An officer of the Washington State University police department
observed a student (Overdahl) leave a dormitory carrying a bottle
of gin; because Overdahl appeared to be under 21 (the minimum age
allowable under Washington law for possession of alcoholic
beverages), the officer stopped him and asked for identification.
After Overdahl requested to retrieve his identification from his
dormitory room, the officer accompanied him there and, while
remaining in the open doorway watching Overdahl and his roommate
(respondent), noticed what he believed to be marihuana seeds and a
pipe lying on a desk in the room. The officer then entered the
room, confirmed that the seeds were marihuana, and determined that
the pipe smelled of marihuana, and informed Overdahl and
resspondent of their rights under
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U. S. 436. The
students indicated their willingness to waive such rights, and
after the officer asked if there were any other drugs in the room,
respondent gave him a box which contained more marihuana and cash.
After a second officer arrived, the students voluntarily consented,
orally and in writing, to a search of the room, which yielded more
marihuana and another controlled substance. Respondent was later
charged with two counts of possessing the controlled substances
and, after denial of his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence
seized in the room, was convicted. The Washington Court of Appeals
affirmed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed. It held that,
although Overdahl had been placed under lawful arrest, the officer
had no right to enter the room and
Page 455 U. S. 2
seize contraband without a warrant, and that, because the
students' consent to the subsequent search of the room was the
fruit of the officer's initial entry, the contraband found during
that search should also have been suppressed.
Held:
1. It is not "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment for a
police officer, as a matter of foutine, to monitor the movements of
an arrested person, as his judgment dictates, following the arrest.
The officer's need to ensure his own safety -- as well as the
integrity of the arrest -- is compelling. Such surveillance is not
an impermissible invasion of the privacy or personal liberty of an
individual who has been arrested. Once the officer had placed
Overdahl under lawful arrest, he was authorized to accompany him to
his room for the purpose of obtaining identification. The officer
had a right to remain literally at Overdahl's elbow at all times,
and thus a showing of "exigent circumstances" was not necessary to
warrant the officer's accompanying Overdahl from the public
corridor of the dormitory into his room. Pp.
455 U. S. 5-7.
2. The Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the seizure of the
contraband discovered in plain view in the room. Regardless of
where the officer was positioned with respect to the room's
threshold when he observed the contraband, and regardless of
whether he may have hesitated briefly at the doorway before
entering the room, he did not abandon his right to be in the room
with Overdahl whenever he considered it essential. Accordingly, he
had the right to act as soon as he observed the seeds and pipe. Pp.
455 U. S. 8-9.
The seizure of other contraband taken from respondent's room
pursuant to his valid consent did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
He voluntarily produced marihuana after being informed of his
Miranda rights, and he then consented to the search of the
room. Thus, all of the seized contraband was properly admitted at
his trial. Pp.
455 U. S.
9-10.
94 Wash. 2d
711,
619 P.2d
971, reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, 455 U.
S. 10.
Page 455 U. S. 3
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to consider whether a police officer may,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, accompany an arrested person
into his residence and seize contraband discovered there in plain
view.
I
On the evening of January 21, 1978, Officer Daugherty of the
Washington State University police department observed Carl
Overdahl, a student at the University, leave a student dormitory
carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. Because Washington law
forbids possession of alcoholic beverages by persons under 21,
Wash.Rev.Code § 66.44.270 (1981), and Overdahl appeared to be under
age, [
Footnote 1] the officer
stopped him and asked for identification. Overdahl said that his
identification was in his dormitory room, and asked if the officer
would wait while he went to retrieve it. The officer answered that,
under the circumstances, he would have to accompany Overdahl, to
which Overdahl replied "OK."
Overdahl's toom was approximately 11 bt 17 feet, and located on
the 11th floor of the dormitory. Respondent Chrisman, Overdahl's
roommate, was in the room when the officer and Overdahl entered.
The officer remained in the open doorway, leaning against the
doorjamb while watching Chrisman and Overdahl. He observed that
Chrisman, who was in the process of placing a small box in the
room's medicine cabinet, because nervous at the sight of an
officer.
Page 455 U. S. 4
Within 30 to 45 seconds after Overdahl entered the room, the
officer noticed seeds ancl a small pipe lying on a clesk 8 to 10
feet from where he uas standing. From his training and experience,
the officer believed the seeds were marihuana and the pipe was of a
type used to smoke marihuana. He entered the room and examined the
pipe and seeds, confirming that the seeds were marihuana and
observing that the pipe smelled of marihuana.
The officer informed Overdahl and Chrisman of their rights under
Mianda v. Aizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966); each acknowledged that he understood his rights and
indicated that he was willing to waive them. Officer Daugherty then
asked whether the students had any other drugs in the room. The
respondent handed Daugherty the box he had been carrying earlier,
which contained three small plastic bags filled with marihuana and
$112 in cash. At that point, Officer Daugherty called by radio for
a second officer; on his arrival, the two students were told that a
search of the room would be necessary. The officers explained to
Overdahl and Chrisman that they had an absolute right to insist
that the officers first obtain a search warrant, but that they
could voluntarily consent to the search. Following this
explanation, which was given in considerable detail, the two
students conferred in whispers for several minutes before
announcing their consent; they also signed written forms consenting
to the search of the room. The search yielded more marihuana and a
quantity of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), both controlled
substances.
Respondent was charged with one count of possessing more than 40
grams of marihuana and one count of possessing LSD, both felonies
under Wash.Rev.Code § 69.50.401(c) (1976) (current version at
Wash.Rev.Code § 69.50.401(d) (1981)). A pretrial motion to suppress
the evidence seized in the room was denied; respondent was
convicted of both counts. On appeal, the Washington Court of
Appeals affirmed the convictions, upholding the validity of the
search. 24 Wash. App. 385, 600 P.2d 1316 (1979).
Page 455 U. S. 5
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed.
94 Wash. 2d
711,
619 P.2d
971 (1980). It held that, although Overdahl had been placed
under lawful arrest and "there was nothing to prevent Officer
Daugherty from accompanying Overdahl to his room," the officer had
no right to enter the room and either examine or seize contraband
without a warrant. The court reasoned there was no indication that
Overdahl might obtain a weapon or destroy evidence, and, with the
officer blocking the only exit from the room, his presence inside
the room was not necessary to prevent escape. Because the officer's
entry into the room and his observations of its interior were not
justified by "exigent circumstances," the seizure of the seeds and
pipe were held not to fall within the plain view exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The court went on to hold
that, because the students' consent to the subsequent search of the
room was the fruit of the officer's initial entry, the contraband
found during that search should also have been suppressed.
[
Footnote 2]
Three justices dissented. They concluded it was reasonable for a
police officer to keep an arrested person in sight at all times;
accordingly, the officer had a legitimate reason for being in the
place where he discovered the contraband, and was entitled, under
the plain view doctrine, to seize it.
We granted certiorari, 452 U.S. 959 (1981), and reverse.
II
A
The "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement permits a law enforcement officer to seize
Page 455 U. S. 6
what clearly is incriminating evilence or contraband when it is
discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 (1971);
Harris v. United States,
390 U. S. 234
(1968). Here, the officer had placed Overdahl under lawful arrest,
and therefore was authorized to accompany him to his room for the
purpose of obtaining identification. [
Footnote 3] The officer had a right to remain literally at
Overdahl's elbow at all times; nothing in the Fourth Amendment is
to the contrary.
The central premise of the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Washington is that Officer Daugherty was not entitled to accompany
Overdahl from the public corridor of the dormitory into his room,
absent a showing that such "intervention" was required by "exigent
circumstances." We disagree with this novel reading of the Fourth
Amendment. The absence of an affirmative indication that an
arrested person might have a weapon available or might attempt to
escape does not diminish the arresting officer's authority to
maintain custody over the arrested person.
See Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U. S. 106,
434 U. S.
109-110 (1977);
United States v.
Robinson, 414
Page 455 U. S. 7
U.S. 218,
414 U. S.
234-236 (1973). Nor is that authority altered by the
nature of the offense for which the arrest was made.
Every arrest must be presumed to present a risk of danger to the
arresting officer.
Cf. United States v. Robinson, supra,
at
414 U. S. 234,
n. 5. There is no way for an officer to predict reliably how a
particular subject will react to arrest, or the degree of the
potential danger. Moreover, the possibility that an arrested person
will attempt to escape if not properly supervised is obvious.
Although the Supreme Court of Washington found little likelihood
that Overdahl could escape from his dormitory room, an arresting
officer's custodial authority over an arrested person does not
depend upon a revieving court's after-the-fact assessment of the
particular arrest situation.
Cf. Neu York v. Beltn,
453 U. S. 454,
453 U. S.
458-460 (1981);
United States v. Robinson,
supra, at
414 U. S.
235.
We hold, therefore, that it is not "unreasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as a matter of routine, to
monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his judgment
dictates, following the arrest. The officer's need to ensure his
own safety -- as well as the integrity of the arrest -- is
compelling. Such surveillance is not an impermissible invasion of
the privacy or personal liberty of an individual who has been
arrested. [
Footnote 4]
It follows that Officer Daugherty properly accompanied Overdahl
into his room, and that his presence in the room was lawful. With
restraint, the officer remained in the doorway momentarily,
entering no farther than was necessary to keep the arrested person
in his view. It was only by chance that, while in the doorway, the
officer observed in plain view what he recognized to be contraband.
Had he exercised his undoubted right to remain at Overdahl's side,
he might well have observed the contraband sooner.
Page 455 U. S. 8
B
Respondent nevertheless contends that the officer lacked
authority to seize the contraband, even though in plain view,
because he was "outside" the room at the time he made his
observations. The Supreme Court of Washington noted that
"[t]he record is in conflict as to whether Officer Daugherty
stood in the doorway and then entered the room or whether, while in
the doorway, he was in fact in the room."
94 Wash. 2d at 716, 619 P.2d at 974. It concluded, however, that
it "need not . . . let the result be determined by such niceties,"
and assumed for purposes of its decision that the officer "was in
the room at the time he observed the seeds and pipe."
Ibid. We agree that, on this record, "such niceties" are
not relevant. It is of no legal significance whether the officer
was in the room, on the threshold, or in the hallway, since he had
a right to be in any of these places as an incident of a valid
arrest.
Respondent's argument appears to be that, even if the officer
could have stationed himself "inside" the room had he done so
immediately upon Overdahl's entry, his 30- to 45-second hesitation
was fatal; and that, having chosen to remain in the doorway, the
officer was precluded from proceeding further to seize the
contraband. We reject this contention. Respondent's argument, if
accepted, would have the perverse effect of penalizing the officer
for exercising more restraint than was required under the
circumstances. Moreover, it ignores the fundamental premise that
the Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable intrusions
into an individual's privacy.
See Katz v. Urited States,
389 U. S. 347
(1967).
The "intrusion" in this case occurred when the officer, quite
properly, followed Overdahl into a private area to a point from
which he had unimpeded view of and access to the area's contents
and its occupants. His right to custodial control did not evaporate
with his choice to hesitate briefly in the doorway, rather than at
some other vantage point inside the
Page 455 U. S. 9
room. It cannot be gainsaid that the officer would have had
unrestricted access to the room at the first indication that he was
in danger, or that evidence might be destroyed -- or even upon
reassessment of the wisdom of permitting a distance between himself
and Overdahl.
We therefore conclude that, regardless of where the officer was
positioned with respect to the threshold, he did not abandon his
right to be in the room whenever he considered it essential.
Accordingly, he had the right to act as soon as he observed the
seeds and pipe. [
Footnote 5]
This is a classic instance of incriminating evidence found in plain
view when a police officer, for unrelated but entirely legitimate
reasons, obtains lawful access to an individual's area of privacy.
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit seizure of evidence of
criminal conduct found in these circumstances. [
Footnote 6]
III
Since the seizure of the marihuana and pipe was lawful, we have
no difficulty concluding that this evidence and the contraband
subsequently taken from respondent's room were properly admitted at
his trial. Respondent voluntarily produced three bags of marihuana
after being informed of his rights under
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966). He then consented, in writing, to a search of the room,
after being advised that his consent must be voluntary and that he
had an absolute right to refuse consent and demand procurement of a
search warrant. The seizure of the drugs pursuant
Page 455 U. S. 10
to respondent's valid consent did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. [
Footnote 7]
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
In addition, University regulations prohibit possession of
alcoholic beverages on University property. Tr. 4, 34. At the
suppression hearing, Officer Daugherty testified that, because of
these regulations, he would have stopped Overdahl without regard to
his age.
Id., at 6-7.
[
Footnote 2]
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington repeatedly refers
to the Fourth Amendment and our cases construing it. The court did
not, however, cite Art. 1, § 7 of the Washington Constitution,
which provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." While
respondent, relying on this latter provision, urges that we "treat
the case as having been decided under the Washington State
Constitution," it is clear that the court did not rest its decision
on an independent state ground.
[
Footnote 3]
The trial court found that it was Overdahl who proposed to
retrieve the identification, and, after being informed that Officer
Daugherty would have to accompany him, agreed to the officer's
presence. Respondent nevertheless claims that Overdahl was
"coerced" to return to the room in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, because he was in custody and had not yet been advised
of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966). He argues that, since identification
would serve as proof of Overdahl's age -- an element of the offense
for which he had been arrested -- the officer could not ask him for
this "incriminating" evidence without first advising him of his
rights to counsel and to remain silent.
Assuming,
arguendo, that Overdahl's Fifth Amendment
rights were violated in some fashion, this does not vitiate the
legality of his arrest, nor does it undercut the officer's right to
maintain custody over an arrested person. The failure to give
"
Miranda warnings" might preclude introduction of
incriminating statements made by Overdahl while in custody, but no
such statements are even peripherally involved in this case. The
act of going to the room was neither "incriminating" nor a
"testimonial communication."
Cf. Fisher v. United States,
425 U. S. 391,
425 U. S.
408-414 (1976).
[
Footnote 4]
Indeed, were the rule otherwise, it is doubtful that an arrested
person would ever be permitted to return to his residence, no
matter how legitimate the reason for doing so. Such a rule would
impose far greater restrictions on the personal liberty of arrested
individuals than those occasioned here.
[
Footnote 5]
The circumstances of this case distinguish it significantly from
one in which an officer, who happens to pass by chance an open
doorway to a residence, observes what he believes to be contraband
inside.
See, e.g., Paton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573,
445 U. S.
585-589 (1980);
Johnson v. United States,
333 U. S. 10,
333 U. S. 14-15
(1948).
[
Footnote 6]
In light of our disposition, we need not decide whether, as the
Washington Court of Appeals held, the likelihood that the
contraband would be destroyed constituted an "exigent cicumstance"
independently justifying the officer's entry into the room.
[
Footnote 7]
We reject as frivolous he respondent's contention that, on the
facts presented here, Officer Daugherty was required to knock and
announce his presence at the doorway prior to entering the
room.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, dissenting.
The arrest in this case was made on the street. It gave Officer
Daugherty no authority to enter Overdahl's quarters without his
consent. But Overdahl wanted to retrieve his identification from
his room; if Daugherty was willing for Overdahl to do so, he could
properly condition his consent on accompanying Overdahl and keeping
him under close surveillance. Accordingly, when Overdahl entered
his room, Daugherty could stay as close to Overdahl as he deemed
necessary to protect himself and maintain control over his
arrestee. If it had been reasonably necessary for Daugherty to
enter the room in pursuit of these purposes, he would not have
violated any of Overdahl's Fourth Amendment rights. It is also
plain enough that he was entitled to stand in the doorway and keep
Overdahl in sight.
The record in this case is clear, however, that Daugherty did
not leave the doorway and enter the room in order to protect
himself or maintain control over Overdahl. Daugherty's
uncontradicted testimony was that he entered the room solely to
confirm his suspicion that the seeds and the seashell he had
observed from the doorway were marihuana seeds and a seashell pipe
that had been used to smoke marihuana. [
Footnote 2/1]
Page 455 U. S. 11
Daugherty made no claim that he entered the room as a necessary
incident to the permission given Overdahl to secure his
identification. Rather, he claimed that the entry was justified
because of what as in plain view on the desk inside the room.
The plain view doctrine, however, does not authorize an officer
to enter a dwelling without a warrant to seize contraband merely
because the contraband is visible from outside the dwelling. This
is settled law. As the Court said in
Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
403 U. S. 468
(1971):
"[P]lain view
alone is never enough to justify the
warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the
familiar principle discussed above, that no amount of probable
cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent 'exigent
circumstances.' Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an
incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect
may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But
even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly
Page 455 U. S. 12
stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter
and make a warrantless seizure.
Taylor v. Ulited States,
286 U. S.
1;
Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10;
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451;
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S.
493,
357 U. S. 497-498;
Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S.
610;
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S.
699. [
Footnote 2/2]"
Coolidge emphasized that the plain view doctrine
applies only after a lawful search is in progress or the officer
was otherwise legally present at the place of the seizure. The
initial intrusion must be justified by a warrant, by an exception
to the warrant requirement, or by other circumstances authorizing
his presence.
If a police officer passing by an open door of a home sees
incriminating evidence within the house, his observation may
provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Yet
the officer may not enter the home without a warrant unless an
exception to the warrant requirement applies. [
Footnote 2/3] This rule is fully supported by
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, and the cases cited in
the Court's opinion in that case. [
Footnote 2/4]
Page 455 U. S. 13
Any contrary rule would severely undercut the protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment, for it is the physical entry of
the home that is the chief evil against which the Amendment
Page 455 U. S. 14
is directed.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573,
445 U. S.
585-586 (1980);
United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U. S. 297,
407 U. S. 313
(1972).
The Court does not purport to hold otherwise. There is apparent
agreement that the seizure in this case is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment only if the officer was legally where he was when
he made the seizure. Neither does the Court purport to find that
Daugherty's presence in the room was, in fact, necessary to
effectuate the arrest or to protect the officer. To do so would
require contradicting Daugherty's own testimony. Rather, the Court
asserts that Daugherty could have remained at Overdahl's elbow,
that he could have entered the room wholly apart from his
observation of the seeds, and that the case should be judged as
though Daugherty had found it necessary to enter the room for the
purpose of guarding Overdahl. Under this approach, the officer's
presence at the desk where he made the seizure should be deemed
lawful.
The difficulty with this is not merely that the officer himself
did not suggest that he entered the room to maintain control over
Overdahl or to protect himself. The more basic issue is whether the
Court is justified in concluding as a matter of law that the
circumstances would have warranted an entry for those reasons. The
trial court did not sustain the entry on this basis, and the
Washington Supreme Court expressly held that there were no exigent
circumstances connected with Overdahl's arrest and custody that
gave Daugherty sufficient reason to enter the room. I am unwilling
on this record to decide as a matter of law what is more properly
to be resolved as a matter of fact, and I would not differ with the
state court on the record we now have before us.
I perceive no justification for what is, in effect, a
per
se rule that an officer in Daugherty's circumstances could
always enter the room and stay at the arrestee's elbow. This would
be true only if there were no limits to the conditions which
Page 455 U. S. 15
the officer could attach when he permits his charge to return to
his room. I doubt, for example, that he could insist that he be
permitted to search desks, closets, drawers, or cabinets. Likewise,
he should not be permitted to invade living quarters any more than
is necessary to maintain control and protect himself. Bright-line
rules are indeed useful and sometimes necessary,
cf.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106,
434 U. S.
109-110 (1977);
United States v. Robinson,
414 U. S. 218,
414 U. S.
234-236 (1973), but the Court should move with some care
where the home or living quarters are involved.
This is not a case, therefore, involving punishing an officer
for entering a room for the wrong reason when there was a perfectly
legal basis for his doing so.
See Scott v. United States,
436 U. S. 128,
436 U. S. 138
(1978);
Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.
S. 560,
389 U. S.
564-565 (1968) (WHITE, J., dissenting). This is a case
where the record before us does not demonstrate that it was
necessary for the officer to enter the room as an incident to his
custodial arrest. He thus had no legal basis for being in the room
unless his sighting of the seeds permitted him to be there. The
Court agrees that the plain view doctrine does not provide that
justification.
For me, the case comes down to whether the trial court properly
found that the officer's observation from the doorway furnished
exigent circumstances for the entry and seizure. The Washington
Supreme Court did not review this finding of the trial court, but
it should have before setting the conviction aside. I would
therefore vacate and remand for this purpose.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he had
entered the room for just one purpose -- "to affirm my beliefs and
to seize the articles, if they were [contraband]." Tr. 44.
The officer also testified:
"I stood in the doorway without entering, actually physically
entering the room. . . . I was standing against the doorjamb. . . .
I was not in the room. I was in the doorway."
Id. at 7, 9, 21.
The trial court stated in its memorandum opinion that "[t]he
officer stoood in the doorway, and watched [Overdahl]," observed
the seashell pipe and the seeds from the doorway, and "
then
entered the room and examined the pipe and seeds closely."
App. 47 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court of Appeals
stated:
"Prior to entering the room, the officer saw from his vantage
point in the doorway what he believed to be contraband.
Only at
that time did he cross the threshold and seize the pipe and
marijuana seeds."
24 Wash. App. 385, 389, 600 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1979) (emphasis
added).
As I read the Supreme Court of Washington's opinion, the court
held that, whether or not the officer had physically entered the
room by standing in the doorway, his presence in the doorway was
sufficiently intrusive that his observations were unlawful unless
he could justify his presence. The court concluded that the officer
should have remained outside the room, since there was no
indication that Overdahl was likely to escape, destroy evidence, or
seize a weapon.
[
Footnote 2/2]
One of the many cases cited in
Coolidge to illustrate
this point was
Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S.
1 (1932). The police omcers in Talor had looked through
a small opening in a garage and had seen cardboard cases inside the
garage that they believed contained contraband liquor. The officers
could smell the odor of whiskey coming from the garage. Yet this
Court held that they had violated the Fourth Amendment by entering
the garage and seizing the whiskey without obtaining a warrant.
[
Footnote 2/3]
There is no contention in this case that, by entering the
dormitory building, the officer had already entered respondents
dwelling. The officer himself testified at trial that a dormitory
room is considered a private area, but that the public has access
to the hallway. Tr. 37.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Harris v. United States, 390 U.
S. 234 (1968), is not to the contrary. There, an
automobile had been impounded and towed to a police station. The
windows of the car were open, the doors were unlocked, and it had
begun to rain. The Court held that the Fourth Amenclment did not
require the police officer to obtain a warrant before opening the
door of the car to roll up the car window, for this was simply "a
measure taken to protect the car while it was in police custody."
Id. at
390 U. S. 236.
Harris did not rely on the plain view doctrine to justify
the warrantless intrusion into the automobile. The Court emphasized
that the police officer had already lawfully entered the car when
he saw incriminating evidence in plain view inside the car and
seized it:
"
Once the door had lawfully been opened, the
registration card, with the name of the robbery victim on it, was
plainly visible. It has long been settled that objects falling in
the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure, and may be introduced in
evidence."
Ibid. (emphasis added). The broad wording of the second
sentence quoted above has apparently created some confusion
regarding the plain view doctrine. One commentator remarked:
"The hardest conceptual problem attending the plain view
doctrine is to grasp that it is not a universal statement of the
right of a policeman to seize after seeing something in open view;
it is rather a limited statement of that right in one of its
several instances -- following a valid intrusion. . . . The source
of difficulty is that the harbinger case,
Harris v. United
States, spoke carelessly in universal terms:"
"It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view
of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure. . . ."
"Seeing something in open view does not, of course, dispose . .
. of the problem of crossing constitutionally protected
thresholds."
Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great
"Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 Mercer L.Rev. 1047, 1096
(1975).
See also 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a)
(1978).
This problem of "crossing constitutionally protected thresholds"
without a warrant is easily resolved if the so-called "automobile
exception" to the warrant requirement applies, for that exception
justifies a warrantless entry into the automobile to seize
contraband in plain view inside the car. In
Colorado v.
Bannister, 449 U. S. 1 (1980),
for example, we held that an officer's obseration of items in plain
view inside a car did not violate the occupant's Fourth Amendment
rights.
Id. at
449 U. S. 4, n. 4.
The officer's observations could therefore be used to establish
probable cause to search the car. Yet it was also necessary to
justify the warrantless intrusion into the car. We did not seek to
justify that intrusion by relying on the plain view doctrine.
Rather, we held that the warrantless entry was justified under the
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement.
See Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42
(1970);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 (1926).