Transamerica Mtg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
Annotate this Case
444 U.S. 11 (1979)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Transamerica Mtg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis
Argued March 20, 1979
Reargued October 2, 1979
Decided November 13, 1979
444 U.S. 11
Respondent, a shareholder of petitioner Mortgage Trust of America (Trust), brought this suit in Federal District Court as a derivative action on behalf of the Trust and as a class action on behalf of the Trust's shareholders, alleging that several trustees of the Trust, its investment adviser, and two corporations affiliated with the latter, had been guilty of various frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty in violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Act). The complaint sought injunctive relief, rescission of the investment advisers contract between the Trust and the adviser, restitution of fees and other considerations paid by the Trust, an accounting of illegal profits, and an award of damages. The District Court ruled that the Act confers no private right of action and accordingly dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
"implication of a private right of action for injunctive relief and damages under the Advisers Act in favor of appropriate plaintiffs is necessary to achieve the goals of Congress in enacting the legislation."
1. Under § 215 of the Act, which provides that contracts whose formation or performance would violate the Act "shall be void . . . as regards the rights of" the violator, there exists a limited private remedy to void an investment advisers contract. The language of § 215 itself fairly implies a right to specific and limited relief in a federal court. When Congress declared in § 215 that certain contracts are void, it intended that the customary legal incidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a suit for rescission or for an injunction against continued operation of the contract, and for restitution. Pp. 444 U. S. 18-19.
2. Section 206 of the Act -- which makes it unlawful for any investment adviser
"to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . [or] to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client,"
or to engage in specified transactions with clients without making required disclosures -- does not, however, create a private cause of action
for damages. Unlike § 215, § 26 simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not, in terms, create or alter any civil liabilities. In view of the express provisions in other sections of the Act for enforcing the duties imposed by § 206, it is not possible to infer the existence of an additional private cause of action. And the mere fact that § 206 was designed to protect investment advisers' clients does not require the implication of a private cause of action for damages on their behalf. Pp. 444 U. S. 19-24.
575 F.2d 237, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring statement, post, p. 444 U. S. 25. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 444 U. S. 25.