Under §§ 9 and 10 of petitioner School Board's rules, the Board
has discretion to suspend a high school student for "good cause,"
which is defined as including "sale, use or possession of alcoholic
beverages or illegal drugs." Section 11 of the rules provides for
mandatory suspension for the remainder of the semester if a student
has on school premises used, sold, or been under the influence or
in possession of "narcotics or other hallucinogenics, drugs, or
controlled substances" classified as such by an Arkansas statute.
That statute specifically exempts alcohol from its coverage of
"controlled substances." After a hearing before the Board,
respondent, a 10th-grade student, was expelled for the remainder of
the semester because he was on school premises while intoxicated.
Respondent then sought injunctive relief in Federal District Court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). While there was
conflicting evidence concerning which section of its rules the
Board had invoked, the Board's Chairman testified that the Board
had suspended students under § 11 for alcohol offenses for the past
five years. The District Court concluded that, as a matter of fact,
the Board had acted under § 11, that § 11 did not apply to alcohol,
and that the Board thus had acted unreasonably and had violated
respondent's right to substantive due process, even though the
Board had discretion to suspend him under § 10. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Held: The courts below plainly erred in replacing the
Board's construction of § 11 with their own notions under the facts
of this case. The Board's interpretation of § 11 is reasonable,
since even though alcohol is not a "controlled substance" under §
11, that section also covers "drugs," and alcohol is a "drug." It
is reasonable to conclude that § 11 requires suspension for any
drug use, including use of alcohol, on school premises, while § 10
permits discretionary suspension for drug use off school premises.
In any event, federal courts are not authorized to construe school
regulations,
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.
S. 308, and thus the Board's interpretation of its
regulations controls.
Certiorari granted; 662 F.2d 1263, reversed.
Page 458 U. S. 967
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, a 10th-grade student in the Rogers, Ark., School
District, left school on October 21, 1980, after the first period
without permission, and, with four other students, consumed alcohol
and became intoxicated. When he returned to school later that day
to go on a band trip, he was notified that he was suspended from
school. His parents were notified the next day that their son had
been suspended pending a hearing before the Rogers School Board; a
hearing was scheduled for October 29. At the hearing before the
Board, none of the five students denied that they had been
drinking, and the Board voted to expel all five for the remainder
of the semester.
Respondent immediately sought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), and the case was heard by the United
States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on
December 4. The District Court decided that the School Board had
violated respondent's right to substantive due process, and ordered
that he be granted credit for the semester during which he was
suspended and that all references to his suspension be expunged
from his school records.
The District Court's action was based on its interpretation of
the School Board's rules and its conclusions concerning which rules
the Board invoked in suspending respondent. There is no doubt that
the Board had the authority to suspend respondent under §§ 9 and 10
of its written Policies on Pupil Suspension. Section 9 provides
that the Board may suspend or expel any student "for good cause."
Section 10 defines "good cause," and provides that it includes
"sale, use or possession of alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs."
Thus, it was clearly within the Board's discretion to suspend a
student for becoming intoxicated.
The District Court decided that the Board had acted under § 11
of its rules, which provides for mandatory suspension when it
applies. Section 11 provides:
Page 458 U. S. 968
"For the protection of other pupils in the school grades 9-12,
the school board shall expel for the remainder of the semester with
loss of credit for the semester's work any pupil whenever it has
been established to the satisfaction of the board, or the
superintendent, or the principal, or his assistant in charge, that
the pupil has on school premises or at school sponsored activities
(including trips) used, sold, been under the influence of, or been
in possession of narcotics or other hallucinogenics, drugs, or
controlled substances classified as such by Act 590 of 1971, as
amended."
There was conflicting testimony concerning which section the
Board had invoked. The letters sent to respondent's parents
informing them of the suspension and the hearing cited both § 10
and § 11. Adams, a Board member and a lawyer, testified that he
based his motion to expel McCluskey on § 10 because he had doubts
about the applicability of § 11. The Chairman of the Board
testified that the Board had suspended students under § 11 for
alcohol offenses for the past five years.
The District Court found as a matter of fact that the Board
acted under § 11 when it suspended respondent. It then went on to
decide that § 11 did not apply to alcohol.
* Section 11
applies to "narcotics or other hallucinogenics, drugs, or
controlled substances classified as such by Act 590 of 1971, as
amended." Act 590, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 82-2602(e) (Supp.1981),
specifically exempts alcohol from its coverage; therefore, alcohol
is not a "controlled substance." Nor is it a "narcotic or other
hallucinogenic." The District Court also concluded that alcohol is
not a "drug." While technically alcohol is a drug, the District
Court noted, it is not considered a drug in common parlance. For
this reason, the District Court
Page 458 U. S. 969
concluded, the Board had acted unreasonably by suspending
respondent under § 11. It held that the Board violated substantive
due process by suspending him under the mandatory terms of § 11,
even though the Board had discretion to suspend him under § 10.
A divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 662
F.2d 1263 (1981). It reviewed the District Court's conclusion that
the Board acted under § 11, rather than § 10, under the clearly
erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), and
held that the District Court's conclusion passed muster. It also
affirmed the District Court's holding that § 11 cannot reasonably
be interpreted to apply to alcohol because "the express terms of
section 11 apply only to
drugs,' and expressly exempt alcohol."
662 F.2d at 1267. For this reason, the Court of Appeals concluded,
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308
(1975), was distinguishable. There this Court had stated
that
"§ 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court
evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or
the proper construction of school regulations."
Id. at 326. Although this Court had plainly stated that
federal courts were not authorized to construe school regulations,
the Court of Appeals concluded that
Wood v. Strickland was
distinguishable, because the school board in that case had
construed its regulations reasonably, while here the Board had
construed its regulations unreasonably. 662 F.2d at 1267. Judge
McMillian dissented because he concluded that
Wood v.
Strickland barred federal courts from construing the school
regulations involved in this case differently than the Board had
construed them.
Wood v. Strickland plainly requires that the Court of
Appeals be reversed. There high school girls were expelled for
"spiking" a punch served at a school meeting by adding two bottles
of malt liquor. The malt liquor had an alcoholic content of 3.2%
and the alcoholic content of the spiked punch was estimated at
0.91%. 420 U.S. at
420 U. S. 326.
The Court of Appeals
Page 458 U. S. 970
had set aside the girls' expulsions because they had been
expelled for adding an alcoholic beverage to the punch, but a state
statute defined "intoxicating liquor" as a beverage with an
alcoholic content exceeding 5%, and the court thought the 5% rule
of the statute should apply to the school regulation. We held that
the court erred in substituting its own notions for the school
board's definition of its rules:
"[T]he Court of Appeals was ill-advised to supplant the
interpretation of the regulation of those officers who adopted it
and are entrusted with its enforcement."
Id. at
420 U. S. 325.
The Court continued, as noted
supra, by stating that
"§ 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court
evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings
or the proper construction of school regulations."
Id. at
420 U. S. 326
(emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals and the District Court plainly erred in
distinguishing
Wood v. Strickland on the ground that the
Board's interpretation of § 11 in this case was unreasonable, while
the school board's construction of "alcoholic beverage" in
Wood
v. Strickland was reasonable. A case may be hypothesized in
which a school board's interpretation of its rules is so extreme as
to be a violation of due process, but this is surely not that case.
The Board's interpretation of § 11 is reasonable. Contrary to the
Court of Appeals, alcohol is not expressly exempted from the
coverage of § 11. Section 11 covers "controlled substances
classified as such by Act 590," and Act 590 expressly exempts
alcohol from its coverage. Therefore, alcohol is not a "controlled
substance" under § 11. But § 11 also covers "drugs," and, as the
District Court conceded, alcohol is a "drug." Moreover, § 11
mandates suspension of students under the influence of drugs while
on school premises. Section 10, which gives the Board discretion to
suspend students for drug use, is not limited in its
application
Page 458 U. S. 971
to drug use on school premises. It is reasonable to conclude
that the regulations require suspension for any drug use, including
use of alcohol, on school premises, while permitting suspension for
drug use off school premises.
In any case, even if the District Court's and the Court of
Appeals' views of § 11 struck us as clearly preferable to the
Board's -- which they do not -- the Board's interpretation of its
regulations controls under
Wood v. Strickland. The
Chairman of the Board testified that the Board had interpreted § 11
as requiring the suspension of students found intoxicated on school
grounds for a number of years prior to respondent's suspension, and
it is undisputed that the Board had the authority to suspend
students for that reason. We conclude that the District Court and
the Court of Appeals plainly erred in replacing the Board's
construction of § 11 with their own notions under the facts of this
case. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
* The Board has since amended its regulations so as to remove
all question that suspension for the remainder of the semester is
mandatory if a student is intoxicated on school premises.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, dissenting.
As JUSTICE REHNQUIST has reminded us, in "our zeal to provide
equal justice under law,' we must never forget that this Court
is not a forum for the correction of errors." Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U. S. 364,
454 U. S.
367-368 (1982) (dissenting opinion).
"To remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide
only those cases which present questions whose resolution will have
immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties
involved. [
Footnote 1]"
This case illustrates how ineffectively the Court is supervising
its discretionary docket.
Page 458 U. S. 972
The case is not of sufficient importance to warrant full
briefing and argument. It is not worthy of an opinion signed by a
Member of this Court. The disposition is explained by an anonymous
author writing "per curiam" -- that is to say, "for the Court." In
ever-increasing numbers, appeals throughout the federal system are
being decided in this anonymous fashion. It is not uncommon for
courts of appeals to issue pinions that are not to be cited as
authority in other cases. [
Footnote
2] In one recent published case -- which was sufficiently
important to induce this Court to grant certiorari even before a
conflict in the circuits had developed -- the court purported to
justify such an
ad hoc adjudication by asserting that it
lacked "precedential character." [
Footnote 3] The threat to the quality of our work that is
presented by the ever-increasing impersonalization and
bureaucratization of the federal judicial system is far more
serious than is generally recognized. Regrettably, the example set
by this Court in cases of this kind is not one of resistance, but
rather of encouragement, to the rising administrative tide.
We are far too busy to correct every error that we perceive
among the thousands of cases that litigants ask us to review. In
recent years, when we have exercised our discretionary jurisdiction
and issued per curiam rulings deciding cases summarily, we have
most frequently come to the aid of a prosecutor or a warden who has
been rebuffed by another court. [
Footnote 4] Today we exercise our majestic power to
enforce a
Page 458 U. S. 973
School Board's suspension of a 10th-grade student who consumed
too much alcohol on October 21, 1980.
If the student had been unjustly suspended, I wonder if the
Court would consider the matter of sufficient national importance
to require summary reversal. I doubt it.
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 1]
Address of Chief Justice Vinson before the American Bar
Association, September 7, 1949 (quoted in R. Stern & E.
Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 258 (5th ed.1978)).
[
Footnote 2]
See Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential
Precedent -- Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum.L.Rev. 1167 (1978); Note,
Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63
Cornell L.Rev. 128 (1977).
[
Footnote 3]
Rowley v. Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central
School District, 632 F.2d 945, 948, n. 7 (CA2 1980),
rev'd, ante p.
458 U. S. 176.
[
Footnote 4]
In this Term,
see Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U. S.
1 (1981);
Jago v. Van Cren, 454 U. S.
14 (1981);
Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U. S.
83 (1981);
California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell
Brothers' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U. S. 90
(1981);
Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.
S. 339 (1981);
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.
S. 370 (1982);
Wainwright v. Torna,
455 U. S. 586
(1982);
Sumner v. Mata, 455 U. S. 591
(1982);
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.
S. 603 (1982);
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car
Co., ante p.
458 U. S. 263;
Michigan v. Thomas, ante p.
458 U. S. 259.
But see Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.
S. 364 (1982).
It certainly cannot be said that egregious error is presented
only in cases in which prosecutors and wardens seek review.
See, e.g., McKinney v. Estelle, 657 F.2d 740 (CA5 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982);
Tejeda-Mata v.
INS, 626 F.2d 721 (CA9 1980),
cert. denied, 456 U.S.
994 (1982).