After respondent, a former officer, director, and loan officer
of petitioner Great American Federal Savings and Loan Association
(Association) received a right-to-sue letter upon filing a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he brought this suit
against the Association and its directors in Federal District
Court, alleging that the Association had intentionally embarked
upon a course of conduct the effect of which was to deny to female
employees equal employment opportunity; that, when respondent
expressed support for the female employees at a meeting of the
board of directors, his connection with the Association abruptly
ended; and that his support for the female employees was the cause
of the termination of his employment. Respondent claimed damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. II), contending that he
had been injured as the result of a conspiracy to deprive him of
equal protection of, and equal privileges and immunities under, the
laws. Section 1985(3) provides,
inter alia, that a person
so injured may have an action for damages against any one or more
of the conspirators. The District Court granted petitioners' motion
to dismiss, holding that § 1985(3) could not be invoked because the
directors of a single corporation cannot, as a matter of law and
fact, engage in a conspiracy. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that conspiracies motivated by an invidious animus against
women fall within § 1985(3), and that respondent, a male allegedly
injured as a result of such a conspiracy, has standing to bring
suit under that provision. The court further ruled that Title VII
can be the source of a right asserted in a § 1985(3) action, and
that intracorporate conspiracies come within the intendment of the
section.
Held: Section 1985(3) may not be invoked to redress
violations of Title VII. It creates no substantive rights itself,
but is a purely remedial statute, providing a civil cause of action
when some otherwise defined federal right -- to equal protection of
the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws -- is
breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined by the section.
Thus, the question in this case is whether rights created by Title
VII -- respondent alleged that he was injured
Page 442 U. S. 367
by a conspiracy to violate § 704(a) of Title VII, which makes it
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against an employee because he has opposed any employment practice
made unlawful by Title VII or because he has participated in an
investigation or proceeding under Title VII -- may be asserted
within the remedial framework of § 1985(3). If a violation of Title
VII could be asserted through § 1985(3), a complainant could avoid
most if not all of the detailed and specific provisions of Title
VII, which provides a comprehensive plan of administrative and
judicial process designed to provide an opportunity for nonjudicial
and nonadversary resolution of claims. Perhaps most importantly,
the complainant could completely bypass the administrative process,
which plays such a crucial role in the scheme established by
Congress in Title VII. Unimpaired effectiveness can be given to the
plan of Title VII only by holding that deprivation of a right
created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action
under § 1985(3).
Cf. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.
S. 820. Pp.
442 U. S.
370-378.
584 F.2d 1235, vacated and remanded.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined. POWELL, J.,
post, p.
442 U. S. 378,
and STEVENS, J.,
post, p.
442 U. S. 381,
filed concurring opinions. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
442 U. S.
385.
Page 442 U. S. 368
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
More than a century after their passage, the Civil Rights Acts
of the Reconstruction Era continue to present difficult problems of
statutory construction.
Cf. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U. S. 600. In
the case now before us, we consider the scope of 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. II), the surviving version of § 2 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. [
Footnote
1]
I
The respondent, John R. Novotny, began his career with the Great
American Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter
Association) in Allegheny County, Pa., in 1950. By 1975, he was
secretary of the Association, a member of its board of directors,
and a loan officer. According to the allegations of the complaint
in this case, the Association
"intentionally and deliberately embarked upon and pursued a
course of conduct the effect of which was to deny to female
employees
Page 442 U. S. 369
equal employment opportunity. . . ."
When Novotny expressed support for the female employees at a
meeting of the board of directors, his connection with the
Association abruptly ended. He was not reelected as secretary; he
was not reelected to the board; and he was fired. His support for
the Association's female employees, he alleges, was the cause of
the termination of his employment.
Novotny filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
[
Footnote 2] After receiving a
right-to-sue letter, [
Footnote
3] he brought this lawsuit against the Association and its
directors in the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. He claimed damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976
ed., Supp. II), contending that he had been injured as the result
of a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection of and equal
privileges and immunities under the laws. [
Footnote 4] The District Court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss. It held that § 1985(3) could not be invoked
because the directors of a single corporation could not, as a
matter of law and fact, engage in a conspiracy.
430 F.
Supp. 227, 230. [
Footnote
5]
Novotny appealed. After oral argument before a three-judge
panel, the case was reargued before the en banc Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, which unanimously reversed
Page 442 U. S. 370
the District Court's judgment. 584 F.2d 1235. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Novotny had stated a cause of action under §
1985(3). It held that conspiracies motivated by an invidious animus
against women fall within § 195(3), and that Novotny, a male
allegedly injured as a result of such a conspiracy, had standing to
bring suit under that statutory provision. It ruled that Title VII
could be the source of a right asserted in an action under §
1985(3), and that intracorporate conspiracies come within the
intendment of the section. Finally, the court concluded that its
construction of § 1985(3) did not present any serious
constitutional problem. [
Footnote
6]
We granted certiorari, 439 U.S. 1066, to consider the
applicability of § 1985(3) to the facts alleged in Novotny's
complaint.
II
The legislative history of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
of which § 1985(3) was originally a part, has been reviewed many
times in this Court. [
Footnote
7] The section as first enacted
Page 442 U. S. 371
authorized both criminal and civil actions against those who
have conspired to deprive others of federally guaranteed rights.
Before the 19th century ended, however, the Court found the
criminal provisions of the statute unconstitutional because they
exceeded the scope of congressional power,
United States v.
Harris, 106 U. S. 629;
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, and
the provisions thus invalidated were later formally repealed by
Congress. The civil action provided by the Act remained, but for
many years was rarely, if ever, invoked.
The provisions of what is now § 1985(3) were not fully
considered by this Court until 1951, in the case of
Collins v.
Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651.
[
Footnote 8] There the Court
concluded that the section protected citizens only from injuries
caused by conspiracies "under color of state law." [
Footnote 9] Twenty years later, in
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, the
Court unanimously concluded that the
Collins Court had
accorded to the provisions of § 1985(3) too narrow a scope.
[
Footnote 10] The fears
concerning congressional power that had motivated the Court in
Page 442 U. S. 372
the
Collins case had been dissolved by intervening
cases.
See Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra at
403 U. S. 96-97,
403 U. S.
104-106. Therefore, the Court found that § 1985(3) did
provide a cause of action for damages caused by purely private
conspiracies.
The Court's opinion in
Griffin discerned the following
criteria for measuring whether a complaint states a cause of action
under § 1985(3):
"To come within the legislation, a complaint must allege that
the defendants did (1) 'conspire or go in disguise on the highway
or on the premises of another' (2) 'for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws.' It must then assert that one or more of
the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, 'any act in
furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy,' whereby another was
(4a) 'injured in his person or property' or (4b) 'deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States.'"
403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
102-103.
Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely
provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates. The
primary question in the present case, therefore, is whether a
person injured by a conspiracy to violate § 704(a) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is deprived of "the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws"
within the meaning of § 1985(3). [
Footnote 11]
Under Title VII, cases of alleged employment discrimination are
subject to a detailed administrative and judicial process designed
to provide an opportunity for nonjudicial and
Page 442 U. S. 373
nonadversary resolution of claims. As the Court explained in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36,
415 U. S.
44:
"Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., to assure equality of employment
opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. . . . Cooperation and voluntary compliance were
selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal. To this
end, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and established a procedure whereby existing state and local
employment opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission, would
have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference,
conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was
permitted to file a lawsuit."
As part of its comprehensive plan, Congress provided that a
complainant in a State or locality with a fair employment
commission must first go to that commission with his claim.
Alternatively, an employee who believes himself aggrieved must
first file a charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. [
Footnote 12]
The time limitations for administrative and judicial filing are
controlled by express provisions of the statute. [
Footnote 13] At several different points,
the statutory
Page 442 U. S. 374
plan prevents immediate filing of judicial proceedings in order
to encourage voluntary conciliation. [
Footnote 14] The EEOC has the power to investigate and to
prosecute a civil action in a complainant's case. [
Footnote 15] The Act provides for
injunctive relief, specifically including backpay relief. [
Footnote 16] The majority of the
Page 442 U. S. 375
federal courts have held that the Act does not allow a court to
award general or punitive damages. [
Footnote 17] The Act expressly allows the prevailing
party to recover his attorney's fees, and, in some cases, provides
that a district court may appoint counsel for plaintiff. [
Footnote 18] Because the Act
expressly authorizes only equitable remedies, the courts have
consistently held that neither party has a right to a jury trial.
[
Footnote 19]
If a violation of Title VII could be asserted through § 1985(3),
a complainant could avoid most, if not all, of these detailed
Page 442 U. S. 376
and specific provisions of the law. Section 1985(3) expressly
authorizes compensatory damages; punitive damages might well
follow. The plaintiff or defendant might demand a jury trial. The
short and precise time limitations of Title VII would be grossly
altered. [
Footnote 20]
Perhaps most importantly, the complainant could completely bypass
the administrative process, which plays such a crucial role in the
scheme established by Congress in Title VII.
The problem in this case is closely akin to that in
Brown v.
GSA, 425 U. S. 820.
There, we held that § 717 of Title VII provides the exclusive
remedy for employment discrimination claims of those federal
employees that it covers. Our conclusion was based on the
proposition that
"[t]he balance, completeness, and structural integrity of § 717
are inconsistent with the petitioner's contention that the judicial
remedy afforded by § 717(c) was designed merely to supplement other
putative judicial relief."
425 U.S. at
425 U. S.
832.
Here, the case is even more compelling. In
Brown, the
Court concluded that § 717 displaced other causes of action
arguably available to assert substantive rights similar to those
granted by § 717. Section 1985(3), by contrast, creates no rights.
It is a purely remedial statute, providing a civil cause of action
when some otherwise defined federal right -- to equal protection of
the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws -- is
breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined by the section.
Thus, we are not faced in this case with a question of implied
repeal. The right Novotny claims under § 704(a) did not even
arguably exist before the passage of Title
Page 442 U. S. 377
VII. The only question here, therefore, is whether the rights
created by Title VII may be asserted within the remedial framework
of § 1985(3).
This case thus differs markedly from the cases recently decided
by this Court that have related the substantive provisions of last
century's Civil Rights Acts to contemporary legislation conferring
similar substantive rights. In those cases, we have held that
substantive rights conferred in the 19th century were not
withdrawn,
sub silentio, by the subsequent passage of the
modern statutes. Thus, in
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U. S. 409,
392 U. S.
413-417, we considered the effect of the fair housing
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 on the property rights
guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1982. And in
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U. S. 454,
421 U. S.
457-461, we held that the passage of Title VII did not
work an implied repeal of the substantive rights to contract
conferred by the same 19th-century statute and now codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981.
See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
396 U. S. 229,
396 U. S.
237-238;
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.
S. 160,
427 U. S.
174-175. [
Footnote
21]
Somewhat similarly, in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U. S. 36, the
Court upheld an employee's invocation of two alternative remedies
for alleged employment discrimination:
Page 442 U. S. 378
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement, and
litigation under Title VII. As the Court pointed out:
"In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks
to vindicate his contractual right under a collective bargaining
agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an
employee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress.
The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory
rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a
result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no
inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in
their respectively appropriate forums."
Id. at
415 U. S.
49-50.
This case, by contrast, does not involve two "independent"
rights, and for the same basic reasons that underlay the Court's
decision in
Brown v. GSA, supra, reinforced by the other
considerations discussed in this opinion, we conclude that §
1985(3) may not be invoked to redress violations of Title VII. It
is true that a § 1985(3) remedy would not be coextensive with Title
VII, since a plaintiff in an action under § 1985(3) must prove both
a conspiracy and a group animus that Title VII does not require.
While this incomplete congruity would limit the damage that would
be done to Title VII, it would not eliminate it. Unimpaired
effectiveness can be given to the plan put together by Congress in
Title VII only by holding that deprivation of a right created by
Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under §
1985(3).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated,
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. II), Rev.Stat. §
1980, provides:
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go
in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State
or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more
persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any
citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support
or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election
of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or
Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or
to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such
support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators."
[
Footnote 2]
42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq.
[
Footnote 3]
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
[
Footnote 4]
His complaint also alleged, as a second cause of action, that
his discharge was in retaliation for his efforts on behalf of equal
employment opportunity, and thus violated § 704(a) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 86 Stat.
109. Section 704(a), as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), reads
in relevant part:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter."
[
Footnote 5]
As to the Title VII claim, the District Court held that Novotny
was not a proper plaintiff under § 704(a).
[
Footnote 6]
The Court of Appeals ruled that Novotny had also stated a valid
cause of action under Title VII. It held that § 704(a) applies to
retaliation for both formal and informal actions taken to advance
the purposes of the Act. That holding is not now before this
Court.
We note the relative narrowness of the specific issue before the
Court. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether a plaintiff
would have a cause of action under § 1985(3) where the defendant
was not subject to suit under Title VII or a comparable statute.
Cf. United States v. Johnson, 390 U.
S. 563. Nor do we think it necessary to consider whether
§ 1985(3) creates a remedy for statutory rights other than those
fundamental rights derived from the Constitution.
Cf. Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88.
[
Footnote 7]
A partial list of the opinions in this Court that have discussed
the Act's legislative history includes
Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600,
441 U. S.
608-612 (opinion of the Court);
id. at
441 U. S.
650-658 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment);
id. at
441 U. S.
627-640 (POWELL, J., concurring);
Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.
S. 658,
436 U. S.
665-689;
District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 U. S. 418,
409 U. S. 423,
409 U. S.
425-429;
Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra at
403 U. S.
99-101;
Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co.,
398 U. S. 144,
398 U. S.
162-166 (opinion of the Court);
id. at
398 U. S.
215-231 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.
S. 167,
365 U. S.
172-185 (opinion of the Court);
id. at
365 U. S.
194-198 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment);
id. at
365 U. S.
225-236 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 8]
At least two earlier cases in this Court involved causes of
action based upon what is now § 1985(3). In
Hague v. CIO,
307 U. S. 496, the
plaintiff had stated claims based on the predecessors of both §
1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The opinions of Mr. Justice Roberts
and Mr. Justice Stone both discussed the § 1983 cause of action,
but neither discussed the conspiracy claim. In
Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, the
plaintiff had also stated claims under the predecessors of both
sections. The Court held that no constitutional violation had been
shown, and did not consider whether the statutes could have been
utilized if such a showing had been made.
[
Footnote 9]
Mr. Justice Burton dissented, joined by Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Douglas. 341 U.S. at
341 U. S.
663.
[
Footnote 10]
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred, with one reservation. He found it
unnecessary to rely, as the Court did in part, on the defendants'
alleged interference with the right of interstate travel. 403 U.S.
at
403 U. S.
107.
[
Footnote 11]
For the purposes of this question, we assume but certainly do
not decide that the directors of a single corporation can form a
conspiracy within the meaning of § 1985(3).
[
Footnote 12]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) provides for filing charges with
the federal Commission. When a State or locality has a
"State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice
alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority
to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
proceedings with respect thereto,"
filing a complaint with that authority is a predicate for
assertion of the federal rights involved. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).
If a member of the EEOC files a charge alleging violations in such
a State or locality, the federal Commission must notify the state
or local authority of the charge before taking any action. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d).
Cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.
S. 522.
[
Footnote 13]
The statute requires that a complaint be filed with the federal
agency within 10 days "after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred. . . ." If the complainant has filed a charge
with a state or local agency, the time is extended to 300 days from
the event, or 30 days from the end of state or local proceedings,
whichever is sooner. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). After a "right to sue"
letter issues from the EEC, the complainant is given another 90
days to bring a civil action in a federal district court. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (f)(1).
Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U. S. 553.
[
Footnote 14]
Within 10 days of the Commission's receipt of a complaint, it
must notify the employer of the charge, including the date, place,
and circumstances of the alleged violation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
5(b), (e). Only if the Commission has been unable to secure an
acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer within 30 days
of the filing of the charge may it bring a civil action against the
employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The complainant must await
notice from the Commission of his right to bring a suit. This
notice is provided if (1) the Commission dismisses his charge, (2)
neither the Commission nor the Attorney General has filed a civil
action in his case within 180 days of the filing of the charge, or
(3) the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to
which he is a party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Cf. Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355.
[
Footnote 15]
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a),(b), (f)(1).
See Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. EEOC, supra.
[
Footnote 16]
Section 706(g) of the Act, as amended, as set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g), provides:
"If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer,
employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be,
responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability
shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the
filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts
earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons
discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay
otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require the
admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union,
or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual
was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused
employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section
2000e-3(a) of this title."
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.
S. 405.
[
Footnote 17]
See EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308-310
(CA6 1975);
Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 926-928 (CA3
1977); cases collected in
id. at 926 n. 13.
[
Footnote 18]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides:
"In any action or proceeding under this subchapter, the court in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall
be liable for costs the same as a private person."
See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.
S. 412.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 20005(f)(1) provides that,
"upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances
as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for
such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action
without the payment of fees, costs, or security."
[
Footnote 19]
See Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (CA9 1975);
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., supra at 308;
Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (CA5 1969);
Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577,
581 (CA4 1966) (en banc).
See also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, supra at
422 U. S.
441-445 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 20]
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently applied a
6-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations to employment
discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Davis v.
United States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335, 337 (1978).
See
also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.
S. 454,
421 U. S.
462-466.
[
Footnote 21]
Another difference between those cases and this one is to be
found in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968. As the Court noted in
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, and
Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, the
Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 were explicitly discussed during
the course of the legislative debates on both the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 and the 1972 amendments to the 1964 Act, and the view was
consistently expressed that the earlier statutes would not be
implicitly repealed.
See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
supra, at
421 U. S.
457-459;
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra,
at
392 U. S.
413-417. Specific references were made to §§ 1981 and
1983, but, significantly, no notice appears to have been taken of §
1985.
See case below, 584 F.2d 1235, 1252 n. 86.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the opinion of the Court as far as it goes, and I
join it. I also agree with the views expressed by MR. JUSTICE
STEVENS' concurring opinion. I write separately because
Page 442 U. S. 379
it seems to me that the Court's decision affords unnecessarily
limited guidance to courts in the federal system.
The Court's specific holding is that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976
ed., Supp. II) may not be invoked to redress violations of Title
VII. The broader issue argued to us in this case was whether this
Civil War Era remedial statute, providing no substantive rights
itself, was intended to provide a remedy generally for the
violation of subsequently created statutory rights. For essentially
the reasons suggested by MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, I would hold that §
1985(3) should not be so construed, and that its reach is limited
to conspiracies to violate those fundamental rights derived from
the Constitution.
The Court's unanimous decision in
Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88
(1971), is to this effect. The alleged conspiracy there was an
attempt by white citizens, resorting to force and violence, to
deprive Negro citizens of the right to use interstate highways. In
sustaining a cause of action under § 1985(3), the Court found that
the alleged conspiracy -- if implemented -- would violate the
constitutional "right of interstate travel" as well as the right of
Negro citizens to be free from "invidiously discriminatory" action.
The Court declared:
"That the statute was meant to reach private action does not,
however, mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious,
conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others. For, though
the supporters of the legislation insisted on coverage of private
conspiracies, they were equally emphatic that they did not believe,
in the words of Representative Cook, 'that Congress has a right to
punish an assault and battery when committed by two or more persons
within a State.' [Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 485 (1871).]
The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of
interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided
by giving full effect to the congressional purpose -- by requiring,
as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously
Page 442 U. S. 380
discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the
limiting amendment.
See the remarks of Representatives
Willard and Shellabarger, quoted
supra at
403 U. S.
100. The language requiring intent to deprive of equal
protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there
must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. The
conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal
enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all."
403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
101-102. In reaching its conclusion, the Court
identified "two constitutional sources" (
id. at
403 U. S. 107)
relied upon to support a cause of action under § 1985(3):
"We can only conclude that Congress was wholly within its powers
under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory cause
of action for Negro citizens who have been the victims of
conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at
depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free
men."
"
* * * *"
"Our cases have firmly established that the right of interstate
travel is constitutionally protected, does not necessarily rest on
the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against private as well
as governmental interference. [Citations omitted.] The 'right to
pass freely from State to State' has been explicitly recognized as
'among the rights and privileges of National citizenship.'
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78,
211 U. S.
97. That right, like other rights of national
citizenship, is within the power of Congress to protect by
appropriate legislation."
Id. at
403 U. S.
105-106.
By contrast, this Court has never held that the right to any
particular private employment is a "right of national citizenship,"
or derives from any other right created by the Constitution.
Indeed, even Congress, in the exercise of its
Page 442 U. S. 381
powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, has
accorded less than full protection to private employees. It
excluded several classes of employers from the coverage of Title
VII, for example, employers of fewer than 15 employees.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Nor does the Constitution create
any right to be free of gender-based discrimination perpetuated
solely through private action.
The rationale of
Griffin accords with the purpose,
history, and common understanding of this Civil War Era statute.
Rather than leave federal courts in any doubt as to the scope of
actions under § 1985(3), I would explicitly reaffirm the
constitutional basis of
Griffin. *
* The doubts which will remain after the Court's decision are
far from insubstantial. At least one federal court, for example,
has held that, although Title VII rights may not be asserted
through § 1985(3), claims based on § 3 of the Equal Pay Act of
1963, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), may be raised in a § 1985(3)
suit.
Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F.
Supp. 804, 808 (Md.1978).
See also Murphy v. Operating
Engineers, Local 18, 99 LRRM 2074, 2124-2126 (ND Ohio 1978)
(conspiracy to violate Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act cognizable under § 1985(3));
Local No. 1, ACA v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 419 F.
Supp. 263, 276 (ED Pa.1976) (same). I would take advantage of
the present opportunity to make clear that this Civil War Era
statute was intended to provide a remedy only for conspiracies to
violate fundamental rights derived from the Constitution.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
While I join the Court's opinion, including its reliance on
Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, and
while I agree with much of MR. JUSTICE POWELL's concurrence, I add
a few words of my own to explain why I would reach the same
conclusion even if the Court had agreed with my dissenting views in
Brown.
Sections 1983 and 1985(3) of Title 42 of the United States Code
(1976 ed., and Supp. II) are the surviving direct descendants of §§
1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 17 Stat. 13. Neither of
these sections created any substantive rights. Earlier this Term,
we squarely held that § 1983
Page 442 U. S. 382
merely provides a remedy for certain violations of certain
federal rights, [
Footnote 2/1] and
today the Court unequivocally holds that § 1985(3) "provides no
substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy for
violation of the rights it designates."
Ante at
442 U. S. 372.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Somewhat different language was used by Congress in describing
the substantive rights encompassed within the two provisions: § 1
of the 1871 Act, the predecessor to § 1983, referred to "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United
States," whereas § 2, the predecessor to § 1985(3), referred to
"equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities
under the laws." [
Footnote 2/3]
The
Page 442 U. S. 383
import of the language, however, as well as the relevant
legislative history, suggests that the Congress which enacted both
provisions was concerned with providing federal remedies for
deprivations of rights protected by the Constitution and, in
particular, the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment. If a violation
was effected "under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State," § 1983 afforded
redress; if a violation was caused by private persons who "conspire
or go in disguise on the highway," § 1985(3) afforded redress.
Thus, the former authorized a remedy for state action depriving an
individual of his constitutional rights, the latter for private
action.
Some privileges and immunities of citizenship, such as the right
to engage in interstate travel and the right to be free of the
badges of slavery, are protected by the Constitution against
interference by private action, as well as impairment by state
action. Private conspiracies to deprive individuals of these rights
are, as this Court held in
Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U. S. 88,
actionable under § 1985(3) without regard to any state involvement.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Page 442 U. S. 384
Other privileges and immunities of citizenship such as the right
to due process of law and the right to the equal protection of the
laws are protected by the Constitution only against state action.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1,
334 U. S. 13. If
a state agency arbitrarily refuses to serve a class of persons --
Chinese-Americans, for example,
see Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U. S. 356 --
it violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Or if private persons take
conspiratorial action that prevents or hinders the constituted
authorities of any State from giving or securing equal treatment,
the private persons would cause those authorities to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment; the private persons would then have violated
§ 1985(3). [
Footnote 2/5]
If, however, private persons engage in purely private acts of
discrimination -- for example, if they discriminate against women
or against lawyers with a criminal practice,
see Dombrowski v.
Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 194-196 -- they do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote 2/6] The rights secured by the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment are rights to protection against unequal or unfair
treatment by the State, not by private parties. Thus, while §
1985(3) does not require that a defendant act under color of state
law, there still
Page 442 U. S. 385
can be no claim for relief based on a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment if there has been no involvement by the State.
The requirement of state action, in this context, is no more than a
requirement that there be a constitutional violation.
Here, there is no claim of such a violation. Private
discrimination on the basis of sex is not prohibited by the
Constitution. The right to be free of sex discrimination by other
private parties is a statutory right that was created almost a
century after § 1985(3) was enacted. Because I do not believe that
statute was intended to provide a remedy for the violation of
statutory rights -- let alone rights created by statutes that had
not yet been enacted -- I agree with the Court's conclusion that it
does not provide respondent with redress for injuries caused by
private conspiracies to discriminate on the basis of sex. [
Footnote 2/7]
With this additional explanation of my views, I join the Court's
opinion.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"Standing alone, § 1983 clearly provides no protection for civil
rights, since, as we have just concluded, § 1983 does not provide
any substantive rights at all."
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.
S. 600,
441 U. S.
618.
In that opinion, we quoted Senator Edmunds' comment in the 1871
debate:
"All civil suits, as every lawyer understands, which this act
authorizes, are not based upon it; they are based upon the right of
the citizen. The act only gives a remedy."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871).
[
Footnote 2/2]
And
ante at
442 U. S. 376,
the Court states:
"Section 1985(3), by contrast, creates no rights. It is a purely
remedial statute, providing a civil cause of action when some
otherwise defined federal right -- to equal protection of the laws
or equal privileges and immunities under the laws -- is breached by
a conspiracy in the manner defined by the section."
[
Footnote 2/3]
In its present form, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 refers to deprivations of
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws." The "and laws" language was not included in the original
statute enacted in 1871, however; it was added in 1874, when
Congress enacted the Revised Statutes of the United States.
Rev.Stat. § 1979. No similar change was ever made in § 2 of the
1871 Act, the predecessor to § 1985(3). As originally introduced,
that section did provide for criminal and civil actions for
deprivations of "rights, privileges, or immunities . . . under the
Constitution
and laws of the United States." Cong.Globe,
42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871) (emphasis added). "The
enormous sweep of the original language led to pressures for
amendment,"
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S.
88,
403 U. S. 100,
and the present language was substituted. The criminal provisions
of § 2 were later declared unconstitutional,
United States v.
Harris, 106 U. S. 629, and
repealed by Congress. 35 Stat. 1088, 1154. This criminal provision
should be distinguished from 18 U.S.C. § 241, relied upon by MR.
JUSTICE WHITE,
see post at
442 U. S. 389
n. 5. Section 241 has, since its enactment in 1870, referred
explicitly to "the Constitution
or laws of the United
States."
See 16 Stat. 141 (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 2/4]
Ib
Griffin, supra at
403 U. S. 105,
the Court quoted the statement from the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U. S. 3,
109 U. S. 20,
that the Thirteenth Amendment
"is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or
upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or
involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United
States."
The opinion added:
"We can only conclude that Congress was wholly within its powers
under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory cause
of action for Negro citizens who have been the victims of
conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at
depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free
men."
403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
105.
With respect to the right of interstate travel, the opinion
added:
"Our cases have firmly established that the right of interstate
travel is constitutionally protected, does not necessarily rest on
the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertible against private as well
as governmental interference."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/5]
I have paraphrased the statutory language
"preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any
State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within
such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws"
because that language sheds important light on the meaning of
the entire section.
[
Footnote 2/6]
As the Court stated in
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S.
1,
334 U. S. 13, the
Fourteenth Amendment "erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."
[
Footnote 2/7]
Unlike the problem presented by
Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U. S. 160,
where I concluded that it was my duty to follow decisions of this
Court which in my judgment had erroneously construed the actual
intent of Congress, this is a case in which I am free to respect my
understanding of congressional intent. To do so does not require me
to advocate overruling any prior decisions of this Court in favor
of a position which would appear to be "a significant step
backwards . . . clearly contrary to my understanding of the mores
of today."
Id. at
427 U. S. 191-192 (STEVENS, J., concurring). And with
respect to the issue which is presented in this case, there is no
doubt in my mind that the construction of the statute adopted by
the Court of Appeals "would have amazed the legislators who voted
for it."
Id. at
427 U. S.
189.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL join, dissenting.
The Court today releases employers acting with invidious
discriminatory animus in concert with others from liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. II) for the injuries
Page 442 U. S. 386
they inflict. Because, for both respondent in this case and as a
general matter, § 1985(3) is an entirely consistent supplement to
Title VII, I dissent.
I
Respondent sought compensatory damages under § 1985(3) [
Footnote 3/1] on the ground that he had
been injured by acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy for the
purpose of depriving others of "equal privileges and immunities"
guaranteed in § 703(a) of Title VII, [
Footnote 3/2] which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of,
inter alia, sex. Additionally, and separately,
respondent sought relief under Title VII itself on the ground that
he had been deprived of his right under § 704(a) of Title VII
[
Footnote 3/3] not to be
discriminated against because he assisted
Page 442 U. S. 387
others in asserting their Title VII rights. Petitioners have not
sought review of the Court of Appeals' holding that respondent had
stated a cause of action under§ 704(a), and, accordingly, the Court
does not address that issue. However, the majority holds that the
claim under § 1985(3) must be dismissed because "deprivation of a
right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of
action under § 1985(3),"
ante at
442 U. S.
378.
Unfortunately, the majority does not explain whether the "right
created by Title VII" to which it refers is the right guaranteed to
women employees under § 703(a) or the right guaranteed to
respondent under § 704(a). Although, in stating its view of the
issue before the Court, the majority intimates that it is relying
on the fact that respondent has a claim directly under § 704(a),
[
Footnote 3/4] the reasoning of the
majority opinion in no way indicates why the existence of a §
704(a) claim should prevent respondent from seeking to vindicate
under § 1985(3) the entirely separate right provided by §
703(a).
Clearly, respondent's right under § 704(a) -- to be free from
retaliation for efforts to aid others asserting Title VII rights --
is distinct from the Title VII right implicated in his claim under
§ 1985(3), which is the right of women employees not to be
discriminated against on the basis of their sex. Moreover,
Page 442 U. S. 388
that respondent in this case is in a position to assert claims
under both § 1985(3) and § 704(a) is due solely to the peculiar
facts of this case, rather than to any necessary relationship
between the two provisions. First, it is, of course, possible that
a person could be injured in the course of a conspiracy to deny §
703(a) rights -- as respondent claims under his § 1985(3) cause of
action -- by some means other than retaliatory discrimination
prohibited under § 704(a). Second, § 704(a) itself protects only
employees and applicants for employment; others, such as customers
or suppliers, retaliated against in the course of a conspiracy to
violate § 703(a) are not expressly protected under any provision of
Title VII. Indeed, if respondent in this case had been only a
director, rather than both a director and an employee, of the Great
American Federal Savings and Loan Association, he apparently would
not be able to assert a claim under § 704(a).
Because the existence of a § 704(a) claim is due entirely to the
peculiar facts of this case, I interpret the majority's broad
holding that "deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be
the basis for a cause of action under § 1985(3)" to preclude
respondent from suing under § 1985(3) not because he coincidentally
has a § 704(a) claim, but because the purpose of the conspiracy
allegedly resulting in injury to him was to deny § 703(a)
rights.
II
The pervasive and essential flaw in the majority's approach to
reconciliation of § 1985(3) and Title VII proceeds from its
characterization of the former statute as solely a "remedial"
provision. It is true that the words "equal privileges and
immunities under the laws" in § 1985(3) refer to substantive rights
created or guaranteed by other federal law, be it the Constitution
or federal statutes other than § 1985(3); [
Footnote 3/5] and,
Page 442 U. S. 389
in this case, it is a conspiracy to deny a substantive right
created in § 703(a) of Title VII [
Footnote 3/6] that is part of the basis for respondent's
suit under § 1985(3). [
Footnote
3/7] However, § 1985(3),
Page 442 U. S. 390
unlike a remedial statute such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [
Footnote 3/8] does not merely provide a
cause of action for persons deprived of rights elsewhere
guaranteed. Because 1985(3) provides a remedy for
any
person injured as a result of deprivation of a substantive
federal right, it must be seen as itself creating rights in persons
other than those to whom the underlying federal right extends.
In this case, for instance, respondent is seeking to redress an
injury inflicted upon him, which injury is distinct and separate
from the injury inflicted upon the female employees whose § 703(a)
rights were allegedly denied. The damages available to a person
such as respondent suing under § 1985(3) are not dependent upon the
amount of injury caused persons deprived of "equal privileges and
immunities under the laws," but upon the gravity of the separate
injury inflicted upon the person suing.
Cf. Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U. S. 229,
396 U. S.
254-255 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In this circumstance -- where the § 1985(3) plaintiff is seeking
redress for injury caused as a result of the denial of other
persons' Title VII rights -- it makes no sense to hold that the
remedies provided in Title VII are exclusive, for such a § 1985(3)
plaintiff has no Title VII remedy. [
Footnote 3/9] It thus can hardly be asserted that
allowing this § 1985(3) plaintiff to seek redress of his injury
would allow such individual to "completely bypass" the
administrative and other "detailed and specific" enforcement
mechanisms provided in Title VII,
ante at
442 U. S.
375-376.
In enacting § 1985(3), Congress specifically contemplated that
persons injured by private conspiracies to deny the federal
Page 442 U. S. 391
rights of others could redress their injuries, quite apart from
any redress by those who are the object of the conspiracy.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88,
403 U. S. 103
(1971). Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests any warrant for
refusal to recognize this cause of action simply because Title VII
rights are involved.
III
I am also convinced that persons whose own Title VII rights have
allegedly been violated retain the separate right to seek redress
under § 1985(3). In seeking to accommodate the civil rights
statutes enacted in the decade after the Civil War and the civil
rights statutes of the recent era, the Court has recognized that
the later statutes cannot be said to have impliedly repealed the
earlier unless there is an irreconcilable conflict between them.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160,
427 U. S. 173
n. 10 (1976).
See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U. S. 454,
421 U. S.
457-461 (1975);
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
supra at
396 U. S.
237-238.
Cf. United States v. Johnson,
390 U. S. 563
(1968). Of course, the mere fact of overlap in modes of redressing
discrimination does not constitute such irreconcilable conflict.
See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36 (1974);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U. S. 409
(1968), and cases cited above. Indeed, we have embraced the notion
of an implied repeal only when "[i]t would require the suspension
of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design" to allow
vindication under a Reconstruction statute of a right also subject
to redress under one of the modern Civil Rights Acts.
Brown v.
GSA, 425 U. S. 820,
425 U. S. 833
(1976).
It is clear that such overlap as may exist between Title VII and
§ 1985(3) occurs only because the latter is directed at a discrete
and particularly disfavored form of discrimination, and examination
of § 1985(3) shows that it constitutes a compatible and important
supplement to the more general prohibition and remedy provided in
Title VII. Thus, while it may be that, in many cases, persons
seeking redress under
Page 442 U. S. 392
§ 1985(3) also have a claim directly under Title VII, [
Footnote 3/10] this is not sufficient
reason to deprive those persons of the right to sue for the
compensatory and punitive damages to which they are entitled under
the post-Civil War statute. [
Footnote
3/11]
As previously indicated, the majority's willingness to infer a
silent repeal of § 1985(3) is based on its view that the provision
only gives a remedy to redress deprivations prohibited by other
federal law. But this narrow view of § 1985(3) is incorrect even as
to § 1985(3) plaintiffs themselves denied Title VII rights. Because
only conspiracies to deprive persons of federal rights are subject
to redress under § 1985(3), that statute, like 18 U.S.C. § 241,
[
Footnote 3/12] is itself a
prohibition separate and apart from the prohibitions stated in the
underlying provisions of federal law. Moreover, only those
deprivations imbued with "invidiously discriminatory motivation"
amounting to "class-based . . . animus,"
Griffin v.
Breckenridge, supra at
403 U. S. 102,
are encompassed by § 1985(3). Viewed in this manner, the right
guaranteed by § 1985(3) is the right not to be subjected to an
invidious conspiracy to deny other federal rights. This discrete
category of deprivations to which § 1985(3) is directed stands in
sharp contrast to the broad prohibition on discrimination provided
in § 703(a) of Title VII,
see 442
U.S. 366fn3/2|>n. 2,
supra; Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U. S. 424
(1971). If, as the majority suggests, it would not recognize an
implied repeal of an earlier statute granting a separate but
overlapping right, then it should not do so in this case; for
respondent has alleged a violation of § 703(a) in a manner
independently prohibited by § 1985(3), and under the
Page 442 U. S. 393
majority's approach should be allowed to redress both
deprivations.
Even to the extent that § 1985(3) is properly characterized as a
"remedial" statute, there is no reason for holding it inapplicable
to redress deprivations of Title VII rights. The majority's
apparent assumption that this Court has greater freedom in
inferring repeal of remedial statutes than it does of statutes
guaranteeing substantive rights has no support in our previous
cases. The one instance in which we held Title VII's remedies to be
exclusive,
Brown v. GSA, supra, was required because of
the unmistakable legislative intent that alternative modes of
redress were not to be available for a grievance relating to
discrimination in federal employment. [
Footnote 3/13] Nor has the majority's right/remedy
distinction been enunciated in any of our cases recognizing that
Congress did not intend Title VII to preempt all "alternative means
to redress individual grievances,"
Runyon v. McCrary,
supra at
427 U. S. 174
n. 11, quoting 118 Cong.Rec. 3371 (1972) (Sen. Williams). [
Footnote 3/14]
Page 442 U. S. 394
With respect to remedies as well as with respect to substantive
rights, an implied repeal of post-Civil War civil rights
legislation occurs only when the legislative scheme of the new
statute is incompatible with the old.
In this case, Title VII and the remedial aspect of § 1985(3) are
entirely consistent, the latter clearly supplementing the former.
Title VII operates both to create new federal rights and to provide
a general remedy for the denial thereof, while § 1985(3) operates
to provide a separate remedy when the manner of denial is
especially invidious and threatening. [
Footnote 3/15] The Reconstruction Congress that enacted
§ 1985(3) believed that an especial danger was posed by persons
acting with invidious animus and acting in concert -- thereby
compounding their power and resources [
Footnote 3/16] -- to deny federal rights. Because such
private conspiratorial action, the paradigm of which was the
activity of the Ku Klux Klan, constituted a serious threat to civil
rights and civil order, [
Footnote
3/17] it was deemed necessary to "giv[e] a civil action to
anybody who shall be injured by [such] conspiracy." [
Footnote 3/18] Thus, though it may be
that those
Page 442 U. S. 395
who conspire with invidious motivation to violate § 703(a) may,
in many cases, also be reached under Title VII itself, there is no
basis for inferring a silent repeal [
Footnote 3/19] of the legislative judgment that the
distinct nature of the deprivation to which § 1985(3) is directed
warrants separate and more complete relief, and, accordingly, the
Court has an obligation to honor the terms of that statute.
[
Footnote 3/20]
Page 442 U. S. 396
Because respondent exhausted his administrative remedies under
Title VII,
see ante at
442 U. S. 369,
there is no need in this case to reach the question whether persons
whose Title VII rights have been violated may bring suit directly
in federal court alleging an invidious conspiracy to deny those
Title VII rights. I note, however, that the majority's desire not
to undercut the administrative enforcement scheme, including the
encouragement of voluntary conciliation, provided by Title VII
would be completely fulfilled by insisting that § 1985(3)
plaintiffs exhaust whatever Title VII remedies they may have. The
concerns expressed in the majority opinion do not provide a basis
for precluding redress altogether under § 1985(3).
[
Footnote 3/1]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. II) provides in
relevant part that, when persons who
"conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; . . . do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, . . . the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury . . against any one or more of
the conspirators."
[
Footnote 3/2]
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This statute provides:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer --
"
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or"
"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
[
Footnote 3/3]
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). This statute provides:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate
against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."
[
Footnote 3/4]
See ante at
442 U. S. 372
("The primary question in the present case, therefore, is whether a
person injured by a conspiracy to violate § 704(a) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is deprived of
the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws' within the meaning of § 1985(3)"). See also ante
at 442 U. S. 377
("The only question here, therefore, is whether [the right Novotny
claims under § 704(a)] may be asserted within the remedial
framework of § 1985(3)"). (Emphasis deleted.)
[
Footnote 3/5]
The majority opinion does not reach the issue whether § 1985(3)
encompasses federal statutory rights other than those proceeding in
"fundamental" fashion from the Constitution itself. I am not
certain in what manner the Court conceives of sex discrimination by
private parties to proceed from explicit constitutional guarantees.
In any event, I need not pursue this issue, because I think it
clear that § 1985(3) encompasses all rights guaranteed in federal
statutes as well as rights guaranteed directly by the Constitution.
As originally introduced, § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17
Stat. 13, encompassed "rights, privileges, or immunities . . .
under the Constitution and laws of the United States." Cong.Globe,
42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871). The substitution of the terms
"the equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and
immunities under the laws,"
see 442
U.S. 366fn3/1|>n. 1,
supra, did not limit the scope
of the rights protected, but added a requirement of certain
"class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action,"
Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U. S. 88,
403 U. S. 102
(1971). We have repeatedly held that 18 U.S.C. § 241 (derived from
§ 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 141), which is the
"closest remaining criminal analogue to § 1985(3),"
Griffin v.
Breckenridge, supra at
403 U. S. 98,
encompasses all federal statutory rights.
See United States v.
Waddell, 112 U. S. 76
(1884);
In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532
(1895);
United States v. Mosley, 238 U.
S. 383,
238 U. S.
387-388 (1915);
United States v. Price,
383 U. S. 787,
383 U. S. 800
(1966);
United States v. Johnson, 390 U.
S. 563,
390 U. S.
565-566 (1968). Similarly, we have stated that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, derived from § 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, encompasses
federal statutory as well as constitutional rights.
Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651,
415 U. S. 675
(1974);
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397
(1970).
See generally Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Organization, 441 U. S. 600,
441 U. S. 646
(1979) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment).
[
Footnote 3/6]
Although
Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra at
403 U. S. 102
n. 9, did not reach the issue whether discrimination on a basis
other than race may be vindicated under § 1985(3), the Court
correctly assumes that the answer to this question is "Yes." The
statute broadly refers to all privileges and immunities, without
any limitation as to the class of persons to whom these rights may
be granted. It is clear that sex discrimination may be sufficiently
invidious to come within the prohibition of § 1985(3),
see
infra at
442 U. S. 392.
See generally Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.
S. 199 (1977);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S.
71 (1971);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.
S. 495,
427 U. S. 506
(1976).
[
Footnote 3/7]
This is analogous to
United States v. Johnson, supra,
where the basis for a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 241 was a
conspiracy to deny the substantive right to equality in public
accommodations guaranteed under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
[
Footnote 3/8]
See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441
U.S. at
441 U. S. 602;
id. at
441 U. S. 623
(POWELL, J., concurring);
id. at
441 U. S. 646
(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment);
id. at
441 U. S. 672
(STEWART, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 3/9]
Section 706(b) of Title VII. 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(b),
contemplates suit only "on or behalf of . . . person[s] . . .
aggrieved" under § 703 or § 704.
[
Footnote 3/10]
It is, of course, theoretically possible that an individual
could be injured by a conspiracy to violate his Title VII rights
even though that conspiracy was never brought to fruition, and thus
there was no violation of Title VII itself.
[
Footnote 3/11]
Title VII authorizes only equitable relief, including backpay
for a period not to exceed two years.
See § 706(g), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
[
Footnote 3/12]
See nn.
442
U.S. 366fn3/5|>5,
442
U.S. 366fn3/7|>7,
supra.
[
Footnote 3/13]
The Court asserts,
ante at
442 U. S. 378,
that its holding is required for "the same basic reasons that
underlay the Court's decision in
Brown v. GSA," as
reinforced by the consideration that § 1985(3) is assertedly purely
remedial. But the majority opinion utterly fails to explain in what
way the basis for the decision in
Brown -- clear
congressional intent -- is applicable in this case.
Brown
concerned the peculiar legislative context in which the extension
of Title VII to federal employment was enacted, stressing that
Congress was under the impression that there was, at that time
(1972), no other effective judicial remedy for federal
discriminatory action. By contrast, this case concerns private
discrimination which, of course, has been encompassed by Title VII
since the original enactment of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.
Brown expressly reaffirmed the conclusion of our previous
cases that, with respect to private employment,
"the explicit legislative history of the 1964 Act . . .
'manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue
independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable
state and federal statutes,'"
Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. at
425 U. S. 833,
quoting
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.
S. 454,
421 U. S. 459
(1975);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36,
415 U. S. 48
(1974).
[
Footnote 3/14]
See cases cited in
442
U.S. 366fn3/13|>n. 13,
supra; Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. at
427 U. S.
174-175.
[
Footnote 3/15]
Because § 1985(3) refers to all federal rights, it is irrelevant
that the particular right sought to be vindicated thereunder was
not in existence at the time the cause of action was enacted.
Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528
(1974);
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397
(1970) (cause of action under § 1983 to vindicate right under
subsequently enacted statute);
United States v. Johnson,
390 U. S. 563
(1968) (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 241 for violation of
subsequently enacted statute);
see also United States v.
Waddell, 112 U. S. 76
(1884).
[
Footnote 3/16]
Cf. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.
S. 587,
364 U. S.
593-594 (1961);
Krulewitch v. United States,
336 U. S. 440,
336 U. S.
448-449 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring);
Pinkerton
v. United States, 328 U. S. 640,
328 U. S. 654
(1946).
[
Footnote 3/17]
See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
436 U. S. 658,
436 U. S. 665,
and n. 11 (1978);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
99-102.
[
Footnote 3/18]
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871) (Sen. Edmunds).
The passage from which this remark is excerpted is also
instructive:
"The second section, it will be observed, only provides for the
punishment of a conspiracy. It does not provide for the punishment
of any act done in pursuance of the conspiracy, but only a
conspiracy to deprive citizens of the United States, in the various
ways named, of the rights which the Constitution and the laws of
the United States made pursuant to it give to them; that is to say,
conspiracies to overthrow the Government, conspiracies to impede
the course of justice, conspiracies to deprive people of the equal
protection of the laws, whatever those laws may be. It does not
provide, as I say, for any punishment for any act which these
conspirators shall do in furtherance of the conspiracy. It punishes
the conspiracy alone, leaving the States, if they see fit, to
punish the acts and crimes which may be committed in pursuance of
the conspiracy. I confess that I thought myself it was desirable,
to make the bill complete, to make it completely logical and
completely effective, that a section should have been added
providing not only for punishing the conspiracy, but providing also
in the same way for punishing any act done in pursuance of the
conspiracy. This section gives a civil action to anybody who shall
be injured by the conspiracy, but does not punish an act done as a
crime."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 3/19]
The majority recognizes that Congress has explicitly noted that
Title VII does not preempt redress of grievances under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
ante at
442 U. S. 377
n. 21.
See H.R.Rep. No. 92-238, P. 19 (June 2, 1971);
S.Rep. No. 92-415, p. 24 (Oct. 28, 1971). This Court did not
resurrect § 1985(3),
Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra, (June
7, 1971), from its interment under
Collins v. Hardyman,
341 U. S. 651
(1951), until one week after the House Report was filed; neither
Report mentions § 1985(3), nor does the Senate Report mention
Griffin.
[
Footnote 3/20]
Petitioners argue that neither the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor the Commerce Clause grants Congress
authority to reach private conspiracies to deny Title VII rights
such as are involved in this case. But petitioners do not dispute
that the Commerce Clause is the source of authority for the
enactment of Title VII, and Congress needs no additional grant of
authority to prohibit, and provide a remedy for, invidious
conspiracies to deny such rights.