Respondents were charged with unlawful possession of stolen
mail. The checks that formed the basis of the indictment had been
seized by police during a search, conducted pursuant to a warrant,
of an apartment rented by one respondent's mother. Respondents
moved to suppress the checks on the ground that the affidavit
supporting the application for the search warrant was inadequate to
show probable cause. The District Court granted the motion. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding, in reliance on Jones v.
United States, 362 U. S. 257
that, since respondents were charged with crimes of possession,
they were entitled to claim "automatic standing" to challenge the
legality of the search without regard to whether they had an
expectation of privacy in the premises searched.
Defendants charged with crimes of possession may
only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own
Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated. Jones v.
United States, supra,
overruled. Pp. 448 U. S.
(a) The "dilemma" identified in Jones
(and given as one
of the two reasons for establishing the "automatic standing" rule
as an exception to the exclusionary rule) that a defendant charged
with a possessory offense might only be able to establish his
standing to challenge a search and seizure by giving
self-incriminating testimony admissible as evidence of his guilt,
was eliminated by Simmons v. United States, 390 U.
, wherein it was held that testimony given by a
defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as
evidence of his guilt at trial. Pp. 448 U. S.
(b) The second reason given in Jones
for the "automatic
standing" rule that such rule would prevent the "vice of
prosecutorial self-contradiction" whereby the Government would
assert that the defendant possessed the goods in question for
purposes of criminal liability while simultaneously asserting that
he did not possess them for the purposes of claiming the
protections of the Fourth Amendment, has likewise been eroded. It
is now the rule that a prosecutor, without legal contradiction, may
simultaneously maintain that a defendant criminally possessed the
seized goods but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment
Page 448 U. S. 84
Rakas v. Illinois, 139 U. S. 128
underlying assumption for such "vice of prosecutorial
self-contradiction" that possession of seized goods is the
equivalent of Fourth Amendment "standing" to challenge the search
creates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment
rights. Rather, it must be asked not merely whether the defendant
has a possessory interest in the items seized, but also whether he
had an expectation of privacy in the area searched. Pp.
448 U. S.
(c) The issue whether the prosecutor, although not permitted
under Simmons v. United States, supra,
to use a
defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing as substantive
evidence of guilt at trial, may still be permitted to use such
testimony to impeach the defendant at trial, need not be resolved
here, since it is an issue that more aptly relates to the proper
breadth of the Simmons
privilege, and not to the need for
retaining automatic standing. Pp. 448 U. S.
(d) Respondents' argument that the "automatic standing" rule
should be retained, since it maximizes the deterrence of illegal
police conduct by permitting an expanded class of potential
challengers, is without merit. Pp. 448 U. S.
599 F.2d 1094, reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
BRENNAN, J., joined, post,
p. 448 U. S.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Relying on Jones v. United States, 362 U.
(1960), the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that, since respondents were charged with crimes of
possession, they were
Page 448 U. S. 85
entitled to claim "automatic standing" to challenge the legality
of the search which produced the evidence against them, without
regard to whether they had an expectation of privacy in the
premises searched. 599 F.2d 1094 (1979). Today we hold that
defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the
benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment
rights have in fact been violated. The automatic standing rule of
Jones v. United States, supra,
is therefore overruled.
Respondents, John Salvucci and Joseph Zackular, were charged in
a federal indictment with 12 counts of unlawful possession of
stolen mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1708. The 12 checks which
formed the basis of the indictment had been seized by the
Massachusetts police during the search of an apartment rented by
respondent Zackular's mother. The search was conducted pursuant to
Respondents filed a motion to suppress the checks on the ground
that the affidavit supporting the application for the search
warrant was inadequate to demonstrate probable cause. The District
Court granted respondents' motions and ordered that the checks be
suppressed. [Footnote 1
Government sought reconsideration of the District Court's ruling,
contending that respondents lacked "standing" to challenge the
constitutionality of the search. The District Court reaffirmed its
suppression order, and the Government appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that respondents had
"standing" and the search warrant was constitutionally inadequate.
The court found that the respondents were not required to establish
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the
property seized because they were entitled to assert "automatic
standing" to object to the search
Page 448 U. S. 86
and seizure under Jones v. United States, supra.
court observed that the vitality of the Jones
been challenged in recent years, but that,
"[u]ntil the Supreme Court rules on this question, we are not
prepared to hold that the automatic standing rule of Jones
has been . . . overruled. . . . That is an issue which the Supreme
Court must resolve."
599 F.2d at 1098. The Court of Appeals was obviously correct in
its characterization of the status of Jones,
granted certiorari in order to resolve the controversy. [Footnote 2
] 444 U.S. 989 (1979).
As early as 1907, this Court took the position that remedies for
violations of constitutional rights would only be afforded to a
person who "belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional
protection is given." Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.
, 204 U. S. 160
The exclusionary rule is one form of remedy afforded for Fourth
Amendment violations, and the Court in Jones v. United
held that the Hatch v. Reardon
properly limited its availability. The Court reasoned that,
"it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge
the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant
evidence that he . . . establish, that he himself was the victim of
an invasion of privacy."
362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 261
Subsequent attempts to vicariously assert violation of the Fourth
Amendment rights of others have been repeatedly rejected by this
Court. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.
, 394 U. S. 174
(1969); Brown v. United
Page 448 U. S. 87
223, 411 U. S. 230
(1973). Most recently, in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.
(1978), we held that "it is proper to permit only
defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to
benefit from the [exclusionary] rule's protections." Id.
at 439 U. S.
Even though the Court in Jones
recognized that the
exclusionary rule should only be available to protect defendants
who have been the victims of an illegal search or seizure, the
Court thought it necessary to establish an exception. In cases
where possession of the seized evidence was an essential element of
the offense charged, the Court held that the defendant was not
obligated to establish that his own Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated, but only that the search and seizure of the evidence
was unconstitutional. [Footnote
] Upon such a showing, the exclusionary rule would be
available to prevent the admission of the evidence against the
The Court found that the prosecution of such possessory offenses
presented a "special problem" which necessitated the departure from
the then settled principles of Fourth Amendment "standing."
] Two circumstances
were found to require this exception. First, the Court found that,
in order to establish standing at a hearing on a motion to
suppress, the defendant would often be "forced to allege facts the
proof of which would tend, if indeed not be sufficient, to convict
him," since several Courts of Appeals had "pinioned a defendant
within this dilemma" by holding that evidence adduced at the
Page 448 U. S. 88
to suppress could be used against the defendant at trial. 362
U.S. at 362 U. S. 262
The Court declined to embrace any rule which would require a
defendant to assert his Fourth Amendment claims only at the risk of
providing the prosecution with self-incriminating statements
admissible at trial. The Court sought resolution of this dilemma by
relieving the defendant of the obligation of establishing that his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an illegal search or
The Court also commented that this rule would be beneficial for
a second reason. Without a rule prohibiting a Government challenge
to a defendant's "standing" to invoke the exclusionary rule in a
possessory offense prosecution, the Government would be allowed the
"advantage of contradictory positions." Id.
362 U. S. 263
The Court reasoned that the Government ought not to be allowed to
assert that the defendant possessed the goods for purposes of
criminal liability, while simultaneously asserting that he did not
possess them for the purposes of claiming the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. The Court found that
"[i]t is not consonant with the amenities, to put it mildly, of
the administration of criminal justice to sanction such squarely
contradictory assertions of power by the Government."
at 362 U. S.
-264. Thus, in order to prevent both the risk that
self-incrimination would attach to the assertion of Fourth
Amendment rights, as well as to prevent the "vice of prosecutorial
self-contradiction," see Brown v. United States, supra
411 U. S. 229
the Court adopted the rule of "automatic standing."
In the 20 years which have lapsed since the Court's decision in
the two reasons which led the Court to the rule of
automatic standing have likewise been affected by time. This Court
has held that testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion
to suppress cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.
(1968). Developments in the principles of Fourth
Amendment standing, as well, clarify that a prosecutor may, with
legal consistency and legitimacy, assert that a defendant
Page 448 U. S. 89
charged with possession of a seized item did not have a privacy
interest violated in the course of the search and seizure. We are
convinced not only that the original tenets of the Jones
decision have eroded, but also that no alternative principles exist
to support retention of the rule.
The "dilemma" identified in Jones,
that a defendant
charged with a possessory offense might only be able to establish
his standing to challenge a search and seizure by giving
self-incriminating testimony admissible as evidence of his guilt,
was eliminated by our decision in Simmons v. United States,
the defendant Garrett was charged
with bank robbery. During the search of a codefendant's mother's
house, physical evidence used in the bank robbery, including a
suitcase, was found in the basement and seized. In an effort to
establish his standing to assert the illegality of the search,
Garrett testified at the suppression hearing that the suitcase was
similar to one he owned, and that he was the owner of the clothing
discovered inside the suitcase. Garrett's motion to suppress was
denied, but his testimony was admitted into evidence against him as
part of the Government's case-in-chief at trial. This Court
reversed, finding that
"a defendant who knows that his testimony may be admissible
against him at trial will sometimes be deterred from presenting the
testimonial proof of standing necessary to assert a Fourth
390 U.S. at 390 U. S.
-393. The Court found that, in effect, the defendant
"obliged either to give up what he believed, with advice of
counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect,
to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to
assert another. We therefore hold that, when a defendant testifies
in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment
Page 448 U. S. 90
grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against
him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
at 390 U. S. 394
This Court's ruling in Simmons
thus not only extends
protection against this risk of self-incrimination in all of the
cases covered by Jones,
but also grants a form of "use
immunity" to those defendants charged with nonpossessory crimes. In
this respect, the protection of Simmons
broader than that of Jones.
Thus, as we stated in
Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. at 411 U. S.
"[t]he self-incrimination dilemma, so central to the
decision, can no longer occur under the prevailing
interpretation of the Constitution [in Simmons
This Court has identified the self-incrimination rationale as
the cornerstone of the Jones
opinion. See Brown v.
United States, supra,
at 411 U. S. 228
We need not belabor the question of whether the "vice" of
prosecutorial contradiction could alone support a rule
countenancing the exclusion of probative evidence on the grounds
that someone other than the defendant was denied a Fourth Amendment
right. The simple answer is that the decisions of this Court,
especially our most recent decision in Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U. S. 128
(1978), clearly establish that a prosecutor may simultaneously
maintain that a defendant criminally possessed the seized good, but
was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal
contradiction. To conclude that a prosecutor engaged in
self-contradiction in Jones,
the Court necessarily relied
on the unexamined assumption that a defendant's possession of a
seized good sufficient to establish criminal culpability was also
sufficient to establish Fourth Amendment "standing." This
assumption, however, even if correct at the time, is no longer so.
Page 448 U. S. 91
The person in legal possession of a good seized during an
illegal search has not necessarily been subject to a Fourth
Amendment deprivation. [Footnote
] As we hold today in Rawlings v. Kentucky, post,
448 U. S. 98
possession of a seized good is not a proxy for determining whether
the owner had a Fourth Amendment interest, for it does not
invariably represent the protected Fourth Amendment interest. This
Court has repeatedly repudiated the notion that "arcane
distinctions developed in property and tort law" ought to control
our Fourth Amendment inquiry. Rakas v. Illinois, supra
439 U. S. 143
In another section of the opinion in Jones
Court concluded that
"it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by
the common law in evolving the body of private property law. . .
362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 266
See also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.
(1963); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.
While property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in
determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated, see Rakas, supra
at 439 U. S. 144
n. 12, property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of
this Court's inquiry. In Rakas,
this Court held that an
illegal search only violates the rights of those who have "a
Page 448 U. S. 92
expectation of privacy in the invaded place." 439 U.S. at
439 U. S. 140
See also Mancusi v. DeForte, supra.
We simply decline to use possession of a seized good as a
substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. In
the Court held not only that automatic standing
should be conferred on defendants charged with crimes of
possession, but, alternatively, that Jones had actual standing
because he was "legitimately on the premises" at the time of the
search. In Rakas,
this Court rejected the adequacy of this
standard, finding that it was "too broad a
gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights." 439 U.S. at
439 U. S. 142
In language appropriate to our consideration of the automatic
standing rule as well, we reasoned:
"In abandoning 'legitimately on premises' for the doctrine that
we announce today, we are not forsaking a time-tested and workable
rule, which has produced consistent results when applied, solely
for the sake of fidelity to the values underlying the Fourth
Amendment. Rather, we are rejecting blind adherence to a phrase
which, at most, has superficial clarity and which conceals
underneath that thin veneer all of the problems of line drawing
which must be faced in any conscientious effort to apply the Fourth
Amendment. Where the factual premises for a rule are so generally
prevalent that little would be lost and much would be gained by
abandoning case-by-case analysis, we have not hesitated to do so. .
. . We would not wish to be understood as saying that legitimate
presence on the premises is irrelevant to one's expectation of
privacy, but it cannot be deemed controlling."
at 439 U. S.
-148. As in Rakas, we again reject "blind adherence"
to the other underlying assumption in Jones
possession of the seized good is an acceptable measure of Fourth
Amendment interests. As in Rakas,
we find that the
standard "creates too
Page 448 U. S. 93
broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights" and
that we must, instead, engage in a "conscientious effort to apply
the Fourth Amendment" by asking not merely whether the defendant
had a possessory interest in the items seized, but whether he had
an expectation of privacy in the area searched. Thus, neither
prosecutorial "vice" nor the underlying assumption of
that possession of a seized good is the equivalent
of Fourth Amendment "standing" to challenge the search can save the
automatic standing rule.
Even though the original foundations of Jones
longer relevant, respondents assert that principles not articulated
by the Court in Jones
support retention of the rule.
First, respondents maintain that, while Simmons v. United
States, 390 U. S. 377
(1968), eliminated the possibility that the prosecutor could use a
defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing as substantive
evidence of guilt at trial, Simmons
did not eliminate
other risks to the defendant which attach to giving testimony on a
motion to suppress. [Footnote
] Principally, respondents assert that the prosecutor may
still be permitted to use the defendant's testimony to impeach him
at trial. [Footnote 8
Page 448 U. S. 94
has not decided whether Simmons
precludes the use of a
defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing to impeach his
testimony at trial. [Footnote
] But the issue presented here is quite different from the one
of whether "use immunity" extends only through the Government's
case-in-chief, or beyond that to the direct and cross-examination
of a defendant in the event he chooses to take the stand. That
issue need not be, and is not, resolved here, for it is an issue
which more aptly relate to the proper breadth of the
privilege, and not to the need for retaining
Respondents also seek to retain the Jones
rule on the
grounds that it is said to maximize the deterrence of illegal
police conduct by permitting an expanded class of potential
challengers. The same argument has been rejected by this Court as a
sufficient basis for allowing persons whose Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated to nevertheless claim the benefits of the
exclusionary rule. In Aldeman v. United States,
at 394 U. S. 174
175, we explicitly stated:
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those
whose rights the police have violated have been considered
sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even
though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We
adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the
additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other
defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public
interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
exposes the truth."
See also Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. at 439 U. S. 137
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.
, 435 U. S.
-276 (1978); United States v. Calandra,
414 U. S. 338
414 U. S.
-351 (1974). Respondents' deterrence
Page 448 U. S. 95
argument carries no special force in the context of possessory
offenses, and we therefore again reject it.
We are convinced that the automatic standing rule of
has outlived its usefulness in this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The doctrine now serves only to afford a
windfall to defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been
violated. We are unwilling to tolerate the exclusion of probative
evidence under such circumstances, since we adhere to the view of
that the values of the Fourth Amendment are
preserved by a rule which limits the availability of the
exclusionary rule to defendants who have been subjected to a
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
This action comes to us as a challenge to a pretrial decision
suppressing evidence. The respondents relied on automatic standing,
and did not attempt to establish that they had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the areas of Zackular's mother's home
where the goods were seized. We therefore think it appropriate to
remand so that respondents will have an opportunity to demonstrate,
if they can, that their own Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
See Combs v. United States, 408 U.
Reversed and remanded.
The District Court held that the affidavit was deficient because
the affiant relied on double hearsay, and failed to specify the
dates on which information included in the affidavit had been
The Courts of Appeals have divided on the continued
applicability of the automatic standing rule. The Sixth Circuit
abandoned the rule after our decision in Simmons v. United
States, 390 U. S. 377
(1968). See, e.g., United States v. Hunter,
550 F.2d 1066
(1977). Most of the remaining Circuits appear to have retained the
rule, but many with "misgivings." See, e.g., United States v.
560 F.2d 45, 52 (CA2 1977); United States v.
577 F.2d 883, 892 (CA5), cert. denied,
U.S. 968 (1978).
In Brown v. United States, 411 U.
, 411 U. S. 229
(1973), this Court clarified that the automatic standing rule of
was applicable only where the offense charged
"possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested
search and seizure."
this Court discarded reliance on concepts of
"standing" in determining whether a defendant is entitled to claim
the protections of the exclusionary rule. The inquiry, after
is simply whether the defendant's rights were
violated by the allegedly illegal search or seizure. Because
was decided at a time when "standing" was designated
as a separate inquiry, we use that term for the purposes of
reexamining that opinion.
Respondent Salvucci cites this Court's decision in United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48
(1951), as support for the view that legal ownership of the seized
good was sufficient to confer Fourth Amendment "standing." In
however, we stated that "[s]tanding in
was based on Jeffers' possessory interest in
the premises searched and the property seized." 439
U.S. at 439 U. S. 136
Legal possession of the seized good may be sufficient in some
circumstances to entitle a defendant to seek the return of the
seized property if the seizure, as opposed to the search, was
illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Lisk,
522 F.2d 228
(CA7 1975) (Stevens, J.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1078
(1976), although, in that case, the property was ultimately found
not to have been illegally seized. We need not explore this issue,
since respondents did not challenge the constitutionality of the
seizure of the evidence.
The respondents argue that the prosecutor's access to the
suppression testimony will unfairly provide the prosecutor with
information advantageous to the preparation of his case and trial
strategy. This argument, however, is surely applicable equally to
possessory and nonpossessory offenses. This Court has clearly
declined to expand the Jones
rule to other classes of
offenses, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.
(1969); Brown v. United States,
411 U. S. 223
(1973), and thus respondents' rationale cannot support the
retention of a special rule of automatic standing here.
A number of courts considering the question have held that such
testimony is admissible as evidence of impeachment. Gray v.
43 Md.App. 238,
403 A.2d 853
(1979); People v. Douglas, 66 Cal. App. 3d
, 136 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1977); People v.
Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d
, 317 N.E.2d
(1974). See also Woody v. United States,
U.S.App.D.C. 353, 354-355, 379 F.2d 130, 131-132 (Burger, J.),
389 U.S. 961 (1967).
This Court has held that "the protective shield of
is not to be converted into a license for false
representations. . . ." United States v. Kahan,
415 U. S. 239
415 U. S. 243
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
Today the Court overrules the "automatic standing" rule of
Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257
(1960), because it concludes that the rationale underpinning the
rule has been "eroded," ante
at 448 U. S. 89
do not share that view.
A defendant charged with a possessory offense who moves to
suppress the items he is charged with possessing must now establish
at the suppression hearing that the police conduct of which he
complains violated his personal Fourth Amendment rights. In many
cases, a defendant will be able to make the required showing only
by taking the stand and testifying about his interest in the place
searched and the evidence
Page 448 U. S. 96
seized; the need for the defendant's own testimony may, in fact,
be more likely to arise in possession cases than in cases involving
other types of offenses. The holding in Jones
premised, in part, on the unfairness of "pinion[ing] a defendant
within th[e] dilemma," 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 262
of being able to assert his Fourth Amendment claim only by
relinquishing his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The Court finds that this dilemma no longer
exists, because Simmons v. United States, 390 U.
(1968), held that testimony given by a defendant
in support of a motion to suppress "may not thereafter be admitted
against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
at 390 U. S.
I cannot agree that Simmons
protection against the "self-incrimination dilemma," Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223
411 U. S. 228
(1973). Respondents contend that the testimony given at the
suppression hearing might be held admissible for impeachment
purposes and, while acknowledging that that question is not before
us in this case, the majority broadly hints that this is so.
at 448 U. S. 94
9; see Harris v. New York, 401 U.
(1971); United States v. Kahan,
415 U. S. 239
(1974); United States v. Havens, 446 U.
(1980); Jenkins v. Anderson,
447 U. S. 231
(1980); but see New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.
(1979). The use of the testimony for impeachment
purposes would subject a defendant to precisely the same dilemma,
unless he was prepared to relinquish his constitutional right to
testify in his own defense, and would thereby create a strong
deterrent to asserting Fourth Amendment claims. One of the purposes
was to remove such
obstacles. See Simmons, supra
at 390 U. S.
-394. Moreover, the opportunity for cross-examination
at the suppression hearing may enable the prosecutor to elicit
incriminating information beyond that offered on direct examination
to establish the requisite Fourth Amendment interest. Even if such
information could not be introduced at the subsequent trial, it
might be helpful to the prosecution in developing its case or
deciding its trial strategy. The furnishing
Page 448 U. S. 97
of such a tactical advantage to the prosecution should not be
the price of asserting a Fourth Amendment claim. Simmons,
therefore, does not eliminate the possibility that a defendant will
be deterred from presenting a Fourth Amendment claim because of
"the risk that the words which he utters may later be used to
incriminate him." Simmons, supra,
at 390 U. S. 393
Accordingly, I conclude that this part of the reasoning in
A second ground for relieving the defendant charged with
possession from the necessity of showing "an interest in the
premises searched or the property seized" was that "to hold to the
contrary . . . would be to permit the Government to have the
advantage of contradictory positions as a basis for conviction,"
362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 263
That is, since "possession both convicts and confers standing,"
the Government, which had charged the defendant
with possession, would not be permitted to deny that he had
standing. By holding today in Rawlings v. Kentucky, post,
p. 448 U. S. 98
a person may assert a Fourth Amendment claim only if he has a
privacy interest in the area that was searched, the Court has, to
be sure, done away with that logical inconsistency. For reasons
stated in my dissenting opinion in that case, I believe that
holding is diametrically opposed to the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment as it has always been understood.
In sum, I find neither of the Court's grounds for abandoning
persuasive. The automatic standing rule is a
salutary one which protects the rights of defendants and eliminates
the wasteful requirement of making a preliminary showing of
standing in pretrial proceedings involving possessory offenses,
where the charge itself alleges an interest sufficient to support a
Fourth Amendment claim. I dissent.