Following a riot in the Pennsylvania State Prison where he was
an inmate, respondent was removed from his cell and the general
prison population and confined to administrative segregation within
the prison pending an investigation into his role in the riot. The
next day, respondent received notice of a misconduct charge against
him. Five days after his transfer to administrative segregation, a
Hearing Committee reviewed the evidence against respondent, and he
acknowledged in writing that he had an opportunity to have his
version of the events reported, but no finding of guilt was made.
Subsequently, criminal charges based on the riot were filed against
respondent, but were later dropped. In the meantime, a Review
Committee concluded that respondent should remain in administrative
segregation as posing a threat to the safety of other inmates and
prison officials and to the security of the prison. Ultimately, the
Hearing Committee, based on a second misconduct report and after
hearing testimony from a prison guard and respondent, found
respondent guilty of the second misconduct charge and ordered him
confined to disciplinary segregation for six months, while dropping
the earlier misconduct charge. Respondent sued in Federal District
Court, claiming that petitioner prison officials' actions in
confining him to administrative segregation violated his rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, on the facts,
respondent had a protected liberty interest in continuing to reside
in the general prison population, which interest was created by the
Pennsylvania regulations governing the administration of state
prisons; that respondent could not be deprived of this interest
without a hearing in compliance with the requirements of
Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539; and
that, since the court was uncertain whether the Hearing Committee's
initial proceeding satisfied such requirements, the case would be
remanded to the District Court for a hearing regarding the
character of that proceeding.
Held:
1. Prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary
authority over the institutions they manage, and lawfully
incarcerated persons
Page 459 U. S. 461
retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests.
Administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates
should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their
incarceration, and does not involve an interest independently
protected by the Due Process Clause. But in light of the
Pennsylvania statutes and regulations setting forth the procedures
for confining an inmate to administrative segregation, respondent
did acquire a protected liberty interest in remaining in the
general prison population. Pp.
459 U. S.
466-472.
2. The process afforded respondent satisfied the minimum
requirements of the Due Process Clause. Pp.
459 U. S.
472-477.
(a) In view of the wide-ranging deference accorded prison
administrators in adopting and executing policies and practices
needed to preserve order and discipline and to maintain security,
petitioners were obligated to engage only in an informal,
nonadversary review of the information supporting respondent's
administrative confinement. P.
459 U. S.
472.
(b) Under
Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.
S. 319, the private interests at stake in a governmental
decision, the governmental interests involved, and the value of
procedural requirements are considered in determining what process
is due under the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, respondent's private
interest was not of great consequence, but the governmental
interests in the safety of the prison guards and other inmates and
in isolating respondent pending investigation of the charges
against him were of great importance. Neither of the grounds for
confining respondent to administrative segregation involved
decisions or judgments that would have been materially assisted by
a detailed adversary proceeding. Pp.
459 U. S.
473-474.
(c) An informal, nonadversary evidentiary review is sufficient
both for the decision that an inmate represents a security threat
and the decision to confine him to administrative segregation
pending completion of an investigation into misconduct charges
against him. In either situation, an inmate must merely receive
notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his
views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to
transfer him to administrative segregation. Measured against these
standards, respondent received all the process that was due after
being confined to administrative segregation. Pp.
459 U. S.
476-477.
655 F.2d 487, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part,
post, p.
459 U. S. 478.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
MARSHALL,
Page 459 U. S. 462
JJ., joined, and in Parts II and III of which BLACKMUN, J.,
joined,
post, p.
459 U. S.
479.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Aaron Helms was serving a term in the State
Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pa. (SCIH), which was
administered by petitioners. He sued in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, claiming that
petitioners' actions confining him to administrative segregation
within the prison violated his rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment,
but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 655 F.2d
487 (1981). We granted certiorari, 455 U.S. 999 (1982), to consider
what limits the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
places on the authority of prison administrators to remove inmates
from the general prison population and confine them to a less
desirable regimen for administrative reasons.
In the early evening of December 3, 1978, a prisoner in the
state penitentiary at Huntingdon, assaulted two guards. The
prisoner was subdued with the assistance of other
Page 459 U. S. 463
guards, but one guard received a broken nose, and another a
broken thumb. Later in the evening, the violence erupted into a
riot during which a group of prisoners attempted to seize the
institution's "control center." One group of inmates attacked a
prison guard and a trainee, using table legs, the guard's
flashlight, barbells, and whatever else came to hand. On another
floor, three inmates were subdued while trying to attack a sergeant
of the prison guard with a flashlight, and it was necessary to
forcibly subdue them and handcuff them to pipes. Inmates in one of
the prison blocks tried to break a grille to enter the prison's
control center, but they were held back. One of the assaulted
guards suffered cuts and bruises on the face and leg areas, and
another reported a possible skull fracture, broken jaw, broken
teeth, and an injured collarbone.
This uprising was eventually quelled, but only with the
assistance of state police units, local law enforcement officers,
and off-duty prison guards whose aid was summoned. Several hours
after the riot ended, respondent Helms was removed from his cell
and the general prison population for questioning by the state
police. Following the interview, he was placed in restrictive
confinement, [
Footnote 1] and
the state police
Page 459 U. S. 464
and prison authorities began an investigation into his role in
the riot.
On December 4, 1978, Helms was given a "Misconduct Report"
charging him with "Assaulting Officers and Conspiracy to Disrupt
Normal Institution Routine by Forcefully Taking Over the Control
Center." The report briefly described the factual basis for the
charge and contained a lengthy recitation of the procedures
governing the institution's disciplinary hearing. [
Footnote 2] On December 8, 1978, a "Hearing
Committee," consisting of three prison officials charged with
adjudicating alleged instances of misconduct by inmates, was
convened to dispose of the charges against Helms. Following a
review of the misconduct report, the panel summarized its decision
as "[n]o finding as to guilt reached at this time, due to
insufficient information," and ordered that Helms' confinement in
restricted housing be continued.
While, as a matter of probabilities, it seems likely that Helms
appeared personally before the December 8 Hearing Committee, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the record does not allow
definitive resolution of the issue on summary judgment. Helms
signed a copy of the misconduct report stating that "[t]he
circumstance of the charge has been read and fully explained to
me," and that "I have had the opportunity to have my version
reported as part of the record." App. 41a. Likewise, he admitted in
an affidavit filed during this litigation that he was "informed by
an institutional hearing committee" of the disposition of the
misconduct charge against him.
Id. at 33a. The same
affidavit, however, asserted that no "hearing" was conducted on
December 8, suggesting that respondent did not appear before
Page 459 U. S. 465
the Committee. The State did not file any affidavit
controverting Helms' contention.
On December 11, 1978, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed
state criminal charges against Helms, charging him with assaulting
Correction Officer Rhodes and with riot. On January 2, 1979, SCIH's
Program Review Committee, which consisted of three prison
officials, was convened. The Committee met to review the status of
respondent's confinement in administrative segregation and to make
recommendations as to his future confinement. The Committee
unanimously concluded that Helms should remain in administrative
segregation; affidavits of the Committee members said that the
decision was based on several related concerns. Helms was seen as
"a danger to staff and to other inmates if released back into
general population,"
id. at 11a; he was to be arraigned
the following day on state criminal charges,
id. at 24a;
and the Committee was awaiting information regarding his role in
the riot,
id. at 16a. The Superintendent of SCIH
personally reviewed the Program Review Committee's determination
and concurred in its recommendation.
Id. at 15a, 18a.
The preliminary hearing on the state criminal charges against
Helms was postponed on January 10, 1979, apparently due to a lack
of evidence. On January 19, 1979, a second misconduct report was
given to respondent; the report charged Helms with assaulting a
second officer during the December 3 riot. On January 22, a Hearing
Committee composed of three prison officials heard testimony from
one guard and Helms. Based on this, the Committee found Helms
guilty of the second misconduct charge and ordered that he be
confined to disciplinary segregation for six months, effective
December 3, 1978. The Committee also decided to drop the earlier
misconduct charge against respondent without determining guilt. On
February 6, 1979, the State dropped criminal charges relating to
the prison riot against Helms.
Page 459 U. S. 466
The Court of Appeals, reviewing these facts, concluded that
Helms had a protected liberty interest in continuing to reside in
the general prison population. While the court seemed to doubt that
this interest could be found in the Constitution, it held that
Pennsylvania regulations governing the administration of state
prisons created such an interest. It then said that Helms could not
be deprived of this interest without a hearing, governed by the
procedures mandated in
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.
S. 539 (1974), to determine whether such confinement was
proper. [
Footnote 3] Being
uncertain whether the hearing conducted on December 8 satisfied the
Wolff requirements,
see supra at
459 U. S.
464-465, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
District Court for an evidentiary hearing regarding the character
of that proceeding. On these same facts, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the Pennsylvania statutory framework governing the
administration of state prisons gave rise to a liberty interest in
respondent, but we conclude that the procedures afforded respondent
were "due process" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
While no State may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," it is well settled that only
a limited range of interests fall within this provision. Liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two
sources -- the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the
States.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215,
415 U. S.
223-227 (1976). Respondent argues, rather weakly, that
the Due Process Clause implicitly creates an interest in being
confined to a general population cell, rather than the
Page 459 U. S. 467
more austere and restrictive administrative segregation
quarters. While there is little question on the record before us
that respondent's confinement added to the restraints on his
freedom, [
Footnote 4] we think
his argument seeks to draw from the Due Process Clause more than it
can provide.
We have repeatedly said both that prison officials have broad
administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions
they manage and that lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a
narrow range of protected liberty interests. As to the first point,
we have recognized that broad discretionary authority is necessary
because the administration of a prison is, "at best, an
extraordinarily difficult undertaking,"
Wolff v. McDonnell,
supra, at
418 U. S. 566,
and have concluded that
"to hold . . . that any substantial deprivation imposed by
prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the Due
Process Clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of
discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of
prison administrators, rather than of the federal courts."
Meachum v. Fano, supra, at
427 U. S. 225.
As to the second point, our decisions have consistently refused to
recognize more than the most basic liberty interests in
prisoners.
"Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system."
Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285
(1948). Thus, there is no "constitutional or inherent right" to
parole,
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S.
1,
442 U. S. 7
(1979), and "the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time
credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison,"
Wolff v.
McDonnell, supra, at
418 U. S. 557,
despite the undoubted
Page 459 U. S. 468
impact of such credits on the freedom of inmates. Finally, in
Meachum v. Fano, supra, at
427 U. S. 225,
the transfer of a prisoner from one institution to another was
found unprotected by "the Due Process Clause in and of itself,"
even though the change of facilities involved a significant
modification in conditions of confinement, later characterized by
the Court as a "grievous loss."
Moody v. Daggett,
429 U. S. 78,
429 U. S. 88, n.
9 (1976). As we have held previously, these decisions require
that,
"[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which
the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him
and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process
Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison
authorities to judicial oversight."
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236,
427 U. S. 242
(1976).
See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.
S. 480,
445 U. S. 493
(1980).
It is plain that the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and
more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within
the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison
sentence. The phrase "administrative segregation," as used by the
state authorities here, appears to be something of a catchall: it
may be used to protect the prisoner's safety, to protect other
inmates from a particular prisoner, to break up potentially
disruptive groups of inmates, or simply to await later
classification or transfer.
See 37 Pa.Code §§ 95.104 and
95.106 (1978), and
n 1,
supra. Accordingly, administrative segregation is the sort
of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving
at some point in their incarceration. This conclusion finds ample
support in our decisions regarding parole and good-time credits.
Both these subjects involve release from institutional life
altogether, which is a far more significant change in a prisoner's
freedoms than that at issue here, yet, in
Greenholtz and
Wolff, we held that neither situation involved an interest
independently protected by the Due Process Clause. These decisions
compel an identical result here.
Page 459 U. S. 469
Despite this, respondent points out that the Court has held that
a State may create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause through its enactment of certain statutory or regulatory
measures. Thus, in
Wolff, where we rejected any notion of
an interest in good-time credits inherent in the Constitution, we
also found that Nebraska had created a right to such credits. 418
U.S. at
418 U. S.
556-557.
See also Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
Inmates, supra, (parole);
Vitek v. Jones, supra,
(transfer to mental institution). Likewise, and more relevant here,
was our summary affirmance in
Wright v.
Enomoto, 462 F.
Supp. 397 (ND Cal.1976),
summarily aff'd, 434 U.
S. 1052 (1978), where the District Court had concluded
that state law created a liberty interest in confinement to any
sort of segregated housing within a prison.
Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U. S. 5 (1980)
(per curiam), while involving facts similar to these in some
respects, was essentially a pleading case, rather than an
exposition of the substantive constitutional issues involved.
[
Footnote 5]
Respondent argues that Pennsylvania, in its enactment of
regulations governing the administration of state prisons, has
created a liberty interest in remaining free from the restraints
accompanying confinement in administrative segregation. Except to
the extent that our summary affirmance in
Wright v. Enomoto,
supra, may be to the contrary, we have never held that
statutes and regulations governing daily operation of a prison
system conferred any liberty interest in and of themselves.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215
Page 459 U. S. 470
(1976), and
Montanye v. Haymes, supra, held to the
contrary; in
Wolff, supra, we were dealing with good-time
credits which would have actually reduced the period of time which
the inmate would have been in the custody of the government; in
Greenholtz, supra, we dealt with parole, which would
likewise have radically transformed the nature of the custody to
which the inmate was subject; and in
Vitek, supra, we
considered the transfer from a prison to a mental institution.
There are persuasive reasons why we should be loath to transpose
all of the reasoning in the cases just cited to the situation where
the statute and regulations govern the day-to-day administration of
a prison system. The deprivations imposed in the course of the
daily operations of an institution are likely to be minor when
compared to the release from custody at issue in parole decisions
and good-time credits. Moreover, the safe and efficient operation
of a prison on a day-to-day basis has traditionally been entrusted
to the expertise of prison officials,
see Meachum v. Fano,
supra, at
427 U. S. 225.
These facts suggest that regulations structuring the authority of
prison administrators may warrant treatment, for purposes of
creation of entitlements to "liberty," different from statutes and
regulations in other areas. Nonetheless, we conclude in the light
of the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations here in question, the
relevant provisions of which are set forth in full in the margin,
[
Footnote 6] that respondent
did acquire
Page 459 U. S. 471
a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison
population.
Respondent seems to suggest that the mere fact that Pennsylvania
has created a careful procedural structure to regulate the use of
administrative segregation indicates the existence of a protected
liberty interest. We cannot agree. The creation of procedural
guidelines to channel the decisionmaking of prison officials is, in
the view of many experts in the field, a salutary development. It
would be ironic to hold that, when a State embarks on such
desirable experimentation. it thereby opens the door to scrutiny by
the federal courts, while States that choose not to adopt such
procedural provisions entirely avoid the strictures of the Due
Process Clause. The adoption of such procedural guidelines, without
more, suggests that it is these restrictions alone, and not those
federal courts might also impose under the Fourteenth Amendment,
that the State chose to require.
Nonetheless, in this case, the Commonwealth has gone beyond
simple procedural guidelines. It has used language of an
unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures
"shall," "will," or "must" be employed,
see n 6,
Page 459 U. S. 472
supra, and that administrative segregation will not
occur absent specified substantive predicates --
viz.,
"the need for control," or "the threat of a serious disturbance."
Petitioners argue, with considerable force, that these terms must
be read in light of the fact that the decision whether to confine
an inmate to administrative segregation is largely predictive, and
therefore that it is not likely that the State meant to create
binding requirements. But on balance we are persuaded that the
repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with
requiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclusion that
the State has created a protected liberty interest.
That being the case, we must then decide whether the process
afforded respondent satisfied the minimum requirements of the Due
Process Clause. We think that it did. The requirements imposed by
the Clause are, of course, flexible and variable dependent upon the
particular situation being examined.
E.g., Greenholtz v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 12;
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471,
408 U. S. 481
(1972). In determining what is "due process" in the prison context,
we are reminded that
"one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for
free citizens in an open society . . . to the very different
situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state
prison."
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at
418 U. S.
560.
"Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices
that, in their judgment, are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security."
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520,
441 U. S. 547
(1979). These considerations convince us that petitioners were
obligated to engage only in an informal, nonadversary review of the
information supporting respondent's administrative confinement,
including whatever statement respondent wished to submit, within a
reasonable time after confining him to administrative
segregation.
Page 459 U. S. 473
Under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.
S. 319,
424 U. S. 335
(1976), we consider the private interests at stake in a
governmental decision, the governmental interests involved, and the
value of procedural requirements in determining what process is due
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondent's private interest is
not one of great consequence. He was merely transferred from one
extremely restricted environment to an even more confined
situation. Unlike disciplinary confinement, the stigma of
wrongdoing or misconduct does not attach to administrative
segregation under Pennsylvania's prison regulations. Finally, there
is no indication that administrative segregation will have any
significant effect on parole opportunities.
Petitioners had two closely related reasons for confining Helms
to administrative segregation prior to conducting a hearing on the
disciplinary charges against him. First, they concluded that, if
housed in the general population, Helms would pose a threat to the
safety of other inmates and prison officials and to the security of
the institution. Second, the prison officials believed that it was
wiser to separate respondent from the general population until
completion of state and institutional investigations of his role in
the December 3 riot and the hearing on the charges against him.
Plainly, these governmental interests are of great importance. The
safety of the institution's guards and inmates is perhaps the most
fundamental responsibility of the prison administration.
See
Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at
441 U. S. 547;
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
433 U. S. 119,
433 U. S. 132
(1977);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.
S. 817,
417 U. S. 823
(1974);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.
S. 396,
416 U. S. 404
(1974). Likewise, the isolation of a prisoner pending investigation
of misconduct charges against him serves important institutional
interests relating to the insulating of possible witnesses from
coercion or harm,
see infra at
459 U. S.
476.
Neither of these grounds for confining Helms to administrative
segregation involved decisions or judgments that
Page 459 U. S. 474
would have been materially assisted by a detailed adversary
proceeding. As we said in
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.
S. 337,
452 U. S. 349,
n. 14 (1981), "a prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter
normally left to the discretion of prison administrators." In
assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional security,
prison administrators necessarily draw on more than the specific
facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must
consider the character of the inmates confined in the institution,
recent and longstanding relations between prisoners and guards,
prisoners
inter se, and the like. In the volatile
atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may constitute an
unacceptable threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards
even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation,
and even more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially
disastrous incidents. The judgment of prison officials in this
context, like that of those making parole decisions, turns largely
on "purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future
behavior,"
Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat,
452 U. S. 458,
452 U. S. 464
(1981); indeed, the administrators must predict not just one
inmate's future actions, as in parole, but those of an entire
institution. Owing to the central role of these types of intuitive
judgments, a decision that an inmate or group of inmates represents
a threat to the institution's security would not be appreciably
fostered by the trial-type procedural safeguards suggested by
respondent. [
Footnote 7] This,
and the balance of public and private interests, lead us to
conclude that the Due Process Clause requires only an informal
nonadversary review of evidence, discussed more fully below, in
order to confine an inmate feared to be a threat to institutional
security to administrative segregation.
Page 459 U. S. 475
Likewise, confining respondent to administrative segregation
pending completion of the investigation of the disciplinary charges
against him is not based on an inquiry requiring any elaborate
procedural safeguards. We think the closest case in point dealing
with an analogous situation in the world outside of prisons is
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103
(1975). There, in the context of a challenge to the pretrial
detainment of persons suspected of criminal acts, we held that
States must "provide a fair and reliable determination of probable
cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of
liberty," and we required that "this determination must be made by
a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest."
Id. at
420 U. S. 125.
We explicitly rejected the suggestion, however, that an adversary
proceeding, accompanied by traditional trial-type rights, was
required, and instead permitted an informal proceeding designed to
determine whether probable cause existed to believe that the
detained person had committed a crime.
Id. at
420 U. S.
119-123.
While
Gerstein was grounded in the Fourth Amendment, we
think it provides a useful point of departure with respect to the
due process question raised here.
Mathews v. Eldridge,
supra, at
424 U. S. 335,
again suggests the points at which
Gerstein is inapposite
in the prison context. As our discussion above suggests, the
private interest at stake here is far less weighty than that at
issue in
Gerstein, which involved removing a suspect from
unrestricted liberty in open society and placing him in an
institution. In contrast, as noted above, Helms was merely
transferred from an extremely restricted environment to an even
more confined situation. Under the
Mathews formula,
respondent has a far less compelling claim to procedural safeguards
than did the pretrial detainees in
Gerstein. Likewise,
weighty governmental interests are at stake. To be sure,
Gerstein involved a situation in which a real possibility
existed that the suspected criminal would flee from justice; it is
unlikely, to say the least, that confinement to administrative
segregation is necessary
Page 459 U. S. 476
for this purpose where an inmate has been charged with
misconduct. Yet the State has other important interests. For
example, it must protect possible witnesses -- whose confinement
leaves them particularly vulnerable -- from retribution by the
suspected wrongdoer, and, in addition, has an interest in
preventing attempts to persuade such witnesses not to testify at
disciplinary hearings. These considerations lead us to conclude
that, while general patterns of the
Gerstein procedures
should be our guide, some of the elements required in that case are
unnecessary in the much more informal context of prison officials
who propose to confine an inmate to administrative segregation
pending completion of an investigation against him.
We think an informal, nonadversary evidentiary review is
sufficient both for the decision that an inmate represents a
security threat and the decision to confine an inmate to
administrative segregation pending completion of an investigation
into misconduct charges against him. An inmate must merely receive
some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to
present his views to the prison official charged with deciding
whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. Ordinarily a
written statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose,
although prison administrators may find it more useful to permit
oral presentations in cases where they believe a written statement
would be ineffective. So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker
reviews the charges and then-available evidence against the
prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied. [
Footnote 8] This informal procedure permits a
reasonably accurate assessment of probable cause to believe that
misconduct occurred, and the "value [of additional
formalities
and safeguards'] would be too slight to justify holding, as a
matter of constitutional principle" that they must be adopted,
Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 420 U. S.
122.
Page 459 U. S. 477
Measured against these standards, we are satisfied that
respondent received all the process that was due after being
confined to administrative segregation. He received notice of the
charges against him the day after his misconduct took place. Only
five days after his transfer to administrative segregation, a
Hearing Committee reviewed the existing evidence against him,
including a staff member's statement that
"[t]his inmate was a member of an organized plot, and did
actively involve himself with at least 10 other inmates in the
assault upon 5 corrections officers in 'C' Block and attempted to
break thru the 'C' grill to the Control Center to disrupt the
normal institution routine by usurping the authority of institution
officials."
App. 38a. While the Court of Appeals may have been correct that
the record does not clearly demonstrate that a
Wolff
hearing was held, it does show that he had an opportunity to
present a statement to the Committee. As noted previously, Helms
acknowledged on the misconduct form that he "had the opportunity to
have [his] version reported as part of the record"; we see no
reason to question the accuracy of his statement. This proceeding
plainly satisfied the due process requirements for continued
confinement of Helms pending the outcome of the investigation.
[
Footnote 9]
Page 459 U. S. 478
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Pennsylvania has adopted regulations promulgated by the State
Bureau of Corrections establishing two basic types of restricted
housing in its correctional facilities -- disciplinary and
administrative segregation. 37 Pa.Code § 95.107 (1978). Other
jurisdictions follow a similar pattern.
See 28 CFR pt. 541
(1982). Confinement in disciplinary segregation is imposed when an
inmate has been found to have committed a misconduct violation. 37
Pa. Code § 95.106(2) (1978). Administrative segregation may be
imposed when an inmate poses a threat to security, when
disciplinary charges are pending against an inmate, or when an
inmate requires protection. § 95.104. According to the state
regulations, administrative segregation is somewhat less
restrictive than disciplinary segregation,
compare §
95.107(a)(2)
with § 95.107(b)(2), although, as noted
elsewhere,
see n 4,
infra, we assume for purposes of this case that the
conditions in the two types of confinement are substantially
identical.
[
Footnote 2]
The misconduct report informed respondent that a hearing would
be held as soon as possible, that he could remain silent at the
hearing, that he could be represented by an inmate or staff member,
and that he could request witnesses who would be permitted to
appear if they were found willing, capable of giving relevant
testimony, and not a security hazard. App. 38a-39a.
[
Footnote 3]
Wolff required that inmates facing disciplinary charges
for misconduct be accorded 24 hours' advance written notice of the
charges against them; a right to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in defense, unless doing so would jeopardize
institutional safety or correctional goals; the aid of a staff
member or inmate in presenting a defense, provided the inmate is
illiterate or the issues complex; an impartial tribunal; and a
written statement of reasons relied on by the tribunal. 418 U.S. at
418 U. S.
563-572.
[
Footnote 4]
As noted previously, the case is here on motions for summary
judgment. Respondent submitted an affidavit that the State did not
rebut, claiming that confinement to administrative segregation
imposed severe hardships on him. Among other things, he alleged a
denial of access to vocational, educational, recreational, and
rehabilitative programs, restrictions on exercise, and confinement
to his cell for lengthy periods of time.
[
Footnote 5]
We held there that it was error to dismiss for failure to state
a claim a
pro se prisoner's complaint alleging confinement
to restricted quarters without a hearing. Observing that "[w]e
[could not] say with assurance that petitioner can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief," 449 U.S. at
449 U. S. 12-13,
we expressly stated that "[o]ur discussion of this claim is not
intended to express any view on its merits."
Id. at
449 U. S. 12.
Rowe is likewise factually dissimilar from this case,
since, in
Rowe, we also noted that "[t]here [was] no
suggestion in the record that . . . emergency conditions" existed,
and the prisoner's "offense did not involve violence."
Id.
at
449 U. S. 11.
[
Footnote 6]
Title 37 Pa. Code § 95.104(b)(1) (1978) provides:
"An inmate who has allegedly committed a Class I Misconduct may
be placed in Close or Maximum Administrative Custody upon approval
of the officer in charge of the institution, not routinely but
based upon his assessment of the situation and the need for control
pending application of procedures under § 95.103 of this
title."
Section 95.104(b)(3) of the same Title provides:
"An inmate may be temporarily confined to Close or Maximum
Administrative Custody in an investigative status upon approval of
the officer in charge of the institution where it has been
determined that there is a threat of a serious disturbance, or a
serious threat to the individual or others. The inmate shall be
notified in writing as soon as possible that he is under
investigation and that he will receive a hearing if any
disciplinary action is being considered after the investigation is
completed. An investigation shall begin immediately to determine
whether or not a behavior violation has occurred. If no behavior
violation has occurred, the inmate must be released as soon as the
reason for the security concern has abated, but in all cases within
ten days."
Finally, a State Bureau of Correction Administrative Directive
states that, when the State Police have been summoned to an
institution:
"Pending arrival of the State Police, the institutional
representative shall:"
"1. Place all suspects and resident witnesses or complainants in
such custody, protective or otherwise, as may be necessary to
maintain security. A hearing complying with [37 Pa. Code § 95.103
(1972)] will be carried out after the investigation period. Such
hearing shall be held within four (4) days unless the investigation
warrants delay and in that case as soon as possible."
Pa.Admin.Dir. BC-ADM 004, § IV(B) (1975).
[
Footnote 7]
Indeed, we think an administrator's judgment probably would be
hindered. Prison officials, wary of potential legal liability,
might well spend their time mechanically complying with cumbersome,
marginally helpful procedural requirements, rather than managing
their institution wisely.
[
Footnote 8]
The proceeding must occur within a reasonable time following an
inmate's transfer, taking into account the relatively insubstantial
private interest at stake and the traditionally broad discretion of
prison officials.
[
Footnote 9]
Of course, administrative segregation may not be used as a
pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Prison officials
must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of
such inmates. This review will not necessarily require that prison
officials permit the submission of any additional evidence or
statements. The decision whether a prisoner remains a security risk
will be based on facts relating to a particular prisoner -- which
will have been ascertained when determining to confine the inmate
to administrative segregation -- and on the officials' general
knowledge of prison conditions and tensions, which are singularly
unsuited for "proof" in any highly structured manner. Likewise, the
decision to continue confinement of an inmate pending investigation
of misconduct charges depends upon circumstances that prison
officials will be well aware of -- most typically, the progress of
the investigation. In both situations, the ongoing task of
operating the institution will require the prison officials to
consider a wide range of administrative considerations; here, for
example, petitioners had to consider prison tensions in the
aftermath of the December 3 riot, the ongoing state criminal
investigation, and so forth. The record plainly shows that, on
January 2, a Program Review Committee considered whether Helms'
confinement should be continued, App. 13a-15a. This review,
occurring less than a month after the initial decision to confine
Helms to administrative segregation, is sufficient to dispel any
notions that the confinement was a pretext.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Court's prior cases, of course, recognize that a valid
criminal conviction and sentence extinguish a defendant's otherwise
protected right to be free from confinement.
E.g., Connecticut
Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.
S. 458,
452 U. S. 464
(1981);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480,
445 U. S. 493
(1980);
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S.
1,
442 U. S. 7
(1979);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215,
427 U. S. 224
(1976). Although prison inmates retain a residuum of liberty,
see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539,
418 U. S.
555-556 (1974), this liberty is not infringed by
conditions of confinement that are "within the normal limits or
range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to
impose."
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at
427 U. S. 225;
see Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236,
427 U. S. 242
(1976);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. at
445 U. S. 493.
In
Meachum and
Montanye, we held that certain
prison transfers were "within the normal limits or range of
custody" even though conditions of confinement were more severe in
the prisons to which the inmates were transferred. Because I
believe that a transfer to administrative segregation within a
prison likewise is within the normal range of custody, I agree with
the Court that respondent has not been deprived of "an interest
independently protected by the Due Process Clause,"
ante
at
459 U. S.
468.
I also agree that the Pennsylvania statutes and prison
regulations at issue in this case created an entitlement not to
Page 459 U. S. 479
be placed in administrative segregation without due process.
These statutes and regulations are similar to the ones at issue in
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S. 5 (1980),
and
Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F.
Supp. 397 (ND Cal.1976),
summarily aff'd, 434 U.
S. 1052 (1978), and our dispositions of those cases made
clear that a liberty interest was created. We also found a
state-created liberty interest in
Greenholtz, supra, even
though the statutes at issue there permitted parole decisions to be
based on partially subjective and predictive criteria. In cases in
which we have declined to find a state-created liberty interest, we
have noted that state law permitted prison transfers to be made
"for whatever reason, or for no reason at all,"
Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. at
427 U. S. 228;
that state law "impose[d] no conditions on the discretionary power
to transfer,"
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at
427 U. S. 243;
or that state law gave a Board of Pardons "unfettered discretion,"
Dumschat, 452 U.S. at
452 U. S. 466.
This is not such a case.
Having found a state-created liberty interest, I cannot agree
with the Court that the procedures used here comported with due
process. Accordingly, I join Parts II and III of JUSTICE STEVENS'
dissenting opinion.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, and with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins as to Parts II and III,
dissenting.
When respondent Helms was transferred to "administrative
segregation," he was placed in solitary confinement in B-Block at
the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. The
conditions in B-Block are significantly more restrictive than those
experienced by inmates in the general prison population. [
Footnote 2/1] Indeed, in all material
respects
Page 459 U. S. 480
conditions in administrative custody are the same as those in
disciplinary segregation. [
Footnote
2/2] The reasons for placing one inmate in administrative and
another in punitive segregation may be different, and the periods
of confinement may vary, but the Court properly assumes for
purposes of this case that "the conditions in the two types of
confinement are substantially identical."
Ante at
459 U. S. 463,
n. 1.
None of the three substantive charges against respondent Helms
has ever been substantiated in a valid manner. [
Footnote 2/3]
Page 459 U. S. 481
Nevertheless, he was held in "administrative segregation" for
over seven weeks -- from the evening of December 3, 1978, until
January 22, 1979 -- before he received an evidentiary hearing, and
he was then sentenced to six months in "disciplinary custody."
Despite the severity of conditions in solitary confinement, and the
admitted differences between segregated custody and the general
prison population, petitioners urge us to hold that the transfer of
an inmate into administrative segregation does not deprive him of
any interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. The
Court correctly rejects this contention today. It does so, however,
for reasons that do not withstand analysis. It then concludes that
the procedures afforded by prison authorities in this case "plainly
satisfied the due process requirements for continued confinement of
Helms pending the outcome of the investigation."
Ante at
459 U. S. 477.
I cannot agree.
I
The principal contention advanced by petitioners in this Court
is that the Federal Constitution imposes no procedural limitations
on the absolute discretion of prison officials to place any inmate
in administrative segregation and to keep him there, if they
choose, for the entire period of his confinement. [
Footnote 2/4] Petitioners argue that a transfer
into solitary confinement is merely one example of various routine
decisions
Page 459 U. S. 482
made on a day-to-day basis by prison authorities, regarding
"place of confinement, both as to which facility is appropriate
and within the appropriate facility which cell block or housing
unit is appropriate; his job assignment; the potential for freedom
of movement; and the possibility and variety of educational and
vocational opportunities available to him."
Brief for Petitioners 11-12. According to petitioners,
operational decisions such as these do not raise any constitutional
question, because prison officials need wide latitude to operate
their institutions in a safe and efficient manner.
The Court properly rejects the contention that the Due Process
Clause is simply inapplicable to transfers of inmates into
administrative segregation. It holds that respondent's transfer
from the general population into administrative confinement was a
deprivation of liberty that must be accompanied by due process of
law. The majority's reasoning in support of this conclusion
suffers, however, from a fundamental flaw. In its view, a "liberty
interest" exists only because Pennsylvania's written prison
regulations [
Footnote 2/5] display
a magical combination of "substantive predicates" and "explicitly
mandatory language."
Ante at
459 U. S. 472.
This analysis attaches no significance either to the character of
the conditions of confinement or to actual administrative practices
in the institution. Moreover, the Court seems to assume that, after
his conviction, a prisoner has, in essence, no liberty save that
created, in writing, by the State which imprisons him. Under this
view, a prisoner crosses into limbo when he enters into penal
confinement. He might have some minimal freedoms if the State
chooses to bestow them, but such freedom as he has today may be
taken away tomorrow.
This approach, although consistent with some of the Court's
recent cases, [
Footnote 2/6] is
dramatically different from the analysis
Page 459 U. S. 483
in
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.
S. 539 (1974). In
Wolff, the Court squarely
held that every prisoner retains a significant residuum of
constitutionally protected liberty following his incarceration.
Though the prisoner's
"rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the
institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of
constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There
is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons
of this country. . . . [Prisoners] may not be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."
Id. at
418 U. S.
555-556.
The source of the liberty recognized in
Wolff is not
state law, nor even the Constitution itself. Rather, it is plain
that
"neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States
create the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects. The
relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on the power of
the sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen. . . . Of
course, law is essential to the exercise and enjoyment of
individual liberty in a complex society. But it is not the source
of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source."
"I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by
their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable
rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause
protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred
by specific laws or regulations."
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215,
427 U. S. 230
(1976) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). [
Footnote 2/7]
Page 459 U. S. 484
Identifying the "liberty" that survives in a closely controlled
prison environment is understandably more difficult than in the
world at large. For it is obvious that
"[l]awful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights
and privileges of the ordinary citizen, a 'retraction justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system.'"
Wolff, supra, at
418 U. S. 555,
quoting
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.
S. 266,
334 U. S. 285
(1948). But I remain convinced that an inmate
"has a protected right to pursue his limited rehabilitative
goals, or at the minimum, to maintain whatever attributes of
dignity are associated with his status in a tightly controlled
society. It is unquestionably within the power of the State to
change that status, abruptly and adversely; but if the change is
sufficiently grievous, it may not be imposed arbitrarily. In such
case, due process must be afforded."
Meachum, supra, at
427 U. S. 234
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). Thus, the relevant question in this case
is whether transfer into administrative segregation constitutes a
"sufficiently grievous" change in a prisoner's status to require
the protection of "due process."
See Vitek v. Jones,
445 U. S. 480,
445 U. S. 492
(1980), quoting
Miller v. Vitek, 437 F.
Supp. 569, 573 (Neb.1977);
Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U. S. 471,
408 U. S. 481
(1972), quoting
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U. S. 123,
341 U. S. 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In answering this question, it is useful to consider the
residuum of liberty that the ordinary citizen enjoys in any
organized society. All general laws -- whether designed to protect
the health of the community, to control urban traffic, to improve
the environment, or to raise tax revenues -- curtail the
individual's freedom to do as he pleases. Thus the residuum of
liberty is far removed from a license to gratify every whim without
restraint. It is more akin to the characteristic of "independence,"
which played a special role in our early history. Consider
Professor Dworkin's discussion of this term:
Page 459 U. S. 485
"Mill saw independence as a further dimension of equality; he
argued that an individual's independence is threatened not simply
by a political process that denies him equal voice, but by
political decisions that deny him equal respect. Laws that
recognize and protect common interests, like laws against violence
and monopoly, offer no insult to any class or individual; but laws
that constrain one man, on the sole ground that he is incompetent
to decide what is right for himself, are profoundly insulting to
him. They make him intellectually and morally subservient to the
conformists who form the majority, and deny him the independence to
which he is entitled. Mill insisted on the political importance of
these moral concepts of dignity, personality, and insult. It was
these complex ideas, not the simpler idea of license, that he tried
to make available for political theory. . . ."
R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 263 (1977).
Ordinarily the mere fact that the existence of a general
regulation may significantly impair individual liberty raises no
question under the Due Process Clause. [
Footnote 2/8] But the Clause is implicated when the
State singles out one person for adverse treatment significantly
different from that imposed on the community at large. For an
essential attribute of the liberty protected by the Constitution is
the right to the same kind of treatment as the State provides to
other similarly situated persons. [
Footnote 2/9] A convicted felon, though he is
Page 459 U. S. 486
properly placed in a disfavored class, retains this essential
right. [
Footnote 2/10]
Thus, for a prisoner, as for other persons, the grievousness of
any claimed deprivation of liberty is, in part, a relative matter:
one must compare the treatment of the particular prisoner with the
customary, habitual treatment of the population of the prison as a
whole. In general, if a prisoner complains of an adverse change in
conditions which he shares with an entire class of his fellow
prisoners as part of the day-to-day operations of the prison, there
would be no reason to find that he has been deprived of his
constitutionally protected liberty. [
Footnote 2/11] But if a prisoner is singled out for
disparate treatment, and if the disparity is sufficiently severe,
his liberty is at stake. [
Footnote
2/12]
Page 459 U. S. 487
In this case, by definition, the institutional norm is
confinement in the "general prison population." [
Footnote 2/13] The deprivation of which respondent
complains is transfer to "administrative segregation" -- that is,
solitary confinement -- which, by its nature, singles out
individual prisoners. That confinement was not specified by the
terms of his initial criminal sentence. Not only is there a
disparity, the disparity is drastic. [
Footnote 2/14] It is concededly as serious as the
difference between confinement in the general prison population and
"disciplinary segregation."
See supra at
459 U. S.
479-480, and n. 2. As the District Court wrote in
Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F.
Supp. 397, 402 (ND Cal.1976),
summarily aff'd,@
434 U. S. 1052
(1978):
Page 459 U. S. 488
"When a prisoner is transferred from the general prison
population to the grossly more onerous conditions of maximum
security, be it for disciplinary or for administrative reasons,
there is severe impairment of the residuum of liberty which he
retains as a prisoner -- an impairment which triggers the
requirement for due process safeguards. [
Footnote 2/15]"
In this case, the Court's exclusive focus on written regulations
happens to lead it to the conclusion that there is a "liberty
interest." I agree that the regulations are relevant: by limiting
the substantive reasons for a transfer to administrative
segregation, and by establishing prescribed procedures, these
regulations indicate that the State recognizes the substantiality
of the deprivation. They therefore provide evidentiary support for
the conclusion that the transfer affects a constitutionally
protected interest in liberty. But the regulations do not
create that interest. Even in their absence, due process
safeguards would be required when an inmate's liberty is further
curtailed by a transfer into administrative custody that is the
functional equivalent of punitive isolation.
II
The "touchstone of due process," as we pointed out in
Wolff
v. McDonnell, is "protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government." 418 U.S. at
418 U. S. 558.
Pennsylvania may not arbitrarily place a prisoner in administrative
segregation.
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S.
5,
449 U. S. 9
(1980). The majority agrees with this general proposition, but I
believe its standards guarding against arbitrariness fall short of
what the Constitution requires.
Page 459 U. S. 489
First, the majority declares that the Constitution is satisfied
by an initial proceeding [
Footnote
2/16] with minimal participation by the inmate who is being
transferred into administrative custody. According to the
Court:
"An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges
against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison
official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to
administrative segregation. Ordinarily a written statement by the
inmate will accomplish this purpose, although prison administrators
may find it more useful to permit oral presentations in cases where
they believe a written statement would be ineffective."
Ante at
459 U. S. 476.
Applying this standard, it declares that the proceeding on December
8, 1979, "plainly satisfied the due process requirements for
continued confinement of Helms pending the outcome of the
investigation,"
ante at
459 U. S. 477,
even though the record does not clearly show whether respondent was
present at the Hearing Committee review.
I agree with the Court that the Constitution does not require a
hearing with all of the procedural safeguards set forth in
Wolff v. McDonnell when prison officials initially decide
to segregate an inmate to safeguard institutional security or
to
Page 459 U. S. 490
conduct an investigation of an unresolved misconduct charge. But
unlike the majority, I believe that due process does require that
the inmate be given the opportunity to present his views in person
to the reviewing officials. As many prisoners have little
education, limiting an inmate to a written statement is unlikely to
provide a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" in accordance with
due process principles.
See Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254,
397 U. S.
267-269 (1970). [
Footnote
2/17]
Of greater importance, the majority's due process analysis fails
to provide adequate protection against arbitrary continuation of an
inmate's solitary confinement. [
Footnote 2/18] The opinion recognizes that "[p]rison
officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the
confinement of such inmates."
Ante at
459 U. S. 477,
n. 9. It thus recognizes that the deprivation of liberty in the
prison setting is a continuous process, rather than an isolated
event. [
Footnote 2/19] But the
Court requires only minimal review
Page 459 U. S. 491
procedures; prison officials need not permit the submission of
any additional evidence or statements, and need not give the inmate
a chance to present his position. It is constitutionally
sufficient, according to the majority, that administrative
segregation not be a pretext for indefinite confinement. In my
view, the Due Process Clause requires a more searching review of
the justifiability of continued confinement.
The Court relies on two major justifications for respondent's
transfer into solitary confinement: institutional security and the
pendency of investigations into respondent's behavior on December
3, 1978. Each of these justifications may serve important
governmental interests.
See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at
449 U. S. 13, n.
12. But it cannot fairly be assumed that either rationale, though
it might initially be adequate, remains valid or sufficient
indefinitely. [
Footnote 2/20] Nor
can it
Page 459 U. S. 492
fairly be assumed that prison officials can properly judge the
continued existence of either rationale without gathering fresh
information and allowing the inmate to state his own case in
person.
The majority assumes that the facts needed to decide whether a
particular prisoner remains a security risk "will have been
ascertained when determining to confine the inmate to
administrative segregation."
Ante at
459 U. S. 477,
n. 9. This assertion simply ignores the passage of time. Even if
Helms was a threat to safety on December 8, 1978, it cannot be
taken for granted that he was still a threat to safety on January
8, 1979 -- or that, if there had been no hearing on January 22, he
would still have been a threat to safety a year later. Conditions
-- including Helms' own attitudes, the attitudes of other prisoners
toward him and toward each other, and the disruptions caused by the
riot -- simply do not remain static.
The majority acknowledges that periodic reviews should consider
"the progress of the investigation." But it gives no guidance on
the significance of this factor. In my view, the mere notation on a
record, "there is an ongoing investigation," should not
automatically validate the continuation of solitary confinement. As
the Court held in
Hughes v. Rowe, supra, the Due Process
Clause does not countenance "automatic investigative segregation of
all inmate suspects."
Id. at
449 U. S. 13, n.
12. [
Footnote 2/21]
Investigations take varying forms. An active
Page 459 U. S. 493
investigation involving pursuit of leads among prisoners may
justify continued segregation of the suspected inmate, in order to
protect potential witnesses from intimidation or influence. But
segregation might not be proper if the investigative file is merely
being kept open in the hope that something else might turn up.
[
Footnote 2/22] In such event,
there is a possibility that a prisoner might be kept in segregation
simply because prison officials believe that he should be punished,
even though there is insufficient evidence to support a misconduct
charge at a disciplinary hearing. [
Footnote 2/23] The lengthier the period of
administrative detention, the more likely it may be that
"investigation" is merely a pretext. Therefore, due process demands
periodic reviews that have genuine substance -- not mere
paper-shuffling. [
Footnote
2/24]
Page 459 U. S. 494
At each periodic review, I believe due process requires that the
prisoner be allowed to make an oral statement about the need for,
and the consequences of, continued confinement. Concededly some of
the information relevant to a decision whether to continue
confinement will be beyond the reach of a prisoner who has been
held in segregated custody, including conditions in the general
prison population and the progress of an ongoing investigation. But
the prisoner should have the right to be present in order to
explain his current attitude toward his past activities and his
present circumstances, and the impact of solitary confinement on
his rehabilitation program and training. [
Footnote 2/25] These factors may change as the period
of confinement continues.
Further, if the decisionmaker decides to retain the prisoner in
segregation, I believe he should be required to explain his reasons
in a brief written statement which is retained in the file and
given to the prisoner. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has written in a related
prison context, this requirement would direct the decisionmaker's
focus
"to the relevant . . . criteria and promote more careful
consideration of the evidence. It would also enable inmates to
detect and correct inaccuracies that could have a decisive impact.
And the obligation to justify a decision publicly would provide
the
Page 459 U. S. 495
assurance, critical to the appearance of fairness, that the
Board's decision is not capricious."
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S.
1,
442 U. S. 38-41
(1979) (dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). A written statement
of reasons would facilitate administrative and judicial review,
[
Footnote 2/26] and might give
the prisoner an opportunity to improve his conduct.
Neither a right to personal appearance by the prisoner nor a
requirement of written reasons would impose an undue burden on
prison officials. It is noteworthy that these procedural safeguards
are provided in regulations governing both the Pennsylvania and
federal prison systems. [
Footnote
2/27] Given the
Page 459 U. S. 496
importance of the prisoner's interest in returning to the
general prison population, the benefits of additional procedural
safeguards, and the minimal burden on prison officials, I am
convinced that the Due Process Clause requires more substantial
periodic reviews than the majority acknowledges.
III
Unfortunately, today's majority opinion locates the due process
floor at a level below existing procedures in Pennsylvania. The
Court reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and thus
endorses the District Court's summary judgment in favor of
petitioners. In my view, summary judgment is inappropriate, because
at least three issues of material fact remain unresolved. First,
there has been no finding whether Helms had a constitutionally
adequate opportunity to present his views at the initial proceeding
on December 8, 1978. As the Court today acknowledges, it is not
entirely clear from the record whether respondent appeared in
person before the Hearing Committee on December 8.
Ante at
459 U. S.
464-465. Second, the record does not adequately
Page 459 U. S. 497
disclose the reasons for respondent's prolonged confinement.
[
Footnote 2/28] Finally, it is by
no means clear that the subsequent review proceedings, including
Helms' appearance before the Program Review Committee on January 2,
1979, satisfied the mandates of the Due Process Clause. I therefore
respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
In an uncontroverted affidavit, respondent Helms described those
conditions as follows:
"While confined in segregation, I had no access to vocational,
educational, recreational, and rehabilitative programs as I would
have had while out in the general population. Exercise was limited
to between five and ten minutes a day, and was often only three or
four days a week. Showers were virtually nonexistent in segregation
in December and January. The changing of clothes was also only once
or twice a week, while I could have changed more often in
population. Had I been in general population, I would have had
access to various exercise facilities such as the gym and the yard,
and would have been able to do this for most of the time out of my
cell, which would have been approximately 14 hours a day. While in
segregation, I only got out of my cell a few minutes for exercise,
showers and an occasional visit. I was virtually confined there 24
hours a day otherwise."
App. 35a. The State has not challenged the factual accuracy of
this description.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Compare 37 Pa. Code 95.106(1)
and § 95.106(2)
(1978) (virtually identical language in regulations describing
administrative custody and disciplinary custody);
see also
Tr. of Oral Arg. 9-10 (Attorney General's response to
question).
Indeed, the record shows that, because of the large number of
prisoners placed in administrative custody after the December 3,
1978, riot, some individuals, including Helms,
"were placed in an area otherwise designated as disciplinary
custody close. The physical attributes of these cells are similar
to those of administrative custody. . . ."
Affidavit submitted by Dennis R. Erhard, Deputy Superintendent
for Treatment at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon,
in support of defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment. App. 12a. Mr. Erhard served as a member of the Program
Review Committee.
See also id. at 14a (record of the
January 2, 1979, review proceeding, describing Helms' location as
Disciplinary Custody Close);
id. at 16a (affidavit by
another member of the Program Review Committee stating that Helms
was "in an area designated as disciplinary custody" even though it
was not a disciplinary placement).
[
Footnote 2/3]
The state criminal charges filed on December 11, 1978, were
voluntarily abandoned at the preliminary hearing on February 6,
1979. The first misconduct charge of assaulting a correctional
officer, filed on December 4, 1978, was never sustained.
Id. at 31a. In addition, the second misconduct charge of
assaulting a different correctional officer, filed on January 19,
1979, must be regarded as still unproved. The Court of Appeals held
that due process was violated at the January 22, 1979, hearing that
found respondent guilty of the second misconduct, because the
finding was supported only by uncorroborated hearsay testimony --
"literally, next to no evidence." 655 F.2d 487, 502 (CA3 1981).
Petitioners have not challenged that holding. Brief for Petitioners
7, n. 6.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. There is no contention in this case that
conditions in administrative segregation at Huntingdon violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments. If such a violation existed, the Constitution would
impose substantive, rather than procedural, limits on transfers
into segregated status.
[
Footnote 2/5]
These regulations were issued in compliance with a consent
decree in federal court litigation.
Imprisoned Citizens Union
v. Shapp, C.A. 70-3054 (ED Pa., May 22, 1978).
See 8
Pa.Bull. 2682 (1978).
[
Footnote 2/6]
See Connecticut Board of Pardon v. Dumschat,
452 U. S. 458,
452 U. S.
463-467 (1981);
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
Inmates, 442 U. S. 1,
442 U. S. 11-12
(1979);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215,
427 U. S.
225-228 (1976);
Montanye v. Haymes,
427 U. S. 236,
427 U. S. 243
(1976). Although I believe these cases were erroneously decided, I
am also persuaded that they do not control the present case. None
of them dealt with transfers into solitary confinement.
See
Meachum, supra, at
427 U. S. 222;
Montanye, supra, at
427 U. S.
238.
[
Footnote 2/7]
See United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d
701, 712-713 (CA7 1973) (Stevens, J.) (footnote omitted) ("The
restraints and the punishment which a criminal conviction entails
do not place the citizen beyond the ethical tradition that accords
respect to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every individual.
Liberty' and `custody' are not mutually exclusive concepts"),
cert. denied sub nom. Gutierrez v. Department of Public Safety
of Illinois, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
[
Footnote 2/8]
There are, of course, particular liberties that have
constitutional status in their own right, such as freedom of speech
and the free exercise of religion, whose deprivation by a State on
a class-wide, as well as an individual, basis may violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[
Footnote 2/9]
"Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which
the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted
except for a proper governmental objective."
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497,
347 U. S.
499-500 (1954).
"While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term
has received much consideration, and some of the included things
have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
. . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390,
262 U. S. 399
(1923), quoted in
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.
S. 564,
408 U. S. 572
(1972).
[
Footnote 2/10]
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.
S. 539,
418 U. S. 556
(1974);
cf. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.
S. 333 (1968) (statutes requiring racial segregation in
prisons and jails violate Fourteenth Amendment).
[
Footnote 2/11]
This category would include some, if not all, of the day-to-day
decisions listed by the petitioners,
see Brief for
Petitioners 11-12. When an entire class is affected by a change,
individual prisoners are neither more acutely affected by it than
other members of their class nor uniquely able to bring personal
knowledge to bear on the appropriateness of its implementation.
Therefore the reasons for the due process requirement of some kind
of hearing are absent. There may, of course, be other
constitutional issues, such as the Eighth Amendment's proscription
of cruel and unusual punishments, or the First Amendment's
guarantee of religious freedom.
[
Footnote 2/12]
Although I disagree with the Court's assumption that the State
"creates" a prisoner's interest in liberty, I recognize, of course,
that the State does have the power to limit the scope of the
liberty that remains after incarceration. Just as it may impose
either a long or a short term of confinement, so may it establish
more or less severe conditions of confinement. Whether by formal
written guidelines or by consistent unwritten practice, the State
establishes the baseline of how it customarily treats the prison
population. In my opinion, it does not matter whether the State
uses a particular form of words in its laws or regulations, or
indeed whether it has adopted written rules at all.
Hence, as we noted in
Wolff, the State is not required
to allow prisoners good-time credits. But if it establishes such a
system, it may not arbitrarily deprive a prisoner of these credits
on the ground that the prisoner has engaged in serious misbehavior
unless its procedures for so doing are constitutionally adequate.
Wolff, supra, at
418 U. S.
556-557. Similarly, an offender has a liberty interest
in parole release or probation "derived solely from the existence
of a system that permits criminal offenders to serve their
sentences on probation or parole."
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 24-25
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting in part);
see id. at
442 U. S. 30-31.
Due process must be satisfied when a prisoner is singled out and
denied parole.
See also Connecticut Board of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. at
452 U. S. 471, and n. 5 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (when
75% of all life inmates receive commutation of life sentence, each
life inmate has a liberty interest in commutation).
[
Footnote 2/13]
See Brief for Respondent 32-34 (briefly setting forth
history of penitentiaries; initially solitary confinement was the
norm, but gradually authorities realized the advantages of the
congregated system).
[
Footnote 2/14]
The Commonwealth's own prison regulations make clear how
substantial the disparity is. Title 37 Pa. Code 95.107(a)(2) (1978)
provides:
"The inmates therein shall have all the rights and privileges
accorded to the general population except for freedom to move about
the institution, freedom to engage in programs with the general
population, the use of civilian clothing, the use of items
specifically found by the Program Review Committee to be a security
hazard. . . ."
[
Footnote 2/15]
See Wolff, supra, at
418 U. S.
571-572, n.19 (due process applies to transfer to
solitary confinement for major misconduct because it "represents a
major change in the conditions of confinement");
cf. Montanye
v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at
427 U. S. 242
(question is whether the conditions or degree of confinement to
which the prisoner is subjected is "within the sentence imposed
upon him").
[
Footnote 2/16]
The Court of Appeals recognized that, in the emergency
conditions on December 3, 1978, prison officials were justified in
placing respondent in administrative segregation without a hearing.
Respondent does not contend otherwise. The Due Process Clause
allows prison officials flexibility to cope with emergencies. But
petitioners acknowledge that the disturbance was "quelled" the same
day, Brief for Petitioners 3, and that, within a day or two after
the December 3, 1978, prison riot, conditions had returned
completely to normal.
See App. 55a-56a, 68a. At that
point, the emergency rationale for administrative segregation
without a hearing had expired. The Due Process Clause then required
a prompt proceeding to determine whether continued administrative
segregation was justified.
Cf. Hughes v. Rowe,
449 U. S. 5,
449 U. S. 11
(1980) ("Segregation of a prisoner without a prior hearing may
violate due process if the postponement of procedural protections
is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions"). Yet Helms
was not accorded any procedural safeguards whatsoever until five
days after the riot -- another violation of his due process
rights.
[
Footnote 2/17]
Indeed, petitioners do not contend that a face-to-face
presentation by the inmate would be unduly burdensome. Their brief
cites
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565
(1975), as a model of appropriate procedure, noting that there, the
Court did not require an "elaborate hearing" before a neutral
party,
"but simply 'an informal give-and-take between student and
disciplinarian' which gives the student 'an opportunity to explain
his version of the facts.'"
Brief for Petitioners 27-28, quoting
Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651,
430 U. S. 693
(1977) (WHITE, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 2/18]
Unlike disciplinary custody, which is imposed for a fixed term,
in practice administrative custody sometimes continues for lengthy
or indefinite periods.
See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.
Supp. 1265, 1365, 1367 (SD Tex.1980) ("months or even years");
Mims v. Shapp, 457 F.
Supp. 247, 249 (WD Pa.1978) (five years);
United States ex
rel. Hoss v. Cuyler, 452 F.
Supp. 256 (ED Pa.1978) (more than five years);
Wright v.
Enomoto, 462 F.
Supp. 397, 403-404 (ND Cal.1976) (various instances up to a
year).
[
Footnote 2/19]
As the Eighth Circuit wrote in 1975:
"Conditions in prisons change as they do everywhere else, and a
reason for administrative segregation of an inmate that is valid
today may not necessarily be valid six months or a year in the
future."
"Since there must be a valid and subsisting reason for holding
an inmate in segregation, we agree with the district court that,
where an inmate is held in segregation for a prolonged or
indefinite period of time, due process requires that his situation
should be reviewed periodically in a meaningful way and by relevant
standards to determine whether he should be retained in segregation
or returned to population."
Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394, 400 (CA8 1975).
Accord, Drayton v. Robinson, 519 F.
Supp. 545, 551-552 (MD Pa.1981);
Ruiz v. Estelle,
supra, at 1366;
United States ex rel. Hoss v. Cuyler,
supra, at 290-291.
See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae
30:
"Since the imposition of administrative segregation generally is
a response to a particular confluence of circumstances occurring in
a prison at a given time, fairness and effectiveness would seem to
be best served by reassessments of the situation at regular
intervals to assure that an inmate is released from the restrictive
confinement as soon as the 'reasons for placement cease to
exist.'"
[
Footnote 2/20]
Some of the provisions of Pennsylvania's own regulations appear
to recognize that the investigative rationale does not support
indefinite solitary confinement. When a prisoner is confined as a
result of a general institutional disturbance or incident, because
officials determine that there is a threat of a serious disturbance
or a serious threat to the individual or others, the regulations
provide:
"An investigation shall begin immediately to determine whether
or not a behavior violation has occurred. If no behavior violation
has occurred, the inmate must be released as soon as the reason for
the security concern has abated, but in all cases within ten
days."
37 Pa. Code § 95.104(b)(3) (1978). When a prisoner is placed in
administrative custody pending investigation by the state police,
Administrative Directive BC-ADM 004, § IV(B)(1) (1975) requires
that a hearing
"will be carried out after the investigation period. Such
hearing shall be held within four (4) days unless the investigation
warrants delay, and in that case as soon as possible."
When a prisoner is confined pending a hearing on a misconduct
charge, the inmate shall be informed in writing of the charge and
"given a specific date for a hearing which shall be held no less
than 24 hours after receipt of this notice, but within six days."
37 Pa. Code § 95.103(d)(1) (1978).
[
Footnote 2/21]
The record in
Hughes v. Rowe did not show that
petitioner's segregation was based on specific "investigative
concerns [that] might, in particular cases, justify prehearing
segregation." 449 U.S. at
449 U. S. 13, n.
12. We therefore reversed the lower court's dismissal for failure
to state a claim and remanded for further factfinding
proceedings.
[
Footnote 2/22]
In an affidavit, Lt. Buddy B. Kyler, who prepared the January
18, 1979, misconduct charge, stated that, by January 4, 1979, he
had received the notarized statement from an inmate informant which
was the sole evidence against respondent at the hearing 18 days
later. He did not write a misconduct report at the time, because he
was awaiting the preliminary hearing on the pending state criminal
charges.
"In addition, more information could have come to light at the
preliminary hearing revealing additional acts of assault or
institutional misconduct by plaintiff which should be handled at a
single administrative hearing."
On January 18, he wrote a misconduct report because an Assistant
Attorney General recommended that administrative proceedings be
completed even though the preliminary hearing had not taken place.
App. 82a-84a (affidavit submitted in support of defendants' motion
for summary judgment). It is not at all self-evident that this
delay was justified.
[
Footnote 2/23]
Cf. Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. at 400-401. The
plaintiffs had been placed in administrative solitary confinement
for a variety of reasons, including "becoming too militant" and
spending too much time in the yard with other Black Muslims, being
an influential member of the Mexican prison community and having
"leadership qualities," and being "suspected of being a leader in
Nuestra Familia."
[
Footnote 2/24]
Moreover, once investigation has been completed, the pending
misconduct charge should be promptly adjudicated.
Cf. Moody v.
Daggett, 429 U. S. 78,
429 U. S. 91-92
(1976) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (constitutional right to a fair
hearing on parole revocation includes the right to a prompt
hearing; due process is violated by putting a person under the
cloud of an unresolved charge for an indeterminate period).
[
Footnote 2/25]
In addition to worsening his conditions of confinement,
respondent alleged that detention in solitary confinement might
indirectly affect his parole opportunities by depriving him of the
opportunity to participate in rehabilitation programs. Brief for
Respondent 48, n. 35; App. 35a;
see Brief for State Bar of
Michigan, Prisons and Corrections Committee, as
Amicus
Curiae 11 (prisoner in extended administrative segregation
loses his assigned general population cell and work or program
assignments). Petitioners do not directly answer this assertion,
but generally state that administrative custody has no effect on
parole or prerelease status. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10.
[
Footnote 2/26]
The Pennsylvania regulations provide for administrative review,
upon the inmate's request, of transfers into segregated
confinement, 37 Pa.Code §§ 95.103(g)(2), 95.103(h) (1978);
see
also App. 31a, 41a (notification to Helms of Hearing Committee
actions, informing him of opportunity to seek review). In addition,
petitioners' brief states that "arbitrary action by prison
officials is violative of substantive due process, and, therefore,
subject to full judicial review." Brief for Petitioners 17.
[
Footnote 2/27]
Title 37 Pa.Code § 95.103(g)(4) (1978) requires that a Program
Review Committee, composed of the Deputy Superintendent for
Operations, the Deputy Superintendent for Treatment Services, and
the Classification and Treatment Supervisor, must
"interview in person, at least once every 30 days, those inmates
detained in Administrative Custody or Disciplinary Custody. The
determination of whether continued confinement is warranted will be
based upon a review of the counselor's notes and recommendations,
psychological and psychiatric reports when available,
recommendations by other staff and their written observations
regarding his attitudes and actions, and his attitude and actions
during the interview. . . . When the Program Review Committee
determines that continued confinement is warranted, the inmate
shall be given a written statement of the decision and its
rationale."
In addition, the regulations mandate a weekly status review of
each inmate in restrictive custody, to determine whether
continuation of such custody is appropriate and necessary. The
prisoner is not present at these weekly reviews, which are based on
the notes and recommendations of the counselor and other entries in
the inmate's record. § 95.103(g)(3). Finally, every 30 days, the
Superintendent is required personally to review the case of each
inmate separated from the general population for 30 days or more,
and he must retain a written report of his findings in each such
case. § 95.107(f).
The federal prison system appears to follow similar periodic
review procedures.
See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 29-30:
"After an inmate's first in-person review, he is afforded a
record review (at which he does not appear) every seven days and
further in-person reviews at least every 30 days. In connection
with each of the 30-day in-person reviews, the staff conducts a
psychiatric or psychological assessment of the inmate, which is
submitted to the reviewing authority in a written report
'address[ing] the inmate's adjustment to his surroundings and the
threat the inmate poses to self, staff and other inmates.'"
28 CFR 541.20(c) (1982). According to the Federal Government's
brief, the inmate has a right to make a statement at his in-person
review disputing the grounds for continued confinement in
administrative detention, and he receives a written copy of the
staff's decision and its reasons. Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 29-30.
[
Footnote 2/28]
The written record of the Program Review Committee's decision,
App. 13a-14a, does not specifically discuss the progress of the
investigation or the need for continuing administrative
segregation; it merely states that restrictive custody should
continue "until more information is received regarding his
involvement in the December 3rd incident."