1. On appeal from the granting or refusal of an interlocutory
injunction, inquiry is limited to the question whether the court
abused its discretion. P.
298 U. S.
437.
2. A bill by operators of Market Agencies to enjoin the
Secretary of Agriculture from instituting prosecutions for
violations of an order fixing their rates under the Packers &
Stockyards Act, the ultimate purpose of the suit being to secure a
decree upholding a rate schedule posted by the plaintiffs, is not a
bill to set aside or suspend the order, within the jurisdiction of
the District Court. P.
298 U. S.
438.
3. When the Secretary of Agriculture, pursuant to § 310 of the
Packers & Stockyards Act, orders specified rates thereafter to
be charged by Market Agencies, these become the only lawful rates,
and so remain until the further order of the Secretary. P.
298 U. S.
439.
4. The Secretary of Agriculture, after inquiry and full hearing,
fixed rates thereafter to be charged by the Market Agencies, and
these had not been set aside or enjoined in any appropriate
judicial proceeding or been altered by subsequent order of the
Secretary.
Held that the District Court was without power
to enjoin the prosecution of the operators of the Agencies for
charging rates other than those set by the Secretary. P.
298 U. S.
440.
5. Lack of jurisdiction in a federal court over the subject
matter of the litigation cannot be waived by the parties. The court
should decline to proceed with the cause. P.
298 U. S.
440.
Page 298 U. S. 436
6. If the record discloses that the lower court was without
jurisdiction, this Court will notice the defect although the
parties make no contention concerning it. P.
298 U. S.
440.
7. This Court has jurisdiction on appeal to correct the error of
a District Court in entertaining a suit over which it had no
jurisdiction.
Id.
Reversed.
Appeal from an interlocutory decree of a three-judge District
Court enjoining prosecution of plaintiffs for violation of the
Packers & Stockyards Act.
Cf. the last preceding
case.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a decree of a specially constituted
district court awarding an interlocutory injunction against the
Secretary of Agriculture and others restraining them from
prosecuting the appellees, operators of market agencies at the
Chicago stockyards, for violation of the Packers and Stockyards
Act, 1921. [
Footnote 1]
The appellees are, for the most part, the same persons and
corporations as the appellants in No. 655,
Acker v. United
States, ante, p.
298 U. S. 426.
While that case was pending on appeal to this Court, and the rates
therein prescribed by order of the Secretary of Agriculture were
suspended until final determination respecting their validity, the
appellees prepared and posted, on October 19, 1935, a schedule of
rates for market services at the Chicago
Page 298 U. S. 437
stockyards to become effective November 1, 1935. These rates
were, in most instances, higher than those prescribed by the
Secretary's orders of January 8 and March 12, 1934. On the same
day, the appellees tendered the schedule to the Secretary for
filing. He declined to receive it, assigning as reasons for his
refusal that, once rates are fixed by him, no change therein may be
made except by his order or by action of a court of competent
jurisdiction, and that litigation was then pending challenging the
validity of his outstanding orders. Thereupon, the appellees filed
their bill in the District Court reciting the course of the
Secretary's proceedings referred to in No. 655, the orders made,
and the suit to restrain their enforcement. The pleading asserts
that the orders were based on data for the years 1931 and 1932;
that, subsequent to promulgation of the orders, conditions had so
changed that, to prevent destruction of their business, the
appellees were compelled to adopt a new schedule of charges; it
recites the Secretary's refusal to file the new schedule and
alleges that the refusal was a violation of his duty under the act;
it charges that his refusal was of no effect, since his only power
in the premises was to file the schedule, and, if he believed the
rates named therein unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory, to
suspend them, pursuant to the provisions of the act, and, after
hearing, fix reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates. The bill
alleges that the schedule of October 19, 1935, became effective
November 1, 1935, and that, if appellees failed to conform thereto,
they would incur heavy penalties, while, on the other hand, the
Secretary was threatening to prosecute them unless they adhered to
the rates prescribed by his orders of January 8 and March 12, 1934.
After a hearing upon the bill and a supporting affidavit, the court
granted an injunction.
On appeal from the granting or refusal of an interlocutory
injunction, our inquiry is limited to the question
Page 298 U. S. 438
whether the court abused its discretion. [
Footnote 2] The appellants urge that the action
taken constituted such an abuse for the reason that want of
jurisdiction is evident upon the face of the bill. With this
contention we agree.
Section 316 of the Packers and Stockyards Act [
Footnote 3] adopts the same procedure for
restraining enforcement of or setting aside orders of the Secretary
as is provided by law with respect to orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. By § 1 of the Commerce Court Act, [
Footnote 4] jurisdiction was conferred
upon the Commerce Court "over all cases . . . brought to enjoin,
set aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part any order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission." The Urgent Deficiencies Act of
October 22, 1913, [
Footnote 5]
transferred the jurisdiction of the Commerce Court to the district
courts and provided that such cases should be heard by three
judges. The words of the statute exclude a mere refusal to act from
the section conferring jurisdiction, and this Court has accordingly
held that an order negative in form and substance is not within the
relief accorded. [
Footnote 6]
It is clear that
Page 298 U. S. 439
the instant bill was not one to set aside or suspend any order
of the Secretary. The proceeding brought for that purpose was No.
655, just decided. This suit is to restrain the Secretary and
others from instituting prosecution for violations of an order. Its
ultimate purpose is to secure a decree affirming the validity and
effectiveness of the rate schedule posted by the appellees October
19, 1934. The injunction restrains the defendants from preventing,
or attempting to prevent, or from interfering with the appellees in
the collection of the rates of charge fixed by the schedule
tendered to the Secretary October 19, 1935.
The District Court was without jurisdiction for a further
reason. Section 306 of the Packers and Stockyards Act [
Footnote 7] directs that, within sixty
days after the Secretary shall have given notice that a stockyard
falls within the definition of § 302, every market agency at such
stockyard shall file with him, and keep open for inspection,
schedules of rates and charges for its services. No changes are to
be made in the rates so filed and published except after ten days'
notice to the Secretary and to the public. Section 310 authorizes
an order for investigation and a hearing by the Secretary on
complaint, or on his own initiative, as to whether existing rates
are unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory, and empowers him,
after such hearing, to
"determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable
rate or charge, or rates or charges,
to be thereafter
observed in such case, or the maximum of minimum, or maximum
and minimum, to be charged, and what regulation or practice is or
will be just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
to be
thereafter followed. . . . [
Footnote 8]"
Section 306 prescribes the method of initiating rates upon the
act's becoming effective, and of voluntary alteration of them from
time to time. But when the Secretary, pursuant
Page 298 U. S. 440
to § 310, orders specified rates thereafter to be charged, these
become the only lawful rates, and so remain until the further order
of the Secretary. [
Footnote
9]
The bill shows that the Secretary, after inquiry and full
hearing, fixed rates thereafter to be charged by the appellees, and
these had not been set aside or enjoined in any appropriate
judicial proceeding or been altered by subsequent order of the
Secretary. The court was therefore without power to enjoin the
prosecution of the appellees for charging rates other than those
established by the Secretary.
The appellants did not raise the question of jurisdiction at the
hearing below. But the lack of jurisdiction of a federal court
touching the subject matter of the litigation cannot be waived by
the parties, and the District Court should therefore have declined
sua sponte to proceed in the cause. [
Footnote 10] And if the record discloses that
the lower court was without jurisdiction, this Court will notice
the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it.
[
Footnote 11] While the
District Court lacked jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal
not of the merits, but merely for the purpose of correcting the
error of the lower court in entertaining the suit. [
Footnote 12] The decree must therefore be
reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the
bill.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
42 Stat. 159, U.S.C. Tit. 7, c. 9.
[
Footnote 2]
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.
S. 284,
273 U. S. 290;
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 278 U.
S. 322,
278 U. S. 326;
Alabama v. United States, 279 U.
S. 229,
279 U. S. 230;
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.
S. 331,
281 U. S.
338.
[
Footnote 3]
42 Stat. 168, U.S.C. Tit. 7, Sec. 217:
"The provisions of all laws relating to the suspending or
restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of, or the
setting aside in whole or in part the orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission are made applicable to the jurisdiction,
powers, and duties of the Secretary in enforcing the provisions of
this title, and to any person subject to the provisions of this
title."
[
Footnote 4]
C. 309, 36 Stat. 539.
[
Footnote 5]
C. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219, U.S.C. Tit. 28, §§ 41(8)(27)(28),
47.
[
Footnote 6]
Procter & Gamble v. United States, 225 U.
S. 282,
225 U. S. 292;
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, 243 U.
S. 412;
United States v. Illinois Central R.
Co., 244 U. S. 82;
United States v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co., 282 U.
S. 522;
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 235,
283 U. S.
238.
[
Footnote 7]
C. 64, 42 Stat. 164, U.S.C. Tit. 7, § 207.
[
Footnote 8]
C. 64, 42 Stat. 166, U.S.C. Tit. 7, § 211.
[
Footnote 9]
Compare Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry.
Co., 284 U. S. 370,
284 U. S.
386-387.
[
Footnote 10]
See Cutler v. Rae,
7 How. 729,
48 U. S. 731;
Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315,
129 U. S. 325;
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S.
48,
194 U. S. 62;
Mattingly v. Northwestern V. R. Co., 158 U. S.
53;
443 Cans v. United States, 226 U.
S. 172;
Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.
S. 237,
293 U. S.
244.
[
Footnote 11]
Perez v. Fernandez, 202 U. S. 80,
202 U. S. 100;
Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U. S.
10,
282 U. S.
13.
[
Footnote 12]
United States v.
Huckabee, 16 Wall. 414,
83 U. S. 435;
Stickney v.
Wilt, 23 Wall. 150,
90 U. S. 163;
Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S.
16,
292 U. S. 19.