After being discharged for violation of his employer's plant
rule prohibiting defined misbehavior, an employee, pursuant to the
grievance and arbitration procedure mandated by the collective
bargaining agreement between the employer and respondent union,
asked his union representative to file a grievance on his behalf on
the ground that his dismissal was not for just cause. The union
pursued the grievance through the third step of the grievance
procedure and requested arbitration, but it then withdrew the
request. The union constitution required union members aggrieved by
any action of the union to exhaust the internal union appeals
procedures before seeking redress from a court. The employee,
however, instead of filing an appeal from the union's decision not
to seek arbitration of his grievance, filed an action in Federal
District Court under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, alleging that the union had breached its duty of fair
representation, and that the employer had breached the collective
bargaining agreement by discharging him without just cause. He
sought reinstatement from the employer and monetary relief from
both the employer and the union. The District Court sustained the
union and the employer's affirmative defense that the employee had
failed to exhaust the internal union appeals procedures, and
accordingly dismissed the suit against both the union and the
employer. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the suit
against the union, but reversed the dismissal against the employer.
The court held that the employee's failure to exhaust was fatal to
his claim against the union because, by filing an internal appeal,
he might have received money damages, the relief he sought in his §
301 suit against the union. But the court held that the employee's
failure to exhaust did not bar his suit against the employer,
because the internal appeals procedures
Page 451 U. S. 680
could not result in either reinstatement of his job, the relief
sought from the employer under § 301(a), or reactivation of his
grievance.
Held: Where the internal union appeals procedures could
not reactivate the employee's grievance or grant him the complete
relief he sought under § 301(a), he should not have been required
to exhaust such procedures prior to bringing suit against the union
and the employer under § 301(a). Pp.
451 U. S.
685-696.
(a) Because internal union appeals procedures, in contrast to
contractual grievance and arbitration procedures negotiated by the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement, are created by the
union constitution and are designed to settle disputes between an
employee and his union arising under the constitution, the policies
encouraging private resolution of grievances arising out of the
collective bargaining process are not directly applicable to the
issue whether to require exhaustion of internal union procedures.
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.
S. 650, distinguished. Such policies are furthered by an
exhaustion requirement only where the internal procedures can
either grant the aggrieved employee full relief or reactivate his
grievance. Pp.
451 U. S.
685-689.
(b) If the internal procedures are inadequate to effect the
relief sought by the employee, his failure to exhaust should be
excused, and he should be permitted to pursue his claim for breach
of the duty of fair representation and breach of the collective
bargaining agreement in court under § 301. Here, although it
appears that some monetary relief could be obtained through the
internal procedures, it also appears that the union could neither
reinstate the employee in his job nor reactivate his grievance
because of certain time restrictions in the collective bargaining
agreement for obtaining arbitration of a grievance. These
restrictions on the relief available through the internal
procedures rendered such procedures inadequate. The policy
underlying § 301 to effect a relatively rapid disposition of labor
disputes would be undermined by an exhaustion requirement unless
the internal procedures are capable of either reactivating the
employee's grievance or of redressing it. Pp.
451 U. S.
689-693.
(c) Although the argument that exhaustion of internal procedures
should be required might have force if the employee's § 301 suit is
only against the union and the internal procedures are adequate to
grant the relief sought against the union, the defense should not
be available where, as here, the employee sued both the union and
the employer. If a trial court required exhaustion of the internal
procedures with respect to the suit against the union but not
against the employer, it would be faced with the undesirable
alternatives of either staying the suit against the employer
pending such exhaustion, thus
Page 451 U. S. 681
violating national labor policy, or of permitting the suit
against the employer to proceed and tolling the statute of
limitations against the union pending exhaustion, with the possible
result that the court would find itself with two separate § 301
suits based on the same facts proceeding at different paces in its
courtroom. Pp.
451 U. S.
694-695.
623 F.2d 563, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined,
post,
p.
451 U. S. 696.
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,
and STEWART and POWELL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
451 U. S.
698.
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
An employee seeking a remedy for an alleged breach of the
collective bargaining agreement between his union and employer must
attempt to exhaust any exclusive grievance and arbitration
procedures established by that agreement before he may maintain a
suit against his union or employer under § 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.
S. 650,
379 U. S.
652-653 (1965);
see Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 424 U. S. 554,
424 U. S. 563
(1976);
Vaca v.
Sipes,
Page 451 U. S. 682
386 U. S. 171,
386 U. S. 184
(1967). The question presented by these cases is whether, and in
what circumstances, an employee alleging that his union breached
its duty of fair representation in processing his grievance, and
that his employer breached the collective bargaining agreement,
must also attempt to exhaust the internal union appeals procedures
established by his union's constitution before he may maintain his
suit under § 301.
I
After eight years in the employ of ITT Gilfillan, Clifford E.
Clayton, a member of the United Automobile, Aerospace, and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and a shop steward
of its Local 509, was dismissed for violating a plant rule
prohibiting defined misbehavior. Pursuant to the mandatory
grievance and arbitration procedure established by the collective
bargaining agreement between ITT and Local 509, Clayton asked his
union representative to file a grievance on his behalf on the
ground that his dismissal was not for just cause. The union
investigated Clayton's charges, pursued his grievance through the
third step of the grievance procedure, and made a timely request
for arbitration. [
Footnote 1]
It then withdrew the request, choosing not to proceed to
arbitration. Clayton was notified of the union's decision after the
time for requesting arbitration had expired. [
Footnote 2]
The UAW requires every union member "who feels aggrieved by any
action, decision, or penalty imposed upon
Page 451 U. S. 683
him" by the union to exhaust internal union appeals procedures
before seeking redress from a "civil court or governmental agency."
UAW Constitution, Art. 33, § 12. These procedures, established by
Arts 32 and 33 of the UAW Constitution and incorporated into Art.
IV of Local 509's bylaws, direct the employee first to seek relief
from the membership of his local. Art. 33, § 3. If not satisfied
with the result obtained there, the employee may further appeal to
the International Executive Board of the UAW, and eventually to
either the Constitutional Convention Appeals Committee or to a
Public Review Board composed of "impartial persons of good public
repute" who are not members or employees of the union. Arts. 32,
33, §§ 3-11
Clayton did not file a timely internal appeal from his local's
decision not to seek arbitration of his grievance. [
Footnote 3] Instead, six months after the
union's withdrawal of its request for arbitration, Clayton filed
this action under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), in the District Court for the Central
District of California. He alleged that the union had breached its
duty of fair representation by arbitrarily refusing to pursue his
grievance past the third step of the grievance procedure, and that
the employer had breached the collective bargaining agreement by
discharging him without just cause. [
Footnote 4]
Both the union and the employer pleaded as an affirmative
defense Clayton's failure to exhaust the internal union appeals
procedures. App. 12, 18. The District Court sustained this defense,
finding that Clayton had failed to exhaust the
Page 451 U. S. 684
internal appeals procedures; that those procedures were adequate
as a matter of law; that Clayton had been advised of their
existence; and that his failure to exhaust could not be excused as
futile. Record 397-404. Accordingly, the court dismissed Clayton's
suit against both the union and the employer.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of Clayton's suit against the union and
reversed the dismissal of his suit against the employer. 623 F.2d
563 (1980). Focusing on the adequacy of the relief available under
the internal union appeals procedures, the Court of Appeals held
that Clayton's failure to exhaust was fatal to his claim against
the union, because, by filing an internal appeal, Clayton might
have received money damages, the relief he sought in his § 301 suit
against the union.
Id. at 566. However, the Court held
that Clayton's failure to exhaust did not bar his suit against the
employer, because the internal appeals procedures could not result
in either reinstatement of his job, which was the relief Clayton
sought from the employer under § 301, or in reactivation of his
grievance.
Id. at 569-570.
In No. 80-5049, Clayton argues that his § 301 claim against the
UAW and Local 509 should be allowed to proceed despite his failure
to exhaust internal union procedures. I n No. 8054, ITT Gilfillan
argues that, if Clayton's failure to exhaust bars his suit against
the union, it must also bar his suit against the employer.
The Courts of Appeals are divided over whether an employee
should be required to exhaust internal union appeals procedures
before bringing suit against a union or employer under § 301. Some
hold that the employee's failure to exhaust internal union
procedures may not be asserted as a defense by an employer.
[
Footnote 5] Others permit the
defense to be
Page 451 U. S. 685
asserted by an employer if the internal appeals procedures could
result in reactivation of the grievance. [
Footnote 6] With respect to a union, some courts hold
that the employee's failure to exhaust is excused if union
officials would be so hostile to an employee that he could not hope
to obtain a fair hearing. [
Footnote
7] Others would also excuse the employee's failure to exhaust
if the substantive relief available through the internal procedures
would be less than that available in his § 301 action. [
Footnote 8]
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 449 U.S. 950
(1980). We reverse the dismissal of Clayton's suit against the
union and affirm the reversal of the dismissal of his suit against
the employer. We hold that, where an internal union appeals
procedure cannot result in reactivation of the employee's grievance
or an award of the complete relief sought in his § 301 suit,
exhaustion will not be required with respect to either the suit
against the employer or the suit against the union.
II
In
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.
S. 650 (1965), we were asked to decide whether an
employee alleging a violation
Page 451 U. S. 686
of the collective bargaining agreement between his union and
employer must attempt to exhaust exclusive contractual grievance
and arbitration procedures before bringing suit under § 301(a).
[
Footnote 9] In deciding that
issue, we looked to principles of federal common law.
See
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.
S. 448,
353 U. S. 457
(1957). Two considerations influenced our decision to require
exhaustion. First, Congress had "expressly approved contract
grievance procedures as a preferred method for settling disputes
and stabilizing the
common law' of the plant." 379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 653.
[Footnote 10] Second, a
contrary rule, allowing an employee to bring suit under § 301
without attempting to exhaust the contractual grievance procedures,
would "deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a
uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee
grievances." Ibid. [Footnote 11] The
Page 451 U. S. 687
rule established by Republic Steel was thus intended to protect
the integrity of the collective bargaining process, and to further
that aspect of national labor policy that encourages private,
rather than judicial, resolution of disputes arising over the
interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreements.
See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. at
451 U. S. 567,
424 U. S.
570-571.
The contractual procedures we required the employee to exhaust
in
Republic Steel are significantly different from the
procedures at issue here. In these cases, the Court is asked to
require exhaustion of internal union procedures. These procedures
are wholly a creation of the UAW Constitution. They were not
bargained for by the employer and union, and are nowhere mentioned
in the collective bargaining agreement that Clayton seeks to have
judicially enforced. [
Footnote
12] Nonetheless, Clayton's employer and union contend that
exhaustion of the UAW procedures, like exhaustion of contractual
grievance and arbitration procedures, will further national labor
policy, and should be required as a matter of federal common law.
Their argument, in brief, is that an exhaustion requirement will
enable unions to regulate their internal affairs without undue
judicial interference, and that it will also promote the broader
goal of encouraging private resolution of disputes arising out of a
collective bargaining agreement.
We do not agree that the policy of forestalling judicial
interference with internal union affairs is applicable to these
Page 451 U. S. 688
cases. [
Footnote 13] This
policy has been strictly limited to disputes arising over internal
union matters such as those involving the interpretation and
application of a union constitution. As we stated in
NLRB v.
Marine Workers, 391 U. S. 418
(1968), the policy of deferring judicial consideration of internal
union matters does not extend to issues "in the public domain and
beyond the internal affairs of the union."
Id. at
391 U. S. 426,
n. 8. [
Footnote 14] Here,
Clayton's dispute against his union is based upon an alleged breach
of the union's duty of fair representation. This allegation raises
issues rooted in statutory policies extending far beyond internal
union interests.
Page 451 U. S. 689
See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, ante at
451 U. S. 66,
and n. 2 (STEWART, J., concurring);
Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., supra, at
424 U. S. 562;
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 182;
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335
(1964).
Our analysis, then, focuses on that aspect of national labor
policy that encourages private, rather than judicial, resolution of
disputes arising over collective bargaining agreements. Concededly,
a requirement that aggrieved employees exhaust internal remedies
might lead to nonjudicial resolution of some contractual
grievances. For example, an employee who exhausts internal union
procedures might decide not to pursue his § 301 action in court,
either because the union offered him a favorable settlement or
because it demonstrated that his underlying contractual claim was
without merit. However, we decline to impose a universal exhaustion
requirement lest employees with meritorious § 301 claims be forced
to exhaust themselves and their resources by submitting their
claims to potentially lengthy internal union procedures that may
not be adequate to redress their underlying grievances.
As we stated in
NLRB v. Marine Workers, supra, at
391 U. S. 426,
and n. 8, courts have discretion to decide whether to require
exhaustion of internal union procedures. In exercising this
discretion, at least three factors should be relevant: first,
whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that he
could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; second,
whether the internal union appeals procedures would be inadequate
either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to award him the
full relief he seeks under § 301; and third, whether exhaustion of
internal procedures would unreasonably delay the employee's
opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his
claim. If any of these factors are found to exist, the court may
properly excuse the employee's failure to exhaust.
Clayton has not challenged the finding of the lower courts that
the UAW internal appeals procedures are fair and reasonable. He
concedes that he could have received an impartial
Page 451 U. S. 690
hearing on his claim had he exhausted the internal union
procedures.
See Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co.,
393 U. S. 324,
393 U. S.
330-331 (1969). Accordingly, our inquiry turns to the
second factor, whether the relief available through the union's
internal appeals procedures is adequate.
In his suit under § 301, Clayton seeks reinstatement from his
employer and monetary relief from both his employer and his union.
[
Footnote 15] Although, the
UAW Constitution does not indicate on its face what relief is
available through the internal union appeals procedures, [
Footnote 16] the parties have
stipulated that the Public Review Board can award backpay in an
appropriate case, Tr. 35-36, and the two decisions of the Public
Review Board reprinted in the joint appendix both resulted in
awards of backpay. App. 89-109. It is clear, then. that at least
some monetary relief may be obtained through the internal appeals
procedures. [
Footnote
17]
Page 451 U. S. 691
It is equally clear that the union can neither reinstate Clayton
in his job,
see n
15,
supra, nor reactivate his grievance. Article IX of the
collective bargaining agreement between Local 509 and ITT Gilfillan
provides that the union may obtain arbitration of a grievance only
if it gives
"notice . . . to the Company in writing within fifteen (15)
working days after the date of the Company's decision at Step 3 of
the Grievance Procedure."
By the time Clayton learned of his union's decision not to
pursue the grievance to arbitration, this 15-day time limit had
expired.
See n 2,
supra. Accordingly, the union could not have demanded
arbitration even if the internal appeal had shown Clayton's claim
to be meritorious. The union was bound by its earlier decision not
to pursue Clayton's grievance past the third stage of the grievance
and arbitration procedure. [
Footnote 18] For the reasons that follow, we conclude
that these restrictions on the relief available
Page 451 U. S. 692
through the internal UAW procedures render those procedures
inadequate. [
Footnote
19]
Where internal union appeals procedures can result in either
complete relief to an aggrieved employee or reactivation of his
grievance, exhaustion would advance the national labor policy of
encouraging private resolution of contractual labor disputes. In
such cases, the internal union procedures are capable of fully
resolving meritorious claims short of the judicial forum. Thus, if
the employee received the full relief he requested through internal
procedures, his § 301 action would become moot, and he would not be
entitled to a judicial hearing. Similarly, if the employee obtained
reactivation of his grievance through internal union procedures,
the policies underlying
Republic Steel would come into
play, [
Footnote 20] and the
employee would be required to submit his claim to the collectively
bargained dispute resolution procedures. [
Footnote 21] In either case, exhaustion of internal
remedies could result in final resolution of the employee's
contractual grievance through private, rather than judicial,
avenues.
Page 451 U. S. 693
By contrast, where an aggrieved employee cannot obtain either
the substantive relief he seeks or reactivation of his grievance,
national labor policy would not be served by requiring exhaustion
of internal remedies. In such cases, exhaustion would be a useless
gesture: it would delay judicial consideration of the employee's §
301 action, but would not eliminate it. [
Footnote 22] The employee would still be required to
pursue judicial means to obtain the relief he seeks under § 301.
Moreover, exhaustion would not lead to significant savings in
judicial resources, because, regardless of the outcome of the
internal appeal, the employee would be required to prove
de
novo in his § 301 suit that the union breached its duty of
fair representation and that the employer breached the collective
bargaining agreement. [
Footnote
23] As we recently stated, one of the important federal
policies underlying § 301 is the "
relatively rapid disposition
of labor disputes.'" United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,
ante at 451 U. S. 63,
quoting Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U. S. 696,
383 U. S. 707
(1966). This policy is undermined by an exhaustion requirement
unless the internal procedures are capable of either reactivating
the employee's grievance or of redressing it. [Footnote 24]
Page 451 U. S. 694
In reliance upon the Court of Appeals' opinion in these cases,
the UAW contends that, even if exhaustion is not required with
respect to the employer, it should be required with respect
Page 451 U. S. 695
to the union, because the relief Clayton seeks against the union
in his § 301 suit is available through internal union procedures.
But cf. n. 17,
supra. We disagree. While this
argument might have force where the employee has chosen to bring
his § 301 suit only against the union, the defense should not be
available where, as here, the employee has filed suit against both
the union and the employer. A trial court requiring exhaustion with
respect to the suit against the union, but not with respect to the
suit against the employer, would be faced with two undesirable
alternatives. If it stayed the action against the employer pending
resolution of the internal appeals procedures, it would effectively
be requiring exhaustion with respect to the suit against the
employer, a result we have held would violate national labor
policy. Yet if it permitted the action against the employer to
proceed, and tolled the running of the statute of limitation in the
suit against the union until the internal procedures had been
exhausted, it could very well find itself with two separate § 301
suits, based on the same facts, proceeding at different paces in
its courtroom. As we suggested in
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
at
386 U. S. 197,
this is a result that should be avoided if possible. The preferable
approach is for the court to permit the employee's § 301 action to
proceed against both defendants, despite the employee's failure to
exhaust, unless the internal union procedures can reactivate the
grievance or grant the relief that would be available in the
employee's § 301 suit against both defendants.
III
In contrast to contractual grievance and arbitration procedures,
which are negotiated by the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement and are generally designed to provide
Page 451 U. S. 696
an exclusive method for resolving disputes arising under that
agreement, internal union appeals procedures are created by the
union constitution and are designed to settle disputes between an
employee and his union that arise under that constitution. Because
of this distinction, the policies underlying
Republic
Steel, encouraging private resolution of grievances arising
out of the collective bargaining process, are not directly
applicable to the issue whether to require exhaustion of internal
union procedures.
We conclude that the policies underlying
Republic Steel
are furthered by an exhaustion requirement only where the internal
union appeals procedures can either grant the aggrieved employee
full relief or reactivate his grievance. For only in those
circumstances is there a reasonable possibility that the employee's
claim will be privately resolved. If the internal procedures are
not adequate to effect that relief, the employee should not be
required to expend time and resources seeking a necessarily
incomplete resolution of his claim prior to pursuing judicial
relief. If the internal procedures are inadequate, the employee's
failure to exhaust should be excused, and he should be permitted to
pursue his claim for breach of the duty of fair representation and
breach of the collective bargaining agreement in court under §
301.
In this case, the internal union appeals panels cannot
reactivate Clayton's grievance and cannot grant Clayton the
reinstatement relief he seeks under § 301. We therefore hold that
Clayton should not have been required to exhaust internal union
appeals procedures prior to bringing suit against his union and
employer under § 301.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
|
451
U.S. 679|
* Together with No. 80-54,
ITT Gilfillan, a Division of
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Clayton, also
on certiorari to the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
The collective bargaining agreement between Local 509 and ITT
Gilfillan establishes a four-step grievance procedure, with binding
arbitration as the fourth step. Article IX of the agreement
provides that, if the union wishes to request arbitration, it must
do so within 15 working days after completion of the third step of
the grievance procedure. App. 31-36.
[
Footnote 2]
Clayton was notified of the union's decision by a letter written
by the International Representative responsible for servicing Local
509.
Id. at 779. Neither the union nor the employer
contests Clayton's allegation that he received this letter more
than 15 working days after completion of the third step of the
grievance procedure.
See id. at 7; Tr. 88-99.
[
Footnote 3]
Under Art. 33, § 3, of the UAW Constitution, Clayton had 30 days
from the date the union withdrew its request for arbitration to
initiate the internal union appeals procedures.
[
Footnote 4]
To prevail in an action under § 301 against either the employer
or the union, an employee must ordinarily establish both that the
union breached its duty of fair representation and that the
employer breached the collective bargaining agreement.
Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U. S. 554,
424 U. S. 570
571 (1976).
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., Johnson v. General Motors, 641 F.2d 1075,
1083 (CA2 1981);
Geddes v. Chrysler Corp., 608 F.2d 261,
264 (CA6 1979);
Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d
312, 315 (CA8 1972);
Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel and
Elevator Operators Union, 453 F.2d 1018, 1027, n. 16 (CA9
1972).
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., Varra v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 615 F.2d
1315, 1317-1318 (CA10 1980);
Baldini v. Local Union No.
1095, 581 F.2d 145, 150 (CA7 1978);
Winter v. Local Union
No. 69, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 319-320, 569 F.2d 146, 150-151
(1977);
Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1278
(CA7 1977).
[
Footnote 7]
See, e.g., Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182,
183-184 (CA10 1978);
Winter v. Local Union No. 69, supra,
at 318, 569 F.2d at 149;
Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d
181, 184 (CA10 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915
(1974).
[
Footnote 8]
See, e.g., Tinsley v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 635
F.2d 1288, 1290 (CA7 1980);
Geddes v. Chrysler Corp.,
supra, at 264;
Baldini v. Local Union No. 1095,
supra, at 149;
Buzzard v. Local Lodge 1040, 480 F.2d
35, 41 (CA9 1973). These cases compare the relief available through
internal procedures with the relief available against the union
under § 301.
[
Footnote 9]
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61
Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides:
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
[
Footnote 10]
Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat.
153, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d), provides that
"[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective bargaining agreement."
[
Footnote 11]
We also noted that exhaustion would serve the interests of both
the union and the employer:
"[It] complements the union's status as exclusive bargaining
representative by permitting [the union] to participate actively in
the continuing administration of the contract. In addition,
conscientious handling of grievance claims will enhance the union's
prestige with employees. Employer interests, for their part, are
served by limiting the choice of remedies available to aggrieved
employees."
379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 653.
Moreover, exhaustion would not adversely affect the employee:
"[I]t cannot be said, in the normal situation, that contract
grievance procedures are inadequate to protect the interests of an
aggrieved employee until the employee has attempted to implement
the procedures and found them so."
Ibid. We concluded that, since an employee bringing a §
301 claim is asserting rights created by a collective bargaining
agreement, he should also be required to pursue the dispute
resolution procedures created by that agreement.
See Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. at
424 U. S.
562-563;
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.
S. 171,
386 U. S. 184
(1967).
[
Footnote 12]
Indeed, the parties concede that Clayton has exhausted the
grievance and arbitration procedures that were expressly created by
the collective bargaining agreement.
[
Footnote 13]
This policy has its statutory roots in § 101(a)(4) of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4), which is
part of the subchapter of that Act entitled "Bill of Rights of
Members of Labor Organizations." Section 101(a)(4) provides:
"No labor organization shall limit the right of any member
thereof to institute an action in any court, . . .
Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust
reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse
of time) within such organization, before instituting legal . . .
proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof. . .
."
[
Footnote 14]
In
NLRB v. Marine Workers, we held that respondent
union could not discipline one of its members for failing to
exhaust internal appeals procedures before filing an unfair labor
practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board, because
the unfair labor practices charge was "in the public domain and
beyond the internal affairs of the union." 391 U.S. at
391 U. S. 425.
"A proceeding by the [NLRB] is not to adjudicate private rights,
but to effectuate a public policy," and "[a]ny coercion used to
discourage, retard, or defeat . . . access [to those proceedings]
is beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organization."
Id. at
391 U. S. 424.
Moreover,
"[t]here cannot be any justification to make the public
processes wait until the union member exhausts internal procedures
plainly inadequate to deal with all phases of the complex problem
concerning employer, union, and employee member. If the member
becomes exhausted, instead of the remedies, the issues of public
policy are never reached and an airing of the grievance never
had."
Id. at
391 U. S. 425.
See also 105 Cong.Rec. 17899 (1959) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy) (§ 101(a)(4) not intended "to eliminate existing grievance
procedures established by union constitutions for redress of
alleged violations of
their internal governing laws").
[
Footnote 15]
App. 8-9. Reinstatement is available only from the employer,
because the union has no power to order reinstatement under the
collective bargaining agreement. Damages, however, can be assessed
against both the employer and the union. As we stated in
Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 197-198, an employee who establishes that the
union breached its duty of fair representation in processing his
grievance, and that the employer breached the collective bargaining
agreement, may be entitled to an award of damages
"apportion[ed] . . . between the employer and the union
according to the damage caused by the fault of each. Thus, damages
attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract should not
be charged to the union, but increases if any in those damages
caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance should not
be charged to the employer."
[
Footnote 16]
The UAW Constitution states only that the Constitution
Convention Appeals Committee has "the authority to consider and
decide all appeals submitted to it," Art. 33, § 8, and that the
Public Review Board has the "authority and duty to make final and
binding decisions on all cases appealed to it," Art. 32, § 3(b),
and to "dispose of all facets of the appeal." Art. 33, § 11.
[
Footnote 17]
The record does not indicate whether this monetary relief
includes backpay only, or whether it also may include prospective
monetary relief and incidental or punitive damages, relief that
Clayton is apparently seeking in his § 301 action.
See
App. 9.
[
Footnote 18]
The parties stipulated at trial that, once Local 509 withdrew
its request for arbitration, that "was the end of the road so far
as remedies under the contract were concerned." Tr. 109;
see
also id. at 260, 268. That stipulation is consistent with the
collective bargaining agreement. Although Art. VIII, § 5, which
establishes time limits for processing grievances, states that
"[t]he time limits contained herein may be extended by mutual
agreement in writing by the parties concerned," there is no
comparable waiver provision in Art. IX, which establishes the
15-day time limit for requesting arbitration.
See also Tinsley
v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 635 F.2d at 1292;
Baldini
v. Local Union No. 1095, 581 F.2d at 150;
Harrison v.
Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d at 1279.
Although most collective bargaining agreements contain similarly
strict time limits for seeking arbitration of grievances, there are
some exceptions. The UAW informs us that
"[s]ome employers and unions have, through collective
bargaining, agreed to allow the reinstatement of withdrawn
grievances where a union tribunal reverses the union's initial
decision. This is true, for example, in the current UAW contracts
with the major automobile and agricultural implement
manufacturers."
Brief for Respondents in No. 80-5049, p. 18, n. 40. In such
cases, the relief available through the union's internal appeal
procedures would presumably be adequate.
[
Footnote 19]
Accordingly, we need not discuss the third factor, whether
exhaustion of the union's otherwise adequate internal appeals
procedures would unreasonably delay the employee's opportunity to
obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim.
[
Footnote 20]
Allowing a defendant in a § 301 action to demand exhaustion of
internal union procedures when those procedures could lead to
reactivation of a stalled grievance is wholly consistent with
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.
S. 650 (1965). In
Republic Steel, we held that
an employer may rely on a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement requiring its employees to submit all contractual
grievances to arbitration prior to bringing suit under § 301. If a
provision in the collective bargaining agreement also permits
reactivation of a grievance after an internal union appeal, an
employer or union should also be able to rely on that provision,
and thus defend the § 301 suit on the ground that the employee
failed to exhaust internal union procedures.
[
Footnote 21]
In addition, by reactivating the grievance, the union might be
able to rectify the very wrong of which the employee complains -- a
breach of the duty of fair representation caused by the union's
refusal to seek arbitration -- and the employee would then be
unable to satisfy the precondition to a § 301 suit against the
employer.
[
Footnote 22]
Of course, exhaustion might deplete the employee's energy and
resources to the point where he chooses not to pursue his § 301
claim in court, but that result is surely inconsistent with federal
policy.
[
Footnote 23]
Even if the union admitted during the internal appeals
procedures that it had breached its duty of fair representation, an
admission the UAW has apparently made only once in the 20 years
preceding 1977,
see Klein, Enforcement of the Right to
Fair Representation: Alternative Forums, The Duty of Fair
Representation 103 (1977), the employee would still not be saved
the time and expense of proving that breach in his § 301 suit.
While a union's admission that it breached its duty of fair
representation is certainly evidence a court can consider, an
employer defending a § 301 suit would still be entitled to prove
that no such breach had occurred.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. at
386 U. S.
186-187.
[
Footnote 24]
We are also not persuaded by the Court of Appeals' assumption
that exhaustion would narrow and focus the issues for ultimate
judicial determination. The Court of Appeals stated:
"The UAW's liability (if any) for breach of its duty of fair
representation would depend on the reasons for the union's
withdrawal of the arbitration request. There is little in the
record to indicate why the local official changed his mind and
withdrew the arbitration request. But
the missing motive is
precisely the sort of information that an appellate body within the
union would have elicited, compiling a record that would greatly
assist the court now."
623 F.2d at 566 (emphasis added). There are three reasons why we
are not persuaded by this analysis. First, the record does indicate
why the union withdrew its request for arbitration of Clayton's
grievance. The letter from Local 509's International Representative
to Clayton, informing him that the union had withdrawn its request
for arbitration, listed five reasons in support of the union's
decision.
See n 2,
supra. Second, since the UAW Constitution does not, on its
face, require any of the decisionmaking panels of the union to
explain the reasons underlying their disposition of an employee's
internal union appeal, there is no guarantee that exhaustion will
result in a useful interpretation of union rules. Third, in many
cases the union tribunal is not permitted to consider certain
allegations the employee could assert under § 301. In these cases,
for example, Clayton alleges that the union "acted
arbitrarily . . . and discriminatorily" in refusing to
seek arbitration of his grievance. App. 6 (emphasis added). The UAW
Constitution, however, states that the Public Review Board can only
consider allegations that the employee's grievance "was improperly
handled [by the union] because of
fraud, discrimination, or
collusion with management." Art. 33, § 8(b) (emphasis added).
This standard offers the aggrieved employee less protection than
the "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith" standard for
breach of the duty of fair representation that we developed in
Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at
386 U. S. 190.
As the General Counsel to the Public Review Board has stated:
"The UAW acknowledges that it has a duty of fair representation
to its members. Moreover, it acknowledges that its members may
assert a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation
within the system of internal remedies. It does not concede to its
members, however, that arbitrary, perfunctory, or negligent conduct
amounts to a breach of the duty of fair representation, nor does it
permit them even to assert this type of claim before the PRB, since
the standard of review is jurisdictional. That is, unless the
requisite claim is made (fraud, discrimination, or collusion) the
board may not entertain it."
Klein,
supra, at 99.
See also Johnson v. General
Motors, 641 F.2d at 1081. Of course, if an allegation cannot
be considered by the Public Review Board, no record helpful to a
court will be made with respect to that issue. In sum, we conclude
that the prospect that exhaustion would create a record helpful to
a court in a subsequent § 301 action is too speculative to be given
much weight.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
dissenting.
I join JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent, and write briefly to
Page 451 U. S. 697
emphasize a rationale -- suggested by an
amicus curiae
* -- that is
consistent both with national labor policy and the relevant
precedents.
In briefest summary, I would hold that, in the circumstances of
this case, no issue concerning the breach of the union's statutory
duty of fair representation properly can be said to arise at all.
The union has not made a final determination whether to pursue
arbitration on Clayton's behalf. Clayton should not be able to
claim a breach of duty by the union until the union has had a full
opportunity to make this determination. No such opportunity exists
until Clayton exhausts the procedures available for resolving that
question. Thus, as Clayton cannot claim a breach of duty by the
union, he cannot bring a breach of contract suit under § 301
against his employer.
In my view, the asserted distinction in a tripartite case such
as this one between contractual and internal union remedies,
ante at 687, is immaterial. The situation presented in
this case is well within the doctrine underlying
Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650
(1965), that employees must pursue all procedures established for
determining whether a union will go forward with a grievance.
Employees must pursue available procedures even if the collective
bargaining agreement contains time limits that appear on their face
to bar revival of the grievance. As the Court noted in
John
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.
S. 543,
376 U. S.
556-557 (1964),
"[q]uestions concerning the procedural prerequisites to
arbitration do not arise in a vacuum; they develop in the context
of an actual dispute about the rights of the parties to the
contract or those covered by it."
Therefore,
"it best accords with the usual purposes of an arbitration
clause and with the policy behind federal labor law to regard
procedural disagreements not as separate disputes but as aspects of
the
Page 451 U. S. 698
dispute which called the grievance procedures into play."
Id. at
376 U. S. 559.
Thus, the question whether such time limits should be waived in a
particular case is, itself, an arbitrable matter.
* Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations as
Amicus Curiae 3-4, 5-14.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE STEWART,
and JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the defense
of exhaustion of internal union remedies was available to the union
defendant in this § 301 action, but not to the employer defendant.
The result of this ruling was to put the employer in the unenviable
position of having to defend the manner in which the union
represented one of its employees (Clayton) during a grievance
procedure. The Court's opinion today rights what I view as the
principal error in the decision below by requiring the actions
against the employer and union to proceed simultaneously.
Ante at
451 U. S. 695.
The Court reaches this conclusion by holding that, in this
particular case, the exhaustion defense should not be available to
either the union or employer. I, however, view differently than
does the Court the benefits to be obtained from requiring
exhaustion in these cases, and would require Clayton to exhaust his
intraunion remedies before proceeding against either his union or
employer.
The Court does not require exhaustion of internal union remedies
in this case because it finds the remedies cannot provide Clayton
with all the substantive relief he seeks (
i.e., money
damages and reinstatement) or with reactivation of his grievance.
Ante at
451 U. S. 693.
The Court, however, concedes that, where the internal remedies can
provide such relief, the exhaustion defense should be available to
the employer and union alike.
Ante at
451 U. S. 692,
and n. 20. Presumably, this would require exhaustion in a § 301
case where the only relief sought was money damages and money
damages were obtainable through the internal union procedures. In
such a case, the employee would be able to obtain all "the
substantive relief he seeks."
Ante at
451 U. S.
693.
Page 451 U. S. 699
The Court creates a three-prong test for determining when a
district court should exercise its discretion and require
exhaustion of intraunion remedies.
Ante at
451 U. S. 689.
Admittedly, a district court, when exercising this discretion,
should carefully consider the first criterion referred to by the
Court -- whether union officials are so hostile to the employee
that he could not obtain a fair hearing on his claim.
Ibid. However, there is no question that this criterion
does not come into play in this case.
Ibid.
The second prong of the Court's test is
"whether the internal union appeals procedures would be
inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to
award him the full relief he seeks under § 301. . . ."
Ibid. Exhaustion is not required in this case, the
Court says, because the UAW's internal union appeals procedures
cannot provide Clayton with reinstatement or reactivation of his
grievance.
However, no prior case of this Court has held that exhaustion
should not be required unless the internal union remedies can
provide all the substantive relief requested or reactivation of the
grievance. The principal difficulty with the Court's opinion lies
in its framing of this second criterion which reflects much too
narrow a view of the purposes of the exhaustion defense and the
benefits which will likely result from requiring exhaustion in a
case where a union has established a means for reviewing the manner
in which it has represented an employee during a grievance. It is
worth nothing that neither
NLRB v. Marine Workers,
391 U. S. 418
(1968), on which the Court so heavily relies, nor any other case of
this Court, supports the language used by the Court in the second
prong of its test. In fact,
Marine Workers simply states
exhaustion should not be required "when the administrative remedies
are inadequate."
Id. at
391 U. S. 426,
n. 8. Our focus therefore should be on the adequacies of the union
remedies when viewed in the context of the underlying purpose of
the exhaustion defense -- which is to encourage private, rather
than judicial, resolution of disputes.
Page 451 U. S. 700
The exhaustion of intraunion remedies, even where those remedies
cannot provide reinstatement or reactivation of a grievance, does
promote private resolution of labor disputes. Resort to the
intraunion appeals procedures provides the union with its first
opportunity to focus on the issue of fair representation -- as
opposed to the alleged breach of the collective bargaining
agreement. Resort to the union appeals procedures gives the union
an opportunity to satisfy the employee that its decision not to
pursue a grievance was correct. If successful on this score,
litigation is averted. Where a union determines through its appeals
procedures that it mishandled an employee's grievance, litigation
may also be averted, because, at that point, both the union and the
employer have a strong incentive to pursue private resolution of
the grievance. Even where a collective bargaining agreement does
not provide for reactivation of a grievance, it is reasonable to
assume that many employers, when confronted with both a
determination by a union that it had breached its duty of fair
representation and the immediate prospect of an employee commencing
litigation, would seriously consider voluntarily reactivating the
grievance procedure to avoid the additional burden and costs of
litigation. Should litigation nonetheless occur, exhaustion may
well have narrowed the factual and legal issues to be decided, and
thus result in a savings of judicial resources. A fact that should
also not be discounted is that the conscientious handling by a
union of an employee's intraunion appeal cannot help but enhance
the union's prestige with its members.
Cf. Republic Steel Corp.
v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650,
379 U. S. 653
(1965). Exhaustion promotes union democracy and self-government, as
well as the broader policy of noninterference with internal union
affairs. A union's incentive to maintain internal procedures which
provide substantial procedural protection and which can afford
significant substantive relief will be greatly undermined if an
employee can simply bypass the procedures at will.
The error in the Court's analysis results, in part, from its
Page 451 U. S. 701
apparent belief that intraunion remedies must provide a complete
substitute for either the courts or the contract grievance
procedure in order to be deemed "adequate." The purpose of
intraunion remedies, however, is quite different. These remedies
are provided to facilitate or encourage the private resolution of
disputes, not to be a complete substitute for the courts.
Intraunion remedies can serve this purpose so long as they have the
capacity to address whether the union wrongfully handled the
grievance. Obviously, if a union appeals procedure cannot address
this question, exhaustion should not be required.
An additional question which is also of great importance is
whether a union should ever be found to have breached its duty of
fair representation when a union member shuns an appeals procedure
which is both mandated by the union constitution and established
for the purpose of allowing the union to satisfy its duty of fair
representation. It seems to me not at all unreasonable to say that
a union should have the right to require its members to give it the
first opportunity to correct its own mistakes. Responsible union
self-government demands a fair opportunity to function. This is
especially true in a situation such as here, where exhaustion of
the union remedies could eliminate the need to litigate altogether.
Congress has recognized the importance of these values in §
101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4). This section provides.
in part:
"No labor organization shall limit the right of any member
thereof to institute an action in any court, or any proceeding
before any administrative agency. . . . Provided, That any such
member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures
(but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such
organization, before instituting legal or administrative
proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof. . .
. "
Page 451 U. S. 702
In § 101(a)(4), Congress has restricted the power of unions to
limit the rights of their members to resort to the courts. At the
same time, however, Congress gave the judiciary the discretion to
require union members to exhaust hearing procedures. As this Court
explained in
Marine Workers, the language in § 101(a)(4)
is
"a statement of policy that the public tribunals whose aid is
invoked may, in their discretion, stay their hands for four months
while the aggrieved person seeks relief within the union. We read
it, in other words, as installing in this labor field a regime
comparable to that which prevails in other areas of law before the
federal courts, which often stay their hands while a litigant seeks
administrative relief before the appropriate agency."
391 U.S. at
391 U. S.
426.
Section 101(a)(4) reflects what I believe to be the reasonable
compromise Congress reached when trying to balance two somewhat
competing interests -- furtherance of the national labor policy in
favor of private resolution of disputes, on the one hand, and the
desire not to unduly burden or "exhaust" an individual employee
with time-consuming procedures, on the other. It is fair to say
that § 101(a)(4) represents Congress' judgment that limiting access
to the courts for at least four months is not an unreasonable price
to pay in exchange for the previously mentioned benefits exhaustion
may provide.
The language of § 101(a)(4) also goes a long way to satisfy the
third prong of the test set forth by the Court today. Exhaustion of
internal union procedures should not be required where such would
unreasonably delay an employee's opportunity to obtain a judicial
hearing on the merits of his claim.
Ante at
451 U. S. 689.
Intraunion procedures which take years to complete serve no
worthwhile purpose in the overall scheme of promoting the prompt
and private resolution of claims. But a requirement that an
employee not be permitted
Page 451 U. S. 703
to go to court without first having pursued an intraunion appeal
for at least four months does substantially further this national
labor policy without placing any unfair burden on an employee. As
such, I think all interested parties would be well served by a
requirement that employees exhaust their intraunion procedures for
this limited period of time prescribed by Congress.