Appellee, who sought to run for Congress but asserted that he
was unable to pay California's statutory filing fee, filed a class
action in District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the
filing fee statutes. In the face of an impending filing deadline,
the District Court granted appellee's motion for a preliminary
injunction.
Held: Given the possibility that appellee would prevail
on the merits and the fact that appellee's opportunity to be a
candidate would have been foreclosed absent interim relief, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting a
preliminary injunction. Pp.
411 U. S.
456-457.
342 F. Supp. 1353, affirmed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 on direct appeal from a
three-judge district court in the Northern District of California.
The court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 when appellee
called into
Page 411 U. S. 453
question the constitutionality of those provisions of the
California Elections Code which require candidates in a primary
election to pay a filing fee prior to having their names listed on
the primary ballot. Cal.Elections Code §§ 6552 and 6553 (Supp.
1973). Under these provisions, candidates for the Federal House of
Representatives must pay $425 (1% of the annual salary of the
office); candidates for the Federal Senate must pay $850 (2% of the
salary of the office). Those wishing to run for state-wide offices
must pay similar fees ranging in amount from $192 for State
Assemblyman (1% of the annual salary) to $982 for Governor (2% of
the annual salary). Other portions of the California Elections
Code, not challenged in the present suit, require prospective
candidates to file with appropriate state officials a declaration
of candidacy and sponsor certificates. Cal. Elections Code §§
6490-6491, 6494-6495 (1961 and Supp. 1973).
Appellee commenced this class action on March 3, 1972. He moved,
and was granted permission by, a single district judge, to proceed
in forma pauperis and as his own attorney. In his
complaint, appellee asserted that he wished to become a candidate
for the Federal House of Representatives from the 17th District of
California, and had taken the following steps to place his name in
nomination in the June 6, 1972, California primary election. On
February 17, 1972, appellee called the Registrar of Voters of Santa
Clara County, an official designated by state law to dispense those
forms necessary to place a name in nomination. Appellee was
purportedly told by the Registrar or a member of his office that he
was required to pay $425 in advance in order to secure blank copies
of the necessary papers. According to appellee, the Registrar's
Office also advised him that the papers would be delivered in
exchange for a worthless check. [
Footnote 1]
Page 411 U. S. 454
Appellee proceeded immediately to the Registrar's Office, where
he presented a personal check for $425 and requested copies of the
necessary forms. Across the face of the check, appellee had typed
"Written under protest for filing fee." [
Footnote 2] The Registrar issued the requisite papers
to appellee and informed him that his check would be forwarded to
the California Secretary of State when his completed papers were
submitted. Subsequently, a Deputy Secretary of State informed
appellee that his name would not be placed on the ballot if his
check was not honored. [
Footnote
3]
Citing
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.
S. 134 (1972), appellee asserted that California's
filing fee system was unconstitutional since it barred indigents,
such as himself, from seeking elective office and from voting for
the candidate of his choice. In addition to requesting declaratory
and permanent injunctive relief, appellee moved the District Court
to issue a preliminary injunction so as to allow him to participate
as a candidate in the upcoming primary. Under state law, the final
date on which appellee could submit nominating papers for that
primary was March 10, 1972, one week away.
Because of the impending filing deadline, the District Court
proceeded quickly to set the case for argument.
Page 411 U. S. 455
On March 3, 1972, the same date on which the suit was filed, the
single District Judge to whom the case was assigned entered an
order requiring appellant to show cause why interlocutory relief
should not be granted. The State was given five days in which to
respond. It was not until March 7 that the Chief Judge of the Ninth
Circuit was notified of the application for a three-judge court. On
March 8, he designated the judges who were to compose the panel. On
the same day, the court convened and heard oral argument. Because
of the speed with which the case had developed, neither the court
nor appellee had an opportunity prior to the hearing to consider
appellant's return to the order to show cause, the only paper which
the State had been able to prepare.
On March 9, 1972, one day after oral argument and one day before
the deadline for filing nomination papers, the District Court
granted appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction,
stating:
"Since no . . . showing has been made by the State concerning
either the necessity, the purpose, or the reasonableness of the
filing fee statutes in question, we conclude that, within the
rationale and holding of
Bullock [v. Carter, 405 U. S.
134 (1972)], plaintiff may prevail on the merits, and
that, absent a preliminary injunction, his constitutional right may
be irreparably lost."
342 F. Supp. 1353, 1355-1356. (Emphasis added.) Under the terms
of the preliminary injunction, the State was required to allow
appellee and others similarly situated to place their names on the
ballot without paying the required fee, so long as they were
otherwise eligible for the applicable state or federal office and
had deposited with an appropriate state official an affidavit
attesting to their indigency.
Page 411 U. S. 456
The State appealed directly to this Court under 28 U.S.C. §
1253. Its Jurisdictional Statement posed two questions:
"Under the decision of this Court in
Bullock v. Carter,
405 U. S.
134 (1972), when a state statute requiring a candidate's
filing fee of one per cent (1%) of the first year's salary for the
office is challenged on Equal Protection grounds, does the
'rational basis' or 'close scrutiny' standard of judicial review
apply?"
"Do California Elections Code sections 6552 and 6553 deny voters
or indigent prospective candidates equal protection of the
laws?"
Thus, the State of California, for reasons not clear to us in
light of the limited record, asked the Court to address itself to
the ultimate merits of appellee's constitutional claim, a question
which the District Court did not reach. In the present posture of
the case, there is no occasion to consider any issues beyond those
addressed by the District Court.
The issuance of the requested preliminary injunction was the
only action taken by the District Court. In determining whether
such relief was required, that court properly addressed itself to
two relevant factors: first, the appellee's possibilities of
success on the merits, and second, the possibility that irreparable
injury would have resulted absent interlocutory relief. As the
District Court opinion clearly evidences, issuance of the
injunction reflected the balance which that court reached in
weighing these factors, and was not in any sense intended as a
final decision as to the constitutionality of the challenged
statute. In the exigent circumstances, the grant of extraordinary
interim relief was a permissible choice; but on the very limited
record before the District Court, a decision on the merits would
not have been appropriate.
Page 411 U. S. 457
In reviewing such interlocutory relief, this Court may only
consider whether issuance of the injunction constituted an abuse of
discretion.
Alabama v. United States, 279 U.
S. 229 (1929);
United States v. Corrick,
298 U. S. 435
(1936);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of West
Virginia, 278 U. S. 322
(1929);
National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford v.
Thompson, 281 U. S. 331
(1930). In light of the arguments presented by appellee and the
fact that appellee's opportunity to be a candidate would have been
foreclosed absent some relief, we cannot conclude that the court's
action was an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the action
taken by the District Court in granting interim relief.
In doing so, we intimate no view as to the ultimate merits of
appellee's contentions. The record in this case clearly reflects
the limited time which the parties had to assemble evidence and
prepare their arguments. While the District Court's swift action is
understandable in view of the deadline which it faced, the
resulting record was simply insufficient to allow that court to
consider fully the grave, far-reaching constitutional questions
presented.
The specific deadline which led the District Court to grant
equitable relief has now passed. [
Footnote 4] Nothing precludes appellee from seeking a
trial on the merits if he chooses to proceed. The case is therefore
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. [
Footnote
5]
Affirmed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
The State denies that such advice was ever communicated to
appellee. In an affidavit submitted to the District Court, the
Registrar of Voters of Santa Clara County stated that it was the
policy of his office not to distribute the required forms to anyone
who represented to the Registrar that the check submitted was
worthless. The Registrar further stated that, to his knowledge,
neither he nor anyone in his office had ever informed appellee that
forms would be issued upon presentation of a worthless check.
[
Footnote 2]
When the case was argued before the District Court, appellee
claimed that he had also told the Registrar or a member of his
office that the account on which the check was drawn did not
contain sufficient funds to cover it. However, this fact is not
alleged in the complaint.
[
Footnote 3]
Appellant submitted to the District Court an affidavit from the
Deputy Secretary of State to whom appellee had spoken, disputing
appellee's claim that he had been informed that his name would not
be placed on the ballot if his check was not honored.
[
Footnote 4]
Although the June 6 primary election has passed, the question
raised is one "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Consequently, the case is not moot.
Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498,
219 U. S. 515
(1911);
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.
S. 814,
394 U. S. 816
(1969).
[
Footnote 5]
We have granted certiorari in No. 71-6852,
Lubin v. Allison,
post, p. 964, in order to consider conflicts in holdings
regarding the constitutionality of state filing fee statutes.