Respondents, an association representing stevedoring companies,
and a shipper, sought injunctive relief in an Alabama state court
against picketing of a foreign-flag ship by petitioner maritime
unions which were protesting as substandard the wages paid the
foreign crewmen who manned the ship. The trial court issued a
temporary injunction, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.
Petitioners contend that the state courts were without jurisdiction
to grant relief, and that the issuance of an injunction interfered
with their free speech rights.
1. The jurisdiction of the Alabama courts was not preempted by
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Windward Shipping v.
American Radio Assn., 415 U. S. 104
419 U. S.
(a) Even if there is a dispute between petitioners and
respondents independent of petitioners' dispute with foreign flag
ships, it is subject to state court disposition unless it satisfies
the jurisdictional requirements of the NLRA. P. 419 U. S.
(b) The fact that the state court's jurisdiction is invoked by
stevedores and shippers, rather than by the foreign-ship owners as
in Windward, supra,
does not convert into "commerce"
within the meaning of the NLRA's jurisdictional requirements,
activities that plainly were not such in Windward.
419 U. S.
(c) Neither the shipper seeking to ship his products, the
stevedores who contracted to unload the foreign flag vessel's
cargo, nor the longshoremen employed to do the unloading, were, for
the purposes of jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
over a dispute directly affecting the maritime operations of
foreign flag vessels, "engaged in or affecting commerce" within the
purview of the NLRA, and therefore petitioners' picketing did not
even "arguably" constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(4)
of the Act, the secondary boycott provision. Pp. 419 U. S.
2. The Alabama courts' action in enjoining the picketing
violated no right conferred upon petitioners by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, because that action is well within that
"broad field in which a State, in enforcing some public policy,
whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by
its legislature or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin
Page 419 U. S. 216
aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy,"
Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.
, 354 U. S. 293
Pp. 419 U. S.
(a) Since the picketing here was for a prohibited purpose, it is
not entitled to protection on the ground that the place where it
occurred constituted a public forum for presentation of lawful
communications. Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza,
391 U. S. 308
distinguished. P. 419 U. S.
(b) The injunction is supported by a "valid public policy." In
the context in which the Alabama Supreme Court stated the public
policy to be the prevention of "wrongful interference" with
respondents' businesses, that term obviously refers to third
parties' efforts to induce employees to cease performing services
essential to the conduct of their employer's business, third-party
participation being critical to picketing being categorized as
"wrongful interference." Pp. 419 U. S.
(c) Petitioners' contention that the record fails to support the
conclusion that there was a substantial question whether the
picketing constituted "wrongful interference," is without merit,
since the question whether evidence is sufficient to make out a
cause of action created by state law and tried in the state courts
is a matter for decision by those courts. Pp. 419 U. S.
291 Ala. 201, 279
So. 2d 467
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined.
DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post,
419 U. S. 232
STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN,
and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post,
p. 419 U. S.
Page 419 U. S. 217
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are the six maritime unions which appeared before
this Court as respondents in Windward Shipping v. American
Radio Assn., 415 U. S. 104
(1974). We granted their petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Alabama, 415 U.S. 947, in order to review their
contentions that this case was distinguishable from
on the preemption issue, and that the temporary
injunction upheld by that court had infringed rights guaranteed to
them under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. [Footnote 1
As in Windward,
this case arises from picketing
designed to publicize the adverse impact on American seamen of the
operations of foreign flag carriers which employ foreign crewmen at
wages substantially below those paid to American seamen. As in
the picketing occurred during 1971, but in this
case it took place in Mobile, Ala., and was directed against the
Aqua Glory, a ship of Liberian registry. The pickets displayed the
same signs and distributed the same literature as they did in
and they were subject to the same instructions.
Page 419 U. S. 218
The picketing in each case also had similar results. In
"The picketing, although neither obstructive nor violent, was
not without effect. Longshoremen and other port worker refused to
cross the picket lines to load and unload petitioners'
415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 108
Here, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in affirming a temporary
injunction issued by the Alabama Circuit Court, said of
petitioners' activities in Mobile:
"Posting the pickets, as was done on the dock adjacent to the
Aqua Glory, brought about an immediate refusal by the stevedore
workers of the
Page 419 U. S. 219
locals of International Longshoremen's Association to cross the
picket line of the appellant unions. About eighty percent of the
cargo ships that enter the Port of Mobile, sail under a foreign
flag and are manned by alien crews. [Footnote 3
It is apparent from the facts already stated that the Houston
picketing in Windward
and the Mobile picketing here were,
for all practical purposes, identical. Petitioners refer to
as "involving the union petitioners in the
identical national picketing dispute as part of the Committee's
program. . . ." Brief for Petitioners 7 n. 1. But petitioners
contend that, since the state court plaintiffs in this case are not
the foreign owners of a picketed ship, as they were in
but are instead stevedoring companies which seek
to service the ship [Footnote
] and a shipper who wishes to have his crops loaded on it, the
question of preemption of state court jurisdiction by the National
Labor Relations Act should be answered differently than it was in
Petitioners reason that respondents could have charged them with an
unfair labor practice under the secondary boycott provision of the
National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4), 40 Stat. 452, as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), and that, since petitioners' activities were
arguably prohibited under that section, the respondents' exclusive
remedy was to seek relief from
Page 419 U. S. 220
the National Labor Relations Board. Cf. San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236
Petitioners' position in this respect contrasts markedly with
their posture in the Windward
petitioners, as respondents in this Court, urged that
"peaceful and truthful primary picketing, nonobstructive and
without trespass upon private property, by American workers
protesting substandard wages and benefits paid,"
are activities "actually protected by the Act." Brief for
Respondents in No. 72-1061, O.T. 1973, p. 15. They also urged
"the American seamen's activities at bar constitutes
] typical lawful primary picketing, sanctioned and
protected by the Act, Garner [v. Teamsters Union,
346 U. S.
(1953),] and Longshoremen v. Ariadne
397 U.S. [195,] 397 U. S.
Brief for Respondents in No. 72-1061, O.T. 1973, p. 16.
Petitioners apparently urged the same arguments in the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals, whose judgment we reviewed in Windward,
because that court stated:
"[A]ppellees' picketing carefully remained within the guidelines
for permissible picketing on the premises of a secondary employer
promulgated in Sailor's Union of the Pacific,
547 and adopted in Local 761 Inter. Union of Elec., Radio and
Mach. Wkrs. v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 667
. . . (1961).
Petitioners, having failed to persuade this Court in
that their Houston picketing was protected under
§ 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, now
contend that their Mobile picketing was at least arguably a
secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(B). They would have us hold not only that there is an
independent controversy between petitioner unions, representing
Page 419 U. S. 221
American seamen, and the contracting stevedores represented by
respondent, but also that this independent dispute is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Board.
Acceptance of petitioners' argument would result in a rule
whereby a state court had jurisdiction over a complaint for
injunction filed by a foreign ship owner claiming that picketing
activities of a union were interfering with his business
relationships with a contract stevedore, but the same court would
have no jurisdiction where the contract stevedore sought an
injunction on precisely the same grounds. The anomaly of such a
result is reason enough to question it, but we believe that there
is a more fundamental flaw in petitioners' claim.
Even if there is a dispute between petitioners and respondents
which is, in some semantic sense, independent of petitioners'
dispute with foreign flag ships, that dispute is subject to state
court disposition unless it satisfies the jurisdictional
requirements of the NLRA. In this regard, we note that a necessary
predicate for a finding by the Board of an unfair labor practice
under § 8(b)(4)(i) is that the individual induced or encouraged
must be employed by a "person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce." Similarly, a necessary predicate for finding
an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(4)(ii) is that the person
threatened, coerced, or restrained must have been engaged in
"commerce or in an industry affecting commerce," and a necessary
predicate for Board jurisdiction of unfair labor practices under §
10(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) is that they be practices
Petitioners interpret Windward
as having done nothing
more than establish that the maritime operations of foreign ships
are not "in commerce." They assume that Windward
nothing about either the business activities of persons seeking to
deal with such ships or about whether, for these purposes, those
activities are "in commerce" or "affecting commerce." Petitioners
Page 419 U. S. 222
are able to state that the requirements of §§ 8(b)(4) and 10 are
"Unquestionably, the Association, constituting stevedoring
companies employing longshoremen to load and discharge vessels at
the port of Mobile, Alabama, is an 'employer' engaged in 'commerce'
under the Act, and equally unquestionably, respondent Malone,
delivering his soybeans to the dock elevator, is a 'person' engaged
in 'commerce,' under the Act."
Brief for Petitioners 15-16. We do not believe, however, that
the line of cases [Footnote 7
commencing with Benz
and culminating in Windward
permit such a bifurcated view of the effects of a single group of
pickets at a single site.
we stated that our task was to
"whether the activities . . . complained of were activities
'affecting commerce' within the meaning of . . . the National Labor
Relations Act, [Footnote
and we concluded that they were not. 415 U.S. at 415 U. S.
-106. We recognized that the picketing activities did
not involve the inescapable intrusion into the affairs of foreign
ships that was present in Benz
went on to say that
Page 419 U. S. 223
the latter cases
"do not purport to fully delineate the threshold of interference
with the maritime operations of foreign vessels which makes the
415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 114
We further observed:
"At the very least, the pickets must have hoped to exert
sufficient pressure so that foreign vessels would be forced to
raise their operating costs to levels comparable to those of
American shippers, either because of lost cargo resulting from
the longshoremen's refusal to load or unload the vessels,
because of wage increases awarded as a virtual self-imposed tariff
to regain entry to American ports. Such a large-scale increase in
operating costs would have more than a negligible impact on the
'maritime operations' of these foreign ships, and the effect would
be by no means limited to costs incurred while in American ports.
Unlike Ariadne, the protest here could not be accommodated by a
wage decision on the part of the shipowners which would affect only
wages paid within this country. [Footnote 9
Page 419 U. S. 224
While we thus spoke in Windward
of the effect of the
Houston pickets on the maritime operations of foreign ships, the
quoted passage shows that we fully recognized that this effect
would not be produced solely by the pickets and the messages
carried by their signs. It would be produced in large part by the
refusal of American workmen employed by domestic stevedoring
companies to cross the picket line in order to load and unload
cargo coming to or from the foreign ships. Since Windward
held that the Houston picketing was not in or affecting commerce,
it would be wholly inconsistent to now hold, insofar as concerns
Board jurisdiction over a complaint by respondents, that the
employer of the longshoremen who honored the picket line, or the
shipper whose goods they did not handle, was in or affecting
That we found it unnecessary to expressly state this conclusion
suggests not that the point is an undecided
one, but that such a conclusion inevitably flows from the fact that
the response of the employees of the American stevedores was a
crucial part of the mechanism by which the maritime operations of
the foreign ships were to be affected. The exaction of the
Page 419 U. S. 225
tariff to regain entry to American ports" does not depend upon
American shippers heeding the message on the picket signs and
declining to ship their cargoes in foreign bottoms. The same
pressure upon the foreign flag owners will result if longshoremen
refuse to load or unload their ships. The effect of the picketing
on the operations of the stevedores and shippers, and thence on
these maritime operations, is precisely the same whether it be
complained of by the foreign-ship owners or by persons seeking to
service and deal with the ships. The fact that the jurisdiction of
the state courts in this case is invoked by stevedores and shippers
does not convert into "commerce" activities which plainly were not
such in Windward.
Our dissenting Brethren contend that our disposition is
inconsistent with the Court's decision in Hattiesburg Building
& Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.
(1964), and with the Board's decision in
Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock),
N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). Hattiesburg
dealt with the quite
different question of applying the Board's own limitation of its
jurisdiction to those cases which have "a
effect on commerce." 23 N.L.R.B. Ann.Rep. 7
(1958) (emphasis added). The Board had promulgated a series of
administratively established standards, in effect ceding to state
courts and agencies disputes involving entities which admittedly
"affected commerce," but whose volume of interstate business was
not "sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of [Board]
Page 419 U. S. 226
U.S.C. § 164(c). The standards provided that they could be
"satisfied by reference to the business operations of either the
primary or the secondary employer." Hattiesburg, supra,
377 U. S. 126
Because of this provision, the Board had not, in fact, ceded its
jurisdiction over the particular dispute that had been presented to
the Mississippi courts. In Hattiesburg,
this Court did no
more than enforce the natural consequence of this fact by holding
deprived the state courts of jurisdiction. We
find nothing in that holding inconsistent with what we say or hold
here. Certainly Hattiesburg
does not, as MR. JUSTICE
STEWART's dissent would have it, stand for the proposition that a
secondary employer's domestic business activities may be the basis
for Board jurisdiction where the primary dispute is beyond its
authority over unfair labor practices "affecting
commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
That dissent's treatment of Moore Dry Dock, supra,
reads a great deal more into that 1950 Board decision than its
language and analysis can support. The decision itself contains no
reference whatever to the jurisdiction of the Board over the
primary employer, the foreign flag vessel Phopho,
neither the decision nor the Trial Examiner's report considered the
jurisdictional challenge presently confronting this Court. The
Trial Examiner's report, from which that dissenting opinion quotes,
did state that the Board, in an apparently unreported
determination, had previously dismissed a petition for election
aboard the Phopho,
92 N.L.R.B. 547, 560-561. The report
later acknowledged that the Board had "left somewhat obscure the
precise legal basis" of its jurisdictional ruling, a comment which
was evoked by the contention that, because the primary employer was
"clearly engaged in commerce," the ruling must have been based on a
different jurisdictional defect. Id.
at 568. This Court in
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.
(1957), not only noted that Moore
Page 419 U. S. 227
involved a different situation, but also
rather pointedly stated: "We need only say that these case are
inapposite, without, of course, intimating any view as to their
result." 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 143
n. 5. A 1950 Board precedent such as this can scarcely be regarded
as controlling when it is clearly contrary to the thrust of this
line of cases.
Petitioners rely on Teamsters Union v. N.Y. N.H. & H. R.
Co., 350 U. S. 155
(1956), and Plumbers' Union v. Door County, 359 U.
(1959), for the proposition that, even though the
Board may not have jurisdiction over the primary labor relations of
a party which is excluded from the Act's definition of "employer,"
] it is
nonetheless competent to consider secondary disputes involving such
a party. In Teamsters Union, supra,
a railroad was held to
be barred from seeking relief in the state courts against a
secondary boycott. The Court held that, while the railroad was not
a statutory "employer," it was nonetheless a "person" protected by
§ 8(b)(4). A similar result was reached in Door County,
in which a non-"employer" county sought state court
relief, not with respect to activities of its own employees, but
with respect to a claimed secondary boycott arising from picketing
against a nonunion subcontractor working on an addition to the
county courthouse. While these cases establish the proposition that
an entity which is not within the Act's definition of
Page 419 U. S. 228
may nonetheless be a "person" for purposes of protection against
secondary boycotts, neither they nor any other case decided by this
Court suggests that the Board has jurisdiction of § 8(b)(4)
complaints if the alleged unfair labor practice does not affect
commerce. Indeed, in Door County, supra,
pointedly inquired whether the out-of-state origin of construction
materials was sufficient to establish the jurisdictionally required
effect on interstate commerce. 359 U.S. at 359 U. S.
Here, neither the farmer seeking to ship his soybeans, the
stevedores who contracted to unload the cargo of the foreign flag
vessel, nor the longshoremen whom the stevedores employed to carry
out this undertaking were, for these purposes, engaged in or
affecting commerce within the purview of the National Labor
Relations Act. Therefore the petitioners' picketing did not even
"arguably" violate § 8(b)(4)(b) of that Act. Since Congress did not
intend to strain through the filament of the NLRA picketing
activities which so directly affect the maritime operations of
foreign vessels, we hold that the Alabama courts were competent to
apply their own law in resolving the dispute between petitioners
and respondents unless, as petitioners claim, such a resolution
violated petitioners' rights under the First and Fourteenth
After concluding that the state courts had jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether the picketing was
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying on
Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.
(1957), it concluded that, if the picketing
compromised valid public policies, it was not protected by its
putative purpose of conveying information. The court therefore
thought that the matter narrowed to whether or not the picketing
had a purpose or objective to "wrongfully interfere" with
respondents' businesses. Recognizing that the unions were appealing
a temporary injunction,
Page 419 U. S. 229
issued as a matter of equitable discretion to preserve the
pending final resolution of the dispute, the
court inquired only whether there was evidence of a prohibited
purpose sufficient to establish' that the trial judge had not
abused the "wide discretion" he possesses in such matters. The
court found such evidence in the testimony of a local union
official charged with carrying out the picketing. He had expressed
the hope that union men would not cross the lines, that the port
would become cluttered with foreign ships unable to load or unload,
and that the docks would be shut down. On this basis, the court
concluded that a substantial question was presented as to whether
the picketing had a prohibited purpose, and that the trial judge
had not abused his discretion.
Petitioners repeat their First and Fourteenth Amendment
arguments before this Court. They contend that the picketing was
expressive conduct informing the public of the injuries they suffer
at the hands of foreign ships, and "imploring the public" to
"Buy American' or `ship American.'" Brief for Petitioners 21.
This conduct, they contend, constitutes "the lawful exercise of
protected fundamental rights of free speech," and is thus not
subject to injunction.
We think this line of argument is foreclosed by our holding in
There, the Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, reviewed the cases in which we had dealt with
disputes involving the interests of pickets in disseminating their
message and of the State in protecting various competing economic
and social interests. Vogt
endorsed the view that
picketing involves more than an expression of ideas, 354 U.S. at
354 U. S. 289
and referred to our
"growing awareness that these cases involved not so much
questions of free speech as review of the balance struck by a State
between picketing that involved more than 'publicity' and competing
interests of state policy."
at 354 U. S. 290
The Court concluded
Page 419 U. S. 230
that our cases
"established a broad field in which a State, in enforcing some
public policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and
whether announced by its legislature or its courts, could
constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing
effectuation of that policy."
at 354 U. S. 293
We believe that, in the case now before us Alabama's interference
with petitioners' picketing is well within that "broad field."
Petitioners seek to escape from Vogt
in three ways.
First, they contend that this case is squarely controlled by
Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.
(1968). In that case, claim petitioners,
"identical as at bar, [designed] to peacefully and truthfully
publicize substandard wages and concomitantly request the public
not to patronize the picketed entity,"
was held to be protected. Brief for Petitioners 20. In rejecting
this contention, we need only point out that Logan Valley
concerned the location of picketing, not its purpose; indeed, it
was on exactly this basis that the Logan Valley
distinguished the line of cases culminating in Vogt.
U.S. at 391 U. S. 314
established only that, in some circumstances,
private business property can be so thoroughly clothed in the
attributes of public property that it may not be completely closed
as a public forum to those who wish to present otherwise lawful
Petitioners' second argument is that the injunction here is not
supported by a "valid public policy," as required by Vogt.
They point out that, while the Alabama Supreme Court stated the
public policy to be the prevention of "wrongful interference" with
respondents' businesses, it did not expressly define that term. We,
however, think it obvious that, in this context "wrongful
interference" refers to efforts by third parties to induce
employees to cease performing services essential to the conduct of
their employer's business. That third-party participation is
critical to picketing being categorized as
Page 419 U. S. 231
"wrongful interference" is clear from Pennington v.
Birmingham Baseball Club,
277 Ala. 336, 170 So. 2d
(1964), a case cited by the Alabama Supreme Court in its
opinion in this case.
the Supreme Court of Alabama indicated
that the state policy against "wrongful interference" is quite
analogous to the federal policy of prohibiting secondary boycotts,
and is based on similar considerations. The State's policy also
appears to be based on the state interest in preserving its economy
against the stagnation that could be produced by pickets'
disruption of the businesses of employers with whom they have no
primary dispute. At Mobile, the picketing threatened to eliminate
the 70% to 80% of the stevedores' business that depended on foreign
shipping, and to cause serious losses for farmers whose
agricultural crops required immediate harvesting and shipping.
the State may prefer these interests over
petitioners' interests in conveying their "ship American" message
through the speech-plus device of dockside picketing.
Petitioners' final contention is that the record fails to
support the conclusion that a substantial question existed as to
whether the picketing constituted "wrongful interference" under
Alabama law. The question of whether evidence is sufficient to make
out a cause of action created by state law and tried in the state
courts is a matter for decision by those courts. Insofar as
petitioners' argument on this score may be read to suggest that the
evidence before the Alabama court would not support a finding that
their activities were such as could be enjoined under Vogt,
we reject it. Petitioners seem to argue that the
Alabama courts were bound by
Page 419 U. S. 232
the statements of purpose appearing on the pickets' signs and
literature, and that, in any event, one local official's statements
of his hopes and expectations as to the picketing's effect could
not override those stated purposes. This argument ignores the wide
latitude open to triers of fact to make factual determinations on
the basis of rational inferences which arise from the nature,
location, and effect of picketing. See Vogt, supra,
354 U. S. 286
354 U. S. 295
Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U.
, 345 U. S.
Concluding that the jurisdiction of the Alabama courts in this
case was not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, and
that the action of those courts in enjoining the picketing at
Mobile violated no right conferred upon petitioners by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Alabama.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reported at 291
Ala. 201, 279 So. 2d
(1973). Because that court validated only a temporary
injunction, and remanded for trial on the merits, an issue has been
raised as to our jurisdiction to consider this case. We think that
Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.
(1963), is conclusive of the finality of the
judgment below for the purposes of 2 U.S.C. § 1257.
The pickets carried signs which read:
"ATTENTION TO THE PUBLIC"
"THE WAGES AND BENEFITS PAID ABOARD"
"THE VESSEL SS [name of vessel] ARE SUB-"
"STANDARD TO THOSE OF THE AMERICAN"
"SEAMEN. THIS RESULTS IN EXTREME"
"DAMAGE TO OUR WAGE STANDARD AND"
"THE LOSS OF OUR JOBS. PLEASE DO NOT"
"PATRONIZE [THIS VESSEL]. HELP THE"
"AMERICAN SEAMEN. WE HAVE NO DISPUTE"
"WITH OTHER VESSELS AT THIS SITE."
"[Printed names of the six unions.]"
App. 6a. They distributed literature which stated:
"To the Public -- American Seamen have lost approximately 50% of
their jobs in the past few years to foreign flag ships employing
seamen at a fraction of the wages of American Seamen."
"American dollars flowing to these foreign shipowners operating
ships at wages and benefits substandard to American Seamen are
hurting our balance of payments in addition to hurting our economy
by the loss of jobs."
"A strong American Merchant Marine is essential to our national
defense. The fewer American flag ships there are, the weaker our
position will be in a period of national emergency."
"PLEASE PATRONIZE AMERICAN FLAG VESSELS, SAVE OUR JOBS, HELP OUR
ECONOMY AND SUPPORT OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE BY HELPING TO CREATE A
STRONG AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE."
"Our dispute here is limited to the vessel picketed at this
site, the S.S. _____."
"[Printed names of the six unions.]"
291 Ala. at 205, 279 So. 2d at 470.
The stevedoring companies appear here through their bargaining
representative, Mobile Steamship Association, Inc.
Petitioners also suggest that the result should be different
did not involve vessels which, while
flying foreign flags, were American owned. Petitioners do not,
however direct our attention to any evidence in the record as to
the ownership of the Aqua Glory. In any event, we think this factor
irrelevant, in light of McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,
372 U. S. 10
372 U. S. 19
Windward Shipping v. American Radio Assn.,
675, 678 (1972).
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.
(1957); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,
372 U. S. 10
(1963); Incres S.S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U. S.
The relevant definitions appear in 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6) and
"(6) The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States, or
between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United
States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign
country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or
within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points
in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or
the District of Columbia or any foreign country."
"(7) The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or
burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or
having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."
Our Brother STEWART suggests in dissent that Longshoremen v.
Ariadne Co., 397 U. S. 195
(1970), requires reversal here, because in that case it was held
that longshoremen servicing foreign flag vessels in American ports
are in "commerce" within the meaning of the Act. But the
court, in distinguishing Benz, supra,
stated that "[t]he considerations that
informed the Court's construction of the statute" in those
"are clearly inapplicable to the situation presented here. The
participation of some crew members in the longshore work does not
obscure the fact that this dispute centered on the wages to be paid
American residents, who were employed by each foreign ship not to
serve as members of its crew, but rather to do casual longshore
397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 199
The Court in Windward
reiterated that distinction:
"The pickets in Ariadne,
unlike the pickets in
were primarily engaged in a
dispute as to whether an employer should hire unionized or
nonunionized American workers to perform longshoremen's work, and
the substandard wages which they were protesting were being paid to
fellow American workers."
415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 112
Here, the picketing which triggered the dispute was not directed
toward an wages or conditions of employment of the longshoremen. It
was instead directed to substandard wages being paid to the crews
of foreign flag vessels throughout those vessels' worldwide
maritime operations. In Ariadne,
on the contrary, the
picketing was directed toward requiring a foreign flag vessel to
hire unionized American workers, rather than nonunionized American
workers, to service vessels berthed in American ports. That the
latter effect does not surpass "the threshold of interference with
the maritime operations of foreign vessels which makes the LMRA
inapplicable," Windward, supra,
at 415 U. S. 114
certainly provides no support for the proposition that the former
effect also does not surpass that threshold.
In so holding, we need cast no doubt on those cases which hold
that the Board has jurisdiction under § 8(b)(4) of domestic
secondary activities which are in commerce, even though the primary
employer is located outside the United States. See Madden v.
Grain Elevator Workers Local,
418, 334 F.2d 1014 (CA7 1964),
379 U.S. 967 (1965); Grain Elevator
Workers Local 418 v. NLRB,
126 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 376 F.2d 774,
389 U.S. 932 (1967).
The definition appears in 29 U.S.C. § 152(2):
"(2) The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent
of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the
United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision
thereof, or any corporation or association operating a hospital, if
no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, or any person subject to the Railway
Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor organization
(other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization."
The record indicates that all grain storage facilities in the
Mobile area were full. Additional soybeans could be harvested only
as those already stored were transferred to waiting vessels. App.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I agree with my Brother STEWART that the dispute in the present
case is within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board, and that that jurisdiction is exclusive of state
jurisdiction. The foreign flag ship involved in the present
controversy is Liberian. Hence, I add a few observations generated
by Noel Mostert's Supership (1974), discussing the problems of the
big new oil tankers and their vast pollution of the oceans of the
world. He puts Liberian flag ships in the following
"Liberia now has the world's largest merchant marine, followed
by Japan and Britain, and her lead is rapidly increasing; flag of
convenience fleets have regularly grown at rates more than twice
those of world fleets as a whole. Liberia and Panama together now
own, on paper, nearly a quarter of world shipping. Tankers dominate
these expatriate fleets."
"Thirty-five to 40 percent of the Liberian tonnage is
American-owned, and an additional 10 percent of
Page 419 U. S. 233
it is American-financed, which helps explain where the American
merchant fleet, in steady decline since the end of the war, has
taken itself. According to law, American flag ships must be built
in the United States and must be three-quarters manned by
Americans. American shipbuilding costs used to be double those
elsewhere (inflation abroad has helped make them competitive
again), and American seamen's wages are still higher than
elsewhere. . . ."
"Flag of convenience operators often say that their ships,
especially many of those under the Liberian flag, are among the
largest, best-equipped, and most modern in the world. This may be
true. But ships are only as good as the men who run them, and the
record is not impressive. Old ships traditionally have a higher
casualty rate than new ones. Liberian losses between 1966 and 1970
not only averaged twice as high as those of the other major
maritime nations, but, contrary to the rule, the ships they were
losing were, on the whole new ones, certainly newer than the ones
lost by the other principal merchant marines: the average age of
Liberian losses in that four-year period was 8.7 years, while that
of the Japanese and Europeans averaged 12 years."
"To a disconcerting degree, oil cargoes have been delivered in
recent years by improperly trained and uncertificated officers
aboard ships navigating with defective equipment."
at 58-59. While the Liberian flag vessel in the
present case was not an oil tanker, the quoted passages demonstrate
the scope of the public interest of our people in keeping marine
traffic in more responsible hands than those which the "flag of
convenience" commonly uses. No public issue is today more
important, at least to the life of the oceans of the world and the
wellbeing of our own working force. Large national interests ride
on today's decision. Congress, in this type of case, has
Page 419 U. S. 234
made the National Labor Relations Board the exclusive arbiter of
the present controversy, as my Brother STEWART convincingly
demonstrates. I accordingly would reverse the judgment below.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
The issue in the present case is quite different from the issue
decided last Term in Windward Shipping v. American Radio
Assn., 415 U. S. 104
Because the dispute in this case clearly "affects commerce," and
thus falls within the exclusive regulatory power of the National
Labor Relations Board, I would reverse the judgment before us.
In Windward Shipping,
the owners and managing agents of
two foreign flag vessels sought injunctive relief in state courts
in Texas to bar picketing of their vessels by several American
maritime unions. The unions were attempting to publicize the
competitive advantage enjoyed by foreign flag vessels because of
the substantial disparity between foreign and domestic seamen's
wages. The vessels' owners and managing agents asked the state
courts to enjoin the picketing as tortious under Texas law. The
primary basis for this claim was that the picketing sought to
induce the foreign flag vessel owners and their foreign crews to
break preexisting contracts. The Texas courts concluded that they
lacked jurisdiction to consider the complaint of interference with
contract because the dispute between the foreign flag shipowners
and the American unions was "arguably" within the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board.
In reversing the judgment of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals,
this Court reaffirmed earlier cases that had recognized that
"Congress, when it used the words 'in commerce' in the [Labor
Management Relations Act], simply did not intend that Act to erase
longstanding principles of comity and accommodation in
Page 419 U. S. 235
415 U.S. at 415 U. S.
-113. In those earlier cases, the Court had concluded
that maritime operations of foreign flag ships employing alien
seamen are not in "commerce" within the meaning of § 2(6) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §
152(6). Therefore, disputes affecting those operations do not
"affect commerce," and are not within the jurisdiction of the
Board. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.
; McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,
372 U. S. 10
Incres S.S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U. S.
Although the union activity sought to be enjoined by the foreign
flag shipowners in Windward Shipping
did not involve the
same degree of intrusion into the internal affairs of foreign
vessels that was present in Benz, McCulloch,
the Court concluded that the economic impact upon
foreign shipping from the unions' conduct might severely disrupt
the maritime operations of the foreign vessels. "Virtually none of
the predictable responses of a foreign shipowner to picketing of
this type," the Court noted, "would be limited to the sort of
wage-cost decision benefiting American workingmen which the LMRA
was designed to regulate." 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 115
Cf. Longshoremen v. Ariadne Co., 397 U.
. Accordingly, the Court held that the Texas
courts had jurisdiction over the foreign shipowners' complaint that
the union activity was interfering with preexisting contracts
between the owners and their crews.
The question presented by this case, however, is not whether
state court jurisdiction over a dispute between owners of foreign
flag vessels and American maritime unions is outside the scope of
the Act, as it was in Windward Shipping.
question is whether state courts have jurisdiction over a complaint
by an association of American stevedoring companies that secondary
pressure caused by the picketing of American maritime unions
constituted a wrongful interference with the
Page 419 U. S. 236
American companies' right to carry on their lawful business.
Neither the language of the Act nor the principles of comity
underlying our decision in Windward Shipping
Court's conclusion that this dispute between American employers and
American unions is outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Board.
As in Windward Shipping,
the labor dispute in this case
began when six American maritime unions picketed a foreign vessel
to publicize the adverse consequences to American seamen of the low
wages paid by the foreign shipowner. As a result of the picketing,
American longshoremen and other workers employed by the member
companies of the Mobile Steamship Association refused to service
the foreign flag vessel. It was this allegedly unlawful secondary
pressure generated by the maritime unions' picketing that the
Mobile Steamship Association sought to enjoin in state court as a
tortious interference with its right to contract and to carry on
its lawful business.
The allegedly tortious secondary pressure that formed the basis
for Mobile Steamship Association's state court complaint is
precisely the type of concerted activity made subject to Board
regulation by § 8(b)(4)(i)(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, 73 Stat. 42, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(b). That section,
designed to shield neutral third parties from the adverse impact of
labor disputes in which they are not involved, makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization
"to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities . . . where . . . an
object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring any person . . . to
cease doing business with any other person. . . ."
I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that the
Page 419 U. S. 237
secondary dispute between the American maritime unions and the
Mobile Steamship Association that is the basis for this lawsuit
fails to satisfy all the jurisdictional requirements of §
8(b)(4)(b). [Footnote 2/1
and the cases on which it relied have
established that the maritime operations of foreign flag ships
employing alien seamen are not in "commerce" within the meaning of
the Act. Accordingly, we held in those cases that labor disputes
affecting those operations do not "affect commerce" so far as the
Act is concerned. But those decisions cannot be read to suggest
that American stevedoring companies whose American employees load
and unload both American and foreign flag vessels in American ports
are not "engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce."
Indeed, in Longshoremen v. Ariadne Co.,
397 U.S. at
397 U. S. 200
we held that longshoremen servicing foreign flag vessels in
American ports are in "commerce" within the meaning of § 2(6) of
the Act, and thus subject to the regulatory power of the Board.
Consequently, stevedoring companies employing such longshoremen
must be "engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce"
within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(b), and a labor dispute affecting
their operations necessarily "affects commerce" within the meaning
of the Act.
The Court's contrary conclusion appears to be based on the
premise that it would be "wholly inconsistent" to hold that the
unions' picketing was not "affecting commerce" so far as the
primary dispute with the foreign flag shipowner was concerned, but
was "affecting commerce" in the secondary dispute here involved.
at 419 U. S. 224
The Court does not indicate that a secondary
Page 419 U. S. 238
dispute between the maritime unions and the Mobile Steamship
Association could never "affect commerce" within the meaning of the
Act, unlike the Windward Shipping
dispute between the
unions and the foreign shipowners, which would never "affect
If the maritime unions had a primary dispute with American flag
shipowners, that dispute would clearly "affect commerce" within the
meaning of the Act, and would thus clearly fall within the Board's
regulatory power. To avoid inconsistency, the Court would
presumably conclude that a secondary dispute between stevedoring
companies and maritime unions in such a situation would also
"affect commerce." The Court would thus make the determination
whether an American stevedoring company was "engaged in an industry
affecting commerce," the § 8(b)(4)(b) jurisdictional requirement,
depend entirely on whether, in a particular case, a primary labor
dispute to which the stevedoring company was not privy was between
an American union and an American flag shipowner or an American
union and a foreign flag shipowner. "The anomaly of such a result
is reason enough to question it. . . ." Ante
419 U. S.
More importantly, the Court's conclusion that this secondary
dispute between an American employer and American unions does not
affect commerce because the primary dispute between the unions and
foreign flag shipowners is not within the Board's jurisdiction
squarely conflicts with our decision in Hattiesburg Building
& Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.
. In that case, an employer subjected to secondary
pressure brought suit in state court to enjoin picketing at its
premises. After finding that the primary employer was not in
"commerce" within the meaning of the Act, the state court ruled
that the preemption doctrine of San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236
not applicable. The state court then enjoined the secondary
picketing of the union. This Court unanimously reversed that
Page 419 U. S. 239
holding that the record clearly showed that
employer's operations met the [Board's]
jurisdictional requirements. Since the union's activities in this
case were arguably an unfair labor practice, he state court had no
jurisdiction to issue the injunction."
377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 127
(emphasis added; citations omitted).
The unanimous holding in Broome
that exclusive Board
jurisdiction over a secondary dispute exists although the primary
dispute did not "affect commerce" within the meaning of the Act
finds solid support in the language of § 8(b)(4)(b) itself. The
section expressly requires that the neutral, secondary employer be
"engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce."
However, it requires only that the primary object of the secondary
pressure be a "person." As defined by § 2(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(1), there is no requirement that a "person," which includes
"individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations,
[and] corporations," either be "engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce," or otherwise be within the
jurisdiction of the Act. See Plumbers' Union v. Door
County, 359 U. S. 354
(governmental unit); Teamsters Union v. N.Y. N.H. & H.R.
Co., 350 U. S. 155
(railroad). Thus, the fact that the foreign flag vessel which was
the primary object of the unions' picketing activity was not in
"commerce" cannot stand as a bar to the Board's exercise of
jurisdiction over the secondary dispute in this case.
Neither considerations of comity nor a "reluctance to intrude
domestic labor law willy nilly into the complex of considerations
affecting foreign trade," Windward Shipping v. American Radio
415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 110
justifies the Court's disregard of the clear language of §
8(b)(4)(b) or its failure to follow the Broome
The dispute before the Alabama courts did not involve the maritime
operations of the foreign flag vessel that was the primary target
of the unions' activity. The shipowners were not parties to the
state court law
Page 419 U. S. 240
suit. The injunction approved by the Alabama Supreme Court is
concerned solely with union interference with operations and
contractual relations of the Mobile Steamship Association at the
Port of Mobile. That one of the contractual relationships allegedly
interfered with was between members of the Association and a
foreign flag vessel is not apparent from the face of the state
court injunction. [Footnote
In short, the dispute between American workingmen and unions and
their American employers was well within the boundaries of the Act
as we have defined those boundaries in Windward Shipping, Benz,
As such, it is
indistinguishable from a number of
Page 419 U. S. 241
secondary boycott cases over which the Board has exercised its
exclusive jurisdiction. For example, in Sailors' Union of the
Pacific (Moore Dry Dock),
92 N.L.R.B. 547, the Board
considered charges by an American drydock owner that union
picketing of a Panamanian ship tied up at the drydock constituted
unlawful secondary activity. The union was picketing in an attempt
to be recognized as the bargaining representative of the Panamanian
shipowner's crew. Prior to the Board's consideration of the
secondary dispute, the union had filed a petition for certification
with the Regional Director of the NLRB. The petition was dismissed
"inasmuch as the internal economy of a vessel of foreign
registry and ownership is involved.'" Upon appeal, the Board
sustained the Regional Director's action on the ground that, "`upon
the facts presently existing in this case, it does not appear hat
the Board has jurisdiction over the [e]mployer.'" Id. at
560-561. Notwithstanding the Board's refusal to exercise
jurisdiction over the primary dispute because it involved a foreign
flag vessel, the Board assumed jurisdiction over the secondary
dispute between the union and the drydock owner. This Court in
Benz observed that the Board's assumption of jurisdiction
over the secondary dispute in Moore Dry Dock was very
different from an attempt to assert jurisdiction over the primary
dispute involving the foreign flag shipowner. Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 143
n. 5. [Footnote 2/3]
Because the secondary dispute in this case implicates only
American employers and their American employees, following the
literal language of § 8(b)(4)(b) and
Page 419 U. S. 242
recognizing the Board's exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute
would not in any way undermine the principles of comity emphasized
in our decision in Windward Shipping.
The Board will only
decide whether the secondary effects of the dispute are prohibited
by § 8(b)(4)(B). Exercise of this jurisdiction will not "thrust the
National Labor Relations Board into a delicate field of
international relations.'" Longshoremen v. Ariadne Co.,
397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 199.
Certainly a Board decision that secondary pressure violated §
8(b)(4)(b) would not risk interference with international maritime
trade. Nor would a decision that the secondary pressure did not
violate § 8(b)(4)(b) endanger the foreign flag shipowners'
interests in preserving the integrity of their maritime operations
from the impact of the unions' picketing. These interests are fully
protected under Windward Shipping by permitting the
foreign ship owner to seek an injunction in state court.
Where activities by parties subject to the regulatory power of
the National Labor Relations Board are "arguably" prohibited by § 8
of the National Labor Relations Act, the general rule is that the
jurisdiction of the Board is exclusive, preempting both federal and
state court jurisdiction. San Diego Building Trades Council v.
359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 245
see Longshoremen v. Ariadne Co., supra,
at 397 U. S.
-202 (WHITE, J., concurring). Despite this rule, the
Solicitor General has suggested as amicus curiae
recognize concurrent jurisdiction in state courts and the Board to
enjoin secondary conduct when the primary dispute involves a
foreign flag vessel. Congress adopted such a proposal for
concurrent state court jurisdiction to award damages for conduct
that violates § 8(b)(4). § 303, Labor Management Relations Act, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 187; see Teamsters Union v. Morton,
377 U. S. 252
Congress expressly rejected a proposal for a comparable exception
to the general rule of exclusive jurisdiction for complaints
Page 419 U. S. 243
relief against secondary conduct arguably prohibited by §
8(b)(4). [Footnote 2/4
] The only
distinction between the amendment providing for general concurrent
jurisdiction over secondary conduct rejected by Congress and the
scheme suggested by the Government is that the Solicitor General
would limit concurrent state court jurisdiction to secondary
disputes in which the primary employer was a foreign flag
shipowner. Windward Shipping
fully protects the interests
of these shipowners in maintaining the integrity of the maritime
operations of their vessels by permitting them to seek state court
injunctions. Consequently, this distinction cannot justify
overruling the congressional determination that American employers
who enjoy the protection of § 8(b)(4) should be limited to securing
injunctive relief through the Board.
The Solicitor General also argues that there is no justification
for the preemption doctrine in cases involving secondary disputes
where the primary dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the Board.
That position, of course, directly conflicts with Hattiesburg
Building & Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.
, where this Court, as previously noted reversed a
state court in; function directed against secondary conduct,
holding the preemption doctrine applicable even though the Board
had no jurisdiction over the primary dispute.
Page 419 U. S. 244
Moreover, even though the primary dispute is outside the Board's
jurisdiction, there is a continuing need to avoid development of
conflicting rules of substantive law governing concerted secondary
conduct. Through initial passage and subsequent amendment of §
8(b)(4)(b), Congress has clearly stated that certain types of
secondary activity are illegal without regard to the identity of
the primary employer. But just as deliberately, Congress has chosen
not to prohibit resort to certain types of secondary pressure. If
the Alabama law of secondary boycotts can be applied to proscribe
conduct that Congress decided not to prohibit when it enacted §
"the inevitable result would be to frustrate the congressional
determination to leave this weapon of self-help available, and to
upset the balance of power between labor and management expressed
in our national labor policy."
"For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to
be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the
state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods
which the federal Act prohibits."
Teamsters Union v. Morton,
377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 260
quoting Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.
, 346 U. S. 500
The need to avoid conflicting rules of substantive law in the labor
relations area and the desirability of leaving the development of
such rules to the National Labor Relations Board, the agency
created by Congress for that purpose, is a "primary justification
for the preemption doctrine." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.
, 386 U. S. 180
Because the secondary activity of the maritime unions challenged by
the Mobile Steamship Association "arguably" violates § 8(b)(4)(B)
of the Act, that need is fully present in the instant case. In sum,
the dispute between the American unions and the American
stevedoring companies in this case clearly "affects commerce"
within the meaning of the Act, and thus falls within the exclusive
regulatory power of the National Labor Relations Board. The
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court should, therefore, be
Nobody has suggested that the maritime unions engaged in the
secondary picketing are not "labor organizations" within the
meaning of § 2(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), or that the
longshoremen and other workers who refused to cross the picket
lines and service the foreign flag vessel are not "employees"
within the meaning of § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
The Alabama courts enjoined the six maritime unions, their
officers, members, and employees, from:
"1. Loitering, congregating, or picketing, by standing, walking,
marching, sitting, or otherwise, at or near any part of the
premises owned, occupied, or used by members of Complainant Mobile
Steamship Association, Inc."
"2. In any manner interfering with or obstructing, by words or
actions, any person or persons working for or desiring to work for
members of Complainant Mobile Steamship Association, Inc."
"3. Interfering with the operations of any member of Complainant
Mobile Steamship Association, Inc. in any manner whatsoever."
"4. Picketing or interfering at or near Complainant Mobile
Steamship Association Inc. and its members' premises or premises
used by Complainant Mobile Steamship Association's members in a
manner calculated to intimidate Complainant Mobile Steamship
Association's members' employees or anyone working in association
with the Complainant Mobile Steamship Association's members, or any
other person entering or leaving or attempting to enter or leave
Mobile Steamship Association's members' premises, or calculated to
induce any such persons not to report or apply for work at Mobile
Steamship Association's members' premises, or any facility used by
Mobile Steamship Association's members."
"5. Picketing directed at vessels with whom members of the
Mobile Steamship Association, Inc. have contractual relations."
"6. Interfering with the contractual relations existing or to
exist between the members of the Mobile Steamship Association, Inc.
and companies owning and/or operating vessels calling at the Port
The only two Courts of Appeals that appear to have addressed the
question have also sustained Board jurisdiction over secondary
disputes involving American employers and unions despite the fact
that the primary dispute involved foreign flag vessels. Madden
v. Grain Elevator Workers Local 418,
334 F.2d 1014 (CA7);
Grain Elevator Workers 418 v. NLRB,
126 U.S. App.D.C. 219,
376 F.2d 774.
When Congress was considering the Taft-Hartley bill in 1947, an
amendment was proposed in the Senate which would have given an
injured party suffering from a secondary boycott the right to go
directly into a district court and seek injunctive relief. 93
Cong.Rec. 4835. Senator Taft opposed the amendment, arguing that
resistance to providing a private injunctive remedy in cases of
secondary boycotts was so strong that the language of the committee
bill authorizing the Board alone to obtain injunctive relief should
be retained. Senator Taft proposed that private parties be given
only the right to sue for damages. Id.
at 4843-4844. The
amendment was thereafter defeated, id.
at 4847; and
Senator Taft's proposal for a private damages remedy, presently
LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187, was adopted. 93 Cong.Rec.