A sheriff, acting on a tip, made a complaint before a magistrate
charging that petitioner and another individual on the date and at
the place named "did then and there unlawfully break and enter into
[the described] locked . . . building," and a warrant was issued. A
police radio bulletin named and described the two persons, the type
of car they were probably driving, and the amount and type of money
taken. Relying on the bulletin, an officer in another county made a
warrantless arrest of the suspects. The car was then searched and
various incriminating items removed, which were later used at
petitioner's trial, which resulted in his conviction. Petitioner
filed a habeas corpus petition reiterating the challenge he had
made at his arraignment and trial to the constitutionality of the
use of evidence seized during a search incident to the assertedly
illegal arrest. The District Court denied the petition, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. Petitioner's arrest violated his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and the evidence secured incident thereto
should have been excluded from his trial. Pp. 401 U. S.
(a) The complaint, which did not mention that the sheriff acted
on an informer's tip, and which consisted of no more than the
sheriff's conclusion that the individuals named committed the
offense, could not support the independent judgment of a
disinterested magistrate. P. 401 U. S.
(b) The standards applicable to the factual basis for an
arresting officer's probable cause assessment are no less strict
than those applicable to the magistrate's assessment. Here, the
arresting officer had no information to corroborate the report that
the suspects had committed the crime and the fact that the
warrantless arrest was based on a police radio bulletin cannot
supply the element of probable cause that the officer who issued
the bulletin lacked. Pp. 401 U. S.
2. Since, notwithstanding petitioner's constitutional challenge
at each stage, respondent made no attempt to show that the
magistrate had more information than was presented in the
Page 401 U. S. 561
he may not attempt to do so now on remand; and the writ must
issue unless the State appropriately arranges to retry the
petitioner. P. 401 U. S.
416 F.2d 36, reversed and remanded.
HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACK,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined,
p. 401 U. S. 570
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting statement, post,
401 U. S.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Whiteley, in 1965, was convicted in the District
Court for the Second Judicial District of the State of Wyoming on
charges of breaking and entering and being an habitual criminal.
] Both at his
arraignment and at trial, Whiteley challenged the constitutionality
of the use of evidence seized during a search incident to an arrest
which he claimed was illegal. The trial court overruled
petitioner's motion to suppress, and, on appeal, the Supreme Court
of Wyoming affirmed. Whiteley v. State, 418 P.2d 164
(1966). This proceeding commenced with a petition for habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming,
which was denied on November 25, 1968. [Footnote 2
] Whiteley v. Wyoming,
293 F. Supp.
381. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
Page 401 U. S. 562
the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Whiteley v. Meacham,
F.2d 36 (1969). We granted certiorari, limiting the writ to the
issue of the constitutionality of the arrest and ensuing search and
seizure. 397 U.S. 1062 (1970). [Footnote 3
] We reverse the judgment of the Tenth Circuit
for the reasons stated herein.
The circumstances surrounding petitioner's arrest and the
incidental search and seizure, as stated by the Wyoming Supreme
Court, 418 P.2d 164
16166, are as follows: [Footnote
"On November 23, 1964, certain business establishments in
Saratoga were broken into, including the Rustic Bar and Shively's
Hardware, the offenses being investigated by the Carbon County
Sheriff [Sheriff Ogburn] who, acting on a tip, the next day signed
a complaint charging defendant and another with breaking and
entering the building identified
Page 401 U. S. 563
as the Rustic Bar. This complaint was made before a justice of
the peace at approximately 11:30 a.m. on the 24th, and a warrant
issued. After the investigation, the sheriff put out a state item
on the radio to pick up two suspects of the breaking and entering,
defendant and another. The message went to the network at Casper,
and was transmitted over the State, received by the Albany County
Sheriff's Office and communicated to the Laramie Police Department,
the message giving name and descriptions of the two persons and
advising the type of car probably being driven and the amount of
money taken, including certain old coins with the dates. Late at
night on November 24, a Laramie patrolman, in reliance on the
information in the radio item, arrested the defendant and his
companion. At the time, the patrolman had no warrant for
defendant's arrest, nor search warrant. The officer together with a
deputy sheriff, who had come up in the meantime, searched the car
and removed a number of items introduced in evidence, including
tools and old coins, identified at the trial as taken from
Shively's Hardware. . . ."
Sheriff Ogburn's complaint, which provided the basis for the
arrest warrant issued by the justice of the peace, is as
"I, C. W. Ogburn, do solemnly swear that, on or about the 23 day
of November, A.D. 1964, in the County of Carbon and State of
Wyoming, the said Harold Whiteley and Jack Daley, defendants, did
then and there unlawfully break and enter a locked and sealed
building [describing the location and ownership of the
A state item 881, the bulletin which Sheriff Ogburn
Page 401 U. S. 564
put out on the radio and which led to petitioner's arrest and
search by the Laramie patrolman, is as follows:
"P & H for B & E Saratoga, early A.M. 11-24-64. Subj.
#1. Jack Daley, WMA, 38, D.O.B. 2-29-, 5'10', 175, med. build,
med. comp., blonde and blue. Tat. left shoulder: 'Love Me or Leave
Me.' #2. Harold Whitley, WMA, 43, D.O.B. 6-22-21, 5'11', 180, med.
build, fair comp. brown eyes. Tat. on right arm 'Bird.' Poss.
driving 1953 or 1954 Buick, light green bottom, dark top. Wyo. lic.
2-bal. unknown. Taken: $281.71 in small change, numerous old coins
ranging from .5� pieces to silver dollars, dated from 1853 to 1908.
Warrant issues, will extradite. Special attention Denver. . .
App. 31. [Footnote 5
The decisions of this Court concerning Fourth Amendment probable
cause requirements before a warrant for either arrest or search can
issue require that the judicial officer issuing such a warrant be
supplied with sufficient information to support an independent
judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant. [Footnote 6
] Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U. S. 410
(1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.
(1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.
(1964); Rugendorf v. United States,
376 U. S. 528
(1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.
(1960); Giordenello v. United States,
357 U. S. 480
(1958). In the instant case -- so far as the record stipulated to
by the parties
Page 401 U. S. 565
reveals [Footnote 7
] -- the
sole support for the arrest warrant issued at Sheriff Ogburn's
request was the complaint reproduced above. [Footnote 8
] That complaint consists of nothing
more than the complainant's conclusion that the individuals named
therein perpetrated the offense described in the complaint. The
actual basis for Sheriff Ogburn's conclusion was an informer's tip,
but that fact, as well as every other operative fact, is omitted
from the complaint. Under the cases just cited, that document alone
could not support the independent judgment of a disinterested
The State, [Footnote 9
however, contends that, regardless of the sufficiency of the
complaint to support the arrest warrant, the Laramie police officer
who actually made the
Page 401 U. S. 566
arrest possessed sufficient factual information to support a
finding of probable cause for arrest without a warrant. In support
of this proposition, the State argues that a reviewing court should
employ less stringent standards for reviewing a police officer's
assessment of probable cause as a prelude to a warrantless arrest
than the court would employ in reviewing a magistrate's assessment
as a prelude to issuing an arrest or search warrant. [Footnote 10
] That proposition has
been consistently rejected by this Court. United States v.
380 U.S. at 380 U. S.
-109; Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. at
378 U. S.
-111; Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. at
362 U. S.
-271. And the reason for its rejection is both
fundamental and obvious: less stringent standards for reviewing the
officer's discretion in effecting a warrantless arrest and search
would discourage resort to the procedures for obtaining a warrant.
Thus, the standards applicable to the factual basis supporting the
officer's probable cause assessment at the time of the challenged
arrest and search are at least as stringent as the standards
applied with respect to the magistrate's assessment. See McCray
v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300
386 U. S.
Applying those standards to the instant case, the information
possessed by the Laramie police officer at the time of arrest and
search consisted of: (1) the data contained in state bulletin 881,
reproduced supra; (2) the knowledge, obtained by personal
observation, that two men were driving a car matching the car
described in the radio bulletin; (3) the knowledge, possessed by
one of the arresting officers, that one of the people in the car
was Jack Daley, App. 71; (4) the knowledge, acquired
Page 401 U. S. 567
by personal observation, that the other individual in the car
fitted the description of Whiteley contained in state bulletin 881;
and (5) the knowledge, acquired by the officer after stopping
Whiteley, that he had given a false name. [Footnote 11
This Court has held that, where the initial impetus for an
arrest is an informer's tip, information gathered by the arresting
officers can be used to sustain a finding of probable cause for an
arrest that could not adequately be supported by the tip alone.
Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959). See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.
(1969). But the additional information acquired
by the arresting officers must in some sense be corroborative of
the informer's tip that the arrestees committed the felony or, as
itself, were in the process of committing the
the opinions of the Court and that of MR.
JUSTICE WHITE concurring in Spinelli v. United States,
and p. 393 U. S. 423
In the present case, the very most the additional information
tended to establish is that either Sheriff Ogburn or his informant,
or both of them, knew Daley and Whiteley and the kind of car they
drove; the record is devoid of any information at any stage of the
proceeding, from the time of the burglary to the event of the
arrest and search, that would support either the reliability of the
informant or the informant's conclusion that these men were
connected with the crime. Spinelli v. United States, supra;
McCray v. Illinois, supra; Aguilar v. Texas, supra.
Page 401 U. S. 568
The State, however, offers one further argument in support of
the legality of the arrest and search: the Laramie police relied on
the radio bulletin in making the arrest, and not on Sheriff
Ogburn's unnamed informant. Clearly, it is said, they had probable
cause for believing that the passengers in the car were the men
described in the bulletin, and, in acting on the bulletin, they
reasonably assumed that whoever authorized the bulletin had
probable cause to direct Whiteley's and Daley's arrest. To prevent
arresting officers from acting on the assumption that fellow
officers who call upon them to make an arrest have probable cause
for believing the arrestees are perpetrators of a crime would, it
is argued, unduly hamper law enforcement.
We do not, of course, question that the Laramie police were
entitled to act on the strength of the radio bulletin. Certainly
police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing
arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting
aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an
independent judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, however,
the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal arrest
cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the
instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the
In sum, the complaint on which the warrant issued here clearly
could not support a finding of probable cause by the issuing
magistrate. The arresting officer was not himself possessed of any
factual data tending to corroborate the informer's tip that Daley
and Whiteley committed the crime. [Footnote 12
] Therefore, petitioner's arrest violated
Page 401 U. S. 569
his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments; the evidence secured as an incident thereto should have
been excluded from his trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.
There remains the question as to the proper disposition of this
case. The State urges us to remand so that it will have an
opportunity to develop a record which might show that the issuing
magistrate had factual information additional to that presented in
Sheriff Ogburn's complaint. Brief for Respondent 8-9. Yet the State
concedes, as on the record, it must, that, at every stage in the
proceedings below, petitioner argued the insufficiency of the
warrant as well as the lack of probable cause at the time of the
arrest. Brief for Respondent 4. Knowing the basis for petitioner's
constitutional claim, the State chose to try those proceedings on
the record it had developed in the state courts. See
explanation for this state of affairs is that "the state has felt,
based on precedent and logic, that no court would accept the legal
reasoning of petitioner." Brief for Respondent 9. In the
circumstances of this case, that justification, as we have shown,
Pursuant to our authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to make such
disposition of the case "as may be just under the circumstances,"
we reverse the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remand with
directions that the writ is to issue unless the State makes
appropriate arrangements to retry petitioner. [Footnote 13
] Cf. Giordenello v. United
357 U.S. at 357 U. S.
It is so ordered.
Page 401 U. S. 570
He was given concurrent sentences on the breaking and entering
charges of one to 10 years and, in consequence of the recidivist
charge, imprisonment for life.
Prior to commencing federal habeas corpus proceedings, Whiteley
had filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the
Wyoming statutes. No appeal was taken from the denial of that
In his petition for habeas corpus, Whiteley raised several other
issues which had previously been advanced in his state petition for
post-conviction relief, but not in his direct appeal to the Supreme
Court of Wyoming. On these other issues, both lower federal courts
held that failure to appeal the denial of his state post-conviction
petition constituted nonexhaustion of state remedies. Petitioner
sought to raise the exhaustion issue in his present petition for
certiorari, but, as noted in text, we granted the writ limited to
the search and seizure issue decided by the lower federal
At the outset of the federal habeas corpus proceeding now before
us, both parties entered into the following stipulation, App.
"IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties through
their respective counsel that, pursuant to the agreement of the
parties in open court on February 16, 1968, both sides will rely
exclusively on the record before the trial court in the original
case of the State of Wyoming v. Harold Whiteley . . . and any and
all parts of the record on appeal to the State of Wyoming . . . in
the hearing on the merits of this case before the [U.S. District
A second version of state item 881 is identical in all relevant
respects except that it omits reference to the arrest warrant.
In Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23
(1963), the Court held that the same probable cause standards were
applicable to federal and state warrants under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.
(1961), the Court held the exclusionary rule was
applicable to state prosecutions.
The dissent seems to imply that "this record shows" that Sheriff
Ogburn received the description of the car contained in the radio
bulletin from someone who also informed him that he also saw the
car at the scene of the crime. Post
at 401 U. S. 570
The record wholly fails to support any such implication. Sheriff
Ogburn, who testified on four separate occasions at the trial,
R. 105-112, 187-191, 310-314, 335-337, said nothing of
the sort. Only one other witness, Leonard Russell Marion, testified
to having given Ogburn any information about the car prior to
Whiteley's arrest; Marion never testified to seeing the car near
the scene of the crime. R. 317-322, 329-330. Indeed, it is quite
apparent from reading Marion's testimony that his observations of
Whiteley on the day of the robbery took place at his own house. R.
More importantly, even the dissent apparently concedes that, as
far as the record in this case reveals, the only information
Sheriff Ogburn communicated to the magistrate issuing the warrant
was contained in his written complaint reproduced above. Under the
cases of this Court, an otherwise insufficient affidavit cannot be
rehabilitated by testimony concerning information possessed by the
affiant when he sought the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing
magistrate. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.
, 378 U. S. 109
n. 1. A contrary rule would, of course, render the warrant
requirements of the Fourth Amendment meaningless.
Since this is a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the State is
technically not a party.
"The legal principles relied upon by the state throughout this
entire litigated process have been based on the premise that a law
enforcement officer may make a warrantless arrest if he has
requisite probable cause, which can be something less than the
requisite probable cause that must be presented to a judicial
officer prior to the issuance of an arrest or search warrant."
Brief for Respondent 6.
After arresting Whiteley and Daley, the officers searched the
car and discovered in the car's interior the old coins taken in one
of the burglaries and described in the radio bulletin. In addition,
they found burglar's tools in the trunk of the car. Of course, the
discoveries of an illegal search cannot be used to validate the
probable cause judgment upon which the legality of the search
The arrest warrant issued at about noon on November 24, 1964.
App. 53. State bulletin 881 was broadcast at 3:03 p.m.
that same day. App. 31. It is apparent that Sheriff Ogburn did not
himself acquire additional corroborative data possibly supporting a
probable cause arrest after securing the warrant.
The State makes a half-hearted attempt to argue that the
introduction of the illegally seized evidence was harmless error.
The evidence, of course, was damning, to say the least.
The only other evidence implicating Whiteley was
his accomplice's testimony. It is clear that the error cannot be
said to be harmless under applicable standards. Chapman v.
California, 386 U. S. 18
(1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.
Contrary to the implications in the dissenting opinion, see
at 401 U. S. 571
no witness at trial other than the accomplice placed Whiteley "near
the scene of the crime" on the night of the robbery.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
With all respect, to my Brethren who agree to the judgment and
opinion of the Court, I am constrained to say that I believe the
decision here is a gross and wholly indefensible miscarriage of
justice. For this reason it may well be classified as one of those
calculated to make many good people believe our Court actually
enjoys frustrating justice by unnecessarily turning professional
criminals loose to prey upon society with impunity. Here is what
this record shows:
On the night of November 23, 1964, several establishments,
including a bar and hardware store, were broken into at the village
of Saratoga, Wyoming. Some old coins and other items were taken
from the hardware store. Some people saw petitioner and his
companion that night in or near Saratoga . The next morning, the
sheriff, who lived at Rawlins, the county seat, another village in
sparsely settled Carbon County, [Footnote 2/1
] investigated the burglaries. In addition
to viewing the scene of the crimes, the sheriff received a rather
detailed description of the car, including a portion of the license
plate number, said to have been used by the burglars. The sheriff
also received a tip that persuaded him that petitioner and his
companion, Jack Daley, were probably guilty of one of the
burglaries. Upon the strength of this tip, coupled
Page 401 U. S. 571
with his observation of the scene of the crimes and the
description of the vehicle, the sheriff personally appeared before
the justice of the peace in Rawlins to secure a warrant for the
arrest of petitioner and his companion. After securing the warrant,
he authorized and sent a state-wide radio police alert describing
the men and their car and calling upon officers to arrest them. The
night of November 24, policemen at Laramie, Wyoming, learned that
petitioner's companion, Daley, was in the city. They located and
stopped the car described in the alert, finding it occupied by two
men matching the descriptions contained in the message. One of the
officers personally recognized Jack Daley. In response to a request
for identification, Harold Whiteley gave police a false name. At
that point, the two men were arrested and the car was searched. Old
coins, tools, and other items later identified at trial as having
been taken from the burglarized hardware store were found in the
trunk and interior of the car.
At the trial, the seized items were introduced into evidence
over petitioner's objection. In addition, petitioner was identified
as having been near the scene of the crime on the night of November
23. [Footnote 2/2
] Jack Daley,
petitioner's companion, told the jury in vivid detail how he and
Whiteley jimmied open the back door and burglarized the hardware
store. [Footnote 2/3
took the stand
Page 401 U. S. 572
and presented an alibi defense which was discredited by several
witnesses, including Jack Daley. Petitioner was convicted and
sentenced to 10 years for burglary and concurrently to life
imprisonment under Wyoming law because of his several prior
convictions. It was charged and proved that he had been convicted
of three felonies, and the record shows that he was 43 year of age
and had already served six times in the penitentiary. The Supreme
Court of Wyoming affirmed the conviction September 15, 1966,
Whiteley v. State, 418 P.2d 164
holding that the Laramie officers had a right and duty to arrest
the men in their vehicle because they had reasonable ground to
believe the men had committed a burglary and that they had the
fruits of their crime in the car, citing among other cases
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
(1925). See also Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U. S. 42
I think it is a distortion of the Fourth Amendment's meaning to
hold that this petitioner's arrest and the seizure of the goods he
had stolen were an "unreasonable arrest" and an "unreasonable
seizure." In deciding this question, it should always be remembered
that the Fourth Amendment itself does not expressly command that
evidence obtained by its infraction should always be excluded from
There was certainly probable cause to arrest this man. The store
was burglarized. The county was a sparsely settled one in which
people knew one another. Petitioner, whose previous life would
appear to have earned for him the title of professional in the
Page 401 U. S. 573
was seen around the store with his car the very night of the
burglary. Undoubtedly this longtime county sheriff (who appears
still to be sheriff) was bound to know petitioner. The tip he
received was so persuasive to him that, in the performance of his
official duty, he was willing to assume all the risk incident to
having petitioner arrested. It surely cannot be said that, when a
sheriff, with his prestige and standing, and bond against civil
suit, communicates an emergency message to arrest men in cars as
burglars, a policeman must stand supinely by while two people
denounced as burglars go along their way. Of course, these
policemen had enough information from the sheriff to have probable
cause to arrest petitioner.
My disagreement with the majority concerning the wisdom and
constitutional necessity of a "little trial" before a magistrate or
justice of the peace prior to the issuance of a search or arrest
warrant is a matter of record. See Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U. S. 108
378 U. S. 116
(1964) (Clark, J., dissenting); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U. S. 410
393 U. S. 429
(1969) (BLACK, J., dissenting). But even accepting those decisions
they do not control the disposition of this case
which involves the apprehension of criminals in an automobile
moving away from the scene of the crime less than 24 hours after
its commission. The sheriff's belief that Whiteley and Daley were
guilty, even if it was only a "suspicion," as the majority seems to
label it, gave police officers proper grounds to stop petitioner's
car and inquire about its passengers. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1
And once the officers stopped the car and positively identified
Jack Daley, they had every reason to believe that Whiteley was
lying and attempting to escape detection when he reported a false
name. At least at that point, if not before, the Laramie police had
probable cause to arrest petitioner and Daley. With probable cause
to arrest the men, they also had
Page 401 U. S. 574
authority to search the car. Such a search could be justified
under either of two theories. Even under Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752
(1969), the search of an automobile incident to the arrest of the
occupants is permissible. And in this very case, the officers found
a fully loaded handgun in the glove compartment. The search was
also permissible under the "movable vehicle" exception to the usual
requirement for a search warrant. Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U. S. 42
(1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
(1925). I consider it a travesty of justice to
turn this man out of jail or give him a new trial six years after
he was convicted. [Footnote
Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963), does not, in my Judgment, justify what the Court is doing.
The trial court passed on this issue of validity of petitioner's
arrest some years ago. Later, he asked for relief through state
post-conviction procedures on the same ground and his claim was
rejected. He has now sought relief through federal habeas corpus.
After the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals
rejected his unlawful search claim, bringing to 10 the number of
state and federal judges who have consistently and unanimously
rejected petitioner's claim, this Court reverses his judgment of
conviction, although petitioner does not, of course, now allege his
innocence. As I said in Kaufman v. United States,
394 U. S. 217
394 U. S. 231
(BLACK, J., dissenting), the Fay v. Noia
remedy should be
limited as it
Page 401 U. S. 575
was by its own facts, and convictions should remain final unless
a petitioner seeking habeas corpus alleges that he can currently
show he was innocent. There is not even a suspicion here that this
hardened criminal is innocent, and I would let him stay in
confinement to serve his sentence.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN agrees with much that is said by MR.
JUSTICE BLACK and also dissents from the opinion and judgment of
The population of Carbon County according to the 1970 census is
about 13,000 persons.
Leonard Russell Marion testified at trial that he had seen
Whiteley at his home in Saratoga, a town of about 1,000 population,
on the day of the robbery. Mr. Marion further testified that he
observed Whiteley's car and a portion of the license plate number
and gave that information to the sheriff. See
329-330. The majority fails to recognize that Saratoga is a very
small country town, and that strangers are most unlikely to move
about unnoticed. Something obviously aroused Mr. Marion's
suspicion, or else he would not have reported the observation of
petitioner and his car to the sheriff.
Daley's testimony was not uncorroborated. He testified in detail
about the trip from Laramie to Saratoga where the crime was
committed with stops in Medicine Bow and Elk Mountain. Ernest
Hornden testified at trial that Daley and Whiteley were in the Dip
Bar in Medicine Bow on the night of November 23, 1964, shortly
before the burglary. Another witness, LeRoy Hansen, testified that
Whiteley was in Elk Mountain on the day of the burglary,
The search in this case took place on November 24, 1964.
Although I disagreed with Spinelli v. United States,
393 U. S. 410
(1969), I have always believed that constitutional decisions should
be fully retroactive in their application. See Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S. 618
381 U. S. 640
(1965) (BLACK, J., dissenting). I am thus glad to see that the
majority has apparently decided to apply constitutional decisions
retroactively even when they do not affect the "integrity of the
factfinding process," see id.
at 381 U. S. 639
and will greatly burden the administration of justice, see
Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244
394 U. S. 250