California and Nevada entered into a Compact, later consented to
by Congress, to create respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA) to coordinate and regulate development in the Lake Tahoe
Basin resort area and to conserve its natural resources. The
Compact authorized TRPA to adopt and enforce a regional plan for
land use, transportation, conservation, recreation, and public
services. Petitioners, Basin property owners, brought suit in
Federal District Court alleging that TRPA and its individual
members and executive officer (also respondents) had adopted a land
use ordinance that destroyed the value of petitioners' property in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking
monetary and equitable relief. To support their federal claim,
petitioners asserted,
inter alia, that respondents had
acted under color of state law and that therefore their cause of
action was authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and jurisdiction was
provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The District Court dismissed the
complaint, holding that, although a cause of action for "inverse
condemnation" was sufficiently alleged, the action could not be
maintained against TRPA because it had no authority to condemn
property, and that the individual respondents were immune from
liability. The Court of Appeals, while reinstating the complaint
against the individual respondents on other grounds, rejected
petitioners' claims based on §§ 1983 and 1343, holding that
congressional approval had transformed the Compact into federal
law, with the result that respondents had acted pursuant to federal
authority, rather than under color of state law. The court further
held that TRPA was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment,
and that with respect to the individual respondents they should be
absolutely immune for conduct of a legislative character and
qualifiedly immune for executive action.
Held:
1. Petitioners stated a cause of action under § 1983, and hence
properly invoked federal jurisdiction under § 1343. The requirement
of federal approval of the Compact did not foreclose a finding that
respondents' conduct was "under color of state law" within the
meaning of § 1983. The facts with respect to TRPA's operation --
such as that its implementation depended upon the appointment of
members by
Page 440 U. S. 392
both States and their subdivisions and upon financing by
counties; that the appointees, in discharging their duties as TRPA
officials, also serve the interests of the appointing units; that
federal involvement is limited to the appointment of one nonvoting
member; and that each State has an absolute right to withdraw from
the Compact -- adequately characterize respondents' alleged actions
as "under color of state law." Pp.
440 U. S.
398-400.
2. TRPA is not immune from liability under the Eleventh
Amendment. The States' intention in creating TRPA, the terms of the
Compact, and TRPA's actual operation make clear that nothing short
of an absolute rule would allow TRPA to claim sovereign immunity,
and, because the Eleventh Amendment prescribes no such rule, TRPA
is subject to "the judicial power of the United States" within the
meaning of that Amendment. Pp.
440 U. S.
400-402.
3. To the extent that the evidence discloses that the individual
respondents were acting in a legislative capacity, they are
entitled to absolute immunity from federal damages liability.
"Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private
indulgence but for the public good,"
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367,
341 U. S. 377,
and this reasoning is equally applicable to federal, state, and
regional legislators. Whatever potential damages liability regional
legislators may face as a matter of state law, petitioners' federal
claims do not encompass the recovery of damages from TRPA members
acting in a legislative capacity. Pp.
440 U. S.
402-406.
566 F.2d 1353, reversed in part and affirmed in part.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined, and in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined
in part. BRENNAN, J.,
post, p.
440 U. S. 406,
and MARSHALL, J.,
post, p.
440 U. S. 406,
filed opinions dissenting in part. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion
dissenting in part, in Part I of which BRENNAN, J., joined,
post, p.
440 U. S.
408.
Page 440 U. S. 393
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, an entity created by Compact between California
and Nevada, is entitled to the immunity that the Eleventh Amendment
provides to the compacting States themselves. [
Footnote 1] 436 U.S. 943. The case also presents
the question whether the individual members of the Agency's
governing body are entitled to absolute immunity from federal
damages claims when acting in a legislative capacity.
Lake Tahoe, a unique mountain lake, is located partly in
California and partly in Nevada. The Lake Tahoe Basin, an area
comprising 500 square miles, is a popular resort area that has
grown rapidly in recent years. [
Footnote 2]
Page 440 U. S. 394
In 1968, the States of California and Nevada agreed to create a
single agency to coordinate and regulate development in the Basin
and to conserve its natural resources. As required by the
Constitution, [
Footnote 3] in
1969, Congress gave it consent to the Compact, and the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) was organized. [
Footnote 4] The Compact authorized TRPA to adopt
and to enforce a regional plan for land use, transportation,
conservation, recreation, and public services. [
Footnote 5]
Petitioners own property in the Lake Tahoe Basin. In 1973, they
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California alleging that TRPA, the individual
members of its governing body, and its executive officer had
adopted a land use ordinance and general plan, and engaged in other
conduct, that destroyed the economic value of petitioners'
property. [
Footnote 6]
Petitioners alleged that respondents had thereby taken their
property without due process of law and without just compensation
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States. They sought monetary and
equitable relief.
Petitioners advanced alternative theories to support their
Page 440 U. S. 395
federal claim. First, they asserted that the alleged violations
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments gave rise to an implied
cause of action, comparable to the claim based on an alleged
violation of the Fourth Amendment recognized in
Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.
S. 388, and that jurisdiction could be predicated on 28
U.S.C. § 1331. [
Footnote 7]
Second, they claimed that respondents had acted under color of
state law, and therefore their cause of action was authorized by 42
U.S.C. § 1983 [
Footnote 8] and
jurisdiction was provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1343. [
Footnote 9]
The District Court dismissed the complaint. Although it
concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of
Page 440 U. S. 396
action for "inverse condemnation," [
Footnote 10] it held that such an action could not be
brought against TRPA because that agency did not have the authority
to condemn property. The court also held that the individual
defendants were immune from liability for the exercise of the
discretionary functions alleged in the complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of TRPA, but reinstated the complaint against the
individual respondents. 566 F.2d 1353. Addressing first the
questions of cause of action and jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals
rejected petitioners' claims based on §§ 1983 and 1343. The court
held that congressional approval had transformed the Compact
between the States into federal law. As a result, the respondents
were acting pursuant to federal authority, rather than under color
of state law, and §§ 1983 and 1343 could not be invoked to provide
a cause of action and federal jurisdiction. But the court accepted
petitioners' alternative argument: it held that they had alleged a
deprivation of due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, that an implied remedy comparable to that upheld in
Bivens, supra, was available, and that federal
jurisdiction was provided by § 1331.
Having found a cause of action and a basis for federal
jurisdiction, the court turned to the immunity questions. Although
the point had not been argued, the Court of Appeals decided that
the Eleventh Amendment immunized TRPA from suit in a federal court.
With respect to the individual respondents, the Court of Appeals
held that absolute immunity should be afforded for conduct of a
legislative character and qualified immunity for executive action.
Since the record did not adequately disclose whether the challenged
conduct was legislative or executive, the court remanded for a
hearing.
Petitioners ask this Court to hold that TRPA is not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the individual
Page 440 U. S. 397
respondents are not entitled to absolute immunity when acting in
a legislative capacity. Because none of the respondents filed a
cross-petition for certiorari, we have no occasion to review the
Court of Appeals' additional holding that a violation of the Due
Process Clause was adequately alleged. [
Footnote 11] For purposes of our decision, we assume
the sufficiency of those allegations.
Page 440 U. S. 398
I
Before addressing the immunity issues, we must consider whether
petitioners properly invoked the Jurisdiction of a federal court.
While respondents did not cross-petition for certiorari, they now
argue that the
Bivens rationale does not apply to a claim
based on the deprivation of property, rather than liberty, and
therefore the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional analysis was
defective.
We do not normally address any issues other than those fairly
comprised within the questions presented by the petition for
certiorari and any cross-petitions. An exception to this rule is
the question of jurisdiction: even if not raised by the parties, we
cannot ignore the absence of federal jurisdiction. In this case,
however, respondents' attack on the Court of Appeals'
Bivens holding fails to support dismissal for want of
jurisdiction for two reasons.
First, respondents' "jurisdictional" arguments are not squarely
directed at jurisdiction itself, but rather at the existence of a
remedy for the alleged violation of their federal rights. Faced
with a similar claim in
Mt. Healthy Board of Ed. v. Doyle,
429 U. S. 274, we
found that the cause of action argument was "not of the
jurisdictional sort which the Court raises on its own motion."
Id. at
429 U. S. 279.
Since the petitioners in
Mt. Healthy had "failed to
preserve the issue whether the complaint stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted,"
id. at
429 U. S. 281,
the Court simply assumed, without deciding, that the suit could
properly be brought.
Second, even if the lack of a cause of action were considered a
jurisdictional defect in a suit brought under § 1331, [
Footnote 12] we may not dismiss for
that reason if the record discloses that federal jurisdiction does,
in fact, exist. In this case, we need not even reach the
Bivens question to conclude that there is both a cause of
action and federal jurisdiction.
Page 440 U. S. 399
Section 1983 provides a remedy for individuals alleging
deprivations of their constitutional right by action taken "under
color of state law." The Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that
the requirement of federal approval of the interstate Compact
foreclosed the possibility that the conduct of TRPA and its
officers could be found to be "under color of state law" within the
meaning of § 1983. [
Footnote
13]
The Compact had its genesis in the actions of the compacting
States, and it remains part of the statutory law of both States.
[
Footnote 14] The actual
implementation of TRPA, after federal approval was obtained,
depended upon the appointment of governing members and executives
by the two States and their subdivisions and upon mandatory
financing secured, by the terms of the Compact, from the counties.
[
Footnote 15] In discharging
their duties as officials of TRPA, the state and county appointees
necessarily have also served the interests of the political units
that appointed them. The federal involvement, by contrast, is
limited to the appointment of one nonvoting member to the governing
board. [
Footnote 16] While
congressional consent to the original Compact was required, the
States may confer additional powers and duties on TRPA without
further congressional action. And each State retains an absolute
right to withdraw from the Compact.
Even if it were not well settled that § 1983 must be given
Page 440 U. S. 400
a liberal construction, [
Footnote 17] these facts adequately characterize the
alleged actions of the respondents as "under color of state law"
within the meaning of that statute. Federal jurisdiction therefore
rests on § 1343, and there is no need to address the question
whether there is an implied remedy for violation of the Fifth or
the Fourteenth Amendment.
II
The Court of Appeals held that California and Nevada had
delegated authority ordinarily residing in each of those States to
TRPA. Because "the bi-state Authority serves as an agency of the
participant states, exercising a specially aggregated slice of
state power," the court concluded "that the TRPA is protected by
sovereign immunity, preserved for the states by the Eleventh
Amendment." 566 F.2d at 1359-1360.
The reasoning of the Court of Appeals would extend Eleventh
Amendment immunity to every bistate agency unless that immunity
were expressly waived. TRPA argues that the propriety of this
result is evidenced by the special constitutional requirement of
congressional approval of any interstate compact. Any agency that
is so important that it could not even be created by the States
without a special Act of Congress should receive the same immunity
that is accorded to the States themselves.
We cannot accept such an expansive reading of the Eleventh
Amendment. By its terms, the protection afforded by that Amendment
is only available to "one of the United States." It is true, of
course, that some agencies exercising
Page 440 U. S. 401
state power have been permitted to invoke the Amendment in order
to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had
essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against
the State itself. [
Footnote
18] But the Court has consistently refused to construe the
Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as
counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a
"slice of state power." [
Footnote 19]
If an interstate compact discloses that the compacting States
created an agency comparable to a county or municipality, which has
no Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Amendment should not be
construed to immunize such an entity. Unless there is good reason
to believe that the States structured the new agency to enable it
to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the States
themselves, and that Congress concurred in that purpose, there
would appear to be no justification for reading additional meaning
into the limited language of the Amendment.
California and Nevada have both filed briefs in this Court
disclaiming any intent to confer immunity on TRPA. They point to
provisions of their Compact that indicate that TRPA is to be
regarded as a political subdivision, rather than an arm of the
State. Thus, TRPA is described in Art. III(a) as a "separate legal
entity," and in Art. VI(a) as a "political subdivision." Under the
terms of the Compact, 6 of the 10 governing members of TRPA are
appointed by counties and cities, and only 4 by the 2 States.
[
Footnote 20] Funding under
the
Page 440 U. S. 402
Compact must be provided by the counties, not the States.
[
Footnote 21] Finally,
instead of the state treasury being directly responsible for
judgments against TRPA, Art. VII(f) expressly provides that
obligations of TRPA shall not be binding on either State.
The regulation of land use is traditionally a function performed
by local governments. Concern with the proper performance of that
function in the bistate area was a primary motivation for the
creation of TRPA itself, and gave rise to the specific controversy
at issue in this litigation. Moreover, while TRPA, like cities,
towns, and counties, was originally created by the States, its
authority to make rules within its jurisdiction is not subject to
veto at the state level. Indeed, that TRPA is not, in fact, an arm
of the State subject to its control is perhaps most forcefully
demonstrated by the fact that California has resorted to litigation
in an unsuccessful attempt to impose its will on TRPA. [
Footnote 22]
The intentions of Nevada and California, the terms of the
Compact, and the actual operation of TRPA make clear that nothing
short of an absolute rule, such as that implicit in the holding of
the Court of Appeals, would allow TRPA to claim the sovereign
immunity provided by the Constitution to Nevada and California.
Because the Eleventh Amendment prescribes no such rule, we hold
that TRPA is subject to "the judicial power of the United States"
within the meaning of that Amendment. [
Footnote 23]
III
We turn, finally, to petitioners' challenge to the Court of
Appeals' holding that the individual respondents are absolutely
Page 440 U. S. 403
immune from federal damages liability for actions taken in their
legislative capacities.
The immunity of legislators from civil suit for what they do or
say as legislators has its roots in the parliamentary struggles of
16th- and 17th-century England; such immunity was consistently
recognized in the common law, and was taken as a matter of course
by our Nation's founders. [
Footnote 24] In
Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U. S. 367,
this Court reasoned that Congress, in enacting § 1983 as part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, could not have intended
"to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in
England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of
State and National Governments here."
341 U.S. at
341 U. S. 376.
It therefore held that state legislators are absolutely immune from
suit under § 1983 for actions "in the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity." 341 U.S. at
341 U. S.
376.
Petitioners do not challenge the validity of the holding in
Tenney, or of the decisions recognizing the absolute
immunity of federal legislators. [
Footnote 25] Rather, their claim is that absolute
immunity should be limited to the federal and state levels, and
should not extend to individuals acting in a legislative capacity
at a regional level. In support of this proposed distinction,
petitioners argue that the source of immunity for state legislators
is found in constitutional provisions, such as the Speech or Debate
Clause, which have no application to a body such as TRPA. In
addition, they point out that, because state legislatures have
effective means of disciplining their members that TRPA does not
have, the threat of possible
Page 440 U. S. 404
personal liability is necessary to deter lawless conduct by the
governing members of TRPA. [
Footnote 26]
We find these arguments unpersuasive. The Speech or Debate
Clause of the United States Constitution [
Footnote 27] is no more applicable to the members of
state legislatures than to the members of TRPA. The States are, of
course, free to adopt similar clauses in their own constitutions,
and many have, in fact, done so. [
Footnote 28] These clauses reflect the central importance
attached to legislative freedom in our Nation. But the absolute
immunity for state legislators recognized in
Tenney
reflected the Court's interpretation of federal law; the decision
did not depend on the presence of a speech or debate clause in the
constitution of any State, or on any particular set of state rules
or procedures available to discipline erring legislators. Rather,
the rule of that case recognizes the need for
Page 440 U. S. 405
immunity to protect the "public good." As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter pointed out:
"Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private
indulgence but for the public good. One must not expect uncommon
courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of little value
if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation
as to motives. The holding of this Court in
Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87,
10 U. S.
130, that it was not consonant with our scheme of
government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators
has remained unquestioned."
341 U.S. at
341 U. S.
377.
This reasoning is equally applicable to federal, state, and
regional legislators. [
Footnote
29] Whatever potential damages liability regional legislators
may face as a matter of state law, we hold that petitioners'
federal claims do not encompass the recovery of damages from the
members of TRPA acting in a legislative capacity. [
Footnote 30]
Page 440 U. S. 406
Like the Court of Appeals, we are unable to determine from the
record the extent to which petitioners seek to impose liability
upon the individual respondents for the performance of their
legislative duties. We agree, however, that, to the extent the
evidence discloses that these individuals were acting in a capacity
comparable to that of members of a state legislature, they are
entitled to absolute immunity from federal damages liability.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and
affirmed in part.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.
S. 651. The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
[
Footnote 2]
The Senate Report on the Compact describes the lake and its
background as follows:
"Lake Tahoe, a High Sierra Mountain lake, is famed for its
scenic beauty and pristine clarity. Of recent geologic origin, the
190-square-mile lake bore little evidence of even natural aging
processes when it was discovered by John Fremont in 1844. Because
of its size, its 1,645-foot depth and its physical features, Lake
Tahoe was able to resist pollution even when human activity began
accelerating as a result of settlement and early logging
operations. Even by 1962, its waters were still so transparent that
a metal disc 20 centimeters in diameter reportedly could be seen at
a depth of 136 feet and a light transmittance to a depth of nearly
500 feet as detected with hydrophotometer."
"Only two other sizable lakes in the world are of comparable
quality -- Crater Lake in Oregon, which is protected as part of the
Crater Lake National Park, and Lake Baikal in the Soviet Union.
Only Lake Tahoe, however, is so readily accessible from large
metropolitan centers and is so adaptable to urban development."
S.Rep. No. 91-510, pp. 3 l (1969).
[
Footnote 3]
Article I, § 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution provides:
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty
of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."
[
Footnote 4]
See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, 83 Stat. 360,
Cal.Gov't Code Ann. §§ 66800-66801 (West Supp. 1977), Nev.Rev.Stat.
§§ 277.190277.230 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Compact).
[
Footnote 5]
Compact, Arts. V and VI.
[
Footnote 6]
The States of California and Nevada and the county of El Dorado
were originally named as defendants but either were not properly
served or have been dismissed as parties.
[
Footnote 7]
The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. Title 28 U.S.C. §
1331, the general federal question jurisdiction statute, provides
in part:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States except
that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action
brought against the United States, any agency, thereof, or any
officer or employee thereof in his official capacity."
[
Footnote 8]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
[
Footnote 9]
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343 provides in part :
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:"
"
* * * *"
"(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States."
[
Footnote 10]
See 2 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.21 (rev. 3d
ed.1976).
[
Footnote 11]
The issue we do not address is clearly stated in the following
footnote to the Court of Appeals opinion:
"Under the strict standard of pleading called for by
Pacific
States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S.
176 . . . (1935), none of the complaints in any of the
cases on appeal would withstand a motion to dismiss. They lack
specific factual allegations which, if proved, would rebut the
presumption of constitutionality that the Pacific States Court
accorded acts of administrative and legislative bodies."
"Although
Pacific States has never been explicitly
overruled, we do not believe that it represents the present state
of the law, because it was decided two years before the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We find no
precedent in the Ninth Circuit applying Pacific State to an
analogous case since the Rules took effect."
"In
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 . . . (1957), the
Supreme Court explained the modern philosophy of pleading:"
""[A]ll the Rules require is
a short and plain statement of
the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. . . . The
Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill
in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and
accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate
a proper decision on the merits.""
"
Id. at
355 U. S. 47-48, . . .
(citations omitted)."
"Thus, a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency
unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of
the claim. 2A J. Moore, Federal Practice 12.08 (1975)."
"The allegations of 'taking,' even though phrased in terms of
inverse condemnation, are sufficient to show that appellants
complained that the TRPA exercised its police powers improperly,
and that they relied on the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments."
566 F.2d at 1359 n. 9.
[
Footnote 12]
See University of California Regents v. Bakke,
438 U. S. 265,
438 U. S. 380
(WHITE, J.);
United States v. Griffin, 303 U.
S. 226,
303 U. S.
229.
[
Footnote 13]
The fact that the Compact at issue here required congressional
consent to be effective clearly does not, itself, mean that action
taken pursuant to it does not qualify as being "under color of
state law." This Court has, in the past, accepted that state
regulations are properly considered "state law" even though they
required federal approval prior to their implementation.
See
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397;
Ring v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309.
[
Footnote 14]
See n 4,
supra.
[
Footnote 15]
Compact, Arts. III(a), VII(a).
[
Footnote 16]
§ 3, 83 Stat. 369. Section 6, 83 Stat. 369, also reserves to
Congress the right to require TRPA to furnish information and data
that it considers appropriate.
[
Footnote 17]
Section 1983 originated as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
In introducing that Act in Congress, Representative Shellabarger
pointed out:
"This act is remedial and in aid of the preservation of human
liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional
provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently
construed . . . the largest latitude consistent with the words
employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871).
[
Footnote 18]
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.
S. 651;
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of
Indiana, 323 U. S. 459.
[
Footnote 19]
See Mt. Healthy Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.
S. 274;
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.
S. 693,
411 U. S.
717-721;
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.
S. 529,
133 U. S. 530;
Compact, Art. VIII(b).
[
Footnote 20]
Compact, Art. III(a). In addition, 10 of the 17 members of the
Advisory Planning Commission established by the Compact are to be
associated with local agencies, 4 others are to be residents of the
region, and only 1 is from state government. Compact, Art. III
(h).
[
Footnote 21]
Compact, Art. VII(a)
[
Footnote 22]
See California v. TRPA, 516 F.2d 215 (CA9 1975).
[
Footnote 23]
Because of our disposition of this question, we need not address
petitioners' argument that, even assuming that TRPA might be
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, such protection was
affirmatively waived by the compacting States.
See Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bride Comm'n, 359 U.
S. 275.
[
Footnote 24]
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.
S. 367,
341 U. S.
372-375;
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.
S. 232,
416 U. S. 239
n. 4; Developments in the Law -- Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
Harv.L.Rev. 1133, 1200 (1977) (legislative immunity "enjoys a
unique historical position").
[
Footnote 25]
See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306;
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168.
[
Footnote 26]
In support of these arguments, petitioners invoke decisions of
the Courts of Appeals denying absolute immunity to subordinate
officials such as county supervisors and members of a park district
board.
Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1101 (CA8
1977) (school board members);
Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d
1090, 1101 (CA5 1975) (county supervisors);
Curry v.
Gillette, 461 F.2d 1003, 1005 (CA6 1972),
cert. denied sub
nom. Marsh v. Curry, 409 U.S. 1042 (alderman);
Progress
Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222, 231 (CA7 1961)
(members of park district board and village board of trustees);
Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312, 314-315 (CA6 1958) (city
commissioners);
Cobb v. Malden, 202 F.2d 701, 706-707 (CA1
1953) (McGruder, C.J., concurring) (city councilmen). Respondents,
on the other hand, contend that in most, if not all, of the cases
in which absolute immunity has been denied, the individuals were
not, in fact, acting in a legislative capacity. We need not resolve
this dispute. Whether individuals performing legislative functions
at the purely local level, as opposed to the regional level, should
be afforded absolute immunity from federal damages claims is a
question not presented in this case.
[
Footnote 27]
Article I, § 6, of the United States Constitution provides in
part that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators
and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
Place."
[
Footnote 28]
See Tenney v. Brandhove, supra at
341 U. S.
375.
[
Footnote 29]
There is no allegation in this complaint that any members of
TRPA's governing board profited personally from the performance of
any legislative act. App. 8-12. If the respondents have enacted
unconstitutional legislation, there is no reason why relief against
TRPA itself should not adequately vindicate petitioners' interests.
See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
436 U. S. 658.
[
Footnote 30]
This holding is supported by the analysis in
Butz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478,
which recognized absolute immunity for individuals performing
judicial and prosecutorial functions within the Department of
Agriculture. In that case, we rejected the argument that absolute
immunity should be denied because the individuals were employed in
the Executive Branch, reasoning that
"[j]udges have absolute immunity not because of their particular
location within the Government, but because of the special nature
of their responsibilities."
Id. at
438 U. S. 511.
This reasoning also applies to legislators.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting in part.
I join Part I of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion dissenting in
part. In addition, I would not reach the question, which the Court
discusses in dicta,
ante at
440 U. S. 401,
whether compacting States can create an agency protected by
Eleventh Amendment immunity. In all other respects, I join the
Court's opinion.
MR JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting in part.
The Court today extends absolute immunity to nonelected regional
officials for their legislative acts. Because extension of such
extraordinary protection is without support in either precedent or
policy, I cannot join
440 U. S.
In
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.
S. 367 (1951), this Court declined to construe 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 as abrogating state legislators' unqualified immunity from
suits that arise out of their legislative activity. Underlying the
decision in
Tenney was a recognition of the unique status
of the legislative privilege, maintained for several centuries at
common law and enshrined in the Federal Constitution, Art. I, § 6,
as well as in all but seven of the States' constitutions. 341 U.S.
at
341 U. S.
372-375. Absent evidence of explicit congressional
intent,
Page 440 U. S. 407
the Court was unwilling to strip state legislators of a
protection so long enjoyed when there remained power in the voters
to "discourag[e] or correc[t]" abuses by their elected
representatives.
Id. at
341 U. S.
378.
Neither of the premises on which
Tenney rested can
sustain today's holding. Immunity for appointed regional officials
is without common law antecedents or state constitutional status.
Even the Compact does not purport to confer immunity on TRPA
officials, and neither California nor Nevada has claimed any such
intent in the briefs filed in the instant case. More significantly,
none of TRPA's 10-member governing board is elected. Six are
appointed by county and city governments in the area, two are
appointed by the Governors of California and Nevada, respectively,
and two are members by virtue of their offices in state natural
resource agencies. Compact, Art. III(a). Thus, no member of the
board is directly accountable to the public for his legislative
acts. To cloak these officials with absolute protection where
control by the electorate is so attenuated subverts the very system
of checks and balances that the doctrine of legislative privilege
was designed to secure. Insulating appointed officials from
liability, no matter how egregious their "legislative" misconduct,
is unlikely to enhance the integrity of the decisional process. Nor
will public support for the outcome of such processes be fostered
by a scheme placing these decisionmakers beyond constitutional
constraints.
Equally troubling is the majority's refusal to confront the
logical implications of its analysis. To be sure, the Court
expressly reserves the question whether individuals performing
legislative functions at the local level should be afforded
absolute immunity from federal damages claims.
Ante at
440 U. S. 404,
n. 26. But the majority's reasoning in this case leaves little room
to argue that municipal legislators stand on a different footing
than their regional counterparts. Surely the Court's supposition
that the "cost and inconvenience and distractions
Page 440 U. S. 408
of a trial" will impede officials in the "
uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duty,'" ante at
440 U. S. 405,
quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 341 U. S. 377,
applies with equal force whether the officials occupy local or
regional positions. Moreover, the Court implies that the test for
conferring unqualified immunity is purely functional. Ante
at 440 U. S. 405
n. 30. If the sole inquiry under that test is the nature of the
officials' responsibilities, see ibid., not the common law
and constitutional underpinnings of the privilege itself or the
wisdom of extending it to nonelected officials, then presumably any
appointed member of a municipal government can claim absolute
protection for his legislative acts.
A doctrine that denies redress for constitutional wrongs should,
in my judgment, be narrowly confined to those contexts where
history and public policy compel its acceptance. Today's decision
both expands the scope of immunity beyond such limits and lays the
groundwork for further extension.
I respectfully dissent.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins as to
Part I, dissenting in part.
I
I cannot conclude so easily, as the Court does,
ante at
440 U. S.
405-406, that the members of TRPA are absolutely immune
from liability from federal claims for what ultimately may be
determined to be legislative acts. Nor do I know what the Court
means by a "regional legislator" -- other than its conclusion that
members of TRPA are such -- or where the line is now to be drawn
between a "regional legislator" and a member of a public body
somewhat farther down the scale of entities in our varied political
structures.
It is difficult for me to associate the members of TRPA with
federal or state legislators. Their duties are not solely
legislative; they possess some executive powers. They are not in
equipoise with other branches of government, and the concept
Page 440 U. S. 409
of separation of powers has no relevance to them. They are not
subject to the responsibility and the brake of the electoral
process. And there is no provision for discipline within the body,
as the Houses of Congress and the state legislatures possess.
I therefore am not now prepared to agree that the members of
TRPA enjoy absolute immunity, against federal claims, for their
"legislative" acts. I think they are entitled to qualified immunity
within the limitations outlined in
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232
(1974), and
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.
S. 478 (1978). Those cases, it seems to me, set forth
the guidelines appropriate for this one, and I would follow them in
the present context.
II
I also do not join the Court in its flat ruling,
ante
at
440 U. S. 404,
that the Speech or Debate Clause of our Federal Constitution, Art.
I, § 6, has no application to state legislatures. That may well be,
but some federal courts have ruled otherwise,
Eslinger v.
Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 228 (CA4 1973) (holding the Clause to be
applicable);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577,
582-583 (CA3 1977), and
United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d
284, 286 (CA6 1978) (both recognizing a federal common law speech
or debate privilege for state legislators based in part on the
federal Speech or Debate Clause), and the controversy on this point
remains a live one.
See United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d
773, 776 (CA7),
opinion on rehearing en banc, 537 F.2d
957,
cert. denied sub nom. Markert v. United States, 429
U.S. 999 (1976). Because the issue of application of the Clause to
state legislatures (as distinguished from TRPA) is not presented
here, I would not decide it with a passing fiat.