been superfluous. We conclude that Congress intended simply to
eliminate a lengthy and redundant phrase, without intending to
change the meaning of the provision. This explains Congress'
silence on the question without violating either logic or
language.
Petitioner's reliance upon other portions of the legislative
history also is unavailing. As petitioner notes, the House Report
on the bill containing the language now found in § 3304(a)(12)
refers to "nineteen states" that had "special disqualification
provisions pertaining to pregnancy." H.R.Rep. No. 94-755, at 7. The
Report goes on to observe that
"[s]everal of these provisions hold pregnant women unable to
work and unavailable for work; the remainder disqualify a claimant
because she left work on account of her condition or because her
unemployment is a result of pregnancy."
Ibid. Although the Report does not specify which 19
States had "special disqualification provisions pertaining to
pregnancy," the parties agree that Congress most probably was
referring to the 19 States listed in a program letter issued by the
Department of Labor a week before the Committee Report was filed.
See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 33-75 (Dec.
8, 1975). In that letter, the agency called for the repeal of state
laws which "still include special disqualifications for pregnancy
or automatically consider unavailable
Page 479 U. S. 520
for work any pregnant claimant."
Id. at 2. In an
attached summary, the letter discussed the statutory provisions of
19 States relating to pregnancy.
Neither Missouri nor any State with a rule like Missouri's is
included in the list of 19 States having special disqualification
provisions pertaining to pregnancy. The summary includes only state
provisions that disqualify women from receiving unemployment
compensation for a defined period around the date of childbirth
(the kind of provision at issue in
Turner v. Department of
Employment Security of Utah, 423 U. S. 44
(1975)); provisions that specifically disqualify women who leave
work because of pregnancy; and miscellaneous provisions that
otherwise single out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment.
Petitioner argues that the Department omitted States with neutral
disqualification provisions because "their policies were not
apparent from their statutes." Brief for Petitioner 24. But
Missouri does not have a "policy" specifically relating to
pregnancy: it neutrally disqualifies workers who leave their jobs
for reasons unrelated to their employment. The focus of the House
Report clearly was on "
discriminatory disqualifications
because of pregnancy," H.R.Rep. No. 94-755, at 50 (emphasis added);
there is no hint in the House Report of any disagreement with state
provisions that neutrally disqualify workers who leave their jobs
for reasons unrelated to their employment.
The Senate Report also focuses exclusively on state rules that
single out pregnant women for disadvantageous treatment. In
Turner v. Department of Employment Security, supra, this
Court struck down on due process grounds a Utah statute providing
that a woman was disqualified for 12 weeks before the expected date
of childbirth and for 6 weeks after childbirth, even if she left
work for reasons unrelated to pregnancy. The Senate Report used the
provision at issue in
Turner as representative of the kind
of rule that § 3304(a)(12) was intended to prohibit:
Page 479 U. S. 521
"In a number of States, an individual whose unemployment is
related to pregnancy is barred from receiving any unemployment
benefits. In 1975, the Supreme Court found a
provision of this
type in the Utah unemployment compensation statute to be
unconstitutional. . . . A number of other States have similar
provisions, although most appear to involve somewhat shorter
periods of disqualification."
S.Rep. No. 94-1265 at 19, 21 (emphasis added).
In short, petitioner can point to nothing in the Committee
Reports, or elsewhere in the statute's legislative history, that
evidences congressional intent to mandate preferential treatment
for women on account of pregnancy. There is no hint that Congress
disapproved of, much less intended to prohibit, a neutral rule such
as Missouri's. Indeed, the legislative history shows that Congress
was focused only on the issue addressed by the plain language of §
3304(a)(12): prohibiting rules that single out pregnant women or
formerly pregnant women for disadvantageous treatment.
Finally, the Department of Labor's interpretation of §
3304(a)(12) supports the holding of the Missouri Supreme Court.
Shortly after the enactment of § 3304(a)(12), the agency
distributed instructions to the States regarding the implementation
of its terms. Petitioner emphasizes that the instructions state, in
part:
"A number of State laws deny benefits for causes related to
pregnancy. These provisions are inequitable in that benefits are
denied regardless of whether or not the individual is able and
available for work and otherwise eligible."
United States Department of Labor, Employment and Training
Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service, Draft Language and
Commentary to Implement the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of
1976 -- P.L. 94-556, p. 62 (undated 1976). If there is any
ambiguity in these sentences, the balance of the communication
clearly establishes that the agency viewed § 3304(a)(12) as an
antidiscrimination provision:
Page 479 U. S. 522
"The new provision requires that the entitlement to benefits of
pregnant claimants be determined on the same basis and under the
same provisions applicable to all other claimants. It does not mean
that pregnant claimants are entitled to benefits without meeting
the requirements of the law for the receipt of benefits. It
requires only that a pregnant claimant not be treated differently
under the law from any other unemployed individual, and that
benefits be paid or denied not on the basis of pregnancy, but on
the basis of whether she meets the statute's conditions for receipt
of benefits."
Ibid.
The agency reiterated this view in a later communication to the
States, stating that § 3304(a)(12)
"does not speak to treating pregnant claimants more favorably.
It only requires that they not be disqualified solely on the basis
of pregnancy or its termination."
United States Department of Labor, Employment and Training
Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service, Supplement No. 1 --
Questions and Answers Supplementing Draft Language and Commentary
to Implement the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 --
P.L. 94-566, p. 26 (Dec. 7, 1976). Since then, the agency has
adhered to the same view.
See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 27-28. Thus, the agency's interpretation of
the statute, like its legislative history, confirms what is clear
from the statute's plain language: that § 3304(a)(12) prohibits
discrimination, but does not mandate preferential treatment.
Because § 3304(a)(12) does not require States to afford
preferential treatment to women on account of pregnancy, the
judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
States with statutory provisions that specifically treat
pregnancy as good cause for leaving work include Arkansas, South
Dakota, and Tennessee.
See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1106(a)
(1976 and Supp.1985); S.D.Codified Laws § 61-6-3 (1978); Tenn.Code
Ann. § 50-7-303(a)(1) (Supp. 1986). For an example of a State that
has reached the same result by administrative determination,
see Cal.Admin.Code, Tit. 22, § 1256-15(b),
reprinted
in 2 CCH Unempl.Ins.Rep. � 5219 O (Apr. 8, 1982).
[
Footnote 2]
See, e.g., Okla.Stat., Tit. 40, §§ 2-404, 2-405 (1981);
Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 21, § 1344(a)(3) (1978 and Supp.1986).