Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank,
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450 U.S. 503 (1981)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981)
Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank
Argued November 10, 1980
Decided March 24, 1981
450 U.S. 503
Under an Illinois statute, real property owners who contest their property taxes are required first to exhaust their available administrative remedy and, if unsuccessful, are then afforded a legal remedy requiring the payment of the taxes under protest and a subsequent state court challenge. The customary delay from the time of payment until the receipt of refund upon successful protest is two years, and the refund is not accompanied by a payment of interest. The beneficial owner of an apartment building in Cook County, Ill., challenged the tax assessment of her property for a certain tax year, but, after an unsuccessful administrative appeal, refused to pay the taxes and instead brought an action in Federal District Court for injunctive relief against petitioners (the Treasurer and Assessor of Cook County), alleging, inter alia, that, by requiring her to pay taxes in excess of the lawful amount, they deprived her of equal protection and due process secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act, which prohibits federal district courts from enjoining the assessment, levy, or collection of state taxes where "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar federal district court jurisdiction because Illinois' procedure of no-interest refunds after two years was not "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy."
Held: The Illinois refund procedure is "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy" within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act, thereby barring federal jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Pp. 450 U. S. 512-528.
(a) The language of the "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" exception appears to require a state court remedy that meets certain minimal procedural criteria, and the Tax Injunction Act's legislative history supports this procedural interpretation. Here, the Illinois state court refund procedure provided the taxpayer with a "full hearing and judicial determination" at which she might raise any and all constitutional objections to the taxes, and review was authorized in the higher Illinois
courts and ultimately could be obtained in this Court. She did not allege any procedural defect in the Illinois remedy, other than delay, that would preclude preservation and consideration of her federal rights, but rather alleged that Illinois' failure to pay interest on the tax refund made the remedy not "plain, speedy and efficient." Any "federal right" she might have to receive interest could be assert.ed in the state court legal proceeding. Pp. 450 U. S. 512-515.
(b) With respect to whether the Illinois remedy was "plain," respondent has not alleged that the remedy is uncertain or otherwise unclear. There is no question that, under the Illinois procedure, the court will hear and decide any federal claim; paying interest or eliminating delay would not make the remedy any more "plain." Pp. 450 U. S. 516-517.
(c) Because the Illinois remedy imposes no unusual hardship on the taxpayer requiring ineffectual activity or an unnecessary expenditure of time or energy, it cannot be said that it is not "efficient." Pp. 450 U. S. 517-518.
(d) Assessing the 2-year delay in receiving a refund against the usual time for similar litigation, such delay is not unusual and, under the circumstances of this case, did not fall outside the boundary of a "speedy" remedy. Pp. 450 U. S. 518-521.
(e) The Tax Injunction Act's overall purpose to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes is consistent with the view that the "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" exception to the Act's prohibition was only designed to require that the state remedy satisfy certain procedural criteria, and that Illinois' refund procedure meets such criteria. It would be unreasonable to construe a statute passed with such a purpose to mean that Congress nevertheless wanted taxpayers from States not paying interest on refunds to have unimpaired access to the federal courts. If Congress had meant to carve out such an expansive exception, some mention of it would be expected, and there is none. Pp. 450 U. S. 522-524.
(f) Although the Tax Injunction Act had its roots in federal equity practice, nevertheless, where it appears that not every wrinkle of such practice was codified intact, but rather that Congress, among other things, legislated to solve an existing problem by cutting back federal equity jurisdiction, the Act will not be interpreted to incorporate that portion of federal equity practice arguably viewing a no-interest refund remedy as inadequate. Pp. 450 U. S. 524-526.
(g) The reasons supporting federal noninterference with state tax administration -- such as the dependency of st.ate budgets on the receipt of local tax revenues and the havoc that would be caused if federal injunctive relief against collection of state or local taxes were widely
available -- are just as compelling today as they were in 1937, when the Tax Injunction Act was passed. Pp. 450 U. S. 527-528.
604 F.2d 530, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 450 U. S. 528. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEWART, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined, post, p. 450 U. S. 529.