Forsham v. Harris,
Annotate this Case
445 U.S. 169 (1980)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980)
Forsham v. Harris
Argued October 31, 1979
Decided March 3, 1980
445 U.S. 169
Under federal grants awarded by the National Institute of Arthritis, Metabolism, and Digestive Diseases (NIAMDD) (a federal agency), the University Group Diabetes Program (UGDP), a group of private physicians and scientists, conducted a long-term study of the effectiveness of certain diabetes treatment regimens. Pertinent federal regulations authorized some supervision of UGDP and gave NIAMDD the right of access to, or permanent custody of, the raw data generated by UGDP. However, the day-to-day administration of grant-supported activities was in UGDP's hands, and NIAMDD did not exercise its right to review or obtain custody of the raw data, which remained at all times in UGDP's possession and under its ownership. The UGDP's reports on the results of its study, indicating that the use of certain drugs in diabetes treatment increased the risk of heart disease, ultimately resulted in proceedings by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to restrict the labeling and use of the drugs. After both UGDP and HEW denied petitioners' request for access to the UGDP raw data underlying its published reports, petitioners filed suit in Federal District Court to require HEW to make the raw data available under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which empowers federal courts to order an "agency" to produce "agency records improperly withheld" from an individual requesting access. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents, holding that HEW properly denied the request on the ground that the data did not constitute "agency records" under the FOIA. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: HEW need not produce the requested data because they are not "agency records" within the meaning of the FOIA. Data generated by a privately controlled organization which has received federal grants (grantee), but which data has not at any time been obtained by the agency, are not "agency records" accessible under the FOIA. Pp 445 U. S. 177-187.
(a) There is no merit to petitioners' claim that the data were at least records of UGDP, and that the federal funding and supervision of UGDP alone provide the close connection necessary to render its
records "agency records" as that term is used in the FOIA. While "agency record" is not defined in the Act, Congress excluded private grantees from FOIA disclosure obligations by excluding them from the Act's definition of "agency," an action consistent with its prevalent practice of preserving the autonomy of federal grantees and their records. Since Congress found that federal funding and supervision (short of Government control) did not justify direct access to the grantee's records, it cannot be concluded that those identical activities were intended to permit indirect access through an expansive definition of "agency records." Pp. 445 U. S. 178-182.
(b) Nor may a broad definition of "agency records" be invoked so as to include all documents created by a private grantee to which the Government has access and which the Government has used. Such a broad definition is not supported by either the language, structure, or legislative history of the FOIA. Instead, Congress contemplated that an agency must first either create or obtain a record as a prerequisite to its becoming an "agency record" within the meaning of the FOIA. This conclusion is also supported by other Acts in which Congress has associated creation or acquisition with the concept of a governmental record. Although, in this case, HEW has a right of access to the data, and a right if it so chooses to obtain permanent custody of the UGDP records, in this context, the FOIA applies to records which have been, in fact, obtained, and not to records which merely could have been obtained. Without first establishing that the agency has created or obtained the document, the agency's reliance on or use of the document is similarly irrelevant. Pp. 445 U. S. 182-186.
190 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 587 F.2d 1128, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 445 U. S. 187.