After her husband of less than six months died, appellee widow
filed applications for mother's Social Security insurance benefits
for herself and child's insurance benefits for her daughter by a
previous marriage, but the Social Security Administration (SSA),
both initially and on reconsideration at the regional level, denied
the applications on the basis of the duration of relationship
requirements of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. §§
416(c)(5) and (e)(2) (1970 ed. and Supp. III), which define "widow"
and "child" so as to exclude surviving wives and stepchildren who
had their respective relationships to a deceased wage earner for
less than nine months prior to his death. Appellees widow and
child, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, then brought a
class action in Federal District Court on behalf of all widows and
step-children denied benefits because of the nine-month
requirements. A three-judge court, after concluding that it had
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, held that the
nine-month requirements constituted constitutionally invalid
"irrebuttable presumptions," and accordingly enjoined appellants
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), its Secretary,
and the SSA and various of its officials from denying benefits on
the basis of those requirements.
Held:
1. The District Court did not have federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because such jurisdiction is barred by the
third sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which provides that no action
against the United States, the HEW Secretary, or any officer or
employee thereof shall be brought under,
inter alia, 28
U.S.C. § 1331 to recover on any claim arising under Title II of the
Act, which covers old-age, survivors', and disability insurance
benefits. Pp.
422 U. S.
756-762.
(a) That § 405(h)'s third sentence, contrary to the District
Court's view, does not merely codify the doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies, is plain from its sweeping language; and, moreover, to
construe it so narrowly would render it superfluous in view of
Page 422 U. S. 750
§ 405(h)'s first two sentences, which provide that the
Secretary's findings and decision after a hearing shall be binding
upon all parties to the hearing, and shall not be reviewed except
as provided in § 405(g), which,
inter alia, requires
administrative exhaustion. Pp.
422 U. S.
756-759.
(b) There is no merit to appellees' argument that, because their
action arises under the Constitution and not under the Act, it is
not barred by § 405(h), since, although their claim does arise
under the Constitution, it also arises under the Act, which
furnishes both the standing and substantive basis for the
constitutional claim. Pp.
422 U. S.
760-761.
(c) Section 405(h)'s third sentence extends to any "action"
seeking "to recover on any [Social Security] claim" -- irrespective
of whether resort to judicial processes is necessitated by
discretionary decisions of the Secretary or by his nondiscretionary
application of allegedly unconstitutional statutory restrictions --
and, although not precluding constitutional challenges, simply
requires that they be brought under jurisdictional grants contained
in the Act, and thus in conformity with the same standards that
apply to nonconstitutional claims arising under the Act.
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361,
distinguished. Pp.
422 U. S.
761-762.
2. The District Court had no jurisdiction over the unnamed
members of the class under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides
that
"[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Secretary
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the
amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a
civil action,"
since the complaint as to such class members is deficient in
that it contains no allegations that they have even filed an
application for benefits with the Secretary, much less that he has
rendered any decision, final or otherwise, review of which is
sought. Pp.
422 U. S.
763-764.
3. The District Court had jurisdiction over the named appellees
under § 405(g). While the allegations of the complaint with regard
to exhaustion of remedies fall short of meeting § 405(g)'s literal
requirement that there shall have been a "final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing" and of satisfying the Secretary's
regulations specifying that the finality required for judicial
review be achieved only after the further steps of a hearing before
an administrative judge and possibly consideration by the Appeals
Council, nevertheless the Secretary, by not challenging the
sufficiency of such allegations, has apparently determined that,
for purposes of this action. the reconsideration determination is
"final."
Page 422 U. S. 751
Under the Act's administrative scheme, the Secretary may make
such a determination, because the term "final decision" is left
undefined by the Act, and its meaning is to be fleshed out by the
Secretary's regulations, 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), and because no
judicial or administrative interest would be served by further
administrative proceedings once the Secretary concluded that a
matter is beyond his jurisdiction to determine, and that the claim
is neither otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a different
section of the Act. Similar considerations control with regard to
the requirement that the Secretary's decision be made "after a
hearing," since, under such circumstances, a hearing would be
futile and wasteful, and since, moreover, the Secretary may award
benefits without requiring a hearing. Pp.
422 U. S.
764-767.
4. The nine-month duration of relationship requirements of §§
416(c)(5) and (e)(2) are not unconstitutional. Pp.
422 U. S.
767-785.
(a) A statutory classification in the area of social welfare
such as the Social Security program is constitutional if it is
rationally based and free from invidious discrimination. Pp.
422 U. S.
768-770.
(b) A noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public
treasury enjoys no constitutionally protected status, although, of
course, there may not be invidious discrimination among such
claimants.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.
S. 645;
Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632,
distinguished. The benefits here are available upon compliance with
an objective criterion, one that the Legislature considered to bear
a sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives as to
be used as the test for eligibility. Appellees are free to present
evidence that they meet the specified requirements, failing which,
their only constitutional claim is that the test they cannot meet
is not so rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective
that it can be used to deprive them of benefits available to those
who do satisfy that test,
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.
S. 441, distinguished. Pp.
422 U. S.
770-773.
(c) The duration of relationship test meets the constitutional
standard that Congress, its concern having been reasonably aroused
by the possibility of an abuse -- the use of sham marriages to
secure Social Security benefits -- which it legitimately desired to
avoid, could rationally have concluded that a particular limitation
or qualification would protect against its occurrence, and that the
expense and other difficulties of individual determinations
justified the inherent imprecision of an objective, easily
administered prophylactic rule. Pp.
422 U. S.
773-780.
Page 422 U. S. 752
(d) Neither the fact that § 416(c)(5) excludes some wives who
married with no anticipation of shortly becoming widows nor the
fact that the requirement does not filter out every such claimant,
if a wage earner lives longer than anticipated or has an illness
that can be recognized as terminal more than nine months prior to
death, necessarily renders the statutory scheme unconstitutional.
While it is possible to debate the wisdom of excluding legitimate
claimants in order to discourage sham relationships, and of relying
on a rule that may not exclude some obviously sham arrangements,
Congress could rationally choose to adopt such a course. Pp.
422 U. S.
781-783.
373 F.
Supp. 961, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ.,
joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
422 U. S. 785.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined,
post, p.
422 U. S.
786.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
its Secretary, the Social Security Administration and various of
its officials, appeal from a decision of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California invalidating duration
of relationship
Page 422 U. S. 753
Social Security eligibility requirements for surviving wives and
stepchildren of deceased wage earners.
373 F.
Supp. 961 (1974).
That court concluded that it had jurisdiction of the action by
virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and eventually certified the case as a
class action. On the merits, it concluded that the nine-month
requirements of §§ 216(c)(5) and (e)(2) of the Social Security Act,
49 Stat. 620, as added, 64 Stat. 510, and as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
416(c)(5) and (e)(2) (1970 ed. and Supp. III), constituted
"irrebuttable presumptions" which were constitutionally invalid
under the authority of
Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632
(1974);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.
S. 441 (1973); and
Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U. S. 645
(1972). We hold that the District Court did not have jurisdiction
of this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that, while it had
jurisdiction of the claims of the named appellees under the
provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), it had no jurisdiction over the
claims asserted on behalf of unnamed class members. We further
decide that the District Court was wrong on the merits of the
constitutional question tendered by the named appellees.
I
Appellee Salfi married the deceased wage earner, Londo L. Salfi,
on May 27, 1972. Despite his alleged apparent good health at the
time of the marriage, he suffered a heart attack less than a month
later, and died on November 21, 1972, less than six months after
the marriage. Appellee Salfi filed applications for mother's
insurance benefits for herself and child's insurance benefits for
her daughter by a previous marriage, appellee Doreen Kalnins.
[
Footnote 1] These applications
were denied by the Social
Page 422 U. S. 754
Security Administration, both initially and on reconsideration
at the regional level, solely on the basis of the duration of
relationship requirements of §§ 416(c)(5) and (e)(2), which define
"widow" and "child." The definitions exclude surviving wives and
stepchildren who had their respective relationships to a deceased
wage earner for less than nine months prior to his death. [
Footnote 2]
Page 422 U. S. 755
The named appellees then filed this action, principally relying
on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for jurisdiction. They sought to represent the
class of
"all widows and stepchildren of deceased wage earners who are
denied widow's [
sic] or children's insurance benefits
because the wage earner died within nine months of his marriage to
the applicant or (in case of a stepchild) the applicant's
mother."
App. 8. They alleged at least partial exhaustion of remedies
with regard to their personal claims, but made no similar
allegations with regard to other class members. They sought
declaratory relief against the challenged statute, and injunctive
relief restraining appellants from denying mother's and child's
benefits on the basis of the statute. In addition to attorneys'
fees and costs, they also sought
"damages or sums due and owing equivalent to the amount of
benefits to which plaintiffs became entitled as of the date of said
entitlement."
Id. at 13.
A three-judge District Court heard the case on cross-motions for
summary judgment, and granted substantially all of the relief
prayed for by appellees. The District Court rendered a declaratory
judgment holding the challenged statute to be unconstitutional,
certified a class consisting of "all otherwise eligible surviving
spouses and stepchildren . . . heretofore disqualified from receipt
of . . . benefits by operation" of the duration of relationship
requirements, enjoined appellants from denying benefits on the
basis of those requirements, and ordered them to provide such
benefits "from the time of
Page 422 U. S. 756
original entitlement." 373 F. Supp. at 966. We noted probable
jurisdiction of the appeal from that judgment. 419 U.S. 992
(1974).
In addition to their basic contention that the duration of
relationship requirements pass constitutional muster, appellants
present several contentions bearing on the scope of the monetary
relief awarded by the District Court. They contend that the award
is barred by sovereign immunity insofar as it consists of
retroactive benefits, that, regardless of sovereign immunity,
invalidation of the duration of relationship requirements should be
given prospective effect only, and that the District Court did not
properly handle certain class action issues. Because we conclude
that the duration of relationship requirements are constitutional,
we have no occasion to reach the retroactivity and class action
issues. We are confronted, however, by a serious question as to
whether the District Court had jurisdiction over this suit.
II
The third sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) provides in part:
"No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any
officer or employee thereof shall be brought under [§ 1331
et
seq.] of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under [Title
II of the Social Security Act]. [
Footnote 3]"
On its face, this provision bars district court federal question
jurisdiction over suits, such as this one, which
Page 422 U. S. 757
seek to recover Social Security benefits. Yet it was § 1331
jurisdiction which appellees successfully invoked in the District
Court. That court considered this provision, but concluded that it
was inapplicable because it amounted to no more than a codification
of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The
District Court's reading of § 405(h) was, we think, entirely too
narrow.
That the third sentence of § 405(h) is more than a codified
requirement of administrative exhaustion is plain from its own
language, which is sweeping and direct and which states that no
action shall be brought under § 1331, not merely that only those
actions shall be brought in which administrative remedies have been
exhausted. Moreover, if the third sentence is construed to be
nothing more than a requirement of administrative exhaustion, it
would be superfluous. This is because the first two sentences of §
405(h), which appear in the margin, [
Footnote 4] assure that administrative exhaustion will be
required. Specifically, they prevent review of decisions of the
Secretary save as provided in the Act, which provision is made in §
405(g). [
Footnote 5] The latter
section prescribes
Page 422 U. S. 758
typical requirements for review of matters before an
administrative agency, including administrative exhaustion.
[
Footnote 6] Thus, the District
Court's treatment of the
Page 422 U. S. 759
third sentence of § 405(h) not only ignored that sentence's
plain language, but also relegated it to a function which is
already performed by other statutory provisions.
Page 422 U. S. 760
A somewhat more substantial argument that the third sentence of
§ 405(h) does not deprive the District Court of federal question
jurisdiction relies on the fact that it only affects actions to
recover on "any claim arising under [Title II]" of the Social
Security Act. [
Footnote 7] The
argument is that the present action arises under the Constitution,
and not under Title II. It would, of course, be fruitless to
contend that appellees' claim is one which does not arise under the
Constitution, since their constitutional arguments are critical to
their complaint. But it is just as fruitless to argue that this
action does not also arise under the Social Security Act. For not
only is it Social Security benefits which appellees seek to
recover, but it is the Social Security Act which provides
Page 422 U. S. 761
both the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation
of their constitutional contentions. Appellees sought, and the
District Court granted, a judgment directing the Secretary to pay
Social Security benefits. To contend that such an action does not
arise under the Act whose benefits are sought is to ignore both the
language and the substance of the complaint and judgment. This
being so, the third sentence of § 405(h) precludes resort to
federal question jurisdiction for the adjudication of appellees'
constitutional contentions.
It has also been argued that
Johnson v. Robison,
415 U. S. 361
(1974), supports the proposition that appellees are not seeking to
recover on a claim arising under Title II. In that case, we
considered 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), which provides:
"[T]he decisions of the [Veterans'] Administrator on any
question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans'
Administration providing benefits for veterans . . . shall be final
and conclusive, and no other official or any court of the United
States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision
by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise."
We were required to resolve whether this language precluded an
attack on the constitutionality of a statutory limitation. We
concluded that it did not, basically because such a limitation was
not a "decision" of the Administrator "on any question of law or
fact"; indeed, the "decision" had been made by Congress, not the
Administrator, and the issue was one which the Administrator
considered to be beyond his jurisdiction. 415 U.S. at
415 U. S.
367-368. Thus, the question sought to be litigated was
simply not within § 211(a)'s express language, and there was
accordingly no basis for concluding
Page 422 U. S. 762
that Congress sought to preclude review of the constitutionality
of veterans' legislation.
The language of § 405(h) is quite different. Its reach is not
limited to decisions of the Secretary on issues of law or fact.
Rather, it extends to any "action" seeking "to recover on any
[Social Security] claim" -- irrespective of whether resort to
judicial processes is necessitated by discretionary decisions of
the Secretary or by his nondiscretionary application of allegedly
unconstitutional statutory restrictions.
There is another reason why
Johnson v. Robison is
inapposite. It was expressly based, at least in part, on the fact
that, if § 211(a) reached constitutional challenges to statutory
limitations, then absolutely no judicial consideration of the issue
would be available. Not only would such a restriction have been
extraordinary, such that "clear and convincing" evidence would be
required before we would ascribe such intent to Congress, 415 U.S.
at
415 U. S. 373,
but it would have raised a serious constitutional question of the
validity of the statute as so construed.
Id. at
415 U. S.
366-367. In the present case, as will be discussed
below, the Social Security Act itself provides jurisdiction for
constitutional challenges to its provisions. Thus, the plain words
of the third sentence of § 405(h) do not preclude constitutional
challenges. They simply require that they be brought under
jurisdictional grants contained in the Act, and thus in conformity
with the same standards which are applicable to nonconstitutional
claims arising under the Act. The result is not only of
unquestionable constitutionality, but it is also manifestly
reasonable, since it assures the Secretary the opportunity prior to
constitutional litigation to ascertain, for example, that the
particular claims involved are neither invalid for other reasons
nor allowable under other provisions of the Social Security
Act.
Page 422 U. S. 763
As has been stated, the Social Security Act itself provides for
district court review of the Secretary's determinations. Title 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) provides that
"[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Secretary
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the
amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a
civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him
of notice of such decision. . . ."
See n 5,
supra. The question with which we must now deal is whether
this provision could serve as a jurisdictional basis for the
District Court's consideration of the present case. We conclude
that it provided jurisdiction only as to the named appellees and
not as to the unnamed members of the class. [
Footnote 8]
Section 405(g) specifics the following requirements for judicial
review: (1) a final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing;
(2) commencement of a civil action within 60 days after the mailing
of notice of such decision (or within such further time as the
Secretary
Page 422 U. S. 764
may allow); and (3) filing of the action in an appropriate
district court, in general that of the plaintiff's residence or
principal place of business. The second and third of these
requirements specify, respectively, a statute of limitations and
appropriate venue. As such, they are waivable by the parties, and
not having been timely raised below,
see Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc. 8(c), 12(h)(1), need not be considered here. We interpret
the first requirement, however, to be central to the requisite
grant of subject matter jurisdiction -- the statute empowers
district courts to review a particular type of decision by the
Secretary, that type being those which are "final" and "made after
a hearing."
In the present case, the complaint seeks review of the denial of
benefits based on the plain wording of a statute which is alleged
to be unconstitutional. That a denial on such grounds, which are
beyond the power of the Secretary to affect, is nonetheless a
decision of the Secretary for these purposes has been heretofore
established.
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.
S. 603 (1960). As to class members, however, the
complaint is deficient in that it contains no allegations that they
have even filed an application with the Secretary, much less that
he has rendered any decision, final or otherwise, review of which
is sought. The class thus cannot satisfy the requirements for
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Other sources of
jurisdiction being foreclosed by § 405(h), the District Court was
without jurisdiction over so much of the complaint as concerns the
class, and it should have entered an appropriate order of
dismissal.
The jurisdictional issue with respect to the named appellees is
somewhat more difficult. In a paragraph entitled "Exhaustion of
Remedies," the complaint alleges that they fully presented their
claims for benefits "to their district Social Security Office and,
upon denial, to
Page 422 U. S. 765
the Regional Office for reconsideration." It further alleges
that they have no dispute with the Regional Office's findings of
fact or applications of statutory law, and that the only issue is a
matter of constitutional law which is beyond the Secretary's
competence. On their face, these allegations with regard to
exhaustion fall short of meeting the literal requirement of §
405(g) that there shall have been a "final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing." They also fall short of satisfying
the Secretary's regulations, which specify that the finality
required for judicial review is achieved only after the further
steps of a hearing before an administrative law judge and,
possibly, consideration by the Appeals Council.
See 20 CFR
§§ 404.916, 404.940, 404.951 (1974).
We have previously recognized that the doctrine of
administrative exhaustion should be applied with a regard for the
particular administrative scheme at issue.
Parisi v.
Davidson, 405 U. S. 34
(1972);
McKart v. United States, 395 U.
S. 185 (1969). Exhaustion is generally required as a
matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes,
so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have
an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and
the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to
compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.
See,
e.g., id. at
395 U. S.
193-194. Plainly these purposes have been served once
the Secretary has satisfied himself that the only issue is the
constitutionality of a statutory requirement, a matter which is
beyond his jurisdiction to determine, and that the claim is neither
otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a different section of the
Act. Once a benefit applicant has presented his or her claim at a
sufficiently high level of review to satisfy the Secretary's
administrative needs, further exhaustion would not merely be futile
for the applicant,
Page 422 U. S. 766
but would also be a commitment of administrative resources
unsupported by any administrative or judicial interest.
The present case, of course, is significantly different from
McKart in that a "final decision" is a statutorily
specified jurisdictional prerequisite. The requirement is,
therefore, as we have previously noted, something more than simply
a codification of the judicially developed doctrine of exhaustion,
and may not be dispensed with merely by a judicial conclusion of
futility such as that made by the District Court here. But it is
equally true that the requirement of a "final decision" contained
in § 405(g) is not precisely analogous to the more classical
jurisdictional requirements contained in such sections of Title 28
as 1331 and 1332. The term "final decision" is not only left
undefined by the Act, but its meaning is left to the Secretary to
flesh out by regulation. [
Footnote
9] Section 405(1) accords the Secretary complete authority to
delegate his statutory duties to officers and employees of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The statutory scheme
is thus one in which the Secretary may specify such requirements
for exhaustion as he deems serve his own interests in effective and
efficient administration. While a court may not substitute its
conclusion as to futility for the contrary conclusion of the
Secretary, we believe it would be inconsistent with the
congressional scheme to bar the Secretary from determining
Page 422 U. S. 767
in particular cases that full exhaustion of internal review
procedures is not necessary for a decision to be "final" within the
language of § 405(g).
Much the same may be said about the statutory requirement that
the Secretary's decision be made "after a hearing." Not only would
a hearing be futile and wasteful once the Secretary has determined
that the only issue to be resolved is a matter of constitutional
law concededly beyond his competence to decide, but the Secretary
may, of course, award benefits without requiring a hearing. We do
not understand the statute to prevent him from similarly
determining in favor of the applicant, without a hearing, all
issues with regard to eligibility save for one as to which he
considers a hearing to be useless.
In the present case, the Secretary does not raise any challenge
to the sufficiency of the allegations of exhaustion in appellees'
complaint. We interpret this to be a determination by him that, for
the purposes of this litigation, the reconsideration determination
is "final." The named appellees thus satisfy the requirements for §
405(g) judicial review, and we proceed to the merits of their
claim. [
Footnote 10]
III
The District Court relied on congressional history for the
proposition that the duration of relationship requirement was
intended to prevent the use of sham marriages to secure Social
Security payments. As such, concluded the court,
"the requirement constitutes a presumption that marriages like
Mrs. Salfi's, which did not precede
Page 422 U. S. 768
the wage earner's death by at least nine months, were entered
into for the purpose of securing Social Security benefits."
373 F. Supp. at 965. The presumption was, moreover, conclusive,
because applicants were not afforded an opportunity to disprove the
presence of the illicit purpose. The court held that, under our
decisions in
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
414 U. S. 632
(1974);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.
S. 441 (1973); and
Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U. S. 645
(1972), the requirement was unconstitutional because it presumed a
fact which was not necessarily or universally true.
Our ultimate conclusion is that the District Court was wrong in
holding the duration of relationship requirement unconstitutional.
Because we are aware that our various holdings in related cases do
not all sound precisely the same note, we will explain ourselves at
some length.
The standard for testing the validity of Congress' Social
Security classification was clearly stated in
Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. at
363 U. S.
611:
"Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a
noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program such as
[Social Security], we must recognize that the Due Process Clause
can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a
patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational
justification."
In
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S.
78 (1971), a portion of the Social Security Act which
required an otherwise entitled disability claimant to be subjected
to an "offset" by reason of his simultaneous receipt of state
workmen's compensation benefits was attacked as being violative of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The claimant in that
case asserted that the provision was arbitrary in that it required
offsetting of a
Page 422 U. S. 769
state workmen's compensation payment, but not of a similar
payment made by a private disability insurer. The Court said:
"If the goals sought are legitimate and the classification
adopted is rationally related to the achievement of those goals,
then the action of Congress is not so arbitrary as to violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
404 U.S. at
404 U. S.
84.
Two Terms earlier, the Court had decided the case of
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
(1970), in which it rejected a claim that Maryland welfare
legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court had said:
"In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the
classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with
mathematical nicety or because, in practice, it results in some
inequality.'
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U. S.
61,
220 U. S. 78."
"The problems of government are practical ones and may justify,
if they do not require, rough accommodations -- illogical, it may
be, and unscientific."
"
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago,
228 U. S.
61,
228 U. S. 69-70. . . ."
"To be sure, the cases cited, and many others enunciating this
fundamental standard under the Equal Protection Clause, have in the
main involved state regulation of business or industry. The
administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves
the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. We
recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the
cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying
a
Page 422 U. S. 770
different constitutional standard. . . . It is a standard that
has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the
availability of employment opportunities.
Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U. S. 464;
Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U. S.
552.
See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S.
603. And it is a standard that is true to the principle
that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to
impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise
economic or social policy."
Id. at
397 U. S.
485-486.
The relation between the equal protection analysis of Dandridge
and the Fifth Amendment due process analysis of
Flemming v.
Nestor and
Richardson v. Belcher was described in the
latter case in this language:
"A statutory classification in the area of social welfare is
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if it is 'rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination.'
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.
471,
397 U. S. 487. While the
present case, involving as it does a federal statute, does not
directly implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, a classification that meets the test articulated in
Dandridge is perforce consistent with the due process
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U. S.
497,
347 U. S. 499."
404 U.S. at
404 U. S.
81.
These cases quite plainly lay down the governing principle for
disposing of constitutional challenges to classifications in this
type of social welfare legislation. The District Court, however,
chose to rely on
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
supra; Vlandis v. Kline, supra; and
Stanley v. Illinois,
supra. It characterized this recent group of cases as dealing
with "the appropriateness
Page 422 U. S. 771
of conclusive evidentiary presumptions." 373 F. Supp. at
965.
Stanley v. Illinois held that it was a denial of the
equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment for a State
to deny a hearing on parental fitness to an unwed father when such
a hearing was granted to all other parents whose custody of their
children was challenged. This Court referred to the fact that
the
"rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
'essential,'
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S.
390,
262 U. S. 399 (1923), 'basic
civil rights of man,'
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S.
535,
316 U. S. 541 (1942), and
'[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights,'
May v.
Anderson, 345 U. S. 528,
345 U. S.
533 (1953)."
405 U.S. at
405 U. S.
651.
In
Vlandis v. Kline, a statutory definition of
"residents" for purposes of fixing tuition to be paid by students
in a state university system was held invalid. The Court held that,
where Connecticut purported to be concerned with residency, it
might not at the same time deny to one seeking to meet its test of
residency the opportunity to show factors clearly bearing on that
issue. 412 U.S. at
412 U. S.
452.
In
LaFleur, the Court held invalid, on the authority of
Stanley and
Vlandis, school board regulations
requiring pregnant school teachers to take unpaid maternity leave
commencing four to five months before the expected birth The Court
stated its longstanding recognition
"that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"
414 U.S. at
414 U. S.
639-640, and that "overly restrictive maternity leave
regulations can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of these
protected freedoms."
Id. at
414 U. S.
640.
We hold that these cases are not controlling on the issue before
us now. Unlike the claims involved in
Page 422 U. S. 772
Stanley and
LaFleur, a noncontractual claim to
receive funds from the public treasury enjoys no constitutionally
protected status,
Dandridge v. Williams, supra, though, of
course, Congress may not invidiously discriminate among such
claimants on the basis of a "bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group,"
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U. S. 528,
413 U. S. 534
(1973), or on the basis of criteria which bear no rational relation
to a legitimate legislative goal.
Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U. S. 628,
417 U. S. 636
(1974);
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U. S. 508,
413 U. S.
513-514 (1973). Unlike the statutory scheme in
Vlandis, 412 U.S. at
412 U. S. 449,
the Social Security Act does not purport to speak in terms of the
bona fides of the parties to a marriage, but then make
plainly relevant evidence of such
bona fides inadmissible.
As in
Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.
Supp. 234 (Minn.1970),
summarily aff'd, 401 U.S. 985
(1971), the benefits here are available upon compliance with an
objective criterion, one which the Legislature considered to bear a
sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives to be
used as the test for eligibility. Like the plaintiffs in
Starns, appellees are completely free to present evidence
that they meet the specified requirements; failing in this effort,
their only constitutional claim is that the test they cannot meet
is not so rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective
that it can be used to deprive them of benefits available to those
who do satisfy that test.
We think that the District Court's extension of the holdings of
Stanley, Vlandis, and
LaFleur to the eligibility
requirement in issue here would turn the doctrine of those cases
into a virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative
judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent with
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. For
example, the very
Page 422 U. S. 773
section of Title 42 which authorizes an action such as this, §
405(g), requires that a claim be filed within 60 days after
administrative remedies are exhausted. It is indisputable that this
requirement places people who file their claims more than 60 days
after exhaustion in a different "class" from people who file their
claims within the time limit. If we were to follow the District
Court's analysis, we would first try to ascertain the congressional
"purpose" behind the provision, and probably would conclude that it
was to prevent stale claims from being asserted in court. We would
then turn to the questions of whether such a flat cutoff provision
was necessary to protect the Secretary from stale claims, whether
it would be possible to make individualized determinations as to
any prejudice suffered by the Secretary as the result of an
untimely filing, and whether or not an individualized hearing on
that issue should be required in each case. This would represent a
degree of judicial involvement in the legislative function which we
have eschewed except in the most unusual circumstances, and which
is quite unlike the judicial role mandated by
Dandridge,
Belcher, and
Nestor, as well as by a host of cases
arising from legislative efforts to regulate private business
enterprises.
In
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.
S. 483 (1955), the Court dealt with a claim that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by
an Oklahoma statute which subjected opticians to a system of
detailed regulation, but which exempted sellers of ready-to-wear
glasses. In sustaining the statute the Court said:
"The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one,
admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may
be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different
remedies. Or so the legislature may think."
Id. at
348 U. S.
489.
Page 422 U. S. 774
More recently, in
Mourning v. Family Publications Service,
Inc., 411 U. S. 356
(1973), the Court sustained the constitutionality of a regulation
promulgated under the Truth in Lending Act which made the Act's
disclosure provisions applicable whenever credit is offered to a
consumer
"'for which either a finance charge is or may be imposed or
which pursuant to an agreement, is or may be payable in more than
four installments.'"
Id. at
411 U. S. 362.
The regulation was challenged because it was said to conclusively
presume that payments made under an agreement providing for more
than four instalments necessarily included a finance charge, when,
in fact, that might not be the case. The Court rejected the
constitutional challenge in this language:
"The rule was intended as a prophylactic measure; it does not
presume that all creditors who are within its ambit assess finance
charges, but, rather, imposes a disclosure requirement on all
members of a defined class in order to discourage evasion by a
substantial portion of that class."
Id. at
411 U. S.
377.
If the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments permit this latitude to
legislative decisions regulating the private sector of the economy,
they surely allow no less latitude in prescribing the conditions
upon which funds shall be dispensed from the public treasury.
Dandridge v. Williams, supra. With these principles in
mind, we turn to consider the statutory provisions which the
District Court held invalid.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1970 ed. and Supp. III) is the basic
congressional enactment defining eligibility for old-age and
survivors insurance benefit payments, and is divided into 23
lettered subsections. Subsection (g) is entitled "Mother's
insurance benefits," and primarily governs the claim of appellee
Salfi. Subsection (d) governs eligibility for child's insurance
benefits, and is the provision
Page 422 U. S. 775
under which appellee Kalnins makes her claim. These subsections,
along with others in § 402, specify the types of social risks for
which protection is provided by what is basically a statutory
insurance policy.
A different insurance system, but similarly defined by statute
and operated by a governmental entity, was the subject of our
consideration in
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.
S. 484 (1974), and our disposition of that case is
instructive. We reversed the judgment of a District Court which had
held that a California state disability insurance program was
invalid insofar as it failed to provide benefits for disabilities
associated with normal pregnancy. In our opinion, we said:
"The District Court suggested that moderate alterations in what
it regarded as 'variables' of the disability insurance program
could be made to accommodate the substantial expense required to
include normal pregnancy within the program's protection. The same
can be said, however, with respect to the other expensive class of
disabilities that are excluded from coverage -- short-term
disabilities. If the Equal Protection Clause were thought to compel
disability payments for normal pregnancy, it is hard to perceive
why it would not also compel payments for short-term disabilities
suffered by participating employees."
"It is evident that a totally comprehensive program would be
substantially more costly than the present program and would
inevitably require state subsidy, a higher rate of employee
contribution, a lower scale of benefits for those suffering insured
disabilities, or some combination of these measures. There is
nothing in the Constitution, however, that requires the State to
subordinate or compromise its legitimate interests solely to
create
Page 422 U. S. 776
a more comprehensive social insurance program than it already
has."
Id. at
417 U. S.
495-496.
The present case is somewhat different, since the Secretary
principally defends the duration of relationship requirement not as
a reasonable legislative decision to exclude a particular type of
risk from coverage, but instead as a method of assuring that
payments are made only upon the occurrence of events the risk of
which is covered by the insurance program. [
Footnote 11] Commercial insurance policies have
traditionally relied upon fixed, prophylactic rules to protect
against abuses which could expand liability beyond the risks which
are within the general concept of its coverage. For example, life
insurance policies often cover deaths by suicide, but not those
suicides which were contemplated when the policy was purchased.
Frequently the method chosen to contain liability within these
conceptual bounds is a strict rule that deaths by suicide are
covered if, and only if, they occur some fixed period of time after
the policy is issued.
See, e.g., 9 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of
Insurance Law § 40.50 (2d ed.1962). While such a limitation
doubtless proves in particular cases to be "underinclusive" or
"overinclusive," in light of its presumed purpose, it is
nonetheless a widely accepted response to legitimate interests in
administrative economy and certainty of coverage for those who meet
its terms. When the Government chooses to follow this tradition in
its own social insurance programs, it does not come up against a
constitutional stone wall. Rather, it may rely on such rules so
long as
Page 422 U. S. 777
they comport with the standards of legislative reasonableness
enunciated in cases like
Dandridge v. Williams and
Richardson v. Belcher.
Under those standards, the question raised is not whether a
statutory provision precisely filters out those, and only those,
who are in the factual position which generated the congressional
concern reflected in the statute. Such a rule would ban all
prophylactic provisions, and would be directly contrary to our
holding in
Mourning, supra. Nor is the question whether
the provision filters out a substantial part of the class which
caused congressional concern, or whether it filters out more
members of the class than nonmembers. The question is whether
Congress, its concern having been reasonably aroused by the
possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid,
could rationally have concluded both that a particular limitation
or qualification would protect against its occurrence and that the
expense and other difficulties of individual determinations
justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule. We
conclude that the duration of relationship test meets this
constitutional standard.
The danger of persons entering a marriage relationship not to
enjoy its traditional benefits, but instead to enable one spouse to
claim benefits upon the anticipated early death of the wage earner,
has been recognized from the very beginning of the Social Security
program. While no early legislative history addresses itself
specifically to the duration of relationship requirement for
mother's and child's benefits, there were discussions of the
analogous requirement for receipt of wife's benefits under §
402(b).
See 42 U.S.C. § 416(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV),
defining "wife." Dr. A. J. Altmeyer, Chairman of the Social
Security Board, noted that a five-year requirement "should be
strict enough to prevent marriage in anticipation
Page 422 U. S. 778
of the larger benefit payments." Hearings on Social Security
before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess., vol. 3, p. 2297 (1939). Similarly, the Advisory Council on
Social Security stated:
"The requirement that the wives' allowance be payable only where
marital status existed prior to the husband's attainment of age 60
is intended to serve as protection against abuse of the plan
through the contracting of marriages solely for the purpose of
acquiring enhanced benefits. If the marriage takes place at least 5
years before any old-age benefits can be paid, a reasonable
assumption exists that it was contracted in good faith."
Id. vol. 1, p. 31.
The Advisory Council also stated, with regard to § 402(e)
widow's benefits which, like mother's benefits, depend on the §
416(c) definition of "widow":
"As in the case of wives' allowances, it is believed desirable
to protect the provisions for widows' benefits against abuse by the
requirement of a minimum period of marital status."
Id. at 32.
Similar concerns were reflected in the House and Senate Reports
on the 1946 amendment which reduced to three years the required
duration of a marriage for the purposes of an eligible "wife." It
was stated:
"The original provision was intended to prevent exploitation of
the fund by claims for benefits from persons who married
beneficiaries solely to get wife's benefits. Experience has shown
that the requirement is unnecessarily restrictive for this purpose,
and that, in a number of cases, a wife is permanently barred from
benefits even though the marriage was entered into many years
before the wage earner became a beneficiary. The amendment, taken
with the provision in section 202(b) that the wife be
Page 422 U. S. 779
living with her husband in order to be eligible for benefits,
should be sufficient protection for the trust fund, and will remedy
situations which now seem inequitable. Few persons are likely to
marry because of the prospect of receiving a modest insurance
benefit which will not be payable until after 3 years."
H.R.Rep. No. 2526, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 25; S.Rep. No. 1862,
79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33.
Later amendments to the Act have been accompanied by discussions
of the duration of relationship requirements contained in the
definitions of "widow" and "child." Like the early history of
analogous requirements, they reflect congressional concern with the
possibility of relationships entered for the purpose of obtaining
benefits. In 1967, when the durational period was reduced from one
year to nine months, the House Report stated:
"Your committee's bill would reduce the duration of relationship
requirements for widows, widowers, and stepchildren of deceased
workers from 1 year to 9 months. The present law contains a 1-year
duration of relationship requirement which was adopted as a
safeguard against the payment of benefits where a relationship was
entered into in order to secure benefit rights. While the present
requirements have generally worked out satisfactorily, situations
have been called to the committee's attention in which benefits
were not payable because the required relationship had existed for
somewhat less than 1 year. Although some duration of relationship
requirement is appropriate, a less stringent requirement would be
adequate."
H.R.Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 56.
When, in 1972, Congress added the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §
416(k)(2) (1970 ed., Supp. III) (eliminating
Page 422 U. S. 780
the nine-month requirement with respect to remarriages of
persons who had previously been married for more than nine months),
the House Report observed:
"This duration of relationship requirement is included in the
law as a general precaution against the payment of benefits where
the marriage was undertaken to secure benefit rights."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-231, p. 55 (1971).
Undoubtedly the concerns reflected in this congressional
material are legitimate, involving as they do the integrity of both
the Social Security Trust Fund and the marriage relationship. It is
also undoubtedly true that the duration of relationship requirement
operates to lessen the likelihood of abuse through sham
relationships entered in contemplation of imminent death. We also
think that Congress could rationally have concluded that any
imprecision from which it might suffer was justified by its ease
and certainty of operation.
We note initially that the requirement is effective only within
a somewhat narrow range of situations lacking certain
characteristics which might reasonably be thought to establish the
genuineness of a marital relationship which involves children (and
thus the potential for mother's and child's benefits). Even though
a surviving wife has not been married for a period of nine months
immediately prior to her husband's death, she is nonetheless within
the definition of "widow" if she meets one of the other disjunctive
requirements of § 416(c). If she is the mother of her late
husband's son or daughter; if she legally adopted his son or
daughter while she was married to him and while such son or
daughter was under the age of 18; if he legally adopted her son or
daughter under the same circumstances; or if, during their
marriage, however short, they legally adopted a child under the age
of 18 -- in any of these circumstances, the surviving wife may
claim widow's or mother's benefits
Page 422 U. S. 781
even though she has not been married to her husband for a full
nine months. [
Footnote 12]
The common denominator of these disjunctive requirements appears to
us to be the assumption of responsibilities normally associated
with marriage, and we think that Congress has treated them as
alternative indicia of the fact that the marriage was entered into
for a reason other than the desire to shortly acquire benefits. The
marriages in which the widow must depend on qualifying under the
nine-month requirement are those in which none of these other
objective evidences of the assumption of marital responsibilities
are present.
Even so, § 416(c)(5) undoubtedly excludes some surviving wives
who married with no anticipation of shortly becoming widows, and it
may be that appellee Salfi is among them. It likewise may be true
that the requirement does not filter out every such claimant, if a
wage earner lingers longer than anticipated, or, in the case of
illnesses which can be recognized as terminal, more than nine
months prior to death. But neither of these facts necessarily
renders the statutory scheme unconstitutional.
While it is possible to debate the wisdom of excluding
legitimate claimants in order to discourage sham relationships, and
of relying on a rule which may not exclude some obviously sham
arrangements, we think it clear that Congress could rationally
choose to adopt such a course. Large numbers of people are eligible
for these programs and are potentially subject to inquiry as to the
validity of their relationships to wage earners. These people
include not only the classes which appellees represent, [
Footnote 13] but also claimants in
other programs for which
Page 422 U. S. 782
the Social Security Act imposes duration of relationship
requirements. [
Footnote 14]
Not only does the prophylactic approach thus obviate the necessity
for large numbers of individualized determinations, but it also
protects large numbers of claimants who satisfy the rule from the
uncertainties and delays of administrative inquiry into the
circumstances of their marriages. Nor is it at all clear that
individual determinations could effectively filter out sham
arrangements, since neither marital intent, life expectancy, nor
knowledge of terminal illness has been shown by
Page 422 U. S. 783
appellees to be reliably determinable. [
Footnote 15] Finally, the very possibility of
prevailing at a hearing could reasonably be expected to encourage
sham relationships.
Page 422 U. S. 784
The administrative difficulties of individual eligibility
determinations are without doubt matters which Congress may
consider when determining whether to rely on rules which sweep more
broadly than the evils with which they seek to deal. In this sense,
the duration of relationship requirement represents not merely a
substantive policy determination that benefits should be awarded
only on the basis of genuine marital relationships, but also a
substantive policy determination that limited resources would not
be well spent in making individual determinations. It is an
expression of Congress' policy choice that the Social Security
system, and its millions of beneficiaries, would be best served by
a prophylactic rule which bars claims arising from the bulk of sham
marriages which are actually entered, which discourages such
marriages
Page 422 U. S. 785
from ever taking place, and which is also objective and easily
administered.
The Constitution does not preclude such policy choices as a
price for conducting programs for the distribution of social
insurance benefits.
Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at
417 U. S. 496.
Unlike criminal prosecutions, or the custody proceedings at issue
in
Stanley v. Illinois, such programs do not involve
affirmative Government action which seriously curtails important
liberties cognizable under the Constitution. There is thus no basis
for our requiring individualized determinations when Congress can
rationally conclude not only that generalized rules are appropriate
to its purposes and concerns, but also that the difficulties of
individual determinations outweigh the marginal increments in the
precise effectuation of congressional concern which they might be
expected to produce.
The judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1) (1970 ed. and Supp. III) provides
for benefits for the "widow" of an insured wage earner, regardless
of her age, if she has in her care a "child" of such wage earner
who is entitled to child's insurance benefits. Title 42 U.S.C. §
402(d) (1970 ed. and Supp. III) provides for benefits for the
"child" of a deceased insured wage earner who was dependent upon
him at his death.
[
Footnote 2]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) provides in
full:
"(c) The term 'widow' (except when used in section 402(i) of
this title) means the surviving wife of an individual, but only if
(1) she is the mother of his son or daughter, (2) she legally
adopted his son or daughter while she was married to him and while
such son or daughter was under the age of eighteen, (3) he legally
adopted her son or daughter while she was married to him and while
such son or daughter was under the age of eighteen, (4) she was
married to him at the time both of them legally adopted a child
under the age of eighteen, (5) she was married to him for a period
of not less than nine months immediately prior to the day on which
he died, or (6) in the month prior to the month of her marriage to
him (A) she was entitled to, or on application therefor and
attainment of age 62 in such prior month would have been entitled
to, benefits under subsection (b), (e), or(h) of section 402 of
this title, (B) she had attained age eighteen and was entitled to,
or on application therefor would have been entitled to, benefits
under subsection (d) of such section (subject, however, to section
402(s) of this title), or (C) she was entitled to, or upon
application therefor and attainment of the required age (if any)
would have been entitled to, a widow's, child's (after attainment
of age 18), or parent's insurance annuity under section 231a of
Title 45."
It is undisputed that appellee Salfi cannot qualify as a "widow"
by satisfying condition(1), (2), (3), (4), or (6).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (1970 ed., Supp. III) provides in
part:
"(e) Child."
"The term 'child' means (1) the child or legally adopted child
of an individual, (2) a stepchild who has been such stepchild for
not less than one year immediately preceding the day on which
application for child's insurance benefit is filed or (if the
insured individual is deceased) not less than nine months
immediately preceding the day on which such individual died. . .
."
Prior to 1967, the required duration of relationship was a full
year. The reduction to nine months was accomplished in Pub.L. 9248,
§§ 156(a) and (b), 81 Stat. 866.
[
Footnote 3]
The literal wording of this section bars actions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 41. At the time § 405(h) was enacted, and prior to the 1948
recodification of Title 28, § 41 contained all of that title's
grants of jurisdiction to United States district courts, save for
several special purpose jurisdictional grants of no relevance to
the constitutionality of Social Security statutes.
[
Footnote 4]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) provides in full:
"Finality of Secretary's decision."
"The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing
shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such
hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be
reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as
herein provided. No action against the United States, the
Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought
under section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under
this subchapter."
[
Footnote 5]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides:
"Judicial review."
"Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made
after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount
in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of
notice of such decision or within such further time as the
Secretary may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district
court of the United States for the judicial district in which the
plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of business, or, if
he does not reside or have his principal place of business within
any such judicial district, in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. As part of his answer, the Secretary
shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record
including the evidence upon which the findings and decision
complained of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon
the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or
without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the
Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the
Secretary or a decision is rendered under subsection (b) of this
section which is adverse to an individual who was a party to the
hearing before the Secretary, because of failure of the claimant or
such individual to submit proof in conformity with any regulation
prescribed under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall
review only the question of conformity with such regulations and
the validity of such regulations. The court shall, on motion of the
Secretary made before he files his answer, remand the case to the
Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and may, at any
time, on good cause shown, order additional evidence to be taken
before the Secretary, and the Secretary shall, after the case is
remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered,
modify or affirm his findings of fact or its decision, or both, and
shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings
of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and
testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was
based. Such additional or modified findings of fact and decision
shall be reviewable only to the extent provided for review of the
original findings of fact and decision. The judgment of the court
shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the
same manner as a judgment in other civil actions. Any action
instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive
notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of
Secretary or any vacancy in such office."
[
Footnote 6]
Nor can it be argued that the third sentence of § 405(h) simply
serves to prevent a bypass of the § 405(g) requirements by filing a
district court complaint alleging entitlement prior to applying for
benefits through administrative channels. The entitlement sections
of the Act specify the filing of an application as a prerequisite
to entitlement, so a court could not, in any event, award benefits
absent an application.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)-(h) (1970
ed. and Supp. III).
See also § 402(j)(1). Once the
application is filed, it is either approved, in which event any
suit for benefits would be mooted, or it is denied. Even if the
denial is nonfinal, it is still a "decision of the Secretary"
which, by virtue of the second sentence of § 405(h), may not be
reviewed save pursuant to § 405(g).
Our Brother BRENNAN relies heavily,
post at
422 U. S.
790-792, on a passage from a Senate document entitled
"Monograph of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure." S.Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, p. 39
(1941). The basic monograph itself is described as
"embodying the results of the investigations made by the staff
of said committee relative to the [administrative] practices and
procedures of"
several agencies of the Government.
Id. at II.
Following the text of the monograph is the "Appendix," which, in
turn, is described in a "Foreword" as follows:
"This statement, developed from a report by the Bureau of
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance making certain recommendations for
the Board's consideration, describes the essential features of a
hearing and review system which has been authorized by the Board
and which is designed to meet both the statutory requirements and
the social purposes of the old-age and survivors insurance program.
It has been developed during several months under the leadership of
Ralph F. Fuchs, professor of law, Washington University, St. Louis,
Mo., a consultant of this Bureau, by whom the Bureau's report, in
the main, was written."
Id. at 34. After the "Foreword" follows a three-part
report in somewhat smaller type, the second of which parts is
entitled "Considerations Affecting the caring and Review System."
Within this second part, appears the language which MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN's dissent characterizes as "the reading which the Social
Security Board itself gave to the provision soon after it went into
effect."
Post at
422 U. S.
790.
We have some doubts that the report of a consultant can be
properly characterized as incorporating the "reading which the
Social Security Board itself gave" to this provision. Even if the
report as a whole is stated to have been "approved" by the Board,
there is no indication that such approval extends beyond the
report's broad-brush conceptualization of "the essential features
of a hearing and review system." In any event, we do not agree that
an administrative agency's general discussion of a statute,
occurring after its passage and in a context which does not require
it to focus closely on the operative impact of a particular
provision, is either an important indicator of congressional
intent, as the dissent suggests,
post at
422 U. S. 792,
or an authoritative source for the proposition that a provision
serves a particular function. Finally, even if the report is an
accurate reading of the Act, its significance goes only to whether
the third sentence of § 405(h) serves a function in addition to
that which we believe it serves; the possibility that the District
Court's interpretation renders the third sentence only largely
superfluous, rather than totally so, is not sufficient to disturb
our analysis of the role of that sentence in this case.
[
Footnote 7]
Title II contains the old-age, survivors, and disability
insurance programs codified at 42 U.S.C. § 401
et seq.
[
Footnote 8]
Since § 405(g) is the basis for district court jurisdiction,
there is some question as to whether it had authority to enjoin the
operation of the duration of relationship requirements. Section
405(g) accords authority to affirm, modify, or reverse a decision
of the Secretary. It contains no suggestion that a reviewing court
is empowered to enter an injunctive decree whose operation reaches
beyond the particular applicants before the court. In view of our
dispositions of the class action and constitutional issues in this
case, the only significance of this problem goes to our own
jurisdiction. If a § 405(g) court is not empowered to enjoin the
operation of a federal statute, then a three-judge District Court
was not required to hear this case, 28 U.S.C. § 2282, and we are
without jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. However, whether or
not the three-judge court was properly convened, that court did
hold a federal statute unconstitutional in a civil action to which
a federal agency and officers are parties. We thus have direct
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252.
McLucas v.
DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21,
421 U. S. 31-32
(1975).
[
Footnote 9]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(a):
"The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules
and regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with
the provisions of this subchapter, which are necessary or
appropriate to carry out such provisions, and shall adopt
reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide
for the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method
of taking and furnishing the same in order to establish the right
to benefits hereunder."
[
Footnote 10]
Section 405(g) jurisdiction in
Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636
(1975), was similarly present. In that case, the Secretary
stipulated that exhaustion would have been futile, and he did not
make any contentions that Wiesenfeld had not complied with the
requirements of § 405(g).
Id. at
420 U. S. 641
n. 8.
[
Footnote 11]
The Secretary also briefly argues that the duration of
relationship requirement rationally serves the interest in
providing benefits only for persons who are likely to have become
dependent upon the wage earner. Brief for Appellants 11-12. In view
of our conclusion with regard to his principal argument, we need
not consider this justification.
[
Footnote 12]
Similarly, the natural or adopted child of a deceased wage
earner need not meet the nine-month requirement.
See 42
U.S.C. § 416(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. III).
[
Footnote 13]
According to the Social Security Administration, in calendar
1973, there were 125,000 applicants for mother's benefits,
1,313,000 for child's benefits, and 403,000 for widow's/widower's
benefits. While these figures include large numbers of persons who
qualify on bases other than the duration of their relationship with
a wage earner, they also doubtlessly exclude persons who did not
even apply because of the durational restriction, or who were
thereby dissuaded from entering the relationship. A feel for the
magnitude of the potential for case-by-case determinations can also
be developed by reference to the Social Security Administration's
estimate that judgment for the class which the named appellees
sought to represent would involve payments of $30 million, assuming
retroactivity to 1967. This figure does not reflect payments in
behalf of persons who met the objective nine-month requirement, or
who could not meet it, and therefore either never applied or never
entered the relationship.
[
Footnote 14]
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(b), (f), and (g), defining "wife,"
"husband," and "widower." These various definitions impose duration
of relationship requirements with regard to "wife's" benefits, 42
U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970 ed. and Supp. III), "husband's" benefits, 42
U.S.C. § 402(c), and "widower's" benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1970
ed. and Supp. III). In addition, "widow's" benefits, 42 U.S.C. §
402(e) (1970 ed. and Supp. III), are available only to those women
who satisfy § 416(c)'s definition of "widow." "Parent's" benefits,
42 U.S.C. § 402(h), are also subject to an objective eligibility
requirement which is similar to a duration of relationship
requirement. Under § 402(h)(3), step-parents and adoptive parents
may receive benefits with respect to a deceased child who was
providing at least half of their support, but only if the marriage
or adoption creating their relationship occurred prior to the
child's 16th birthday.
[
Footnote 15]
Appellees do not contend that marital intent or life expectancy
can be reliably determined. They argue, however, that, because a
marriage could not be entered in contemplation of imminent death
unless the wage earner's "terminal illness" was known, the inquiry
need go no farther than the issue of whether the parties to the
marriage knew of such an illness. They claim that applicants could
demonstrate the state of their knowledge by physicians' affidavits
or documentary medical evidence. These contentions are not,
however, supported by any factual rebuttals of the variety of
difficulties which Congress was entitled to expect to be
encountered.
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420,
366 U. S. 426
(1961).
For example, all evidence of "knowledge of terminal illness"
would ordinarily be under the control of applicants, which suggests
that they should bear the burden of proof. But this burden could be
convincingly carried only with respect to wage earners who happened
to have had physical examinations shortly before their weddings; on
the other hand, awarding benefits where the wage earner had not had
an examination, and no medical evidence was available, would
encourage participants in sham arrangements to conceal their own
adverse medical evidence. Even when adequate medical evidence was
available, there could easily be difficulties in determining
whether a wage earner's physical condition amounted to a "terminal
illness"; if that concept were restricted to conditions which were
virtually certain to result in an early death, benefits would
probably be too broadly available, since certainty of imminent
death, rather than a mere high probability of it, is not a
prerequisite to a sham relationship; yet inquiries into the degree
of likelihood of death could become very complex indeed.
Additional problems with appellees' proposed test arise because
it, like the duration of relationship requirement, is not precisely
related to the objective of denying benefits which are sought on
the basis of sham relationships. In the first place, it presumably
would be necessary to limit the requirement of terminal illness
inquiries to instances in which death occurred within a specified
period after marriage. It would also appear to be necessary to set
an outside limit on the length of the period within which death was
expected that would disqualify applicants (after all, and
paraphrasing Lord Keynes, in the long run we are all expected to
die). Yet there will always be persons on one side of such lines
who are seriously disadvantaged
vis-a-vis persons on the
other side. More basically, appellees' test would clearly exclude
persons who knew of a wage earner's imminent death, but who entered
their marriages for reasons entirely unrelated to Social Security
benefits, such as to fulfill the promises of a longstanding
engagement. Thus, appellees' proposed test would be subject to
exactly the same constitutional attacks which they direct toward
the test on which Congress chose to rely.
Appellees point out that 42 U.S.C. § 416(k) (1970 ed. Supp. III)
provides for limited exceptions to the duration of relationship
requirement, unless the Secretary determines that at the time of
the marriage the wage earner "could not have reasonably been
expected to live for nine months." They argue that this represents
Congress' recognition that case-by-case consideration would not
impose an inordinate administrative burden. The argument is without
merit. Section 416(k) expresses Congress' willingness to accept
case-by-case inquiries with regard to limited classes which bear
particular indices of genuineness (the section is applicable in
cases of accidental death, death in the line of military duty, and
remarriages of persons previously married for more than nine
months). This says nothing about the feasibility of making such
inquiries in other circumstances, much less the rationality of
choosing not to do so.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I agree with MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN that, because there is clearly
jurisdiction, the Court's extended discussion of the subject is
unwarranted.
On the merits, I believe that the main problem with these
legislatively created presumptions is that they frequently invade
the right to a jury trial.
See Tot v. United States,
319 U. S. 463,
319 U. S. 473
(1943) (Black, J., concurring). The present law was designed to bar
payment of certain Social Security benefits when the purpose of the
marriage was to obtain such benefits. Whether this was the aim of a
particular marriage is a question of fact, to be decided by the
jury in an appropriate case. I therefore would vacate and remand
the case to give Mrs. Salfi the right to show that her
Page 422 U. S. 786
marriage did not offend the statutory scheme, that it was not a
sham.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.
The District Court did not err, in my view, either in holding
that it had jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or in
holding that the nine-month requirements of 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(5)
and (e)(2) (1970 ed. and Supp. III) are constitutionally
invalid.
I
Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional issue to which the Court devotes 10 pages,
only to conclude that there is indeed jurisdiction over the merits
of this case both here and in the District Court, was not raised in
this Court by the parties before us nor argued, except most
peripherally, [
Footnote 2/1] in the
briefs or
Page 422 U. S. 787
at oral argument. The question involves complicated questions of
legislative intent and a statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h),
which has baffled district courts and courts of appeals for years
in this and other contexts. [
Footnote
2/2] Of course, this Court is always obliged to inquire into
its own jurisdiction when there is a substantial question about
whether jurisdiction is proper either in the lower courts or in
this Court. But since here there is, according to the Court,
jurisdiction over the cause of action in any event, [
Footnote 2/3] I would have thought it the
wiser
Page 422 U. S. 788
course merely to note that there was jurisdiction in the
District Court either under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), leaving the resolution of the question of which is
applicable to a case in which the decision is of some consequence
and in which the parties have, either of their own volition or upon
request of the Court, briefed and argued the issue. [
Footnote 2/4] Surely, the Court does not
intend to adopt a new policy of always, on its own, canvassing,
with a full discussion, all jurisdictional issues lurking behind
every case, whether or not the issue has any impact at all on the
resolution of the case.
Because the Court nonetheless treats the question fully, I am
obliged to do so as well. For, at least insofar as my own research
and consideration, unaided by the help ordinarily offered by
adversary consideration, is adequate, I am convinced that the Court
is quite wrong about the intended reach of § 405(h), and that its
construction attributes to Congress a purpose both contrary
Page 422 U. S. 789
to all established notions of administrative exhaustion and
absolutely without support in the clear language or legislative
history of the statute. Further, today's decision is in square
conflict with
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.
S. 361 (1974). And finally, even if § 405(g) is the
exclusive route for adjudicating actions seeking payment of a
claim, I do not see how it can apply to the declaratory and
injunctive aspects of this suit.
A
The Court rejects the District Court's conclusion that § 405(h)
is no more than a codified requirement of administrative exhaustion
on the basis of the third sentence of the section, which it
characterizes as
"sweeping and direct, and [stating] that
no action
shall be brought under § 1331, not merely that only those actions
shall be brought in which administrative remedies have been
exhausted."
Ante at
422 U. S. 757.
But the sentence does not say that no action of any kind shall be
brought under § 1331, or other general grants of jurisdiction,
which may result in entitling someone to benefits under Title II of
the Act; it says merely that no action shall be brought under §
1331
et seq. "to
recover on any claim
arising
under [Title II]." (Emphasis added.) This action, I believe,
does not "arise under" Title II in the manner intended by § 405(h),
and it is, at least in part, not an action to "recover" on a claim.
See Parts
422 U. S. S.
797|>C,
infra.
Section 405(h), I believe, only bans, except under § 405(g),
suits which arise under Title II in the sense that they require the
application of the statute to a set of facts, and which seek
nothing more than a determination of eligibility claimed to arise
under the Act. Thus, I basically agree with the District Court that
§ 405(h), including its last sentence, merely codifies the
usual
Page 422 U. S. 790
requirements of administrative exhaustion. The last sentence, in
particular, provides that a plaintiff cannot avoid § 405(g) and the
first two sentences of § 405(h) by bringing an action under a
general grant of jurisdiction claiming that the Social Security Act
itself provides him certain rights. Rather, on
such a claim, a plaintiff
must exhaust
administrative remedies, and the District Court is limited to
review of the Secretary's decision, in the manner
prescribed by § 405(g).
The Court suggests that this reading of § 405(h) makes the last
sentence redundant. But this is the reading which the Social
Security Board itself gave to the provision soon after it went into
effect. In a document prepared for and approved by the Board in
January, 1940, as an outline of the procedures to be followed under
the newly enacted Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, [
Footnote 2/5] the interaction between §§
405(g) and (h) is described as follows:
"The judicial review section of the act, section [405(g)],
provides for civil suits against the Social Security Board in the
United States District Courts. These may be filed by parties to
hearings before the Board who are dissatisfied with final decisions
of the Board. The review of the Board's actions in these suits will
consist of a review of the Board's records in these cases.
Thus, on the one hand, the Board is protected against the
possibility of reversals of its decisions in separate actions filed
for the purpose. . . . Actions of this kind are specifically
excluded by section [405(h)]. On the other hand, judicial
review
Page 422 U. S. 791
on the basis of the Board's records in the cases makes it
necessary that the record in each case be in the best possible
state so as to avoid difficulties if a challenge in court
occurs."
Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, Basic Provisions
Adopted by the Social Security Board for the Hearing and Review of
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Claims With a Discussion of Certain
Administrative Problems and Legal Consideration (1940), in Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Administrative
Procedures in Government Agencies, S.Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, p. 39 (1941). Since the last sentence of § 405(h) is
the only part of the section which "specifically exclude[s]" any
"action," the italicized portion obviously refers to that
sentence.
Thus, the agency responsible for the enforcement of Title II
adopted a construction of the statute which gave the last sentence
the very meaning which the Court now rejects as "superfluous" and
"already performed by other statutory provisions."
Ante at
422 U. S. 757,
759, and n. 6. As explained in the margin, [
Footnote 2/6] the sentence is not superfluous,
Page 422 U. S. 792
an the Board obviously did not regard it as such. Administrative
interpretations by agencies of statutes which they administer are
ordinarily entitled to great weight,
see, e.g., Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. at
415 U. S.
367-368;
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S.
1,
380 U. S. 16
(1965). And in this instance, the contemporary Social Security
Board was intimately involved in the formulation of the 1939
amendments, [
Footnote 2/7] and thus
must be presumed to have had insight into the legislative intent.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Page 422 U. S. 793
Indeed, to adopt the Court's view of the last sentence of §
405(h) is, as far as I can determine, to assume that it was
inserted precisely to cover the situation here -- a suit attacking
the constitutionality of a section of Title II and seeking to
establish eligibility despite the provisions of the statute. Yet
the Court is able to point to no evidence at all that Congress was
concerned with this kind of lawsuit when it formulated these
sections, and I have not been able to find any either.
Without any clear evidence, indeed without any
Page 422 U. S. 794
evidence, the Court should not attribute to Congress an
intention to filter through § 405(g) this sort of constitutional
attack.
"Adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional
enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of
administrative agencies."
Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.
S. 233,
393 U. S. 242
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in result);
Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 368.
[
Footnote 2/9]
See 3 K.
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.04 (1958). Thus, in a case
such as this one, in which no facts are in dispute and no other
sections of the Act are possibly applicable, "the only question of
exhaustion was whether to require exhaustion of nonexistent
administrative remedies."
Id. at 78.
See Aircraft
& Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.
S. 752,
331 U. S. 773
(1947). To assume, with no basis in the legislative history or in
the clear words of the statute, that Congress intended to require
exhaustion in this kind of case is to impute to Congress a
requirement of futile exhaustion in which the only issues in the
case are not discussed, in which the actual issues are in no way
clarified, in which no factual findings are made, and in which
there is no agency expertise to apply. I see no basis for imputing
such an odd intent, especially since, as discussed below, I believe
the clear import of the wording of the statute is to the
contrary.
Page 422 U. S. 795
B
I think it quite clear that a claim "arising under" Title II is
one which alleges that the Title grants someone certain rights.
This claim does not "arise under" the Title because, if the statute
itself were applied, Mrs. Salfi would certainly lose. Instead, this
case "arises under" the Constitution, and seeks to hold invalid the
result which would be reached under the statute itself.
Johnson
v. Robison, supra, as well as cases construing the meaning of
"arising under" in other jurisdictional statutes, [
Footnote 2/10] dictate this result.
In
Johnson, construing the language which appears
ante at
422 U. S. 761,
we said, 415 U.S. at
415 U. S.
367:
"The prohibitions would appear to be aimed at review only of
those decisions of law or fact that arise in the administration by
the Veterans' Administration of a statute providing benefits for
veterans. A decision of law or fact 'under' a statute is made by
the Administrator in the interpretation or application of a
particular provision of the statute to a particular set of facts. .
. . Thus, . . . '[t]he questions of law presented in these
proceedings arise under the Constitution, not under the statute
whose validity is challenged.'"
(Citation omitted.)
The Court,
ante at
422 U. S.
761-762, suggests that this interpretation turned on the
precise wording of the statute construed in
Johnson,
specifically on the words "decisions . . . on any question of law
and fact." First, as the quotation above shows,
Johnson,
in fact, concentrated not upon what constitutes a "decision" of the
administrator,
Page 422 U. S. 796
but upon what is a decision "under" a statute. But more
significantly, the statute construed in
Johnson had,
between 1957 and 1970, read in part:
"[D]ecisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact
concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any law
administered by the Veterans' Administration shall be final and
conclusive. . . ."
38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added).
See
Johnson, 415 U.S. at
415 U. S.
368-369, n. 9. The italicized language is obviously
quite similar to that used in § 405(h). The Court's opinion in
Johnson made clear that the holding that the section does
not apply to constitutional attacks on veterans' benefits
legislation encompasses all prior versions of the section, and that
the "claim for benefits" language in no way affected this
construction of the statute. [
Footnote 2/11]
Aside from
Johnson, our cases concerning the meaning of
"arising under" in the jurisdictional statutes affirm that this
claim arises under the Constitution, and not under the Social
Security Act. We have consistently held that a controversy
regarding title to land does not "arise under" federal law "merely
because one of the parties to it has derived his title under an act
of Congress."
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.
S. 561,
225 U. S. 570
(1912).
See Oneida Indian Nation v.
County of Oneida,
Page 422 U. S. 797
414 U. S. 661,
414 U. S. 676,
and n. 11 (1974). Rather, "a suit to enforce a right which takes
its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily one
arising under the . . . laws of the United States."
Shoshone
Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505,
177 U. S. 507
(1900);
Oneida Indian Nation, supra, at
414 U. S. 683
(REHNQUIST, J., concurring). Unless the dispute requires for its
resolution a decision concerning federal law, the case does not
arise under federal law even if, but for a federal statute, there
would be no right at all.
Shulthis v. McDougal, supra at
225 U. S. 569;
Oneida Indian Nation, supra, at
414 U. S.
677.
Thus, "arising under" is a term of art in jurisdictional
statutes referring, at least in part, to the body of law necessary
to consider in order to determine the rights in question. Here
there is no dispute about the application of the Social Security
Act; the only controversy concerns whether the Constitution permits
the result which the Social Security Act would require. Therefore,
this case does not concern a "claim arising under" Title II, and is
not precluded by the last sentence of § 405(h) from consideration
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
C
Not only does this case not concern a "claim arising under"
Title II, but it is, at least in part, not an "action . . . to
recover on any claim." (Emphasis added.) A three-judge
District Court dealt with the "recover on [a] claim" aspect of §
405(h) in
Gainville v. Richardson, 319 F.
Supp. 16, 18 (Mass.1970). [
Footnote 2/12] Judge Wyzanski wrote concerning the
effect of the last sentence of § 405(h):
"In the present action, while plaintiff does, perhaps
Page 422 U. S. 798
improperly, seek damages, his complaint also has prayers for a
declaratory judgment that § 203(f)(3) of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 403(f)(3) is unconstitutional, and for an injunction
restraining defendant from applying that section. If he were to be
successful with respect to those prayers, plaintiff would not, in
the language of the statute, 'recover on any claim' for benefits.
For recovery of benefits, he would still need to resort to the
administrative process. The only effect of a declaratory judgment
or injunction by this court would be to preclude the Secretary from
making the challenged deduction."
319 F. Supp. at 18.
This holding seems eminently sensible to me. The legislative
history and administrative interpretation of § 405(h),
supra at
422 U. S.
790-792, and n. 8, reveal no basis for supposing that
the section was to apply to suits which did not request immediate
payment of a claim as part of the relief. To construe the statute
to cover all actions which may later, after administrative
consideration, result in eligibility under Title II is to mutilate
the statutory language.
The holding in
Gainville, supra, applies squarely to
this case. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief
with respect to both the named plaintiffs and the class, as well as
retroactive benefits. App. 12-13. The injunction sought was either
an order to provide benefits or "an opportunity for a hearing on
the genuineness of their status, [for] plaintiffs and all those
similarly situated."
Id. at 13. Thus, even if § 405(h)
precludes granting retroactive benefits except under § 405(g), it
would not, under the rationale of
Gainville, supra,
preclude granting any declaratory and injunctive relief to the
class, since the relief requested would not necessarily be
tantamount to recovery on a claim. Indeed,
Page 422 U. S. 799
the appellants seem to have conceded as much in this case, since
it argued here that §§ 405(g) and (h) were preclusive
only
with regard to retroactive benefits,
see 422
U.S. 749fn2/1|>n. 1,
supra.
The Court concludes that there was jurisdiction over the claim
for retroactive benefits for the named plaintiffs under § 405(g).
(
But see Part D,
infra.) Under the
Gainville rationale, there would be jurisdiction under §
1331 over the claims for class declaratory and injunctive relief.
And if there was jurisdiction under one jurisdictional statute or
another for each part of the action, surely there was jurisdiction
over the whole. [
Footnote
2/13]
D
Finally, even if I could agree, and I do not, that § 405(g) is
the exclusive route for consideration of this kind of case, I would
dissent from the Court's treatment of the exhaustion requirement of
§ 405(g),
ante at
422 U. S. 764-767.
Page 422 U. S. 800
The Court admits,
ante at
422 U. S. 765,
that the purposes of administrative exhaustion
"have been served once the Secretary has satisfied himself that
the only issue is the constitutionality of a statutory requirement,
a matter which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine, and that
the claim is neither otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a
different section of the Act."
Nonetheless, the Court construes the statute so as to permit
"the
Secretary [to] specify such requirements for
exhaustion as
he deems serve
his own interests in
effective and efficient administration. . . . [A] court may not
substitute its conclusion as to futility for the contrary
conclusion of the Secretary."
Ante at
422 U. S. 766.
(Emphasis supplied.) If, as the Court holds, the finality and
hearing requirements of § 405(g) are not jurisdictional, [
Footnote 2/14]
ibid., then I
fail to see why it is left to the Secretary to determine when the
point of futility is reached, a power to be exercised, apparently,
with regard only to the Secretary's needs and without taking
account of the claimants' interest in not exhausting futile
remedies, [
Footnote 2/15] and in
obtaining
Page 422 U. S. 801
promptly benefits which have been unconstitutionally denied.
Further, the Court leaves the way open for a lawless application of
this power, since the Secretary can evidently, once the case is in
court, assert or not assert the full exhaustion requirements of §
405(g), as he pleases.
Moreover, and significantly, it flagrantly distorts the record
in this case to say that the Secretary waived the exhaustion
requirements of § 405(g), recognizing their futility. True, the
Secretary does not here claim a lack of jurisdiction for failure to
exhaust on the individual claim,
see 422
U.S. 749fn2/1|>n. 1,
supra. But he did, in the
District Court, move to dismiss the entire action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
See Notice and Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, at Record 114-117. The Secretary
said, referring to §§ 405(g) and (h):
"From the above provisions, it is clear that the only civil
action permitted to an individual on any claim arising under Title
II of the Act is an action to review the 'final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing. . . .' The complaint, however, does
not allege jurisdiction under section [405(g)]. . . . Moreover,
there has been no 'final decision' by the Secretary on the
matters herein complained
Page 422 U. S. 802
of . . . and plaintiffs have not exhausted their
administrative remedies. The exhaustion of any available
administrative remedies is a
condition precedent to the
plaintiffs [
sic] bringing this action against the
defendants, and the issue is one of subject matter
jurisdiction."
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Preliminary Injunction, at Record 65. (First emphasis added.)
In the face of this statement, the Court's conclusion that the
Secretary determined "that, for the purposes of this litigation,
the reconsideration determination is
final,'" ante at
422 U. S. 767,
is patently indefensible.
II
The merits of this case can be dealt with very briefly. For it
is, I believe, apparent on the face of the Court's opinion that
today's holding is flatly contrary to several recent decisions,
specifically
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.
S. 441 (1973);
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U. S. 508
(1973); and
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.
S. 628 (1974).
In
Vlandis, we said, 412 U.S. at
412 U. S. 446:
"[P]ermanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored
under the Due Process [ Clause] of the . . . Fourteenth
[Amendment]." The Court today distinguishes
Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645
(1972), and
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
414 U. S. 632
(1974), two cases which struck down conclusive presumptions,
because both dealt with protected rights, while this case deals
with "a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public
treasury [which] enjoys no constitutionally protected status."
Ante at
422 U. S. 772.
But
Vlandis also dealt with a Government benefit program
-- the provision of an
Page 422 U. S. 803
education at public expense. Since the Court cannot dispose of
Vlandis as it does
Stanley and
LaFleur,
it attempts to wish away
Vlandis by noting that,
"where Connecticut purported to be concerned with residency, it
might not at the same time deny to one seeking to meet its test of
residency the opportunity to show factors clearly bearing on that
issue."
Ante at
422 U. S.
771.
Yet the Connecticut statute in
Vlandis did not set
"residency," undefined, as the criteria of eligibility; it
defined residency in certain ways. The definitions of
"resident" were precisely parallel to the statute here, which
defines "widow" and "child" in part by the number of months of
marriage, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c) and (e) (1970 ed. and Supp. III).
Similarly,
Murry, supra, and
Jimenez, supra,
both dealt with conclusive presumptions contained in statutes
setting out criteria for eligibility for Government benefits. The
Court distinguishes them as cases in which the "criteria . . . bear
no rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal."
Ante at
422 U. S. 772.
But if the presumptions in
Murry and
Jimenez were
irrational, the presumption in this case is even more irrational.
We have been presented with no evidence at all that the problem of
collusive marriages is one which exists at all. Indeed, the very
fact that Congress has continually moved back the amount of time
required to avoid the irrebuttable presumption,
ante at
422 U. S.
778-780, suggests that it found, for each time period
set, that it was depriving deserving people of benefits without
alleviating any real problem of collusion. There is no reason to
believe that the nine-month period is any more likely to discard a
high proportion of collusive marriages than the five-year,
three-year, or one-year periods employed earlier.
The Court says:
"The administrative difficulties of individual eligibility
determinations are without doubt
Page 422 U. S. 804
matters which Congress may consider when determining whether to
rely on rules which sweep more broadly than the evils with which
they seek to deal."
Ante at
422 U. S. 784.
But, as we said in
Stanley v. Illinois, supra:
"[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in
general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry
from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may
characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps
more, than mediocre ones."
405 U.S. at
405 U. S.
656.
This is not to say, nor has the Court ever held, that all
statutory provisions based on assumptions about underlying facts
are
per se unconstitutional unless individual hearings are
provided. But in this case, as in the others in which we have
stricken down conclusive presumptions, it is possible to specify
those factors which, if proved in a hearing, would disprove a
rebuttable presumption.
See e.g., Vlandis, 412 U.S. at
412 U. S. 452.
For example, persuasive evidence of good health at the time of
marriage would be sufficient, I should think, to disprove that the
marriage was collusive. Also, in this case, as in
Stanley,
405 U.S. at
405 U. S. 655,
and
LaFleur, 414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 643,
the presumption, insofar as it precludes people as to whom the
presumed fact is untrue from so proving, runs counter to the
general legislative policy -- here, providing true widows and
children with survivors' benefits. And finally, the presumption
here, like that, in
Vlandis, Murry, and
Jimenez,
involves a measure of social opprobrium; the assumption is that the
individual has purposely undertaken to evade legitimate
requirements. When these factors are present, I believe
Page 422 U. S. 805
that the government's interests in efficiency must be
surrendered to the individual's interest in proving that the facts
presumed are not true as to him.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The appellants in their jurisdictional statement raised as one
of the questions presented "[w]hether sovereign immunity bars this
[suit]
insofar as it seeks retroactive social security
benefits." Jurisdictional Statement 2 (emphasis added). Their
argument was that no retroactive benefits were available to the
class, because 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not waive sovereign immunity,
because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) bars a suit seeking retroactive benefits
except under § 405(g), and because the exhaustion requirements of §
405(g) were not met. Brief for Appellants 16-18.
See also
Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8:
"Question: . . . [I]s the United States satisfied there was
jurisdiction in the district court here?"
"Mrs. Shapiro: We are not satisfied that there was jurisdiction
to
the extent that it . . . identified a class and required
retroactive payments to all members of the class."
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the appellants never claimed here that the District Court
was without jurisdiction over the merits of this case, for they
conceded, apparently, jurisdiction to grant declaratory and
injunctive relief.
[
Footnote 2/2]
See, e.g., on the effect of §§ 405(g) and (h) on cases
seeking to invalidate as unconstitutional a provision of Title II
of the Social Security Act,
Bartley v.
Finch, 311 F.
Supp. 876 (ED Ky.1970),
summarily aff'd, on the merits sub
nom. Bartley v. Richardson, 404 U.S. 980 (1971);
Gainville
v. Richardson, 319 F. Supp.
16 (Mass.1970);
Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F.
Supp. 1226 (Md.),
summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069
(1972);
Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F.
Supp. 1 (SD Fla.1973);
Wiesenfeld v.
Weinberger, 367 F.
Supp. 981 (NJ 1973),
aff'd, 420 U. S. 420 U.S.
636 (1975);
Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F.
Supp. 1299 (ED Pa.1974) (
appeal docketed, No.
74-5538).
Bartley v. Finch, supra, was the only one of these
cases holding that § 405(g) is the exclusive means of determining
the constitutionality of a provision of the Social Security Act,
and that there was, because of noncompliance with § 405(g), no
jurisdiction. The District Court then went on to decide the merits.
This Court's affirmance was explicitly on the merits, and thus must
be taken to have held that there was jurisdiction even though §
405(g) was not complied with. ,
Other courts have grappled with §§ 405(g) and (h) in other
contexts.
See, e.g., Filice v. Celebrezze, 319 F.2d 443
(CA9 1963);
compare Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1
(CA2 1966),
with Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904 (CA9
1973) (en banc). In
Cappadora, supra, Judge Friendly, in
considering the application of §§ 405(g) and (h) to review of a
decision not to reopen a claim of statutory qualification,
cautioned against overly literal interpretation of the sections.
356 F.2d at 5.
[
Footnote 2/3]
If the Court had determined to affirm on the merits, then the
question actually raised by the appellants -- whether there is
jurisdiction to award retroactive benefits despite noncompliance
with § 405(g) -- may have been fairly before us, and may have
entailed canvassing the jurisdictional questions the Court today
discusses. But since the Court reverses on the merits, the source
of the District Court's jurisdiction is immaterial and,
particularly, it is irrelevant whether or not there was
jurisdiction over the class complaint. The Court's decision on the
latter question,
ante at
422 U. S. 764,
can only be characterized as dictum.
[
Footnote 2/4]
In
Norton v. Weinberger, appeal docketed, No. 74-6212,
the District Court did not declare the contested portion of Title
II of the Social Security Act unconstitutional, and we therefore
lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Thus, if § 405(g) is the
exclusive route for determination of constitutional attacks on
Title II, and if, as the Court suggests,
ante at
422 U. S. 763
n. 8, there is a question regarding the power of a court to grant
an injunction under § 405(g), we could be without jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 in
Norton because the three-judge
court, without power to enjoin the statute, was improperly convened
under 28 U.S.C. § 2282. Thus,
Norton, unlike this case,
would be the appropriate vehicle for determination of the
jurisdictional question decided today.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Sections 405(g) and (h) were part of these amendments.
See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939. Tit. II, §
201, 53 Stat. 1362. Before that, the Social Security Act contained
no explicit provisions concerning judicial review.
See
H.R.Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 43 (1939).
[
Footnote 2/6]
The Court argues,
ante at
422 U. S. 759
n. 6, that, if the third sentence of § 405(h) merely forbids a
bypass of § 405(g) via a separate action not framed as a review of
the Secretary's decision, it is superfluous because an application
is a prerequisite to entitlement and "[o]nce the application is
filed, it is either approved . . . or it is denied," resulting in a
decision of the Secretary which, under the second sentence of §
405(h), cannot be reviewed "save pursuant to § 405(g)." This
analysis is faulty in several respects. First, without the last
sentence of § 405(h), an applicant might first file an application
and then, before it is acted upon at all, file a suit for benefits
under Title II. Second, it is not true that all entitlement to
benefits hinge upon filing an application. In some instances, a
person already receiving one type of benefits need not file a new
application in order to receive another category of benefits.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e)(1)(C)(ii) and (f)(1)(C)
(1970 ed., Supp. III); § 402(g)(1)(D). Finally, even if an
application has been filed and a decision made upon it, the
applicant might try to file a suit seeking not review of the
administrative record, but a
de novo determination of
eligibility. This would raise the question whether the second
sentence of § 405(g) should be read only to prescribe the way in
which the administrative record "shall be reviewed"; the third
sentence makes clear, however, that no action except review of the
administrative record is available for suits claiming eligibility
under the statute.
[
Footnote 2/7]
See Report of the Social Security Board, Proposed
Changes in the Social Security Act, H.R.Doc. No. 110, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939); Hearings on Social Security before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., vols. 1, 3, pp.
45-69, 2163-2433 (1939) (testimony of Dr. Altmeyer, Chairman of the
Social Security Board).
[
Footnote 2/8]
Other indices of legislative intent and administrative
interpretation, although sparse, also suggest that §§ 405(g) and
(h) were intended and interpreted as nothing more than a
codification of ordinary administrative exhaustion requirements,
applicable to cases presenting questions of fact and of
interpretation of the statute. The 1939 Report of the Social
Security Board,
see 422
U.S. 749fn2/7|>n. 7,
supra, suggested that the
amendments include a
"[p]rovision that findings of fact and decisions of the Board in
the allowance of claims shall be final and conclusive. Such a
provision would follow the precedent of the World War Veterans' Act
and of other legislation with respect to agencies similar to the
Board which handle a large number of small claims."
Id. at 13. At the hearings on the amendments, Dr.
Altmeyer explained this recommendation as
"follow[ing] the precedent laid down in . . . other acts,
where there is a volume of small claims, and where a review of
the findings of fact would lead to . . . duplicate administration
of the law."
Hearings, n. 7,
supra, vol. 3, p. 2288. (Emphasis
added.) Thus, at their inception, the exhaustion provisions which
became §§ 405(g) and (h) were clearly intended to apply only to
run-of-the-mill claims under the statutory provisions, in which
factual determinations would be paramount.
The House of Representatives Report says of § 405(g): "The
provisions of this subsection are similar to those made for the
review of decisions of many administrative bodies." H.R.Rep. No.
728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 43 (1939). The Report describes §
405(h) basically in its own words.
Id. at 43-44. There is
no indication that the latter section was intended in any way to
alter the intent indicated by the quoted sentence -- to legislate
only ordinary administrative exhaustion requirements.
Finally, a statement inserted by Mr. Mitchell, Commissioner of
Social Security, into the record of the 1959 Hearings on the
Administration of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program
before the Subcommittee on the Administration of the Social
Security Laws of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., 977 (1960), again reflects the view that §§ 405(g) and
(h) together merely reiterate, even if a bit redundantly, that
"the jurisdiction of a court to review a determination of the
Secretary is limited to a review of the record made before the
Secretary. This is made amply clear by the second and third
sentences of § [405(g)] and by the provisions of [§ 405(h)]. . . .
The court has no power to hold a hearing and determine the merits
of the claim, because the statute makes it clear that the
determination of claims is solely a function of the Secretary."
[
Footnote 2/9]
At least twice, claimants who attempted to exhaust pursuant to §
405(g) on a constitutional attack on Title II have been met with an
administrative holding that constitutional claims are beyond the
competence of the administrative agency.
See In re Ephram
Nestor, Referee's Decision, Jan. 31, 1958, at Tr. 9,
Flemming v. Nestor, O.T. 1959, No. 54;
In re Lillian
Daniel, Administrative Law Judge's Decision, Nov. 14, 1973,
cited in Appellees' Motion to Affirm and/or Dismiss 21 n. 34. This
administrative determination of the agency's jurisdiction is due
great deference.
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.
S. 361,
415 U. S.
367-368 (1974).
[
Footnote 2/10]
The last sentence of § 405(h), upon which the Court relies so
heavily, refers expressly to old § 41 of Title 28, now 28 U.S.C. §
1331
et seq. Thus, it is appropriate to assume that
"arising under" is used in § 405(h) in the same sense as it is used
in the general jurisdictional statutes.
[
Footnote 2/11]
Johnson discusses at length the reasons why the
"concerning a claim for benefits or payments" language was
eliminated. 415 U.S. at
415 U. S.
371-373. These reasons had nothing to do with the
problem of constitutional attacks presented in
Johnson and
presented here. The Court concluded:
"Nothing whatever in the legislative history of the 1970
amendment, or
predecessor no-review clauses, suggests any
congressional intent to preclude judicial cognizance of
constitutional challenges to veterans' benefits legislation."
Id. at
415 U. S. 373.
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 2/12]
This Court, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972),
summarily affirmed Griffin
v. Richardson, 346 F.
Supp. 1226, 1230 (Md.), which expressed basically the same
view, albeit somewhat less clearly.
[
Footnote 2/13]
Although this case was argued here as if the District Court
granted retroactive benefits to the class, I am not sure this is
so. The injunction issued ordered the Secretary
"to provide benefits, from the time of original entitlement, to
plaintiffs and the class they represent,
provided said
plaintiffs and class are otherwise fully eligible to receive said
benefits."
373 F.
Supp. 961, 966 (ND Cal.1974). (Emphasis added.) As the Court
points out,
ante at
422 U. S. 759
n. 6, in most instances,
see 422
U.S. 749fn2/6|>n. 6,
supra, a person is not
"eligible" for benefits until he files an application. Further, the
order obviously contemplates administrative proceedings in order to
determine whether "such persons are otherwise fully eligible."
Finally, if exhaustion of § 405(g) is indeed, as the Court holds,
always a prerequisite to eligibility, then a person would not be
"otherwise fully eligible" unless and until he exhausts § 45(g).
Thus, I believe that the order can be read not to mandate
retroactive benefits, but only to require that claims of the class
members be treated as if the nine-month marriage requirement did
not exist. Such an order does not constitute recovery on a claim,
and, in my view, was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
[
Footnote 2/14]
The Court has to ignore plain language of the statute in order
to avoid the absurd result of requiring full exhaustion on all
claims such as this one, even after the point of futility is
reached. The statute says that judicial review can be had only
"after a hearing," § 405(g), and it is apparent that the hearing
contemplated is a full, evidentiary hearing,
see § 405(b).
Rather than avoiding the statutory language by holding that the
Secretary can nonetheless dispense with a hearing, the Court would
do better to recognize that the patent inapplicability of the
statutory language to this kind of case suggests that the statute
was never intended to apply at all to constitutional attacks beyond
the Secretary's competence.
[
Footnote 2/15]
Indeed, in some cases similar to this one, administrative
exhaustion is functionally impossible. For example, in
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.
S. 636 (1975), the applicant was ineligible for benefits
because he was a man, a fact obviously apparent as soon as he
appeared at the Social Security office. Not surprisingly, he was
refused an opportunity even to file an application for benefits.
Id. at
420 U. S. 640
n. 6. This case is slightly different, since Mrs. Salfi was
precluded not by the obvious fact of her sex, but by a fact which
presumably did not appear until she filled out the application --
that she had not been married long enough. Yet, the Court suggests
that we had jurisdiction in
Wiesenfeld only because of a
stipulation that exhaustion would have been futile.
Ante
at
422 U. S. 767
n. 10. Does this intimate that the Secretary could have refused to
waive exhaustion, and thereby have eliminated § 405(g)
jurisdiction, even though Wiesenfeld could not possibly have
complied with the statute without wrestling an application from the
clerk and somehow forcing him to file it?