Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976)
U.S. Supreme CourtMoody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976)
Moody v. Daggett
Argued October 12, 1976
Decided November 15, 1976
429 U.S. 78
Petitioner federal parolee, imprisoned for federal crimes committed while on parole and clearly constituting parole violations, held not to be constitutionally entitled to an immediate parole revocation hearing, where a parole violator warrant was issued and lodged with the institution of his confinement as a "detainer," but was not executed. Pp. 429 U. S. 85-89.
(a) Petitioner's present confinement and consequent liberty loss do not derive from the parole violator warrant, but from his convictions for the crimes committed while on parole. Execution of a parole violator warrant and custody thereunder are the operative events triggering any loss of liberty attendant upon parole revocation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 408 U. S. 488. Pp. 429 U. S. 85-87.
(b) Deferral of the parole revocation decision until execution of the parole violator warrant does not deprive petitioner of the opportunity to serve any sentence imposed for parole violation concurrently with the sentences imposed for the crimes committed while on parole, since, if the Parole Commission chooses to revoke parole, it has the power to grant, retroactively, the equivalent of concurrent sentences, and to provide for unconditional or conditional release upon completion of the subsequent sentences. Pp. 429 U. S. 87-88.
(c) Issuance of the parole violator warrant, without more, did not diminish petitioner's opportunity for parole on his intervening sentences, since the same Commission that will consider such parole will decide whether to revoke parole granted under the earlier conviction, and since the statutory hearing to which petitioner will be entitled upon his application for parole will give him the same opportunity to persuade the Commission that he should be released from custody as would an immediate hearing on the parole violator warrant. P. 429 U. S. 88.
(d) As a practical matter, in cases such as this, in which the parolee has been convicted of an offense plainly constituting a parole violation, a decision to revoke parole would often be foreordained, so that, given the predictive nature of the parole revocation hearing, it is appropriate that such hearing be held at the time at which prediction as to the parolee's ability to live in society without committing antisocial
acts is both most relevant and most accurate -- at the expiration of the parolee's intervening sentence. P. 429 U. S. 89.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 429 U. S. 89.