Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964
requires a state or local government to make arrangements to
preserve transit workers' existing collective bargaining rights
before that government may receive federal financial assistance for
the acquisition of a privately owned transit company. Petitioner
city entered into a "§ 13(c) agreement" with respondent transit
union in order to obtain federal funds to acquire a failing private
bus company and convert it into petitioner Jackson Transit
Authority. Thereafter, the Authority's unionized workers were
covered by a series of collective bargaining agreements. In 1975,
however, the Authority notified the union that it no longer
considered itself bound by the newest of the collective bargaining
agreements. The union subsequently filed suit in Federal District
Court, seeking damages and injunctive relief and alleging that
petitioners had breached the § 13(c) and collective bargaining
agreements. The District Court held that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the complaint rested on contract rights that
should be enforced only in a state court. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that there was subject matter jurisdiction
because the claim arose under a federal law, specifically § 13(c),
and that § 13(c) implicitly provided a federal private right of
action.
Held: Section 13(c) does not provide the union with
federal causes of action for alleged breaches of the § 13(c) and
collective bargaining agreements. While § 13(c)'s language supplies
no definitive answer, the legislative history is conclusive that
Congress intended that such agreements be governed by state law
applied in state courts. Congress designed § 13(c) as a means to
accommodate state law to collective bargaining, not as a means to
substitute a federal law of collective bargaining for state labor
law. Pp.
457 U. S.
20-29.
650 F.2d 1379, reversed and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J.,
joined,
post, p.
457 U. S.
29.
Page 457 U. S. 16
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under § 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (Act
or UMTA), 78 Stat. 307, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c), [
Footnote 1] a state or local government
must make arrangements to preserve transit workers' existing
collective bargaining rights before that government may receive
federal financial assistance for the acquisition of a privately
owned transit company. This case presents the issue whether §
13(c), by itself, permits a union to sue in federal court for
alleged violations of an arrangement of this kind or of the
collective bargaining agreement between the union and the local
government transit authority.
Page 457 U. S. 17
I
A
When the Act was under consideration in the Congress, that body
was aware of the increasingly precarious financial condition of a
number of private transportation companies across the country, and
it feared that communities might be left without adequate mass
transportation.
See S.Rep. No. 82, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
4-5, 19-20 (1963). The Act was designed in part to provide federal
aid for local governments in acquiring failing private transit
companies so that communities could continue to receive the
benefits of mass transportation despite the collapse of the private
operations.
See §§ 2(b) and 3, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§
1601(b) and 1602.
At the same time, however, Congress was aware that public
ownership might threaten existing collective bargaining rights of
unionized transit workers employed by private companies. If, for
example, state law forbade collective bargaining by state and local
government employees, the workers might lose their collective
bargaining rights when a private company was acquired by a local
government.
See Urban Mass Transportation -- 1963,
Hearings on S. 6 and S. 917 before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 318-323
(1963) (Senate Hearings) (statement of Andrew J. Biemiller,
Director, Department. of Legislation, AFL-CIO). To prevent federal
funds from being used to destroy the collective bargaining rights
of organized workers, Congress included § 13(c) in the Act.
See H.R.Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-16
(1963).
Section 13(c) requires, as a condition of federal assistance
under the Act, that the Secretary of Labor certify that "fair and
equitable arrangements" have been made "to protect the interests of
employees affected by [the] assistance." The statute lists several
protective steps that must be taken before a local government may
receive federal aid; among these
Page 457 U. S. 18
are the preservation of benefits under existing collective
bargaining agreements and the continuation of collective bargaining
rights. The protective arrangements must be specified in the
contract granting federal aid. [
Footnote 2]
B
In 1966, petitioner city of Jackson, Tenn., applied for federal
aid to convert a failing private bus company into a public entity,
petitioner Jackson Transit Authority.
See App. 12a-16a. In
order to satisfy § 13(c), the Authority so created entered into a
"§ 13(c) agreement" with respondent Local Division 125, Amalgamated
Transit Union, AFL-CIC-CLC, the union that represented the private
company's employees.
See 29 CFR pt. 215 (1981). Among
other things, the § 13(c) agreement guaranteed the preservation of
the transit workers' collective bargaining rights. App. 16a-20a.
The Secretary of Labor certified that the agreement was "fair and
equitable." Its substance was made a part of the grant contract
between the city and the United States, and the city received
approximately $279,000 in federal aid.
Page 457 U. S. 19
Thereafter, until 1975, the Authority's unionized workers were
covered by a series of collective bargaining agreements. Six months
after a new 3-year collective bargaining agreement was signed in
1975,
see id. at 31a, however, the Authority notified the
union that it no longer considered itself bound by that contract.
See id. at 45a. [
Footnote
3]
Ultimately, the union filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee. It sought damages and
injunctive relief, alleging that petitioners had breached the §
13(c) agreement and the collective bargaining contract. App. 8a,
10a-11a. [
Footnote 4] The
District Court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the suit because the complaint rested on contract rights
that should be enforced only in a state court.
447 F. Supp.
88 (1977).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed. 650 F.2d 1379 (1981). Relying on
Bell v. Hood,
327 U. S. 678
(1946), that court first determined that it had subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because the union's claim
arose under the laws of the United States,
Page 457 U. S. 20
specifically § 13(c). The court then held that § 13(c)
implicitly provides a federal private right of action. Section
13(c) reflects national labor policy, the Court of Appeals
reasoned, and the rights protected by the statute are thus federal
rights. The court concluded that it was consistent with the
congressional intent behind § 13(c) to permit enforcement of these
federal rights in federal court.
Because of the importance of the interpretation of § 13(c) for
local transit labor relations, [
Footnote 5] we granted certiorari. 454 U.S. 1079
(1981).
II
While the Court of Appeals treated this as a private right of
action case,
see, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353
(1982), it does not fit comfortably in that mold. Indeed, since §
13(c) contemplates protective arrangements between grant recipients
and unions as well as subsequent collective bargaining agreements
between those parties,
see H.R.Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., 16 (1963), it is reasonable to conclude that Congress
expected the § 13(c) agreement and the collective bargaining
agreement, like ordinary contracts, to be enforceable
Page 457 U. S. 21
by private suit upon a breach.
See Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11,
444 U. S. 119
(1979). The gist of the union's position is not that § 13(c)
creates an implied right of action to sue for violations of the
statute. Instead, the union argues that
"[i]t was the intent of Congress that federal law would
determine the binding effect of labor protective agreements under §
13(c) and of the collective bargaining agreements reached pursuant
to § 13(c) between unions and recipients of UMTA funds"
so that those agreements "are enforceable in the federal
courts." Brief for Respondent 24.
The issue, then, is not whether Congress intended the union to
be able to bring contract actions for breaches of the two
contracts, but whether Congress intended such contract actions to
set forth federal, rather than state, claims. Admittedly, since the
private right of action decisions address the related question
whether Congress intended that a particular party be able to bring
suit under a federal statute, those decisions may provide
assistance in resolving this case. But the precise question before
us is whether the union's contract actions are federal causes of
action, not whether the union can bring suit at all to enforce its
contracts.
See Local Div. 72, Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 667 F.2d 1327,
1329-1334 (CA11 1982). [
Footnote
6]
Page 457 U. S. 22
As the union points out, on several occasions, the Court has
determined that a plaintiff stated a federal claim when he sued to
vindicate contractual rights set forth by federal statutes, despite
the fact that the relevant statutes lacked express provisions
creating federal causes of action. In
Machinists v. Central
Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682
(1963), the Court held that a union had a federal cause of action
to enforce an award of an airline adjustment board included in a
collective bargaining contract pursuant to § 204 of the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1958 ed.). Similarly, in
Norfolk
& Western R. Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U. S.
37 (1971), the Court ruled that a railroad's employees
made out federal claims when they sought to enforce assurances made
by the railroad to secure the Interstate Commerce Commission's
approval of a consolidation under a provision of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f) (1970 ed.). And recently, in an
analogous private right of action decision, the Court permitted a
federal suit for rescission of a contract declared void by § 215 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15, although
the statute itself made no express provision for private suits.
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at
444 U. S. 119.
See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.
S. 375,
396 U. S. 388
(1970) (recognizing federal right to rescind contracts rendered
void by § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78cc(b));
American Surety Co. v. Shulz, 237 U.
S. 159 (1915) (finding federal question jurisdiction to
hear suit on supersedeas bond required by Rev.Stat. § 1007).
These decisions demonstrate that suits to enforce contracts
contemplated by federal statutes may set forth federal claims, and
that private parties, in appropriate cases, may sue in federal
court to enforce contractual rights created by federal statutes.
But they do not dictate the result in this case. Whenever we
determine the scope of rights and remedies under a federal statute,
the critical factor is the congressional intent behind the
particular provision at issue.
See, e.g.,
Page 457 U. S. 23
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
at
444 U. S. 18;
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.
S. 677,
441 U. S. 688
(1979);
Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. at
372 U. S.
685-692;
see also n 9,
infra. Thus, if Congress intended that §
13(c) agreements and collective bargaining agreements be "creations
of federal law,"
Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372
U.S. at
372 U. S. 692,
and that the rights and duties contained in those contracts be
federal in nature,
see id. at
372 U. S. 695,
then the union's suit states federal claims. Otherwise, the union's
complaint presents only state law claims.
See Miree v. De Kalb
County, 433 U. S. 25
(1977).
III
We begin with the language of the statute itself.
See,
e.g., Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu,
450 U. S. 754,
450 U. S. 771
(1981). The bare language of § 13(c) is not conclusive. In some
ways, the statute seems to make § 13(c) agreements and collective
bargaining contracts creatures of federal law. Section 13(c)
demands "fair and equitable arrangements" as prerequisites for
federal aid; it requires the approval of the Secretary of Labor for
those arrangements; it specifies five different varieties of
protective provisions that must be included among the 13(c)
arrangements; and it expressly incorporates the protective
arrangements into the grant contract between the recipient and the
Federal Government. [
Footnote
7]
See n 2,
supra. On the other hand, labor relations between local
governments and their employees are the subject of a longstanding
statutory exemption from the National Labor Relations Act. 29
U.S.C. § 152(2). Section 13(c) evinces no congressional intent to
upset the decision in the National Labor Relations Act to permit
state law to govern the relationships
Page 457 U. S. 24
between local governmental entities and the unions representing
their employees.
See Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S.
66,
422 U. S. 78
(1975) (noting reluctance to permit suit in federal court when "the
cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state
law").
While the statutory language supplies no definitive answer, the
legislative history is conclusive. A consistent theme runs
throughout the consideration of § 13(c): Congress intended that
labor relations between transit workers and local governments would
be controlled by state law.
In 1963, Secretary of Labor Wirtz presented the original version
of § 13(c) to the relevant House and Senate Committees. Before both
Committees, Members of Congress expressed concern about the effect
of the statute on state laws. And Secretary Wirtz explained to both
Committees that, while attempts would be made to accommodate state
law to the preservation of collective bargaining rights, state law
would control local transit labor relations. The Secretary told the
House Committee that "this proposal is submitted on this basis, . .
. that the State laws must control." Urban Mass Transportation Act
of 1963, Hearings on H.R. 3881 before the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 482 (1963) (House
Hearings). A Committee member raised the issue again; the Secretary
repeated that "State laws would be controlling in the situation,"
though he suggested that there "would be few, if any, situations"
where state law and § 13(c) could not be reconciled. House
Hearings, at 486. When similar concerns were expressed during his
testimony before the Senate Committee, the Secretary reiterated: "I
should like it quite clear that I think that there could be no
superseding here of the State law." Senate Hearings at 313.
The House and Senate Reports took the Secretary at his word. The
House Report advised that § 13(c) would ensure protection of the
interests of workers, but that,
"subject to the basic standards set forth in the bill, specific
conditions for worker protection will normally be the product of
local bargaining
Page 457 U. S. 25
and negotiation."
H.R.Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1963). The Senate
Report was more direct:
"In regard to the question as to whether these provisions would
supersede State labor laws, the committee concurs in a statement
made by the Secretary of Labor 'that there could be no superseding
of State laws by a provision of this kind.'"
S.Rep. No. 82, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1963).
During the debates, the role of state law under § 13(c) was
discussed at length. Senators Goldwater and Tower suggested that §
13(c) would supplant state law with federal law. 109 Cong.Rec. 5416
(1963). Senator Williams, one of the bill's chief sponsors,
replied: "The legislative history has to be corrected" because
"we must have a record that will show that the bill does not
preempt State law; it does not control or dominate with irrevocable
authority local situations."
Id. at 5417. The proposed statute, Senator Williams
continued, would not "preempt or be a substitute for State law."
Ibid. Senator Goldwater remained adamant that "we are
attempting a major alteration in the Nation's labor laws."
Id. at 5418. But Senator Sparkman, the Chairman of the
Senate Committee, repeated the Secretary's assurance that § 13(c)
"will not supersede or displace or override" state law. 109
Cong.Rec. 5418 (1963). [
Footnote
8]
Page 457 U. S. 26
The Senate returned to the issue during a colloquy between
Senator Goldwater and Senator Morse. Senator Goldwater feared that
the proposed statute would override state laws denying public
employees the right to strike.
Id. at 5673. Senator Morse
assured Senator Goldwater otherwise that "the State law would
supervene."
Ibid. When Senator Goldwater inquired about
state laws other than those concerning the right to strike, Senator
Morse replied in the same vein: "The amendment does not supersede
any State policy."
Ibid. .
In an important exchange, Senator Goldwater noted that local
government employers were excluded from the coverage of the
National Labor Relations Act,
see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), and
asked whether § 13(c) would be inconsistent with that exclusion.
109 Cong.Rec. 5673-5674 (1963). Senator Morse responded that the
language of the bill "make[s] it clear that the Taft-Hartley
exemptions are not changed by the amendment."
Id. at 5674.
See also id. at 5422 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (state law
could not be overridden "under any phase of the Taft-Hartley law").
Senator Morse underscored the purpose of the amendment:
"I cannot emphasize the point more than I already have done in
the legislative history in our debate. It deals with municipal and
State problems, and not Federal problems."
Id. at 5674. Finally, Senator Goldwater asked whether
state law would control if there were no specific state law
forbidding strikes by public employees. Senator Morse adhered to
the same course: "In the absence of any local law, it would be for
the State court to decide whether [the employees] had that right."
Ibid.
A similar, but more abbreviated, interchange took place on the
House floor. When some Congressmen questioned the effect of § 13(c)
on state law, they were reassured by Congressman Multer that
"[n]othing in this bill . . . will infringe upon local law, whether
it be of a State or municipality." 110
Page 457 U. S. 27
Cong.Rec. 14980 (1964). And Congressman Rains repeated, "there
is not one line in this bill that would vitiate in any way any
State or local law."
Ibid.
Thus, Congress made it absolutely clear that it did not intend
to create a body of federal law applicable to labor relations
between local governmental entities and transit workers. [
Footnote 9] Section 13(c) would not
supersede state law, it would leave intact the exclusion of local
government employers from the National Labor Relations Act, and
state courts would retain jurisdiction to determine the application
of state policy to local government transit labor relations.
Congress intended that § 13(c) would be an important tool to
protect the collective bargaining rights of transit workers, by
ensuring that state law preserved their rights before federal
aid
Page 457 U. S. 28
could be used to convert private companies into public entities.
[
Footnote 10]
See
109 Cong.Rec. 5673 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Morse) (if city proposed
to reject collective bargaining, it would be ineligible for federal
aid). But Congress designed § 13(c) as a means to accommodate state
law to collective bargaining, not as a means to substitute a
federal law of collective bargaining for state labor law. [
Footnote 11]
Page 457 U. S. 29
IV
Given this explicit legislative history, we cannot read § 13(c)
to create federal causes of action for breaches of § 13(c)
agreements and collective bargaining contracts between UMTA aid
recipients and transit unions. [
Footnote 12] The legislative history indicates that
Congress intended those contracts to be governed by state law
applied in state courts. [
Footnote 13]
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Originally, § 13(c) was § 10(c). In 1966, the Act was amended,
and the section received its present designation. Pub.L. 8962, §
2(b)(1), 80 Stat. 716. Throughout this opinion, it is referred to
as § 13(c).
[
Footnote 2]
Section 13(c) reads in full:
"It shall be a condition of any assistance under section 3 of
this Act that fair and equitable arrangements are made, as
determined by the Secretary of Labor, to protect the interests of
employees affected by such assistance. Such protective arrangements
shall include, without being limited to, such provisions as may be
necessary for (1) the preservation of rights, privileges, and
benefits (including continuation of pension rights and benefits)
under existing collective bargaining agreements or otherwise; (2)
the continuation of collective bargaining rights; (3) the
protection of individual employees against a worsening of their
positions with respect to their employment; (4) assurances of
employment to employees of acquired mass transportation systems and
priority of reemployment of employees terminated or laid off; and
(5) paid training or retraining programs. Such arrangements shall
include provisions protecting individual employees against a
worsening of their positions with respect to their employment which
shall in no event provide benefits less than those established
pursuant to section 5(2)(f) of the Act of February 4, 1887 (24
Stat. 379), as amended. The contract for the granting of any such
assistance shall specify the terms and conditions of the protective
arrangements."
[
Footnote 3]
According to the union's complaint, the Authority, since 1966,
had contracted with a private individual, T. O. Petty, for the
management of the transportation system. App. 6a-7a. The union
negotiated its 1975 contract with Petty; when he left as manager of
the system, the Authority claimed it was not bound by the contract
he had negotiated.
Id. at 47a. The union alleged that
petitioners had promised in the § 13(c) agreement to be bound by
the contracts Petty had signed, and that petitioners violated both
the § 13(c) agreement and the 1975 collective bargaining contract.
App. 7a-8a.
[
Footnote 4]
Prior to filing suit, the union asked the Secretary of Labor and
the Secretary of Transportation to find that petitioners had
violated the § 13(c) agreement and to ensure that petitioners
complied with the agreement. Both Secretaries refused.
See
650 F.2d 1379, 1381 (CA6 1981).
In addition to relief directed at petitioners, the union
requested that the two Secretaries be ordered to take appropriate
enforcement action against petitioners to compel compliance with
the 13(c) agreement. App. 11a. Both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals refused the union's request.
See 447 F. Supp.
88, 90-92 (1977); 650 F.2d at 1387-1388. The union has not
sought review of this ruling, and we express no opinion on that
aspect of the litigation.
[
Footnote 5]
Several Courts of Appeals, in addition to the Sixth Circuit,
have decided that § 13(c) authorizes federal suits for violations
of 13(c) agreements and collective bargaining contracts between
recipients of UMTA funds and transit unions.
Division 587,
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Municipality of Metropolitan
Seattle, 663 F.2d 875 (CA9 1981);
Local Div. 711,
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Greater Portland Transit
District, 589 F.2d 1 (CA1 1978);
Local Div. 519,
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. LaCrosse Municipal Transit
Utility, 585 F.2d 1340 (CA7 1978);
Division 1287,
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Kansas City Area
Transportation Authority, 582 F.2d 444 (CA8 1978),
cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979). One Court of Appeals has reached
the opposite conclusion.
Local Div. 72, Amalgamated Transit
Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 667
F.2d 1327 (CA11 1982). In a related decision, the First Circuit has
concluded that the terms of § 13(c) agreements do not override
conflicting provisions of state law.
Local Div. 589,
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d
618 (1981),
cert. pending, No. 81-1817.
[
Footnote 6]
Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that, strictly
speaking, the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 to hear the union's suit. Under
Bell v. Hood,
327 U. S. 678,
327 U. S. 681
(1946), jurisdiction exists if the complaint is "drawn so as to
claim a right to recover under the Constitution and laws of the
United States." The complaint alleged a violation of the § 13(c)
agreement required by the UMTA and of the subsequent collective
bargaining agreement contemplated by the Act, and prayed for relief
under federal law. We do not consider the union's asserted federal
claims to be "wholly insubstantial and frivolous," 327 U.S. at
327 U. S.
682-683, so that the District Court lacked jurisdiction
to entertain the union's suit. Thus, the District Court had
jurisdiction for the purposes of determining whether the union
stated a cause of action on which relief could be granted.
Id. at
327 U. S. 682.
See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.
S. 647 (1963).
[
Footnote 7]
The statute also provides that the protective "arrangements
shall include provisions . . . which shall in no event provide
benefits less than those established pursuant to section 5(2)(f). .
. ." As we explain,
see n 9,
infra, this portion of the statute
strengthens the union's position, but we do not consider it at all
determinative.
[
Footnote 8]
The union points to the fact that Congress rejected amendments
that would have required the continuation of collective bargaining
rights only to the extent not inconsistent with state law.
See 109 Cong.Rec. 5422 (1963);
id. at 5582;
id. at 5684; 110 Cong.Rec. 14980 (1964). But, as Senator
Williams explained, those amendments were rejected not because
Congress thought § 13(c) would supplant state labor law, but
because such an amendment was "clearly . . . unnecessary" to
guarantee that § 13(c) would not "supersede or preempt or override
State law." 109 Cong.Rec. 5421 (1963).
Accord: 110
Cong.Rec. 14980 (1964) (remarks of Reps. Multer and Rains).
Beyond the explanation given by Senator Williams and repeated on
the House floor, the defeat of these amendments merely reflected a
congressional intent that the Federal Government be able to seek
changes in state law and ultimately to refuse financial assistance
when state law prevented compliance with § 13(c).
See 109
Cong.Rec. 5684 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Morse);
id. at 5422
(remarks of Sen. Javits).
[
Footnote 9]
In light of the legislative history of § 13(c), we do not find
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U. S. 11
(1979), or
Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc.,
372 U. S. 682
(1963), to be controlling. Both cases turned on the language,
purpose, and legislative history of the particular statute
involved,
see Transamerica, 444 U.S. at
444 U. S. 18-19;
Machinists, 372 U.S. at
372 U. S.
685-695, and we read the congressional intent behind §
13(c) to be far different from the congressional purpose underlying
the statutes at issue in those cases.
Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U. S.
37 (1971), of course, is not to be overlooked. In that
case, the Court decided that a railroad's employees stated federal
claims when they alleged a breach of an agreement entered into by
the railroad under § 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. 5(2)(f) (1970 ed.). Section 13(c) refers to § 5(2)(f) and
provides that the protective arrangements shall not provide
benefits less than those established by § 5(2)(f).
See nn.
2 and |
2 and S. 15fn7|>7,
supra. If, when it
passed § 13(c), Congress had expressed an awareness that § 5(2)(f)
assurances could be enforced in federal court, or if there was
reason to presume such awareness, the reference in § 13(c) to §
5(2)(f) would make this a different case.
See generally Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
456 U. S. 353
(1982). But the legislative history contains no such congressional
recognition. Furthermore,
Nemitz was decided several years
after § 13(c) was enacted. Consequently, we find the specific
legislative history of § 13(c), not the holding of
Nemitz,
to be determinative.
[
Footnote 10]
The union relies upon the fact that Congress strengthened the
language of § 13(c) during the course of its passage. Congress
wrote § 13(c) to require protective provisions "necessary for" the
protection of collective bargaining rights, rather than provisions
"as are found to be appropriate for" the protection of those
rights, as the Kennedy administration had recommended.
See
House Hearings, at 476; 110 Cong.Rec. 14976 (1964). In addition, §
13(c)(2) was amended at the request of Senator Morse to require the
"continuation" of collective bargaining rights, rather than the
mere "encouragement" of the continuation of those rights.
See 109 Cong.Rec. 5627 (1963);
id. at 5685. But
these alterations in the bill demonstrate only that Congress
demanded that the Secretary ensure that state law preserved
collective bargaining rights before he provided federal aid for
acquisition of a private transit company. When viewed in
conjunction with the discussion of state law in the legislative
history, the modifications of the original bill do not prove that
Congress intended that federal, rather than state, law would govern
a contract between a UMTA aid recipient and a union representing
its employees.
[
Footnote 11]
Senator Javits summarized:
"[W]e have a balanced scheme. We do not override the [state]
law; at the same time, we do not compel the Federal Government to
go in where the law is adverse to the interest of labor and labor's
own point of view, and perhaps also even give encouragement to
exempt a situation of this kind where the State desires to get this
type of Federal help."
109 Cong.Rec. 5422 (1963).
There remains the possibility that Congress might have intended
a federal court to hear the union's claims, but to apply state law.
Such an anomalous result would be inconsistent with the emphasis in
the legislative history that § 13(c) addresses "municipal and State
problems, and not Federal problems,"
id. at 5674. Thus,
unless there is an independent source of jurisdiction, such as
diversity or pendent jurisdiction, the union must sue in state
court.
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. at
444 U. S. 19, n.
8;
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.
S. 505,
177 U. S.
506-507(1900).
[
Footnote 12]
Based on the legislative history, we could not permit the union
to bring a federal suit if we characterized its complaint as
alleging that petitioners violated § 13(c) itself by virtue of the
alleged contractual breaches.
See Brief for Respondent
33-34.
Nor does 42 U.S.C.1983 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) permit the union to
bring suit. As the Court held in
Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U. S. 1 (1980),
§ 1983 encompasses deprivations of rights secured by all "laws" of
the United States, of which 13(c) is, of course, one. But because
we have determined that Congress did not intend that breaches of
13(c) agreements or collective bargaining contracts would
constitute deprivations of federal rights secured by § 13(c), the
union has no cause of action under § 1983.
See Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn.,
453 U. S. 1,
453 U. S. 19-21
(1981).
[
Footnote 13]
There are other possible remedies for violations of § 13(C)
agreements and collective bargaining contracts. The union, of
course, can pursue a contract action in state court. In addition,
the Federal Government can respond by threatening to withhold
additional financial assistance.
See Local Div. 589, 666
F.2d at 634-635.
While we hold that the union cannot sue in federal court to
enforce its contracts, we express no view on the entirely separate
question whether the Federal Government could bring a federal suit
against a UMTA funding recipient for violating the terms of its
grant agreement with the Government. Such a suit would involve a
different contract from the § 13(C) agreement and the collective
bargaining agreement at issue in this case.
See generally Local
Div. 732, 667 F.2d at 1338-1339;
Local Div. No. 714,
589 F.2d at 13.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,
concurring.
As the Court notes this case "does not fit comfortably in
Page 457 U. S. 30
[the] mold" of our implied right of action cases.
Ante
at
457 U. S. 20.
Congress here provided for the making of contracts that it must
have intended to be enforced. The Court thus identifies the
question correctly as whether Congress intended those contracts to
be enforced in federal court.
Ante at
457 U. S. 21.
This, of course, is precisely the question on which implied rights
of action cases properly are decided.
See, e.g., Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn.,
453 U. S. 1,
453 U. S. 13
(1981);
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc., 451 U. S. 630,
451 U. S. 639
(1981).
There are other parallels between this case and those in the
more familiar implied right of action "mold." Most significantly to
me, both kinds of cases involve the same fundamental issues of
congressional and judicial power. By enforcing contract rights not
within the jurisdictional grant conferred by Congress, as much as
by improperly "inferring" a right of action,
"a court of limited jurisdiction necessarily extends its
authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to
resolve. . . . This runs contrary to the established principle that
'[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded
against expansion by judicial interpretation . . . ,'
American
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6,
341 U. S.
17 (1951), and conflicts with the authority of Congress
under Art. III to set the limits of federal jurisdiction."
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.
S. 677,
441 U. S.
746-747 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
Because a federal court should exercise extreme caution before
assuming jurisdiction not clearly conferred by Congress, we should
not condone the implication of federal jurisdiction over contract
claims in the absence of an unambiguous expression of congressional
intent. As I do not view this position as inconsistent with the
reasoning of the Court, I join its opinion.