The 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act included the
Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN), designed to help individuals
on welfare become wage-earning members of society. The States were
required to incorporate this program into their Aid to Families
With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, to provide that certain
"employable" individuals, as a condition for receiving aid, shall
register for manpower services, training, and employment. In 1971,
New York enacted provisions of its Social Welfare Law, commonly
referred to as the New York Work Rules, which similarly required
cooperation by employable individuals to continue to receive
assistance. Appellees, New York public assistance recipients
subject to the Work Rules, challenge those Rules as having been
preempted by the WIN provisions of the Social Security Act. The
three-judge District Court ruled that, "for those in the AFDC
program, WIN preempts the New York Work Rules."
Held:
1. The WIN provisions of the Social Security Act do not preempt
the New York Work Rules of the New York Social Welfare Law. Pp.
413 U. S.
412-423.
(a) There is no substantial evidence that Congress intended,
either expressly or impliedly, to preempt state work programs. More
is required than the apparent comprehensiveness of the WIN
legislation to show the "clear manifestation of [congressional]
intention" that must exist before a federal statute is held "to
supersede the exercise" of state action.
Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U. S. 199,
344 U. S.
202-203. Pp.
413 U. S.
412-417.
(b) Affirmative evidence exists to establish Congress' intention
not to terminate all state work programs and foreclose future state
cooperative programs: WIN is limited in scope and application;
Page 413 U. S. 406
it is a partial program, with state supplementation, as
illustrated by New York; and the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, responsible for administering the Social Security Act,
has never considered WIN as preemptive. Pp.
413 U. S.
417-421.
(c) Where coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a
complementary administrative framework in the pursuit of common
purposes, as here, the case for federal preemption is not
persuasive. Pp.
413 U. S.
421-422.
2. The question of whether some particular sections of the Work
Rules might contravene the specific provisions of the Social
Security Act is not resolved, but is remanded to the District Court
for consideration. Pp.
413 U. S. 422
423.
348 F.
Supp. 290, reversed and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and DOUGLAS, STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN,
J., joined,
post, p.
413 U. S.
423.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether the Social Security Act of
1935, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, bars a State from
Page 413 U. S. 407
independently requiring individuals to accept employment as a
condition for receipt of federally funded aid to families with
dependent children. More precisely, the issue is whether that part
of the Social Security Act known as the Federal Work Incentive
Program (WIN) preempts the provisions of the New York Social
Welfare Law commonly referred to as the New York Work Rules. A
brief description of both the state and federal programs will be
necessary.
The Work Rules were enacted by New York in 1971 [
Footnote 1]
Page 413 U. S. 408
as part of Governor Rockefeller's efforts to reorganize the New
York Welfare Program. Their aim, as explained by the Governor, is
to encourage
"the young and able-bodied, temporarily in need of assistance
through no fault of their own, to achieve the education and the
skills, the motivation and the determination that will make it
possible for them to become increasingly self-sufficient,
independent citizens who can contribute to and share in the
responsibility for their families and our society. [
Footnote 2]"
To achieve this, the Work Rules establish a presumption that
certain recipients of public assistance are employable [
Footnote 3] and require those
recipients to report every two weeks to pick up their assistance
checks in person; to file every two weeks a certificate from the
appropriate public employment office stating that no suitable
employment opportunities are available; to report for
Page 413 U. S. 409
requested employment interviews; to report to the public
employment office the result of a referral for employment; and not
to fail willfully to report for suitable employment, when
available. In addition to establishing a system of referral for
employment in the private sector of the economy, the Work Rules
permit the establishment of public works projects in New York's
social service districts. [
Footnote
4] Failure of "employable" persons to participate in the
operation of the Work Rules results in a loss of assistance.
[
Footnote 5]
Like the Work Rules, WIN is designed to help individuals on
welfare "acquire a sense of dignity, self-worth, and confidence
which will flow from being recognized as a wage-earning member of
society . . . ," 42 U.S.C. § 630 (1970 ed., Supp. I). The program
was enacted as part of the 1967 amendments to the Social Security
Act, [
Footnote 6] whereby
States were required to incorporate WIN into their Aid to Families
With Dependent Children (AFDC)
Page 413 U. S. 410
plans. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(19), 630
et seq. (1970 ed.
and Supp. I). Every state AFDC plan must provide that certain
"employable" individuals, as a condition for receiving aid, shall
register for manpower services, training, and employment under
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(19)(A) (1970 ed., Supp. I). [
Footnote 7] Available services, to be provided by the
State, must include
"such health, vocational rehabilitation, counseling, child care,
and other social and supportive services as are necessary to enable
such individuals to accept employment or receive manpower training.
. . ."
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(G) (1970 ed.,
Page 413 U. S. 411
Supp. I). After the required services have been provided, the
State must certify to the Secretary of Labor those individuals who
are ready for employment or training programs, 42 U.S.C. §§
602(a)(19)(G), 632, 633 (1970 ed. and Supp. I). [
Footnote 8] Employment consists both of work
in the regular economy and participation in public service
programs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 630, 632, 633 (1970 ed. and Supp. I). As
with the Work Rules, cooperation in WIN is necessary for employable
individuals to continue to receive assistance.
In the court below, appellees, New York public assistance
recipients subject to the Work Rules, challenged those Rules as
violative of several provisions of the Constitution and as having
been preempted by the WIN provisions of the Federal Social Security
Act. The three-judge District Court rejected all but the last
contention.
348 F.
Supp. 290 (WDNY 1972). On this point, it held that "for those
in the AFDC program, WIN preempts" [
Footnote 9] the New York Work Rules.
Id. at 297.
[
Footnote 10] As
Page 413 U. S. 412
this holding not only affected the continued operation of the
New York Rules but raised serious doubts as to the viability of the
supplementary work programs in 22 States, we set the cause for
argument, 409 U.S. 1123 (1973). [
Footnote 11] We now reverse this holding.
I
The holding of the court below affects the Work Rules only
insofar as they apply to AFDC recipients. 348 F. Supp. at
297,
300 and
n. 5. New York's Home Relief program, for example -- a general
state assistance plan for which there is no federal reimbursement
or support [
Footnote 12] --
remains untouched by the court's preemption ruling. As to AFDC
participants, however, the decision below would render the Work
Rules inoperative and hold WIN "the exclusive manner of applying
the carrot and stick" in efforts to place such recipients in
gainful employment.
Id. at 300. [
Footnote 13]
Page 413 U. S. 413
This is a sweeping step that strikes at the core of state
prerogative under the AFDC program -- a program which this Court
has been careful to describe as a "scheme of cooperative
federalism."
King v. Smith, 392 U.
S. 309,
392 U. S. 316
(1968);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471,
397 U. S. 478
(1970);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.
S. 535,
406 U. S. 542
(1972). It could impair the capacity of the state government to
deal effectively with the critical problem of mounting welfare
costs and the increasing financial dependency of many of its
citizens. New York has a legitimate interest in encouraging those
of its citizens who can work to do so, and thus contribute to the
societal wellbeing in addition to their personal and family
support. To the extent that the Work Rules embody New York's
attempt to promote self-reliance and civic responsibility, to
assure that limited state welfare funds be spent on behalf of those
genuinely incapacitated and most in need, and to cope with the
fiscal hardships enveloping many state and local governments, this
Court should not lightly interfere. The problems confronting our
society in these areas are severe, and state governments, in
cooperation with the Federal Government, must be allowed
considerable latitude in attempting their resolution.
This Court has repeatedly refused to void state statutory
programs, absent congressional intent to preempt them.
"If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest
its intention clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal
statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the
state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so.
The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be
presumed."
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199,
344 U. S.
202-203 (1952).
Page 413 U. S. 414
See also Engineers v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co.,
382 U. S. 423,
382 U. S. 429
(1966);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U. S. 440,
362 U. S. 446
(1960);
Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.
S. 346,
289 U. S. 350
(1933);
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501,
225 U. S. 533
(1912).
This same principle relates directly to state AFDC programs,
where the Court already has acknowledged that States
"have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources,
since each State is free to set its own standard of need and to
determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes
to the program."
King v. Smith, supra, at
318 U. S.
318-319;
Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at
397 U. S. 478;
Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, at
406 U. S. 541.
Moreover, at the time of the passage of WIN in 1967, 21 States
already had initiated welfare work requirements as a condition of
AFDC eligibility. [
Footnote
14] If Congress had intended to preempt state plans and efforts
in such an important dimension of the AFDC program as employment
referrals for those on assistance, such intentions would, in all
likelihood, have been expressed in direct and unambiguous language.
No such expression exists, however, either in the federal statute
or in the committee reports. [
Footnote 15]
Appellees argue, nonetheless, that Congress intended to preempt
state work programs because of the comprehensive nature of the WIN
legislation, its legislative history, [
Footnote 16]
Page 413 U. S. 415
and the alleged conflicts between certain sections of the state
and federal laws. [
Footnote
17] We do not agree. We reject, to begin with, the contention
that preemption is to be inferred merely from the comprehensive
character of the federal work incentive provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§
602(a) (19), 630
et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. I). The
subjects of modern social and regulatory legislation often by their
very nature require intricate and complex responses from the
Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its enactment
as the exclusive means of meeting the problem,
cf. Askew v.
American Waterways, 411 U. S. 325
(1973). Given the complexity of the matter addressed by Congress in
WIN, a detailed statutory scheme was both likely and appropriate,
completely apart from any questions of preemptive intent. This
would be especially the case when the federal work incentive
provisions had to be sufficiently comprehensive to authorize and
govern programs in States which had no welfare work requirements of
their own as well as cooperatively in States with such
requirements.
Appellees also rely, as did the District Court, on the
legislative history as supporting the view that "the WIN
legislation is addressed to all AFDC recipients, leaving no
employable recipients to be subject to state work rules." Brief for
Appellees 29. The court below pointed to no specific legislative
history as supportive of its conclusion. Appellees do cite
fragmentary statements
Page 413 U. S. 416
which we find unpersuasive. Reliance is placed, for example, on
a, statement in the Report of the House Ways and Means Committee on
the WIN legislation as follows:
"Under your committee's bill, States would be required to
develop a program
for each appropriate relative and
dependent child which would assure, to the maximum extent possible,
that each individual would enter the labor force
in order to
become self-sufficient. To accomplish this, the States would
have to assure that
each adult in the family and each
child over age 16 who is not attending school is given, when
appropriate, employment counseling, testing, and job training."
H.R.Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1967). [
Footnote 18] (Emphasis supplied.) At
best, this statement is ambiguous as to a possible congressional
intention to supersede all state work programs. [
Footnote 19] "Appropriateness," as used in
the Committee
Page 413 U. S. 417
Report, may well mean "appropriateness" solely within the scope
and confines of WIN. Furthermore, the language employed by Congress
in enacting WIN must be considered in conjunction with its
operational scope and level of funding, which, as will be shown, is
quite limited with respect to the total number of employable AFDC
recipients,
413 U. S.
infra.
In sum, our attention has been directed to no relevant argument
which supports, except in the most peripheral way, the view that
Congress intended, either expressly or impliedly, to preempt state
work programs. Far more would be required to show the "clear
manifestation of [congressional] intention" which must exist before
a federal statute is held "to supersede the exercise" of state
action.
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. at
344 U. S.
202-203.
Page 413 U. S. 418
II
Persuasive affirmative reasons exist in this case which also
strongly negate the view that Congress intended, by the enactment
of the WIN legislation, to terminate all existing state work
programs and foreclose additional state cooperative programs in the
future. We note, first, that WIN itself was not designed on its
face to be all-embracing. Federal work incentive programs were to
be established only in States and political subdivisions
"in which [the Secretary of Labor] determines there is a
significant number of individuals who have attained age 16 and are
receiving aid to families with dependent children. In other
political subdivisions, he shall use his best efforts to provide
such programs either within such subdivisions or through the
provision of transportation for such persons to political
subdivisions of the State in which such programs are
established."
42 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1970 ed., Supp. I).
This section constitutes an express recognition that the federal
statute probably would be limited in scope and application.
[
Footnote 20] In New York,
this has meant operation of WIN in only 14 of New York's 64 social
service districts, though these 14 districts do service
approximately 90 of the welfare recipients in the State. Yet the
Secretary of Labor has not authorized additional WIN programs for
the other districts, resulting in a lack of federal job placement
opportunities in the more lightly populated areas of States and in
those without adequate
Page 413 U. S. 419
transportation of potential enrollees to districts with WIN
programs. [
Footnote 21]
Even in the districts where WIN does operate, its reach is
limited. In New York, according to federal estimates, there are
150,000 WIN registrants for the current fiscal year, but the
Secretary of Labor has contracted with the State to provide
services to only 90,000 registrants, of whom the majority will not
receive full job training and placement assistance. [
Footnote 22] In fiscal 1971, New York
asserts that
"17,511 individuals were referred for participation in the WIN
Program, but the Federal government allowed only 9,600
opportunities for enrollment. [
Footnote 23]"
California claims "over 122,000 employable AFDC recipients" last
year, but only 18,000 available WIN slots. [
Footnote 24]
It is evident that WIN is a partial program which stops short of
providing adequate job and training opportunities for large numbers
of state AFDC recipients. It would be incongruous for Congress, on
the one hand, to promote work opportunities for AFDC recipients,
and, on the other, to prevent States from undertaking supplementary
efforts toward this very same end. We cannot
Page 413 U. S. 420
interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes.
The significance of state supplementation is illustrated by the
experience in New York, where the Work Rules have aided the
objectives of federal work incentives: from July 1 through
September 30, 1971, the first months of the Work Rules' operation,
the State Employment Service claimed job placements for
approximately 9,376 recipients. [
Footnote 25]
Moreover, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the
agency of Government responsible for administering the Federal
Social Security Act -- including reviewing of state AFDC programs
-- has never considered the WIN legislation to be preemptive. HEW
has followed consistently the policy of approving state plans
containing welfare work requirements so long as those requirements
are not arbitrary or unreasonable. [
Footnote 26] Congress presumably knew of this settled
administrative policy at the time of enactment of WIN, when 21
States had welfare work programs. Subsequent to WIN's passage, HEW
has continued to approve state work requirements. Pursuant to such
approval, New York has received
Page 413 U. S. 421
federal grants-in-aid for the operation of its AFDC plan,
including its.work provisions. [
Footnote 27] In interpreting this statute, we must be
mindful that
"the construction of a statute by those charged with its
execution should be followed unless there are compelling
indications that it is wrong. . . ."
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.
S. 367,
395 U. S. 381
(1969);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at
397 U. S.
481-482. In this case, such indications are wholly
absent.
New York, furthermore, has attempted to operate the Work Rules
in such a manner as to avoid friction and overlap with WIN.
Officials from both the State Department of Labor and a local
Social Service Department testified below that every AFDC recipient
appropriate for WIN was first referred there, that no person was to
be referred to the state program who was participating in WIN, and
that only if there was no position available for him under WIN, was
a recipient to be referred for employment pursuant to state
statute. [
Footnote 28] Where
coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complementary
administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes,
the case for federal preemption becomes a less persuasive one.
In this context, the dissenting opinion's reliance on
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282
(1971),
Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.
S. 598 (1972), and
King v. Smith, 392 U.
S. 309 (1968), is misplaced. In those cases, it was
clear that state law excluded people from AFDC benefits who the
Social Security Act expressly provided would be eligible. The Court
found no room either in the Act's
Page 413 U. S. 422
language or legislative history to warrant the States'
additional eligibility requirements. Here, by contrast, the Act
allows for complementary state work incentive programs and
procedures incident thereto -- even if they become conditions for
continued assistance. Such programs and procedures are not
necessarily invalid, any more than other supplementary regulations
promulgated within the legitimate sphere of state administration.
See Wyman v. James, 400 U. S. 309
(1971);
Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.
Supp. 853 (SDNY),
aff'd, 393 U.
S. 323 (1969).
See also Dandridge v. Williams,
supra; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535
(1972).
III
We thus reverse the holding below that WIN preempts the New York
Work Rules. Our ruling establishes the validity of a state work
program as one means of helping AFDC recipients return to gainful
employment. We do not resolve, however, the question of whether
some particular sections of the Work Rules might contravene the
specific provisions of the Federal Social Security Act.
This last question we remand to the court below. That court did
not have the opportunity to consider the issue of specific conflict
between the state and federal programs, free from its
misapprehension that the Work Rules had been entirely preempted.
Further, the New York Legislature amended the Work Rules in 1972 to
provide, among other things, for exemption of persons engaged in
full-time training and vocational rehabilitation programs from the
reporting and check pickup requirements (N.Y.Laws 1972, c. 683),
for monthly rather than semi-monthly payments of shelter allowances
(
id., c. 685) and, most significantly, for a definition of
an "employable" AFDC recipient which is claimed by New York to be
identical to that now used
Page 413 U. S. 423
under WIN (
id., c. 941). Inasmuch as the court below
did not have the opportunity to consider the 1972 amendments as
they related to the issue of potential state-federal conflict, the
remand should afford it.
We deem it unnecessary at the present time to intimate any view
on whether or to what extent particular provisions of the Work
Rules may contravene the purposes or provisions of WIN. Such a
determination should be made initially by the court below,
consistent with the principles set forth in this opinion. [
Footnote 29]
The judgment of the three-judge District Court is reversed, and
the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 72-802,
Onondaga County Department of
Social Services et al. v. Dublino et al., also on appeal from
the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
The basic provisions of the Work Rules at the time this action
was brought are set forth in §131 of the New York Social Services
Law (Supp. 1971-1972):
"4. No assistance or care shall be given to an employable person
who has not registered with the nearest local employment agency of
the department of labor or has refused to accept employment in
which he is able to engage."
"A person shall be deemed to have refused to accept such
employment if he:"
"a. fails to obtain and file with the social services district
at least semi-monthly a new certificate from the appropriate local
employment office of the state department of labor stating that
such employment office has no order for an opening in part-time,
full-time, temporary or permanent employment in which the applicant
is able to engage, or"
"b. willfully fails to report for an interview at an employment
office with respect to employment when requested to do so by such
office, or"
"c. willfully fails to report to such office the result of a
referral to employment, or"
"d. willfully fails to report for employment. Such willful
failures or refusals as above listed shall be reported immediately
to the social services district by such employment office."
"For the purposes of this subdivision and subdivision five, a
person shall be deemed employable if such person is not rendered
unable to work by: illness or significant and substantial
incapacitation, either mental or physical, to the extent and of
such duration that such illness or incapacitation prevents such
person from performing services; advanced age; full-time attendance
at school in the case of minor, in accordance with provisions of
this chapter; full-time, satisfactory participation in an approved
program of vocational training or rehabilitation; the need of such
person to provide full-time care for other members of such person's
household who are wholly incapacitated, or who are children, and
for whom required care is not otherwise reasonably available,
notwithstanding diligent efforts by such person and the appropriate
social services department to obtain others to provide such care. A
person assigned to and participating in a public works project
under the provisions of section one hundred sixty-four or three
hundred fifty-k of this chapter shall be deemed to be employable
but not employed."
"Every employable recipient of public assistance or person who
is deemed not to be employable by reason of full-time satisfactory
participation in an approved program of vocational training or
rehabilitation shall receive his public assistance grants and
allowances in person from the division of employment of the state
department of labor, in accordance with regulations of the
department."
Section 350-k of New York Social Services Law provides for
public works project employment for employable recipients of AFDC
who cannot be placed in regular employment.
[
Footnote 2]
Special Message to the New York State Legislature, Mar. 29, 1971
(Brief for Appellant N.Y. State Depts. 9).
[
Footnote 3]
For the statutory definition of persons deemed "employable"
see n 1,
supra.
[
Footnote 4]
See ibid. These provisions for employment of recipients
in public works projects have not been implemented, as the HEW
Regional Commissioner indicated that such projects would not be
approved for federal aid. Brief for Appellant N.Y. State Depts.
13.
[
Footnote 5]
See n 1,
supra, and Social Services Administrative Letter, 71
PWD-43 which reads in relevant part:
"[T]he Laws of 1971 place a renewed and expanded emphasis on
restoring all employable recipients of public assistance to
employment in the regular economy. Accordingly, all unemployed
employable persons applying for or receiving public assistance are
not only required to register at the New York State Employment
Service district office in their community, and report there
regularly for appropriate employment counseling services and job
referral, but, effective July 1, they will also pick up their
assistance checks there. The penalty for not cooperating in this
procedure is ineligibility for public assistance whether the
individual is the grantee head of family, single person living
alone, or non-grantee non-head of family."
App. 53-54.
[
Footnote 6]
In 1971, further amendments dealing with WIN were enacted. Act
of Dec. 28, 1971, Pub.L. 92-223, § 3, 85 Stat. 803.
[
Footnote 7]
"§ 602. State plans for aid and services to needy families with
children; contents; approval by Secretary."
"(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with
children must . . ."
"
* * * *"
"(19) provide -- "
"(A) that every individual, as a condition of eligibility for
aid under this part, shall register for manpower services,
training, and employment as provided by regulations of the
Secretary of Labor, unless such individual is --"
"(i) a child who is under age 16 or attending school full
time;"
"(ii) a person who is ill, incapacitated, or of advanced
age;"
"(iii) a person so remote from a work incentive project that his
effective participation is precluded;"
"(iv) a person whose presence in the home is required because of
illness or incapacity of another member of the household;"
"(v) a mother or other relative of a child under the age of six
who is caring for the child; or"
"(vi) the mother or other female caretaker of a child, if the
father or another adult male relative is in the home and not
excluded by clause (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this subparagraph
(unless he has failed to register as required by this subparagraph,
or has been found by the Secretary of Labor under section 633(g) of
this title to have refused without good cause to participate under
a work incentive program or accept employment as described in
subparagraph (F) of this paragraph)."
[
Footnote 8]
States are penalized by a reduction in assistance if they fail
to certify to the Secretary of Labor at least 15% of the average
number of those registered each year. 42 U.S.C. § 603(c) (1970 ed.,
Supp. I)
[
Footnote 9]
The District Court and the parties in this case have used the
word "preemption" in a rather special sense. This litigation does
not involve arguable federal preemption of a wholly independent
state program dealing with the same or a similar problem.
Cf.,
e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.
S. 440,
362 U. S. 446
(1960). AFDC is a federal statutory program, of which the WIN
program is a part. The State Work Rules also were promulgated as
part of the implementation of AFDC, and are therefore not wholly
independent of the federal program. With this caveat, however, we
will preserve the District Court's usage, which has the advantage
of focusing attention on the critical question: whether Congress
intended WIN to provide the exclusive mechanism for establishing
work rules under AFDC.
[
Footnote 10]
The court found additional points of conflict between the state
and federal programs with regard to procedures for termination of
benefits and the presence of certain hearings and counseling
services under WIN which were absent from the Work Rules.
348 F.
Supp. 290, 295-297.
[
Footnote 11]
We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction to
the hearing on the merits. We now conclude that the constitutional
questions raised by appellees were not so insubstantial as to
deprive the three-judge District Court of jurisdiction.
As to appellees' due process claim, the court below directed the
State to implement suitable means of informing Home Relief
recipients of their hearing rights.
Id. at 299. The State
stipulates that this has been done. Tr. of Oral Arg.19-20. The only
issue which we address on this appeal is whether the state program
is superseded in whole or in part by federal law.
[
Footnote 12]
The AFDC program is jointly financed by the States and the
Federal Government.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471,
397 U. S. 473
(1970).
[
Footnote 13]
Appellees' position is also one of "complete exclusion" of the
Work Rules, at least with regard to AFDC recipients. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 34; Brief for Appellees in Response to Brief for the United
States as
Amicus Curiae 2-3.
[
Footnote 14]
See Brief for the United States as
Amicus
Curiae 12. The information was derived from a survey of state
plans conducted by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare.
[
Footnote 15]
No express intention to eliminate coexisting state work programs
appears either at the time of the original 1967 enactment of WIN,
see S.Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 26, 145-157;
H.R.Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 559, or at the time of
the 1971 amendments,
n 6,
supra.
[
Footnote 16]
The court below asserted that the legislative history was
supportive of a preemptive intent, 348 F. Supp. at 297.
[
Footnote 17]
In view of our remand,
413 U. S.
infra we do not reach the issue of specific alleged
conflicts. In sum, however, they are not sufficient to indicate
preemptive intent, especially in light of the impressive evidence
to the contrary.
[
Footnote 18]
Other citations to similar effect appear in Brief for Appellees
29-30.
[
Footnote 19]
Perhaps the most revealing legislative expressions confirm,
subsequent to enactment, a congressional desire to preserve
supplementary state work programs, not to supersede them. In the
wake of the invalidation of the New York Work Rules by the
three-judge District Court, members of the New York congressional
delegation became concerned that the court had misconstrued the
intent of Congress. The following colloquy occurred between Senator
Buckley of New York and Senator Long of Louisiana, Chairman of the
Finance Committee which considered WIN prior to approval by the
Senate:
"Mr. Buckley. Was it ever the intention of Congress at that time
to have the provisions of the WIN statutes preempt the field of
employment and training for AFDC recipients?"
"Mr. Long. I did not have that in mind. . . ."
"Mr. Buckley. . . . So far as the distinguished chairman is
concerned, was it ever the intention of at least this body to have
a preemption in this field?"
"Mr. Long. It was never our intention to prevent a State from
requiring recipients to do something for their money if they were
employable. . . ."
118 Cong.Rec. 36819 (1972).
In the House of Representatives, a similar dialogue took place
between Congressman Carey of New York and Congressman Mills,
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, which considered
the WIN program:
"Mr. Carey of New York. . . . My specific question for the
chairman has to do with the intent of the Congress in authorizing
the WIN program in 1967 and in amendments to that program in
subsequent years. It is my understanding that Congress intended,
through the WIN program, merely to assist the States in the
critical area of guiding able-bodied welfare recipients toward
self-sufficiency -- and not to supersede individual State programs
designed to achieve the same end. Under this interpretation, New
York and other States could operate their own programs as
supplementary to the Federal WIN program. Is my understanding of
the congressional intent in this area correct?"
"Mr. Mills of Arkansas. I agree with the interpretation of my
friend, the gentleman from New York, on the matter, so long as the
State program does not contravene the provisions of Federal
law."
118 Cong.Rec. 36931 (1972).
[
Footnote 20]
The WIN guidelines, issued by the United States Department of
Labor, provide, according to appellants, for establishment of WIN
programs only in those areas where there are at least 1,100
potential WIN enrollees. Brief for Appellant N.Y. State Depts.
37.
[
Footnote 21]
See id. at 37-38. Title 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)(iii)
(1970 ed., Supp. I) may also have contemplated limited application
of WIN, since it exempts from WIN registration "a person so remote
from a work incentive project that his effective participation is
precluded."
[
Footnote 22]
See Brief for the United States as
Amicus
Curiae 15, citing U.S. Dept. of Labor, Manpower
Administration, contract No. 36-2001-188, modification No. 3, June
30, 1972. The Government contends further that
"the current level of WIN funding is such that no more than
one-fifth of the WIN registrants will receive the full job training
and placement assistance contemplated by the Act."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 23]
Brief for Appellant N.Y. State Depts. 38, 17.
[
Footnote 24]
Brief for California as
Amicus Curiae 3.
[
Footnote 25]
Brief for Appellant N.Y. State Depts. 15; App. 192. Appellants
claim further that from January to June 1972, "there were 2,657 job
placements under the WIN Program," and 5,323 placements under the
Work Rules.
Id. at 18. These figures must be qualified,
however, with the observation that many of the job placements are
temporary; that many of those placed under the Work Rules may have
been recipients of forms of assistance other than AFDC (while the
number of WIN placements counts only AFDC recipients); and that
single recipients may have been referred or placed -- and thus
statistically tabulated -- on more than one occasion.
See
Brief for Appellees 33-36. None of these observations, however,
obscures the basic fact that the Work Rules materially contribute
toward attainment of the objective of WIN in restoring employable
AFDC recipients as wage-earning members of society.
See 42
U.S.C. § 630 (1970 ed., Supp. I).
[
Footnote 26]
See Brief for the United States as
Amicus
Curiae 3, filed by the Solicitor General and joined in by the
General Counsel of HEW.
[
Footnote 27]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 28]
Excerpts from depositions of Nelson Hopper, Director of the
Employment Service Bureau of the New York State Dept. of Labor, and
George Demmon, Senior Employment Counsellor, Erie County Dept. of
Social Services,App. 226, 234.
See also Brief for
Appellant N.Y. State Depts. 17, and Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
[
Footnote 29]
In considering the question of possible conflict between the
state and federal work programs, the court below will take into
account our prior decisions. Congress "has given the States broad
discretion," as to the AFDC program,
Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U. S. 535,
406 U. S. 545
(1972);
see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at
397 U. S. 478;
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309,
392 U. S.
318-319 (1968), and, "[s]o long as the State's actions
are not in violation of any specific provision of the Constitution
or the Social Security Act," the courts may not void them.
Jefferson, supra, at
406 U. S. 541.
Conflicts, to merit judicial, rather than cooperative
federal-state, resolution, should be of substance, and not merely
trivial or insubstantial. But if there is a conflict of substance
as to eligibility provisions, the federal law, of course, must
control.
Kinh v. Smith, supra; Townsend v. Swank,
404 U. S. 282
(1971);
Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.
S. 598 (1972).
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
Because the Court today ignores a fundamental rule for
interpreting the Social Security Act, I must respectfully dissent.
As we said in
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.
S. 282,
404 U. S. 286
(1971),
"in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion
clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative
history, a state
Page 413 U. S. 424
eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for
assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social
Security Act, and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy
Clause."
See also King v. Smith, 392 U.
S. 309 (1968);
Carleson v. Remillard,
406 U. S. 598,
406 U. S. 600
(1972). The New York Work Rules fall squarely within this
statement; they clearly exclude persons eligible for assistance
under federal standards, and it could hardly be maintained that
they did not impose additional conditions of eligibility. [
Footnote 2/1] For example, under federal
standards, it is irrelevant to a determination of eligibility that
a recipient has or has not filed every two weeks a certificate from
the local employment office that no suitable employment
opportunities are available, yet, under the Work Rules, a recipient
who fails to file such a certificate is "deemed" to have refused to
accept suitable employment, and so is not eligible for assistance.
N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law § 131(4)(a) (Supp. 1971-1972). [
Footnote 2/2] Thus, according to the rules of
interpretation we have heretofore followed, the proper inquiry is
whether the Social Security Act or its legislative history clearly
shows congressional authorization for state employment requirements
other than those involved in WIN. [
Footnote 2/3]
Page 413 U. S. 425
The answer is that neither the Act nor its legislative history
shows such an authorization. The only relevant work-related
conditions of eligibility in the Act are found at 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(19) (1970 ed., Supp. I). In addition to exempting certain
persons from registration for and participation in WIN, [
Footnote 2/4] the Act permits States to
Page 413 U. S. 426
disregard the needs of persons otherwise eligible for assistance
who
"have refused without good cause to participate under a work
incentive program . . . or . . . to accept employment in which he
is able to engage."
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F) (1970 ed., Supp. I). The Act thus
makes
actual refusal to participate in a WIN Program or to
accept employment a permissible ground for denying assistance. In
contrast, New York has adopted the none-too-subtle technique of
"deeming" persons not to have accepted employment because they have
not, for example, obtained a certain certificate from the local
employment office every two weeks. "Deeming" is a familiar legal
device to evade applicable requirements by saying that they have
been satisfied when they have not, in fact, been satisfied. But the
federal requirement, which the State may not alter without clear
congressional authorization, [
Footnote
2/5] requires an actual refusal to participate in a WIN Program
or to accept employment, not a refusal to participate in some other
program or a fictitious refusal of employment. [
Footnote 2/6]
The legislative history of the Social Security Act confirms this
interpretation, for whenever Congress legislated
Page 413 U. S. 427
with respect to work requirements, it focused on actual refusals
to accept employment or to participate in certain special programs
clearly authorized by Congress. At no time has Congress authorized
States to adopt other work referral programs or to make refusal to
participate in such programs a condition of eligibility, even under
the guise of "deeming" such a refusal a refusal to accept
employment.
At its inception, the program of Aid to Dependent Children was
designed to lessen somewhat the burden of supporting such children.
The program provided assistance to children who had been deprived
of parental support by reason of the absence of a parent. 49 Stat.
629 (1935). Assistance was provided to supply the needs of such
children, thus "releas[ing the parent] from the wage-earning role."
H.R.Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 (1935).
See
also H.R.Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935). Thus,
the program's purposes were in many ways inconsistent with a
requirement that the parent leave the home to accept employment.
Yet, in operation, the original program failed to provide
sufficient inducement for the parent to remain at home, since the
amount of assistance was measured solely by the child's needs. In
order further to relieve the pressures on the parent to leave the
home and accept work, Congress amended the Act in 1950 so that the
aid would include payments "to meet the needs of the relative with
whom any dependent child is living." 42 U.S.C. § 606(b)(1).
Until 1961, then, the sole emphasis of the Social Security Act's
provisions for assistance to dependent children was on preserving
the integrity of the family unit. [
Footnote 2/7]
Page 413 U. S. 428
In that year, Congress expanded the definition of dependent
child to include children deprived of parental support by reason of
the unemployment of a parent. 42 U.S.C. § 607. Families with two
parents present could, for the first time, receive assistance, and
one parent could leave the home to work without impairing the
integrity of the family unit. Congress therefore required States
participating in the program for aid to families with an unemployed
parent to deny assistance under this provision to individuals who
refused to accept
bona fide offers of employment. Pub.L.
87-31, 75 Stat. 76 (1961). Refusal of actual offers of employment
was clearly the contemplated condition.
See S.Rep. No.
165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1961). Congress then developed this
concept, permitting States to establish "Community Work and
Training Programs" of work on public projects, Pub.L. 87-543, §
105, 76 Stat. 186, rendered inapplicable by Pub.L. 90-248, 81 Stat.
892. Refusal to accept a work assignment on such a project without
good cause would be a ground for denial of public assistance.
See H.R.Rep. No. 1414, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 15
(1962).
When Congress established WIN, it did not abandon its previous
policies. Recipients of public assistance could be required only to
accept
bona fide offers of employment or placement in
specified programs. There is no indication whatsoever in the
legislative history that Congress intended to permit States to deny
assistance because potential recipients had refused to participate
in programs not supervised by the Secretary of Labor, as WIN
Programs are. The parameters of the WIN Program were designed to
accommodate Congress' dual interests in guaranteeing the integrity
of the family and in maximizing the potential for employment of
recipients of public assistance. Without careful federal
supervision, of the sort contemplated by the delegation to
Page 413 U. S. 429
the Secretary of Labor to establish testing and counseling
services and to require that States design employability plans, 81
Stat. 885, state work programs might upset the accommodation that
Congress sought. The Work Incentive Program was thus a carefully
coordinated system, whose individual parts fit into an integrated
whole. It is hardly surprising that Congress did not expressly or
impliedly authorize States to develop independent work programs,
since the WIN Program represented Congress' recognition that such
programs had to be kept under careful scrutiny if the variety of
goals Congress sought to promote were to be achieved. [
Footnote 2/8] I believe that the Court
seriously misconceives the purposes of the federal programs of
public assistance, in its apparent belief that Congress had the
sole purpose of promoting work opportunities, a purpose that
precluding additional state programs would negate.
Ante at
413 U. S.
418-420.
Page 413 U. S. 430
Instead, Congress has consistently indicated its desire to adopt
programs that will enhance the employability of recipients of
public assistance while maintaining the integrity of families
receiving assistance. A work referral program can do this only if
it is regulated, both as to the persons required to participate and
as to the terms on which they must participate. And Congress has
consistently recognized that such regulation requires close federal
supervision of work programs. In my view, this course of
legislation, which is not mentioned by the Court, is neither
"ambiguous," "fragmentary," nor "peripheral,"
ante at
413 U. S. 415,
413 U. S. 416,
413 U. S. 417.
No matter how it is viewed, however, one cannot fairly say that the
Social Security Act or its legislative history clearly evidences
congressional authorization for making participation in state work
programs a condition of eligibility for public assistance.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Page 413 U. S. 431
The policy of clear statement [
Footnote 2/10] in
Townsend serves a useful
purpose. It informs legislators that, if they wish to alter the
accommodations previously arrived at in an Act of major importance,
they must indicate clearly that wish, since what may appear to be
minor changes of narrow scope may, in fact, have ramifications
throughout the administration of the Act. A policy of clear
statement insures that Congress will consider those ramifications,
[
Footnote 2/11] but only if it is
regularly adhered to.
Finally, it is particularly appropriate to require clear
statement of authorization to impose additional conditions of
eligibility for public assistance. Myths abound in this area. It is
widely yet erroneously believed, for
Page 413 U. S. 432
example, that recipients of public assistance have little desire
to become self-supporting.
See, e.g., L. Goodwin, Do the
Poor Want to Work? 5, 51-52, 112 (1972). Because the recipients of
public assistance generally lack substantial political influence,
state legislators may find it expedient to accede to pressures
generated by misconceptions. In order to lessen the possibility
that erroneous beliefs will lead state legislators to single out
politically unpopular recipients of assistance for harsh treatment,
Congress must clearly authorize States to impose conditions of
eligibility different from the federal standards. As we observed in
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at
392 U. S.
318-319, this rule leaves the States with
"considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since
each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine
the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the
program."
The Court today quotes this observation but misses its import.
The States have latitude to adjust benefits in the two ways
mentioned, but not by imposing additional conditions of
eligibility. When across-the-board adjustments like those are made,
legislators cannot single out especially unpopular groups for
discriminatory treatment. [
Footnote
2/12]
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Appellants state that the Work Rules do not "constitute an
additional condition of eligibility for public assistance." Reply
Brief for Appellant N.Y. State Depts. 9. The arguments they
present, however, relate entirely to the purported congressional
authorization for additional conditions of this sort.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The federal conditions of eligibility relating to registration
for employment are found in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) (1970 ed., Supp.
I).
[
Footnote 2/3]
The United States, as
amicus curiae, argues that the
rule stated in
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.
S. 282 (1971), does not fairly characterize the course
of our interpretation of the Social Security Act. It relies
primarily on the Court's decision in
Wyman v. James,
400 U. S. 309
(1971). But, for reasons that escaped me at the time,
see
id. at
400 U. S. 345
n. 7, the Court did not address the statutory argument.
Wyman does not, therefore, express any limitation on the
rule in
Townsend. Similarly, our summary affirmance in
Snell v. Wyman, 393 U. S. 323
(1969), where the District Court did not have before it our opinion
in
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309
(1968), is at least offset by the summary affirmances in
Carleson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 (1971),
Juras v.
Meyers, 404 U.S. 803 (1971), and
Weaver v. Doe, 404
U.S. 987 (1971).
The United States' argument from authority is weak, and its
argument as a matter of logic is even weaker. The United States
suggests that, while States may not narrow the class of persons
eligible for assistance under federal standards, they may impose
additional conditions of eligibility in pursuit of independent
state policies. This distinction will not withstand analysis, for
it makes decision turn on meaningless verbal tricks. One could just
as easily find an independent state policy in
Townsend as
a narrowing of the class of eligible persons: the State might have
a policy of minimizing subsidies to persons with a clear prospect
of future income well above the poverty level, by denying
assistance to persons attending four-year colleges while granting
it to those attending vocational training schools. Such a system of
subsidies would almost certainly be held constitutional under the
Due Process Clause, and the position of the United States seems to
be that States may impose conditions of eligibility, not squarely
in conflict with federal standards, in the pursuit of some
constitutional state interest.
[
Footnote 2/4]
For example, no child under 16 or attending school full time
need register. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19)(A)(i) (1970 ed., Supp. I). I
take it that the Court would find a conflict "of substance,"
ante at
413 U. S. 423
n. 29, between this provision and a state work requirement
applicable to children under 16. For the legislative history is
clear that Congress, in defining the work-related conditions of
eligibility, "spell[ed] out those people we think should not be
required to go to work," as Senator Long put it. 113 Cong.Rec.
32593 (1967).
See also S.Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 26. The United States' position would be, I assume, that
such a provision would narrow the class of persons eligible for
assistance.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Appellants argue that
"the provision of section 602(a)(10) that aid be furnished 'to
all eligible individuals,' when read within the context of the
Social Security Act, means individuals 'eligible' under State
requirements, not Federal."
Reply Brief for Appellant N.Y. State Depts. 13. We expressly
rejected this argument in
Townsend, 404 U.S. at
404 U. S.
286.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The States may, of course, adopt procedures necessary to insure
that offers of employment are transmitted to recipients of public
assistance. It hardly needs extended argument, however, to show
that the New York Work Rules, taken as a whole, are not necessary
to do that.
[
Footnote 2/7]
In 1956, Congress required States to adopt plans to provide
social services to strengthen family life. Pub.L. 880, § 312, 70
Stat. 848.
[
Footnote 2/8]
The original proposal for a Work Incentive Program would have
permitted a State to operate Community Work and Training Programs
only if a federal WIN Program were not operated in the State. H.R.
5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 204(a). Thus, either a WIN Program
or a state program could operate within a State, but not both. In
the final version, the preexisting authorization for Community Work
and Training Programs was eliminated, and the Federal WIN Program
was to be implemented in every State. Again, Congress recognized
that federal and state work programs could not coexist.
The 1971 Amendments to the WIN Program, Pub.L. 92-223, 85 Stat.
802, further demonstrate Congress' desire to have federal control
of work requirements. Each State must establish a "separate
administrative unit" to provide social services only in connection
with WIN. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(G) (1970 ed., Supp. I). It would
be anomalous for Congress to require the States to devote
substantial resources to such a unit in connection with the WIN
Program, and yet to permit the States to operate independent work
programs using federal funds without providing the special services
that Congress thought so important.
[
Footnote 2/9]
It is unnecessary for me to discuss at any length the Court's
analysis of the preemption problem. I note, as the Court does,
ante at
413 U. S. 411
n. 9, that this case does not present the classic question of
preemption, that is, does the enactment of a statute by Congress
preclude state attempts to regulate the same subject? There is no
question that New York may impose whatever work requirements it
wishes, consistent only with constitutional limitations, when it
gives public assistance solely from state funds.
See ante
at
413 U. S. 412.
The question here relates to the conditions that Congress has
placed on state programs supported by federal funds. The
distinction is not without importance, for it makes inapposite the
strictures in our earlier cases and relied on by the Court, against
lightly interfering with state programs.
Ante at
413 U. S.
413-414. For we must, of course, be cautious when we
prevent a State from regulating in an area where, in the absence of
congressional action, it has important interests. Holding that the
Federal WIN Program is the exclusive method of imposing work
requirements in conjunction with federally funded programs of
public assistance would have no such impact; New York would remain
free to operate public assistance programs with state funds, with
whatever work requirements it chose.
[
Footnote 2/10]
See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1240
(tent. ed.1958).
[
Footnote 2/11]
In this connection, I cannot let pass without comment the
extraordinary use the Court makes of legislative "history," in
relying on exchanges on the floor of the House and Senate that
occurred after the decision by the District Court in this case.
Ante at
413 U. S.
416-417, n.19. Although reliance on floor exchanges has
been criticized in this Court,
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384,
341 U. S.
395-397 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring), there is some
force to the more generally accepted proposition that such
exchanges, particularly when sponsors of a bill or committee
chairmen are involved, are relevant to a determination of the
purpose Congress sought to achieve in enacting the bill.
United
States v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 247 U.
S. 310,
247 U. S. 318
(1918). For legislators know how legislative history is made, and
they ought to be aware of the importance of floor exchanges. If
they disagree with the interpretation placed on the bill in such
exchanges, they may offer amendments or vote against it. Thus,
Congress, in enacting a statute, may fairly be taken to have
endorsed the interpretations offered in such exchanges. None of
this is true of post-enactment floor exchanges, which have no
bearing on pending legislation and to which a disinterested
legislator might well pay scant attention. If Senator Buckley and
Representative Carey wished to have a congressional expression of
intent on the issue of preemption, they were not barred from
introducing legislation.
[
Footnote 2/12]
That the possibility of treatment that is so discriminatory as
to be unconstitutional is not insubstantial is shown by the Court's
brief discussion of the jurisdiction of the District Court,
ante at
413 U. S. 412
n. 11.