Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 requires that wiretapping or electronic surveillance "be
conducted in such a way as to minimize" the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under that
Title. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976 ed.). Pursuant to a court wiretap
authorization order requiring such minimization, Government agents
intercepted for a one-month period virtually all conversations over
a particular telephone suspected of being used in furtherance of a
conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics. Forty percent of the
calls were clearly narcotics related, and the remaining calls were
for the most part very short, such as wrong-number calls, and calls
to persons unavailable to come to the phone, or were ambiguous in
nature, and in a few instances were between the person to whom the
telephone was registered and her mother. After the interceptions
were terminated, petitioners, among others, were indicted for
various narcotics offenses. The District Court, on petitioners'
pretrial motion, ordered suppression of all the intercepted
conversations and derivative evidence, on the ground that the
agents had failed to comply with the wiretap order's minimization
requirement, primarily because only 40% of the conversations were
shown to be narcotics related. The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, stating that the District Court should not have based its
determination upon a general comparison of the number of
narcotics-related calls with the total number of calls intercepted,
but rather should have engaged in a particularized assessment of
the reasonableness of the agents' attempts to minimize in light of
the purpose of the wiretap and information available to the agents
at the time of interception. On remand, the District Court again
ordered suppression, relying largely on the fact that the agents
were aware of the minimization requirement "but made no attempt to
comply therewith." The Court of Appeals again reversed, holding
that the District Court had yet to apply the correct standard, that
the decision on the suppression motion ultimately had to be based
on the reasonableness of the actual interceptions, and not on
whether the agents subjectively intended to minimize their
interceptions, and that suppression in this case was not
Page 436 U. S. 129
appropriate. Petitioners were eventually convicted, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. The proper approach for evaluating compliance with the
minimization requirement, like evaluation of all alleged violations
of the Fourth Amendment, is objectively to assess the agent's or
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting him at the time, without regard to his underlying
intent or motive. Pp.
436 U. S.
135-138.
2. Even if the agents fail to make good faith efforts at
minimization, that is not itself a violation of the statute
requiring suppression, since the use of the word "conducted" in §
2518(5) makes it clear that the focus was to be on the agents'
actions, not their motives, and since the legislative history shows
that the statute was not intended to extend the scope of
suppression beyond search and seizure law under the Fourth
Amendment. Pp.
436 U. S.
138-139.
3. The Court of Appeals did not err in rejecting petitioners'
minimization claim, but properly analyzed the reasonableness of the
wiretap. Pp.
436 U. S.
139-143.
(a) Blind reliance on the percentage of nonpertinent calls
intercepted is not a sure guide to the correct answer. While such
percentages may provide assistance, there are cases, like this one,
where the percentage of nonpertinent calls is relatively high and
yet their interception was still reasonable. P.
436 U. S.
140.
(b) It is also important to consider the circumstances of the
wiretap, such as whether more extensive surveillance may be
justified because of a suspected widespread conspiracy, or the type
of use to which the wiretapped telephone is normally put. P.
436 U. S.
140.
(c) Other factors, such as the exact point during the authorized
period at which the interception was made, may be significant in a
particular case. P.
436 U. S.
141.
(d) As to most of the calls here that were not
narcotics-related, such calls did not give the agents an
opportunity to develop a category of innocent calls that should not
have been intercepted, and hence their interception cannot be
viewed as a violation of the minimization requirement. As to the
calls between the telephone registrant and her mother, it cannot be
said that, even though they turned out not to be relevant to the
investigation, the Court of Appeals was incorrect in concluding
that the agents did not act unreasonably at the time they made
these interceptions. Pp.
436 U. S.
142-143.
179 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 551 F.2d 467, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ., joined.
Page 436 U. S. 130
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined,
post, p.
436 U. S.
143.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which deals with wiretapping and
other forms of electronic surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 2520 (1976
ed.). In this Act, Congress, after this Court's decisions in
Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41
(1967), and
Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 (1967), set out to provide law enforcement
officials with some of the tools thought necessary to combat crime
without unnecessarily infringing upon the right of individual
privacy.
See generally S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968). We have had occasion in the past, the most recent
being just last Term, to consider exactly how the statute
effectuates this balance. [
Footnote
1] This case requires us to construe the statutory requirement
that wiretapping or electronic surveillance "be conducted in such a
way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise
subject to interception under this chapter. . . ." 18 U.S.C. §
2518(5) (1976 ed.).
Pursuant to judicial authorization which required such
minimization, Government agents intercepted all the phone
conversations over a particular phone for a period of one
Page 436 U. S. 131
month The District Court for the District of Columbia suppressed
all intercepted conversations and evidence derived therefrom in
essence because the
"admitted knowing and purposeful failure by the monitoring
agents to comply with the minimization order was unreasonable . . .
even if every intercepted call were narcotic-related."
App. 39. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, concluding that an assessment of the
reasonableness of the efforts at minimization first requires an
evaluation of the reasonableness of the actual interceptions in
light of the purpose of the wiretap and the totality of the
circumstances before any inquiry is made into the subjective intent
of the agents conducting the surveillance. 170 U.S.App.D.C. 158,
516 F.2d 751 (1975). We granted certiorari to consider this
important question, 434 U.S. 888 (1977), and, finding ourselves in
basic agreement with the Court of Appeals, affirm.
I
In January, 1970, Government officials applied, pursuant to
Title III, for authorization to wiretap a telephone registered to
Geneva Jenkins. [
Footnote 2]
The supporting affidavits alleged that there was probable cause to
believe nine individuals, all named, were participating in a
conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics in the Washington,
D.C., area, and that Geneva Jenkins' telephone had been used in
furtherance of the conspiracy, particularly by petitioner Thurmon,
who was then living with Jenkins. The District Court granted the
application on January 24, 1970, authorizing agents to "[i]ntercept
the wire communications of Alphonso H. Lee, Bernis Lee Thurmon, and
other persons as may make use of the facilities hereinbefore
described." App. 80. The order also required the agents to conduct
the wiretap in "such a way as to minimize
Page 436 U. S. 132
the interception of communications that are [not] otherwise
subject to interception" under the Act [
Footnote 3] and to report to the court every five days
"the progress of the interception and the nature of the
communication intercepted."
Ibid. Interception began that
same day, and continued, pursuant to a judicially authorized
extension, until February 24, 1970, with the agents making the
periodic reports to the judge as required. Upon cessation of the
interceptions, search and arrest warrants were executed which led
to the arrest of 22 persons and the indictment of 14.
Before trial the defendants, including petitioners Scott and
Thurmon, moved to suppress all the intercepted conversations on a
variety of grounds. After comprehensive discovery and an extensive
series of hearings, the District Court held that the agents had
failed to comply with the minimization requirement contained in the
wiretap order and ordered suppression of the intercepted
conversations and all derivative evidence. The court relied in
large part on the fact that virtually all the conversations were
intercepted, while only 40% of them were shown to be
narcotics-related. This, the court reasoned, "strongly indicate[d]
the indiscriminate use of wire surveillance that was proscribed by
Katz [
Footnote 4] and
Berger." [
Footnote 5]
331 F.
Supp. 233, 247 (DC 1971).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed and remanded, stating that the District Court should not
have based its determination upon a general comparison of the
number of narcotics-related calls with the total number of calls
intercepted, but rather should have engaged in a particularized
assessment of the reasonableness of the agents' attempts to
minimize in light of the purpose of the wiretap and the information
available to the agents at the time of
Page 436 U. S. 133
interception. 164 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 129, 504 F.2d 194, 198
(1974). [
Footnote 6]
Upon remand, the District Court again ordered suppression, this
time relying largely on the fact that the agents were aware of the
minimization requirement, "but made no attempt to comply
therewith." App. 37, 38. [
Footnote
7]
"The admitted knowing
Page 436 U. S. 134
and purposeful failure by the monitoring agents to comply with
the minimization order was unreasonable . . . even if every
intercepted call were narcotic-related."
Id. at 39. The Court of Appeals again reversed, holding
that the District Court had yet to apply the correct standard. 170
U.S.App.D.C. 158, 516 F.2d 751 (1975). The court recognized that
the
"presence or absence of a good faith attempt to minimize on the
part of the agents is undoubtedly one factor to be considered in
assessing whether the minimization requirement has been
satisfied,"
but went on to hold that
"the decision on the suppression motion must ultimately be based
on the reasonableness of the actual interceptions, and not on
whether the agents subjectively intended to minimize their
interceptions."
Id. at 163, 516 F.2d at 756. Then, because of the
extended period of time which had elapsed since the commission of
the offense in question, that court itself examined the intercepted
conversations and held that suppression was not appropriate in this
case because the court could not conclude that "some conversation
was intercepted which clearly would not have been intercepted had
reasonable attempts at minimization been made."
Id. at
164, 516 F.2d at 757. [
Footnote
8] On the remand from the Court of Appeals, following a nonjury
trial on stipulated evidence which consisted primarily of
petitioners' intercepted conversations, Scott was found guilty of
selling and purchasing narcotics not in the original stamped
package,
see 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1964 ed.), and Thurmon
of conspiracy to sell narcotics,
see 26 U.S.C. §§ 7237(b)
and 4705(a) (1964 ed.). [
Footnote
9] The Court of Appeals affirmed
Page 436 U. S. 135
the convictions, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 551 F.2d 467 (1977), and
we granted certiorari. 434 U.S. 888 (1977).
II
Petitioners' principal contention is that the failure to make
good faith efforts to comply with the minimization requirement is
itself a violation of § 2518(5). They urge that it is only after an
assessment is made of the agents' good faith efforts, and
presumably a determination that the agents did make such efforts,
that one turns to the question of whether those efforts were
reasonable under the circumstances.
See Reply Brief for
Petitioner 4-5. Thus, argue petitioners, Agent Cooper's testimony,
which is basically a concession that the Government made no efforts
which resulted in the noninterception of any call, is dispositive
of the matter. The so-called "call analysis," which was introduced
by the Government to suggest the reasonableness of intercepting
most of the calls, cannot lead to a contrary conclusion, because,
having been prepared after the fact by a Government attorney and
using terminology and categories which were not indicative of the
agents' thinking at the time of the interceptions, it does not
reflect the perceptions and mental state of the agents who actually
conducted the wiretap.
The Government responds that petitioners' argument fails to
properly distinguish between what is necessary to establish a
statutory or constitutional violation and what is necessary to
support a suppression remedy once a violation has been established.
[
Footnote 10] In view of the
deterrent purposes of the exclusionary
Page 436 U. S. 136
rule, consideration of official motives may play some part in
determining whether application of the exclusionary rule is
appropriate after a statutory or constitutional violation has been
established. But the existence
vel non of such a violation
turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time.
Subjective intent alone, the Government contends, does not make
otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional. [
Footnote 11]
Page 436 U. S. 137
We think the Government's position, which also served as the
basis for decision in the Court of Appeals, embodies the proper
approach for evaluating compliance with the minimization
requirement. Although we have not examined this exact question at
great length in any of our prior opinions, almost without
exception, in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment
of an officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances
then known to him. The language of the Amendment itself proscribes
only "unreasonable" searches and seizures. In
Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1,
392 U. S. 21-22
(1968), the Court emphasized the objective aspect of the term
"reasonable."
"And in justifying the particular intrusion, the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth
Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that, at some
point, the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who
must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure
in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that
assessment, it is imperative that the facts be judged against an
objective standard; would the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?"
(Footnotes omitted.)
See also Beck v. Ohio,
379 U. S. 89,
379 U. S. 96-97
(1964);
Henry v. United States, 361 U. S.
98,
361 U. S.
102-103 (1959).
Page 436 U. S. 138
We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have
the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which
provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify that action. In
United States v.
Robinson, 414 U. S. 218
(1973), a suspect was searched incident to a lawful arrest. He
challenged the search on the ground that the motivation for the
search did not coincide with the legal justification for the
"search incident to arrest" exception. We rejected this
argument:
"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to
the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did
not indicate any subjective fear of the respondent, or that he did
not himself suspect that respondent was armed."
Id. at
414 U. S. 236.
The Courts of Appeals which have considered the matter have
likewise generally followed these principles, first examining the
challenged searches under a standard of objective reasonableness
without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the
officers involved. [
Footnote
12]
Petitioners do not appear, however, to rest their argument
entirely on Fourth Amendment principles. Rather, they argue, in
effect, that, regardless of the search and seizure analysis
conducted under the Fourth Amendment, the statute regulating
wiretaps requires the agents to make good faith efforts at
Page 436 U. S. 139
minimization, and the failure to make such efforts is itself a
violation of the statute which requires suppression.
This argument fails for more than one reason. In the first
place, in the very section in which it directs minimization,
Congress, by its use of the word "conducted," made it clear that
the focus was to be on the agents' actions, not their motives. Any
lingering doubt is dispelled by the legislative history, which, as
we have recognized before in another context, declares that § 2515
was not intended "generally to press the scope of the suppression
role beyond present search and seizure law." S.Rep. No 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 96 (1968).
See Alderman v. United States,
394 U. S. 165,
394 U. S.
175-176 (1969). [
Footnote 13]
III
We turn now to the Court of Appeals' analysis of the
reasonableness of the agents' conduct in intercepting all of the
calls in this particular wiretap. Because of the necessarily
ad
hoc nature of any determination of reasonableness, there can
be no inflexible rule of law which will decide every case.
Page 436 U. S. 140
The statute does not forbid the interception of all nonrelevant
conversations, but rather instructs the agents to conduct the
surveillance in such a manner as to "minimize" the interception of
such conversations. Whether the agents have, in fact, conducted the
wiretap in such a manner will depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that blind reliance on the
percentage of nonpertinent calls intercepted is not a sure guide to
the correct answer. Such percentages may provide assistance, but
there are surely cases, such as the one at bar, where the
percentage of nonpertinent calls is relatively high and yet their
interception was still reasonable. The reasons for this may be
many. Many of the nonpertinent calls may have been very short.
Others may have been one-time only calls. Still other calls may
have been ambiguous in nature or apparently involved guarded or
coded language. In all these circumstances, agents can hardly be
expected to know that the calls are not pertinent prior to their
termination.
In determining whether the agents properly minimized, it is also
important to consider the circumstances of the wiretap. For
example, when the investigation is focusing on what is thought to
be a widespread conspiracy, more extensive surveillance may be
justified in an attempt to determine the precise scope of the
enterprise. And it is possible that many more of the conversations
will be permissibly interceptable because they will involve one or
more of the coconspirators. The type of use to which the telephone
is normally put may also have some bearing on the extent of
minimization required. For example, if the agents are permitted to
tap a public telephone because one individual is thought to be
placing bets over the phone, substantial doubts as to minimization
may arise if the agents listen to every call which goes out over
that phone, regardless of who places the call. On the other hand,
if the phone is located in the residence of a person who is thought
to be the head of a major drug ring, a contrary conclusion may be
indicated.
Page 436 U. S. 141
Other factors may also play a significant part in a particular
case. For example, it may be important to determine at exactly what
point during the authorized period the interception was made.
During the early stages of surveillance, the agents may be forced
to intercept all calls to establish categories of nonpertinent
calls which will not be intercepted thereafter. Interception of
those same types of calls might be unreasonable later on, however,
once the nonpertinent categories have been established and it is
clear that this particular conversation is of that type. Other
situations may arise where patterns of nonpertinent calls do not
appear. In these circumstances, it may not be unreasonable to
intercept almost every short conversation because the determination
of relevancy cannot be made before the call is completed.
After consideration of the minimization claim in this case in
the light of these observations, we find nothing to persuade us
that the Court of Appeals was wrong in its rejection of that claim.
[
Footnote 14] Forty percent
of the calls were clearly narcotics-related, and the propriety of
their interception is, of course, not in dispute. Many of the
remaining calls were very short, such as wrong-number calls, calls
to persons who were not available to come to the phone, and calls
to the telephone company to
Page 436 U. S. 142
hear the recorded weather message which lasts less than 90
seconds. In a case such as this, involving a wide-ranging
conspiracy with a large number of participants, even a seasoned
listener would have been hard pressed to determine with any
precision the relevancy of many of the calls before they were
completed. [
Footnote 15] A
large number were ambiguous in nature, making characterization
virtually impossible until the completion of these calls. And some
of the nonpertinent conversations were one-time conversations.
Since these calls did not give the agents an opportunity to develop
a category of innocent calls which should not have been
intercepted, their interception cannot be viewed as a violation of
the minimization requirement.
We are thus left with the seven calls between Jenkins and her
mother. The first four calls were intercepted over a three-day
period at the very beginning of the surveillance. They were of
relatively short length, and at least two of them indicated that
the mother may have known of the conspiracy. The next two calls,
which occurred about a week later, both contained statements from
the mother to the effect that she had something to tell Jenkins
regarding the "business," but did not want to do so over the phone.
The final call was substantially longer, and likewise contained a
statement which could have been interpreted as having some bearing
on the conspiracy,
i.e., that one "Reds," a suspect in the
conspiracy,
Page 436 U. S. 143
had called to ask for a telephone number. Although none of these
conversations turned out to be material to the investigation at
hand, we cannot say that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in
concluding that the agents did not act unreasonably at the time
they made these interceptions. Its judgment is accordingly
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.
S. 413 (1977), which involved that part of the Act which
requires the Government to identify the person, if known, whose
conversations are to be intercepted.
[
Footnote 2]
The application and subsequent court order identified the
subscriber as Geneva Thornton, but that was apparently an alias.
331 F.
Supp. 233, 236 (DC 1971).
[
Footnote 3]
The word "not" was inadvertently omitted, but the agents
apparently understood the intent of the order.
Id. at 245
n. 1.
[
Footnote 4]
Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 (1967).
[
Footnote 5]
Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41
(1967).
[
Footnote 6]
The District Court also made a number of other related rulings
which were affirmed on appeal. It upheld Title III against a claim
that the statute contravened the Fourth Amendment restriction
against unreasonable searches and seizures; determined that the
application and affidavits were sufficient on their face to
establish probable cause; and held that the order complied with the
requirements of the statute. Petitioners have not sought review of
any of these holdings. The Court of Appeals also held that Scott
could introduce evidence based on conversations in which he did not
participate to demonstrate that the intercepted conversations to
which he was a party were not seized "in conformity with the order
of authorization." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(iii) (1976 ed.).
See 164 U.S.App.D.C. at 127-128, 504 F.2d at 196-197.
[
Footnote 7]
This conclusion was based on the fact that virtually all calls
were intercepted and on the testimony of Special Agent Glennon
Cooper, the agent in charge of the investigation, who testified
that the only steps taken which actually resulted in the
nonreception of a conversation were those taken when the agents
discovered the wiretap had inadvertently been connected to an
improper line. The court laid particular stress on the following
exchange:
"BY THE COURT:"
"
* * * *"
"Q. The question I wish to ask you is this, whether at any time
during the course of the wiretap -- of the intercept, what if any
steps were taken by you or any agent under you to minimize the
listening?"
"A. Well, as I believe I mentioned before, I would have to say
that the only effective steps taken by us to curtail the reception
of conversations was in that instance where the line was connected
to -- misconnected from the correct line and connected to an
improper line. We discontinued at that time."
"Q. Do I understand from you then that the only time that you
considered minimization was when you found that you had been
connected with a wrong number?"
"A. That is correct, Your Honor."
App. 179.
[
Footnote 8]
The Court of Appeals, with four judges dissenting, denied
rehearing and rehearing en banc, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 118, 522 F.2d
1333 (1975), and we denied certiorari,
425 U.
S. 917 (1976). MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE POWELL dissented from the denial of
certiorari.
[
Footnote 9]
The specific statutes under which petitioners were convicted
were repealed in connection with the enactment of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1292.
[
Footnote 10]
The Government also argues that, even if the agents in this case
violated the minimization requirement by intercepting some
conversations which could not have reasonably been intercepted, §
2518(10) requires suppression of only those conversations which
were illegally intercepted, not suppression of all the intercepted
conversations.
See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d
1293, 1301-1302 (CA8 1972),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918
(1974);
United States v. Sisca, 361 F.
Supp. 735, 746-747 (SDNY 1973),
aff'd, 503 F.2d 1337
(CA2),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974);
United
States v. Mainello, 345 F.
Supp. 863, 874-877 (EDNY 1972);
United States v.
LaGorga, 336 F.
Supp. 190 (WD Pa.1971). It also renews its argument that
petitioner Scott does not have standing to raise a minimization
challenge based upon the interception of conversations to which he
was not a party. To permit such a challenge would allow Scott to
secure the suppression of evidence against him by showing that the
rights of other parties were violated. This, argues the Government,
would contravene well settled principles of Fourth Amendment law,
cf. Brown v. United States, 411 U.
S. 223,
411 U. S. 230
(1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.
S. 165,
394 U. S. 197
(1969);
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.
S. 377 (1968), which clearly apply to Title III cases,
see S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 91, 106 (1968);
Alderman v. United States, supra at
394 U. S.
175-176.
Given our disposition of this case, we find it unnecessary to
reach the Government's contention regarding the scope of the
suppression remedy in the event of a violation of the minimization
requirement. We also decline to address the Government's argument
with respect to standing. The Government concedes that petitioner
Thurmon was a party to some nonnarcotics-related calls, and thus
has standing to make the arguments advanced herein. Thus, even if
we were to decide that Scott has no standing, we would be compelled
to undertake the decision of these issues. If, on the other hand,
we were to decide that Scott does have standing, we would simply
repeat exactly the same analysis made with respect to Thurmon's
claim, and find against Scott as well. In this circumstance, we
need not decide the questions of Scott's standing.
See
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S.
21,
416 U. S. 44 45
(1974);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179,
410 U. S. 189
(1973).
[
Footnote 11]
The Government also adds that, even if subjective intent were
the standard, the record does not support the District Court's
conclusion that the agents subjectively intended to violate the
statute or the Constitution. It contends that the failure to stop
intercepting calls, the interception of which was entirely
reasonable, does not support a finding that the agents would have
intercepted calls that should not have been intercepted had they
been confronted with that situation. We express no view on this
matter.
[
Footnote 12]
See, e.g., United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d
853, 854 n. 1 (CA9 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136
(1974) ("The fact that the agents were intending at the time they
stopped the car to search it in any event . . . does not render the
search, supported by independent probable cause, invalid");
Dodd v. Beto, 435 F.2d 868, 870 (CA5 1970) ,
cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971);
Klingler v. United
States, 409 F.2d 299, 304 (CA8),
cert. denied, 396
U.S. 859 (1969);
Green v. United States, 386 F.2d 953, 956
(CA10 1967);
Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699, 702
(CA10),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963). As is our usual
custom, we do not, in citing these or other cases, intend to
approve any particular language or holding in them.
[
Footnote 13]
This is not to say, of course, that the question of motive plays
absolutely no part in the suppression inquiry. On occasion, the
motive with which the officer conducts an illegal search may have
some relevance in determining the propriety of applying the
exclusionary rule. For example, in
United States v. Janis,
428 U. S. 433,
428 U. S. 458
(1976), we ruled that evidence unconstitutionally seized by state
police could be introduced in federal civil tax proceedings,
because
"the imposition of the exclusionary rule . . . is unlikely to
provide significant, much less substantial, additional deterrence.
It falls outside the offending officer's zone of primary
interest."
See also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.
S. 268,
435 U. S.
276-277 (1978). This focus on intent, however, becomes
relevant only after it has been determined that the Constitution
was in fact violated. We also have little doubt that, as a
practical matter, the judge's assessment of the motives of the
officers may occasionally influence his judgment regarding the
credibility of the officers' claims with respect to what
information was or was not available to them at the time of the
incident in question. But the assessment and use of motive in this
limited manner is irrelevant to our analysis of the questions at
issue in this case.
[
Footnote 14]
Petitioners argue that the
"district court found that the call analysis contained errors of
characterization and factual inaccuracies, and did not represent
information known to the agents at the time of interception."
Brief for Petitioners 25-26. We do not think petitioners have
fairly characterized the District Court's findings, however. The
District Court found:
"The 'call analysis' conflicts with the reports and
characterizations of the intercepted calls as made and determined
by the monitoring agents whose conduct is controlling in this
case."
App. 38. This does not suggest that the call analysis was
factually erroneous, but rather that the categories used by the
attorney who prepared the analysis were not necessarily of the same
sort employed by the monitoring agents. This finding would thus
have relevance if the critical inquiry focused on the subjective
intent of the agents, but it certainly cannot be read as a finding
that the general analysis of the calls set forth in the call
analysis contains "factual inaccuracies."
[
Footnote 15]
Petitioners intimate that the scope of the investigation was
narrower than originally anticipated because the intercepts
revealed only local purchases within the Washington area. That
certainly has no bearing on what the officers had reasonable cause
to believe at the time they made the interceptions, however. And
while it is true that the conspiracy turned out to involve mainly
local distribution, rather than major interstate and international
importation, it is not at all clear that the information garnered
through the wiretap reduced the agents' estimates of the number of
people involved or the extent of the drug traffic. In short, there
is little doubt on the record that, as the agents originally
thought, the conspiracy can fairly be characterized as
extensive.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.
In 1968, Congress departed from the longstanding national policy
forbidding surreptitious interception of wire communications,
[
Footnote 2/1] by enactment of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 ed.). That Act, for the first
time authorizing law enforcement personnel to monitor private
telephone conversations, provided strict guidelines and limitations
on the use of wiretaps as a barrier to Government infringement of
individual privacy. One of the protections thought essential by
Congress as a bulwark against unconstitutional governmental
intrusion on private conversations is the "minimization
requirement" of § 2518(5). The Court today eviscerates this
congressionally mandated protection of individual privacy, marking
the third decision in which the Court has disregarded or diluted
congressionally established safeguards [
Footnote 2/2] designed to prevent Government electronic
surveillance from becoming the abhorred
Page 436 U. S. 144
general warrant which historically had destroyed the cherished
expectation of privacy in the home. [
Footnote 2/3]
The "minimization provision" of § 2518(5) provides,
inter
alia, that every order authorizing interception of wire
communications include a requirement that the interception
"
shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception under this chapter . . . ."
(Emphasis added.) The District Court's findings of fact, not
challenged here or in the Court of Appeals, plainly establish that
this requirement was shamelessly violated. The District Court
found:
"[T]he monitoring agents made no attempt to comply with the
minimization order of the Court, but listened to and recorded all
calls over the [subject] telephone. They showed no regard for the
right of privacy, and did nothing to avoid unnecessary
intrusion."
App. 36.
The District Court further found that the special agent who
conducted the wiretap testified under oath that "he and the agents
working under him knew of the minimization requirement, but made no
attempt to comply therewith."
Id. at 37. The District
Court found a "knowing and purposeful failure" to comply with the
minimization requirements.
Id. at 39. These findings, made
on remand after reexamination, reiterated the District Court's
initial finding that
"[the agents] did not even attempt 'lip-service compliance' with
the provision of the order and statutory mandate, but rather
completely disregarded it."
331 F.
Supp. 233, 247 (DC 1971). In the face of this clear finding
that the agents monitored every call and, moreover, knowingly
failed to conduct the wiretap "in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications" not subject to interception, and
despite the fact that 60% of all calls intercepted were not subject
to interception,
Page 436 U. S. 145
the Court holds that no violation of § 2518(5) occurred. The
basis for that conclusion is a
post hoc reconstruction
offered by the Government of what would have been reasonable
assumptions on the part of the agents had they attempted to comply
with the statute. Since, on the basis of this reconstruction of
reality, it would have been reasonable for the agents to assume
that each of the calls dialed and received was likely to be in
connection with the criminal enterprise, there was no violation,
notwithstanding the fact that the agents intercepted every call
with no effort to minimize interception of the noninterceptable
calls. That reasoning is thrice flawed.
First, and perhaps most significant, it totally disregards the
explicit congressional command that the wiretap be conducted so as
to minimize interception of communications not subject to
interception. Second, it blinks reality by accepting, as a
substitute for the good faith exercise of judgment as to which
calls should not be intercepted by the agent most familiar with the
investigation, the
post hoc conjectures of the Government
as to how the agent would have acted had he exercised his judgment.
Because it is difficult to know with any degree of certainty
whether a given communication is subject to interception prior to
its interception, there necessarily must be a margin of error
permitted. But we do not enforce the basic premise of the Act that
intrusions of privacy must be kept to the minimum by excusing the
failure of the agent to make the good faith effort to minimize
which Congress mandated. In the nature of things, it is impossible
to know how many fewer interceptions would have occurred had a good
faith judgment been exercised, and it is therefore totally
unacceptable to permit the failure to exercise the congressionally
imposed duty to be excused by the difficulty in predicting what
might have occurred had the duty been exercised. Finally, the
Court's holding permits Government agents deliberately to flout the
duty imposed upon them by Congress. In a linguistic
tour
Page 436 U. S. 146
de force, the Court converts the mandatory language
that the interception "shall be conducted" to a precatory
suggestion. Nor can the Court justify its disregard of the
statute's language by any demonstration that it is necessary to do
so to effectuate Congress' purpose as expressed in the legislative
history. On the contrary, had the Court been faithful to the
congressional purpose, it would have discovered in § 2518(10)(a)
and its legislative history the unambiguous congressional purpose
to have enforced the several limitations on interception imposed by
the statute. Section 2518(10)(a) requires suppression of evidence
intercepted in violation of the statute's limitations on
interception, and the legislative history emphasizes Congress'
intent that the exclusionary remedy serve as a deterrent against
the violation of those limitations by law enforcement personnel.
See S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 96 (1968).
The Court's attempted obfuscation in Part II,
ante at
436 U. S.
135-139, of its total disregard of the statutory mandate
[
Footnote 2/4] is a transparent
failure. None of the cases discussed there deciding the
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of searches and seizures
deals with the discrete problems of wire interceptions or addresses
the construction of the minimization requirement of § 2518(5).
Congress provided the answer to that problem, and the wording of
its command, and not general Fourth Amendment principles, must be
the guide to our decision. The Court offers no explanation for its
failure to heed the aphorism, "Though we may not end with the words
in construing a disputed statute, one certainly begins there."
Frankfurter,
Page 436 U. S. 147
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum.L.Rev.
527, 535 (1947). [
Footnote 2/5]
Moreover, today's decision does not take even a sidelong glance
at
United States v. Kahn, 415 U.
S. 143 (1974), whose reasoning it undercuts, and which
may now require overruling. Answering the question in
Kahn
of who must be named in an application and order authorizing
electronic surveillance, the Court held:
"Title III requires the naming of a person in the application or
interception order only when the law enforcement authorities have
probable cause to believe that that individual is 'committing the
offense' for which the wiretap is sought."
Id. at
415 U. S. 155.
To support that holding against the argument that it would, in
effect, approve a general warrant proscribed by Title III and the
Fourth Amendment,
see id. at
415 U. S.
158-163 (Douglas, J., dissenting), the Court relied on
the minimization requirement as an adequate safeguard to prevent
such unlimited invasions of personal privacy:
"[I]n accord with the statute the order required the agents to
execute the warrant in such a manner as to minimize the
interception of any innocent conversations. . . . Thus, the failure
of the order to specify that Mrs. Kahn's conversations might be the
subject of interception hardly left the executing agents free to
seize at will every communication that came over the wire -- and
there is no indication that such abuses took place in this
case."
Id. at
415 U. S.
154-155. (Footnotes omitted.)
Beyond the inconsistency of today's decision with the reasoning
of
Kahn, the Court manifests a disconcerting willingness
to unravel individual threads of statutory protection without
Page 436 U. S. 148
regard to their interdependence and to whether the cumulative
effect is to rend the fabric of Title III's
"congressionally designed bulwark against conduct of authorized
electronic surveillance in a manner that violates the
constitutional guidelines announced in
Berger v. New York,
388 U. S.
41 (1967), and
Katz v. United States,
389 U. S.
347 (1967),"
Bynum v. United States, 423 U.
S. 952 (1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). This process of myopic, incremental denigration of
Title III's safeguards raises the specter that, as judicially
"enforced," Title III may be vulnerable to constitutional attack
for violation of Fourth Amendment standards, thus defeating the
careful effort Congress made to avert that result.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Prior to the enactment of Title III, § 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1104, provided that
"no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person. . . ."
[
Footnote 2/2]
See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.
S. 413,
429 U. S. 445
(1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting in part);
United States v.
Kahn, 415 U. S. 143,
415 U. S. 168
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
see also United States v.
Chavez, 416 U. S. 562,
416 U. S. 580
(1974) (opinion of Douglas, J.).
[
Footnote 2/3]
See United States v. Kahn, supra, at
415 U. S.
160-162, and nn. 3-4 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 2/4]
Although the Court's refusal to recognize as violative of §
2518(5) a wiretap conducted in bad faith without regard to
minimization necessarily will result in many invasions of privacy
which otherwise would not occur, the objective requirement of
"reasonableness" left unimpaired by the Court will clearly require
suppression of interceptions in other circumstances.
See, e.g.,
Bynum v. United States, 423 U. S. 952
(1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
[
Footnote 2/5]
Accord, United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 151
("[T]he starting point, as in all statutory construction, is the
precise wording chosen by Congress in enacting Title III").