The Hobbs Act, which makes it a federal crime to obstruct
interstate commerce by robbery or extortion, does not reach the use
of violence (which is readily punishable under state law) to
achieve legitimate union objectives, such as higher wages in return
for genuine services that the employer seeks. Pp.
410 U. S.
399-411.
335 F.
Supp. 641, affirmed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J.,
filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
410 U. S. 412.
DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and
POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined,
post, p.
410 U. S.
413.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
A one-count indictment was returned in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Page 410 U. S. 397
charging the appellees with a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951. In pertinent part, that Act provides:
"(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce,
by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or
commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in
furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both."
"Extortion" is defined in the Act, as "the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual
or threatened force, violence, or fear. . . ." 18 U.S.C. §
1951(b)(2).
At the time of the alleged conspiracy, the employees of the Gulf
States Utilities Company were out on strike. The appellees are
members and officials of labor unions that were seeking a new
collective bargaining agreement with that company. The indictment
charged that the appellees and two named coconspirators conspired
to obstruct commerce, and that as part of that conspiracy,
"would obtain the property of the Gulf States Utilities Company
in the form of wages and other things of value with the consent of
the Gulf States Utilities Company . . such consent to be induced by
the wrongful use of actual force, violence and fear of economic
injury by [the appellees] and coconspirators, in that [the
appellees] and the coconspirators did commit acts of physical
violence and destruction against property owned by the Gulf States
Utilities Company in order to force said
Page 410 U. S. 398
Company to agree to a contract with Local 2286 of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers calling for higher
wages and other monetary benefits."
Five specific acts of violence were charged to have been
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy -- firing high-powered
rifles at three Company transformers, draining the oil from a
Company transformer, and blowing up a transformer substation owned
by the Company. In short, the indictment charged that the appellees
had conspired to use and did in fact, use violence to obtain for
the striking employees higher wages and other employment benefits
from the Company.
The District Court granted the appellees' motion to dismiss the
indictment for failure to state an offense under the Hobbs Act.
335 F.
Supp. 641. The court noted that the appellees were union
members on strike against their employer, Gulf States, and that
both the strike and its objective of higher wages were legal. The
court expressed the view that, if "the wages sought by violent acts
are wages to be paid for unneeded or unwanted services, or for no
services at all," then that violence would constitute extortion
within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.
Id. at 645. But in
this case, by contrast, the court noted that the indictment alleged
the use of force to obtain legitimate union objectives:
"The union had a right to disrupt the business of the employer
by lawfully striking for higher wages. Acts of violence occurring
during a lawful strike and resulting in damage to persons or
property are undoubtedly punishable under State law. To punish
persons for such acts of violence was not the purpose of the Hobbs
Act."
Id. at 646. The court found "no case where a court has
gone so far as to hold the type of activity involved here to be a
violation of the Hobbs Act."
Id. at 645.
Page 410 U. S. 399
We noted probable jurisdiction of the Government's appeal, 406
U.S. 916, [
Footnote 1] to
determine whether the Hobbs Act proscribes violence committed
during a lawful strike for the purpose of inducing an employer's
agreement to legitimate collective bargaining demands.
I
The Government contends that the statutory language
unambiguously and without qualification proscribes interference
with commerce by "extortion," and that, in terms of the statute,
"extortion" is "the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear. . . ." Wages are the "property" of the employer,
the argument continues, and strike violence to obtain such
"property" thus falls within the literal proscription of the Act.
But the language of the statute is hardly as clear as the
Government would make it out to be. Its interpretation of the Act
slights the wording of the statute that proscribes obtaining
property only by the "wrongful" use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear. The term "wrongful," which on the face of the
statute modifies the use of each of the enumerated means of
obtaining property -- actual or threatened force, violence, or fear
[
Footnote 2] -- would be
superfluous if it only served to describe the means used. For it
would be redundant to speak of "wrongful violence" or "wrongful
force," since,
Page 410 U. S. 400
as the Government acknowledges, any violence or force to obtain
property is "wrongful." [
Footnote
3] Rather, "wrongful" has meaning in the Act only if it limits
the statute's coverage to those instances where the obtaining of
the property would itself be "wrongful" because the alleged
extortionist has no lawful claim to that property.
Construed in this fashion, the Hobbs Act has properly been held
to reach instances where union officials threatened force or
violence against an employer in order to obtain personal payoffs,
[
Footnote 4] and where unions
used the proscribed means to exact "wage" payments from employers
in return for "imposed, unwanted, superfluous and fictitious
services" of workers. [
Footnote
5] For in those situations, the employer's property has been
misappropriated. But the literal language of the statute will not
bear the Government's semantic argument that the Hobbs Act reaches
the use of violence to achieve legitimate union objectives, such as
higher wages in return for genuine services which the employer
seeks. In that type of case, there has been no "wrongful" taking of
the employer's property; he has paid for the services he bargained
for, and the workers receive the wages to which they are entitled
in compensation for their services.
Page 410 U. S. 401
II
The legislative framework of the Hobbs Act dispels any ambiguity
in the wording of the statute and makes it clear that the Act does
not apply to the use of force to achieve legitimate labor ends. The
predecessor of the Hobbs Act, § 2 of the Anti-Racketeering Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 979, [
Footnote
6] proscribed, in connection with interstate commerce, the
exaction of valuable consideration by force, violence, or coercion,
"not including, however, the payment of wages by a bona-fide
employer to a bonafide employee. . . ." [
Footnote 7] In
United States v. Local 807,
315 U. S. 521, the
Court held that this exception covered
Page 410 U. S. 402
the members of a New York City truck drivers union who, by
violence or threats, exacted payments for themselves from
out-of-town truckers in return for the unwanted and superfluous
service of driving out-of-town trucks to and from the city. The New
York City teamsters would lie in wait for the out-of-town trucks,
and then demand payment from the owners and drivers in return for
allowing the trucks to proceed into the city. The teamsters
sometimes drove the arriving trucks into the city, but, in other
instances, the out-of-town truckers paid the fees but rejected the
teamsters' services and drove the trucks themselves. In several
cases, there was evidence that, having exacted their fees, the city
drivers disappeared without offering to perform any services at
all.
Id. at
315 U. S. 526.
See also id. at
315 U. S. 539
(Stone, C.J., dissenting). The Court held that the activities of
the city teamsters were included within the wage exception to the
Anti-Racketeering Act although what work they performed was
unneeded and unwanted, and although, in some cases, their work was
rejected.
Congressional disapproval of this decision was swift. Several
bills [
Footnote 8] were
introduced with the narrow purpose of correcting the result in the
Local 807 case. [
Footnote
9] H.R. 32, which became the Hobbs Act, 60 Stat. 420,
eliminated the wage exception that had been the basis for the
Local 807 decision. [
Footnote 10] But, as frequently emphasized
Page 410 U. S. 403
on the floor of the House, the limited effect of the bill was to
shut off the possibility opened up by the
Local 807 case,
that union members could use their protected status to exact
payments from employers for imposed, unwanted, and superfluous
services. As Congressman Hancock explained:
"This bill is designed simply to prevent both union members and
nonunion people from making use of robbery and extortion under the
guise of obtaining wages in the obstruction of interstate commerce.
That is all it does."
"
* * * *"
"[T]his bill is made necessary by the amazing decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of the
United States against
Teamsters' Union 807 3 years ago. That decision practically
nullified the anti-racketeering bill of 1934. . . . In effect, the
Supreme Court held that . . . members of the Teamsters' Union . . .
were exempt from the provisions of that law when attempting by the
use of force or the threat of violence to obtain wages for a job,
whether they rendered any service or not."
"91 Cong.Rec. 11900. Congressman Hancock proceeded to read
approvingly from an editorial which characterized the teamsters'
action in the Local 807 case as 'compelling the truckers to pay
day's wages to local union drivers whose services were neither
wanted nor needed.'
Ibid. Congressman Fellows stressed the
fact that the facts of the
Local 807
Page 410 U. S. 404
case showed that 'these stick-up men disappeared as soon as the
money was paid without rendering or offering to render any
service.'
Id. at 11907. And Congressman Rivers
characterized the facts of the
Local 807 case as 'nothing
short of hijacking, intimidation, extortion, and out-and-out
highway robbery.'
Id. at 11917. [
Footnote 11]"
But by eliminating the wage exception to the Anti-Racketeering
Act, the Hobbs Act did not sweep within its reach violence during a
strike to achieve legitimate collective bargaining objectives. It
was repeatedly emphasized in the debates that the bill did not
"interfere in any way with any legitimate labor objective or
activity"; [
Footnote 12]
"there is not a thing in it to interfere in the slightest degree
with any legitimate activity on the part of labor people or labor
unions. . . ." [
Footnote 13]
And Congressman Jennings, in responding to a question concerning
the Act's coverage, made it clear that the Act "does not have a
thing in the world to do with strikes."
Id. at 11912.
Indeed, in introducing his original bill, Congressman Hobbs
[
Footnote 14] explicitly
refuted the suggestion that strike violence
Page 410 U. S. 405
to achieve a union's legitimate objectives was encompassed by
the Act: [
Footnote 15]
"Mr. MARCANTONIO. All right. In connection with a strike, if an
incident occurs which involves --"
"Mr. HOBBS. The gentleman need go no further. This bill does not
cover strikes or any question relating to strikes."
"Mr. MARCANTONIO. Will the gentleman put a provision in the bill
stating so?"
"Mr. HOBBS. We do not have to, because a strike is perfectly
lawful, and has been so described by the Supreme Court and by the
statutes we have passed. This bill takes off from the springboard
that the act must be unlawful to come within the purview of this
bill."
"Mr. MARCANTONIO. That does not answer my point. My point is
that an incident such as a simple assault which takes place in a
strike could happen. Am I correct?"
"Mr. HOBBS. Certainly."
"Mr. MARCANTONIO. That then could become an extortion under the
gentleman's bill, and
Page 410 U. S. 406
that striker, as well as his union officials, could be charged
with violation of sections in this bill."
"Mr. HOBBS. I disagree with that, and deny it
in
toto."
89 Cong.Rec. 3213. [
Footnote
16]
Page 410 U. S. 407
The Government would derive a different lesson from the
legislative history. It points to statements made during the floor
debates that the Act was meant to have "broad coverage" and, unlike
its predecessor, to encompass the "employer employee" relationship.
But that proves no more than that the achievement of illegitimate
objectives by employees or their representatives, such as the
exaction of personal payoffs, or the pursuit of "wages" for
unwanted or fictitious services, would not be exempted from the Act
solely because the extortionist was an employee or union official
and the victim an employer. [
Footnote 17] The Government would also find support for
its expansive interpretation of the statute in the rejection of two
amendments, one proposed by Congressman Celler, the other by
Congressman LaFollette, which would have inserted in the Act an
exception for cases where violence was used to obtain the payment
of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee.
See 91 Cong.Rec. 11913, 11917, and 11919, 11922. But both
amendments were rejected
Page 410 U. S. 408
solely because they would have operated to continue the effect
of the Local 807 case. [
Footnote
18] Their rejection thus proves nothing more than that Congress
was intent on undoing the restrictive impact of that case.
III
In the nearly three decades that have passed since the enactment
of the Hobbs Act, no reported case has upheld the theory that the
Act proscribes the use of force to achieve legitimate collective
bargaining demands.
The only previous case in this Court relevant to the issue,
United States v. Green, 350 U. S. 415,
held no more than that the Hobbs Act had accomplished its objective
of overruling the
Local 807 case. The alleged extortions
in that case, as in
Local 807, consisted of attempts to
obtain so-called wages for "imposed, unwanted, superfluous and
fictitious services of laborers. . . ."
Id. at
350 U. S. 417.
The indictment charged that the employer's consent was obtained "by
the wrongful use, to-wit, the use for the purposes aforesaid, of
actual and threatened force, violence and fear. . . ."
Ibid. The Government thus did not rely, as it does in the
present case, solely on the use of force in an employer employee
relationship; it alleged a wrongful purpose -- to obtain money from
the employer that the union officials had no legitimate right to
demand. We concluded that the Hobbs Act could reach extortion in an
employer employee relationship and that personal profit to the
extortionist was not required, but our holding was carefully
limited to the charges in that case: "We rule only on the
allegations of the indictment and hold that the acts charged
against appellees fall within the terms of the Act."
Id.
at
350 U. S.
421.
Page 410 U. S. 409
A prior decision in the Third Circuit,
United States v.
Kemble, 198 F.2d 889, on which the Government relied in
Green, also concerned the exaction, by threats and
violence, of wages for superfluous services. In affirming a
conviction under the Hobbs Act of a union business agent for using
actual and threatened violence against an out-of-town driver in an
attempt to force him to hire a local union member, the Court of
Appeals carefully limited its holding:
"We need not consider the normal demand for wages as
compensation for services desired by or valuable to the employer.
It is enough for this case, and all we decide, that payment of
money for imposed, unwanted and superfluous services . . . is
within the language and intendment of the statute."
Id. at 892.
Most recently, in
United States v. Caldes, 457 F.2d 74,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was squarely presented
with the question at issue in this case. Two union officials were
convicted of Hobbs Act violations in that they damaged property of
a company with which they were negotiating for a collective
bargaining agreement, in an attempt to pressure the company into
agreeing to the union contract. Concluding that the Act was not
intended to reach militant activity in the pursuit of legitimate
unions ends, the court reversed the convictions and ordered the
indictment dismissed.
Indeed, not until the indictments were returned in 1970 in this
and several other cases has the Government even sought to prosecute
under the Hobbs Act actual or threatened violence employed to
secure a union contract "calling for higher wages and other
monetary benefits." [
Footnote
19]
Page 410 U. S. 410
Yet, throughout this period, the Nation has witnessed countless
economic strikes, often unfortunately punctuated by violence. It is
unlikely that, if Congress had indeed wrought such a major
expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction in enacting the Hobbs
Act, its action would have so long passed unobserved.
See
United States v. Laub, 385 U. S. 475,
385 U. S.
485.
IV
The Government's broad concept of extortion -- the "wrongful"
use of force to obtain even the legitimate union demands of higher
wages -- is not easily restricted. It would cover all overtly
coercive conduct in the course of an economic strike, obstructing,
delaying, or affecting commerce. The worker who threw a punch on a
picket line, or the striker who deflated the tires on his
employer's truck would be subject to a Hobbs Act prosecution and
the possibility of 20 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.
[
Footnote 20]
Page 410 U. S. 411
Even if the language and history of the Act were less clear than
we have found them to be, the Act could not properly be expanded as
the Government suggests -- for two related reasons. First, this
being a criminal statute, it must be strictly construed, and any
ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity.
United
States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76,
18 U. S. 95;
United States v. Halseth, 342 U.
S. 277,
342 U. S. 280;
Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81,
349 U. S. 83;
Arroyo v. United States, 359 U. S. 419,
359 U. S. 424;
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808,
401 U. S. 812.
Secondly, it would require statutory language much more explicit
than that, before us here to lead to the conclusion that Congress
intended to put the Federal Government in the business of policing
the orderly conduct of strikes. Neither the language of the Hobbs
Act nor its legislative history can justify the conclusion that
Congress intended to work such an extraordinary change in federal
labor law or such an unprecedented incursion into the criminal
jurisdiction of the States.
See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236,
359 U. S.
247-248;
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp., 347 U. S. 656,
347 U. S. 665;
Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.
S. 485,
346 U. S. 488;
UAW Local 2 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U. S. 245,
336 U. S.
253.
As we said last Term:
"[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be
deemed to have significantly changed the federal state balance.
Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a federal
crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the States. . . .
[W]e will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect
a significant change in the sensitive
Page 410 U. S. 412
relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction."
United States v. Bass, 404 U.
S. 336,
404 U. S. 349
(footnotes omitted).
The District Court was correct in dismissing the indictment. Its
judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
This appeal was taken under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964 ed.). The
1971 amendment to the Criminal Appeals Act, providing that all
appeals from dismissals of indictments or informations must be
taken to the Courts of Appeals, does not apply to cases instituted
before January 2, 1971. Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.Law
No. 91-644, § 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890, codified, 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.
S. 470,
400 U. S. 474
n. 1, 477-478, n. 6. The present indictment was filed on October
15, 1970.
[
Footnote 2]
Congressman Hobbs indicated that "wrongful" was to modify the
entire section. 91 Cong.Rec. 11908.
[
Footnote 3]
The Government suggests a convoluted construction of "wrongful."
It concedes that, when the means used are not "wrongful," such as
where fear of economic loss from a strike is employed, then the
objective must be illegal. If, on the other hand, "wrongful" force
and violence are used, even for a legal objective, the Government
contends that the statute is satisfied. But that interpretation
simply accepts the redundancy of the term "wrongful" whenever it
applies to "force" and "violence" in the statute.
[
Footnote 4]
See, e.g., United States v. Iozzi, 420 F.2d 512;
United States v. Kramer, 355 F.2d 891,
cert. granted
and case remanded for resentencing, 384 U.
S. 100;
Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d
182.
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., United States v. Green, 350 U.
S. 415,
350 U. S. 417;
United States v. Kemble, 198 F.2d 889.
[
Footnote 6]
Section 2 of the Act provided:
"Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in
any way or in any degree affecting trade or commerce or any article
or commodity moving or about to move in trade or commerce -- "
"(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to
use or threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of
money or other valuable considerations, or the purchase or rental
of property or protective services, not including, however, the
payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee;
or"
"(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced
by wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right;
or"
"(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence
or physical injury to a person or property in furtherance of a plan
or purpose to violate sections (a) or (b); or"
"(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other person or
persons to commit any of the foregoing acts; shall, upon conviction
thereof, be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by
imprisonment from one to ten years or by a fine of $10,000, or
both."
[
Footnote 7]
See § 2(a), quoted in
n 6,
supra. While the specific wage exception was
found only in § 2(a) of the Act, § 3(b) excluded "wages paid by a
bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee" from the definition of
"property," "money," or other "valuable considerations." The wage
exception thus permeated the entire Act.
United States v.
Green, 350 U.S. at
350 U. S. 419
n. 4;
United States v. Local 807, 315 U.
S. 521,
315 U. S. 527
n. 2.
[
Footnote 8]
S. 2347, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6872, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.;
H.R. 7067, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 653, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.;
H.R. 32, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
See Callanan v. United
States, 364 U. S. 587,
364 U. S. 591
n. 5;
United States v. Green, supra, at
350 U. S. 419
n. 5.
[
Footnote 9]
See United States v. Green, supra, at
350 U. S. 419
n. 5; Note, Labor Faces the Amended Anti-Racketeering Act, 101
U.Pa.L.Rev. 1030, 1033-1034 (1953).
[
Footnote 10]
The Hobbs Act also eliminated the proviso in § 6 of the
Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934:
"That no court of the United States shall construe or apply any
of the provisions of this Act in such manner as to impair,
diminish, or in any manner affect the rights of bona fide labor
organizations in lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof, as such rights are expressed in existing statutes of the
United States."
That proviso was one of the supports for the
Local 807
decision,
see 315 U.S. at
315 U. S. 535,
and it was eliminated to prevent reliance on that clause as a means
of resuscitating the
Local 807 decision.
See 91
Cong.Rec. 11912 (remarks of Rep. Hobbs).
[
Footnote 11]
See also 91 Cong.Rec. 11842 (remarks of Rep. Michener);
id. at 11905 (remarks of Rep. Robsion);
id. at
11909 (remarks of Rep. Sumners);
id. at 11912-11913
(remarks of Rep. Whittington).
In its report on the bill, the House Committee on the Judiciary
reproduced this Court's decision in the Local 807 case and
concluded that "[t]he need for the legislation was emphasized by
the opinion of the Supreme Court in . . .
United States v.
Local 807. . . ." H.R.Rep. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 10.
See also S.Rep. No. 1516, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
[
Footnote 12]
91 Cong.Rec. 11841 (remarks of Rep. Walter).
[
Footnote 13]
Id. at 11908 (remarks of Rep. Sumners).
See also
id. at 11900 (remarks of Rep. Hancock);
id. at 11904
(remarks of Rep. Gwynne);
id. at 11909 (remarks of Rep.
Vursell).
[
Footnote 14]
The remarks with respect to that bill, H.R. 653, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess., which passed only the House, are wholly relevant to an
understanding of the Hobbs Act, since the operative language of the
original bill was substantially carried forward into the Act. The
congressional debates on the Hobbs Act in the 79th Congress
repeatedly referred to the legislative history of the original
bill.
See 91 Cong.Rec. 11842 (remarks of Rep. Michener);
id. at 11899-11900 (remarks of Rep. Hancock);
id.
at 11900 (remarks of Rep. Hobbs). Surely an interpretation placed
by the sponsor of a bill on the very language subsequently enacted
by Congress cannot be dismissed out of hand, as the dissent would
have it, simply because the interpretation was given two years
earlier.
[
Footnote 15]
See also 89 Cong.Rec. 3202 (remarks of Rep. Gwynne)
(Act does not cover "a clash between strikers and scabs during a
strike").
[
Footnote 16]
The proponents of the Hobbs Act defended the Act as no
encroachment on the legitimate activities of labor unions on the
ground that the statute did no more than incorporate New York's
conventional definition of extortion, "the obtaining of property
from another . . . with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of
force or fear, or under color of official right." N.Y.Penal Law §
850 (1909).
See 91 Cong.Rec. 11842 (remarks of Rep.
Walter);
id. at 11843 (remarks of Rep. Michener);
id. at 11900 (remarks of Rep. Hancock);
ibid.
(remarks of Rep. Hobbs);
id. at 11906 (remarks of Rep.
Robsion).
See also United States v. Caldes, 457 F.2d 74,
77;
United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 686.
Judicial construction of the New York statute reinforces the
conclusion that, however militant, union activities to obtain
higher wages do not constitute extortion. For extortion requires an
intent "
to obtain that which in justice and equity the party is
not entitled to receive.'" People v. Cuddihy, 151 Misc.
318, 324, 271 N.Y.S. 450, 456, aff'd, 243 App.Div. 694,
277 N.Y.S. 960; see People v. Weinseimer, 117 App.Div.
603, 616, 102 N.Y.S. 579, 588, aff'd, 190 N.Y. 537, 83
N.E. 1129. An accused would not be guilty of extortion for
attempting to achieve legitimate labor goals; he could not be
convicted without sufficient evidence that he
"was actuated by the purpose of obtaining a financial benefit
for himself . . . and was not attempting in good faith to advance
the cause of unionism. . . ."
People v. Adelstein, 9 App.Div.2d 907, 908, 195 N Y.
S.2d 27, 28,
aff'd sub nom. People v. Squillante, 8 N.Y.2d
998, 169 N.E.2d 425.
Hence, New York's highest court has interpreted its extortion
statute to apply to a case where the accused received a payoff to
buy an end to labor picketing.
People v. Dioguardi, 8
N.Y.2d 260, 168 N.E.2d 683.
"The picketing here . . . may have been perfectly lawful in its
inception (assuming it was part of a
bona fide
organizational effort) and may have remained so -- despite its
potentially ruinous effect on the employers' businesses so long as
it was employed to accomplish the legitimate labor objective of
organization. Its entire character changed from legality to
criminality, however, when it wax used as a pressure device to
exact the payment of money as a condition of its cessation. . .
."
Id. at 271, 168 N.E.2d at 690-691.
In short, when the objectives of the picketing changed from
legitimate labor ends to personal payoffs, then the actions became
extortionate.
[
Footnote 17]
The Government relies heavily on a statement by Congressman
Michener, in a dialogue with two of his colleagues, to the effect
that union members who "by robbery or exploitation collect a day's
wage -- a union wage -- they are not exempted from the law solely
because they are engaging in a legitimate union activity." 91
Cong.Rec. 11843-11844. But Congressman Michener was referring to
the activity of "robbery or exploitation," and his statement
continued: "I cannot understand how any union man can claim that
the conduct described by Mr. Justice Stone is a legitimate union
activity."
Id. at 11844. Mr. Chief Justice Stone's
dissenting opinion in the Local 807 case described payoffs for the
superfluous and unwanted work involved in that case.
See
315 U.S. at
315 U. S.
539.
[
Footnote 18]
See 91 Cong. Re. 11914 (remarks of Rep. Hobbs);
ibid. (remarks of Rep. Walter);
id. at 11920
(remarks of Rep. Gwynne).
[
Footnote 19]
As noted above, the indictment in
United States v.
Caldes, 457 F.2d 74, was ordered to be dismissed by the Ninth
Circuit. Two similar indictments returned in the Southern District
of Florida were dismissed by the District Court without opinion in
June, 1970.
United States v. Rutcofsky, No. 70-101-CR-JE,
June 24, 1970;
United States v. Schiffman, No.
70-102-CR-JE, June 25, 1970. An additional indictment, based on a
similar theory of the Hobbs Act, was filed in the Eastern District
of New York on January 12, 1972, and is currently pending.
United States v. Spero, No. 72-CR-17.
The briefs in the present case advise us of one other Hobbs Act
prosecution that may have been brought under this theory -- a 1962
indictment in
United States v. Webb, ND Ala., No.
15080.
[
Footnote 20]
Realizing the breadth of its argument, the Government's brief
concedes that there might be an exception for
"the incidental injury to person or property that not
infrequently occurs as a consequence of the charged atmosphere
attending a prolonged labor dispute. . . ."
But nothing, either in the language or the history of the Act,
justifies any such exception.
Similarly, there is nothing to support the dissent's exception
for "mischievous" conduct,
post, at
410 U. S. 418
n. 17, even if we could begin to define the meaning and limits of
such a term.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion. I readily concede that my visceral
reaction to immaturely conceived acts of violence of the kind
charged in this indictment is that such acts deserve to be
dignified as federal crimes. That reaction on my part, however, is
legislative in nature rather than judicial. If Congress wishes acts
of that kind to be encompassed by a federal statute, it has the
constitutional power in the interstate context to effect that
result. The appellees so concede. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-19. But MR.
JUSTICE STEWART has gathered the pertinent and persuasive
legislative history demonstrating that Congress did not intend to
exercise its power to reach these acts of violence.
The Government's posture, with its concession that certain
strike violence (which it would downgrade as "incidental" and the
dissent as "low level,"
post at
410 U. S. 418
n. 17), although aimed at achieving a legitimate end, is not
covered by the Act, necessarily means that the legislation would be
enforced selectively or, at the least, would embroil all concerned
with drawing the distinction between major and minor violence.
That, for me, is neither an appealing prospect nor solid support
for the position taken.
This type of violence, as the Court points out, is subject to
state criminal prosecution. That is where it must remain until the
Congress acts otherwise in a manner far more clear than the
language of the Hobbs Act.
Page 410 U. S. 413
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE
POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST concur, dissenting.
The Court today achieves by interpretation what those who were
opposed to the Hobbs Act were unable to get Congress to do. The
Court considers primarily the legislative history of a predecessor
bill considered by the 78th Congress. The bill before us was
considered and enacted by the 79th Congress; and, as I read the
debates, the opposition lost in the 79th Congress what they win
today. All of which makes pertinent Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition
in
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U.
S. 267,
194 U. S. 270,
that "it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as the courts."
In
United States v. Local 807, 315 U.
S. 521, we had before us the Anti-Racketeering Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 979, which made it a crime to use violence
respecting interstate trade or commerce to obtain the "payment of
money or other valuable considerations," excluding "the payment of
wages by a bona-fide employer to a bonafide employee." We held that
the exception included demands for unwanted or superfluous services
and covered those who wanted jobs, not only those who presently had
them.
Congress in the Hobbs Act changed the law. The critical change
was the exclusion of the employer employee clause. The Court said
in
United States v. Green, 350 U.
S. 415,
350 U. S.
419:
"In the Hobbs Act, 60 Stat. 420, carried forward as 18 U.S.C. §
1951, which amended the Anti-Racketeering Act, the exclusion clause
involved in the Local 807 decision was dropped. The legislative
history makes clear that the new Act was meant to eliminate any
grounds for future judicial conclusions that
Page 410 U. S. 414
Congress did not intend to cover the employer employee
relationship. The words were defined to avoid any
misunderstanding."
In
Green, the Court held that it was an extortion
within the meaning of the Act to use force to obtain payment of
wages for unwanted and superfluous services.
Id. at
350 U. S.
417.
Here, the services were not unwanted or superfluous; they were
services being negotiated under a collective bargaining
agreement.
The Court relies mostly on the legislative history of a measure
covering the same topic which was passed by the previous House but
on which the Senate did not act. Two years later, the bill in its
present form was enacted. It was a differently constituted House
that debated it and the year was 1945, rather than 1943. So the
most relevant legislative history, in my view, concerns the 79th
Congress, not the 78th.
The fear was expressed in the House that the elimination of the
Exception Clause would open up the prospect of labor's being
prosecuted. [
Footnote 2/1] As a
consequence, Congressman Celler sought to amend the measure so as
to exempt the use of violence to exact "wages paid by a
bona
fide employer to a
bona fide employee." [
Footnote 2/2] His precise amendment in that
regard would define "property" in the Act as not including "wages
paid by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee." [
Footnote 2/3] Those who objected said that
it would substantially restore the 1934 Act. [
Footnote 2/4]
Congressman Biemiller, in speaking for the Celler Amendment
said:
"We fear, for example, under the bill as it now
Page 410 U. S. 415
stands, that a simple, unfortunate altercation on a picket line
-- and we all know that human beings are frail and when tempers are
hot some trouble may develop -- under such a situation, you may
send a man to jail for 20 years or fine him $10,000. [
Footnote 2/5]"
The Celler Amendment was rejected. [
Footnote 2/6]
As I read the Congressional Record, Congressman Baldwin spoke
for the consensus when he said:
"This bill would not have been presented to the House if
organized labor had recognized law and order in striking and in
establishing their rights, as they have a right to do. Everyone can
remember the taxicab strike in the city of Baltimore, which does
not pertain to this bill, where cabs were overthrown, bricks thrown
through the windows endangering the lives of people, innocent
victims. Those were the tactics of organized labor which you people
support outright and which organized labor sanctioned. The leaders
were locked up and put in jail for participating in those
activities. Yet you stand here on the floor of this House and say
they did not do it or they did not know anything about it."
"Mr. Chairman, labor has a right to strike, but when labor
perpetrates that sort of thing, they are going far beyond the
bounds of reason. Certainly, I do not take the position that labor
has not the right to organize or to strike, but when they do so
they should abide by the laws of the land and the laws of decency.
If they had done that, we would not have this legislation before
the House today. [
Footnote 2/7]
"
Page 410 U. S. 416
Congressman Whittington voiced the same sentiments:
"The pending bill will provide for punishing racketeers who rob
or extort. There is no justification for labor unions opposing the
bill as it constitutes no invasion of the legitimate rights of
labor. Robbery and extortion by members of labor unions must be
punished. Labor unions owe that much to the public. In demanding
the protection of laws, labor unions should urge that those engaged
in legitimate interstate commerce be protected from robbery and
extortion. [
Footnote 2/8] "
Congressman Celler offered another amendment which would give as
a defense to a charge under the Hobbs Act that the employee "did
not violate the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Clayton
Act, or the Railway Labor Act, or the National Labor Relations
Act." [
Footnote 2/9] But that
amendment was also voted down; [
Footnote 2/10] the only provision of the Hobbs Act
which touched on that problem was 18 U.S.C. § 1951(c), which stated
that this section "shall not be construed to repeal, modify or
affect" those laws. References were made in the House debates to
the trucking problem in New York, where farmers bringing their
produce to market in trucks were held up and money was extorted
"from the drivers in order that the shipments might enter the
Holland Tunnel and be delivered to their respective destinations in
New York. [
Footnote 2/11]"
Congressman LaFollette offered an amendment which would keep the
1934 Act intact but would bar the use of violence by a person not a
bona fide employee to obtain
Page 410 U. S. 417
property from a
bona fide employer. [
Footnote 2/12] That, too, was defeated. [
Footnote 2/13]
In the present case, violence was used during the bargaining --
five acts of violence involving the shooting and sabotage of the
employer's transformers and the blowing up of a company transformer
substation. The violence was used to obtain higher wages and other
benefits for union members. The acts literally fit the definition
of extortion used in the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The term
"extortion" means the use of violence to obtain "property" from
another. § 1951(b)(2). The crime is the use of "extortion" in
furtherance of a plan to do anything in violation of the section. §
1951(a). The prior exception covering those who seek "the payment
of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee" was taken
out of the Act by Congress. Hence, the use of violence to obtain
higher wages is plainly a method of obtaining "property from
another" within the meaning of § 1951(b)(2).
Page 410 U. S. 418
Seeking higher wages is certainly not unlawful. But using
violence to obtain them seems plainly within the scope of
"extortion" as used in the Act, just as is the use of violence to
exact payment for no work or the use of violence to get a sham
substitution for no work. The regime of violence, whatever its
precise objective, is a common device of extortion and is condemned
by the Act.
Congressman Lemke said in the House debates on the Hobbs Act,
which he opposed, "The minority is generally right." [
Footnote 2/14]
Whatever may be thought of the policy which the Court today
embroiders into the Act, it was the minority view in the House and
clearly did not represent the consensus of the House. No light is
thrown on the matter by the Senate, for it summarily approved the
House version of the bill. [
Footnote
2/15]
It is easy in these insulated chambers to put an attractive
gloss on an Act of Congress if five votes can be obtained. At
times, the legislative history of a measure is so clouded or
obscure that we must perforce give some meaning to vague words.
[
Footnote 2/16] But where, as
here, the consensus of the House is so clear, we should carry out
its purpose no matter how distasteful or undesirable that policy
may be to us, [
Footnote 2/17]
unless, of course, the Act oversteps
Page 410 U. S. 419
constitutional boundaries. But none has been so hardy as even to
suggest that.
While we said in
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,
316 U. S. 517,
316 U. S. 522,
that it is "retrospective expansion of meaning which properly
deserves the stigma of judicial legislation," the same is true of
retrospective contraction of meaning.
I would reverse.
[
Footnote 2/1]
91 Cong.Rec. 11914 (remarks of Rep. Marcantonio).
[
Footnote 2/2]
Id. at 11913.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Id. at 11914; 11914-11915; 11918.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Id. at 11916.
[
Footnote 2/6]
Id. at 11917.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Id. at 11918.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Id. at 11913.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Id. at 11919.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/11]
Id. at 11917.
[
Footnote 2/12]
Id. at 11919. The proposed amendment read as
follows:
"(a) The term 'the payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a
bona fide employee' shall not be construed so as to include the
payment of money or the transfer of a thing of value by a person to
another when the latter shall use or attempt to use or threaten to
use force or violence against the body or to the physical property
(as distinguished from intangible property) of the former or
against the body of anyone having the possession, custody, or
control of the physical property of the former, in attempting to
obtain or obtaining such payment or transfer."
"(b) The term 'the rights of a bona fide labor organization in
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, as such
rights are expressed in existing statutes of the United States'
shall not be construed so as to ignore, void, set aside, or nullify
the definitions set out or the words used in or the plain meaning
of subsection (a) hereof."
[
Footnote 2/13]
Id. at 11922
[
Footnote 2/14]
14
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/15]
92 Cong.Rec. 7308.
[
Footnote 2/16]
See, e.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.
S. 607,
322 U. S.
615-616, for the use by Congress of the rather opaque
phrase "area of production."
[
Footnote 2/17]
The fear was expressed in the House debates by opponents of the
measure that a fistfight on a picket line during a strike could
bring down on the offender a $10,000 fine and 20 years in jail or
both.
See 91 Cong.Rec. 11916;
supra at
410 U. S.
414-415. And the Government actually argued in one case,
United States v. Caldes, 457 F.2d 74, 78, that a union and
its members were guilty of extortion if they used the coercion of a
strike to obtain economic benefits from the employer. That,
however, is nonsense, as the court in
Caldes ruled,
id. at 79, for the Hobbs Act specifically does not touch
collective bargaining of which the strike is a component part. 18
U.S.C. § 1951(c). Moreover, the court in
Caldes held that
"mischievous" conduct during a strike and actions which are "the
by-product of frustration engendered by a prolonged,
bona
fide collective bargaining negotiation,"
id. at 78,
are often only low-level acts of violence that may be unfair labor
practices or, at best, subject to state, not federal, prosecution.
That is my view.