Copperweld v. Independence Tube
Annotate this Case
467 U.S. 752 (1984)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Copperweld v. Independence Tube, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.
Argued December 5, 1983
Decided June 19, 1984
467 U.S. 752
Petitioner Copperweld Corp. purchased petitioner Regal Tube Co., a manufacturer of steel tubing, from Lear Siegler, Inc., which had operated Regal as an unincorporated division, and which, under the sale agreement, was bound not to compete with Regal for five years. Copperweld then transferred Regal's assets to a newly formed, wholly owned subsidiary. Shortly before Copperweld acquired Regal, David Grohne, who previously had been an officer of Regal, became an officer of Lear Siegler, and, while continuing to work for Lear Siegler, formed respondent corporation to compete with Regal. Respondent then gave Yoder Co. a purchase order for a tubing mill, but Yoder voided the order when it received a letter from Copperweld warning that Copperweld would be greatly concerned if Grohne contemplated competing with Regal, and promising to take the necessary steps to protect Copperweld's rights under the noncompetition agreement with Lear Siegler. Respondent then arranged to have a mill supplied by another company. Thereafter, respondent filed an action in Federal District Court against petitioners and Yoder. The jury found, inter alia, that petitioners had conspired to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, but that Yoder was not part of the conspiracy, and awarded treble damages against petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that the exoneration of Yoder from antitrust liability left a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary as the only parties to the § 1 conspiracy, the court questioned the wisdom of subjecting an "intra-enterprise" conspiracy to antitrust liability, but held that such liability was appropriate "when there is enough separation between the two entities to make treating them as two independent actors sensible," and that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Regal was more like a separate corporate entity than a mere service arm of the parent.
Held: Petitioner Copperweld and its wholly owned subsidiary, petitioner Regal, are incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of 1 of the Sherman Act. Pp. 467 U. S. 759-777.
(a) While this Court has previously seemed to acquiesce in the "intra-enterprise conspiracy" doctrine, which provides that § 1 liability is not
foreclosed merely because a parent and its subsidiary are subject to common ownership, the Court has never explored or analyzed in detail the justifications for such a rule. Pp. 467 U. S. 759-766.
(b) Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in contrast to § 2, reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected by a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" between separate entities, and does not reach conduct that is "wholly unilateral." Pp. 467 U. S. 767-769.
(c) The coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate, and their general corporate objectives are guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one. With or without a formal "agreement," the subsidiary acts for the parent's benefit. If the parent and subsidiary "agree" to a course of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served different interests, and there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny. In reality, the parent and subsidiary always have a "unity of purpose or a common design." The "intra-enterprise conspiracy" doctrine relies on artificial distinctions, looking to the form of an enterprise's structure and ignoring the reality. Antitrust liability should not depend on whether a corporate subunit is organized as an unincorporated division or a wholly owned subsidiary. Here, nothing in the record indicates any meaningful difference between Regal's operations as an unincorporated division of Lear Siegler and its later operations as a wholly owned subsidiary of Copperweld. Pp. 467 U. S. 771-774.
(d) The appropriate inquiry in this case is not whether the coordinated conduct of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary may ever have anticompetitive effects or whether the term "conspiracy" will bear a literal construction that includes a parent and its subsidiaries, but rather whether the logic underlying Congress' decision to exempt unilateral conduct from scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act similarly excludes the conduct of a parent and subsidiary. It can only be concluded that the coordinated behavior of a parent and subsidiary falls outside the reach of § 1. Any anticompetitive activities of corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries meriting antitrust remedies may be policed adequately without resort to an "intra-enterprise conspiracy" doctrine. A corporation's initial acquisition of control is always subject to scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act, and thereafter the enterprise is subject to § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Pp. 467 U. S. 774-777.
691 F.2d 310, reversed.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post p. 467 U. S. 778. WHITE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.