FREEMAN v. RUSTON, 4 U.S. 214 (1800)
Syllabus
U.S. Supreme Court
FREEMAN v. RUSTON, 4 U.S. 214 (1800)4 U.S. 214 (Dall.)
Freeman
v.
Ruston.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
September Term, 1800
VENDITIONI EXPONAS. A rule being obtained on the sheriff of Philadelphia county, to bring into Court, the money levied on this execution; another rule was, also, entered, to show cause why Samuel Coates should not receive out of the money, an equal dividend, or proportion, with other judgment creditors, whose judgments were entered on the same day, and who have not issued writs of ca. sa. And, thereupon, a case was stated for the opinion of the Court, comprising the following facts:
'On the 21st day of March 1796,
Samuel Coates obtained judgment in the Supreme Court against Thomas
Ruston. A writ of error was taken out by the defendant, returnable
to July 1797, and judgment affirmed in the High Court of Errors and
Appeals; and the record being remitted, a ca. sa. was sued out of
the Supreme Court, returnable to December 1797, on which (and other
writs of sa. sa. issued at the suit of other plaintiffs) the
defendant was committed to gaol; and remained in custody until the
21st day of November 1798, when he was discharged from confinement,
by virtue of the several acts of assembly, for relief of insolvent
debtors, for the benefit of all of which he petitioned.
'Prior to his said discharge, the
above venditioni exponas was issued returnable to September term
1798; and on the 12th day of July 1798, certain messuages, &c.
were sold by the sheriff, by virtue of the said execution, for
13,320 dollars.
'The purchasers at these sales were
themselves, judgment creditors of the said Thomas Ruston. The sum
of 11,451 dollars was paid on account of the purchases, before the
discharge of Dr. Ruston; and the puschasers have retained in their
hands 1869 dollars, part of the purchase monies, on account of
their own judgments; which judgments are, however, subsequent in
date to that of Mr. Coates; but no writs of ca. sa. were ever issued out thereon.
'The sheriff has paid sundry prior
judgments out of the proceeds of the sales; and there remains in
his hands, or within his power, the sum of 8866 dollars and 17
cents, including the balance of 1869 dollars, which the purchasers
have retained, on account of their judgments as aforesaid. All of
which, however, for the purposes of this agreement, are considered
as being in Court, and liable to such distribution, as the Court
shall direct.
'If the Court shall be of opinion,
that Samuel Coates is entitled to an equal dividend, or proportion,
of the said monies, with other creditors by judgment of the same
date, who have not issued writs of ca. sa., then the rule to be
made absolute, and the parties, in case of disagreement, as to the
sums and portions, agree to appoint three men to determine their
proportions.'
Rawle, on behalf of Samuel Coates, referred to the 17th and 19th sections of the act of assembly,(a) under which Ruston had
(a) Sect. 17. 'And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That no debtor, who shall obtain an order of discharge, as aforesaid, shall, at any time thereafter, be imprisoned by reason of any judgment obtained for payment of money only, or for any debt, damages, costs, sum and sums of money, contracted, accrued, occasioned, owing or growing due, before the date of the said debtor's deed or assignment, but that upon every arrest upon such judgment, or for such debt, damages, costs, sum and sums of money, it shall and may be lawful for any judge of the court, where the process issued, upon showing a copy of the order of discharge, certified by the clerk of the court where the same is recorded, under seal of office, to release and discharge the said debtor out of custody, and the said judge is directed so to do, so that the said debtor, if arrested or detained on mesne process, do give a warrant of attorney to appear to the action or actions on which he is so arrested or detained, and to plead thereunto: Provided, That the discharge of any debtor by virtue of this [1 act] shall not acquit any other person from any debt, sum or sums of money, or any part thereof, but that all other persons shall be answerable for the same, in the same manner as before the passing of this act, and all mortgages, judgments and executions, whereby the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of the said debtor shall be bound, shall remain good and effectual in law, and shall be first satisfied out of the debtor's estate, according to their priority of lien, in the same manner as if this act had never been passed.'
1 The word [act] is omitted in the original law.
Sect. 19. 'And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,
That notwithstanding the discharge of any debtor, by virtue of this
act, all and every debt or debts, due and owing from such debtor,
and all and every judgment and judgments had and taken against him,
shall stand and be good and effectual in law, to all intents and
purposes, against the lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods and
chattels of such debtor, which he, or any other person or persons
in trust for him, at the time of his assignment, hath or have,
[4 U.S. 214,
216]
Opinions
v.
Ruston. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. September Term, 1800 VENDITIONI EXPONAS. A rule being obtained on the sheriff of Philadelphia county, to bring into Court, the money levied on this execution; another rule was, also, entered, to show cause why Samuel Coates should not receive out of the money, an equal dividend, or proportion, with other judgment creditors, whose judgments were entered on the same day, and who have not issued writs of ca. sa. And, thereupon, a case was stated for the opinion of the Court, comprising the following facts:
U.S. Supreme Court
FREEMAN v. RUSTON, 4 U.S. 214 (1800) 4 U.S. 214 (Dall.) Freemanv.
Ruston. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. September Term, 1800 VENDITIONI EXPONAS. A rule being obtained on the sheriff of Philadelphia county, to bring into Court, the money levied on this execution; another rule was, also, entered, to show cause why Samuel Coates should not receive out of the money, an equal dividend, or proportion, with other judgment creditors, whose judgments were entered on the same day, and who have not issued writs of ca. sa. And, thereupon, a case was stated for the opinion of the Court, comprising the following facts:
'On the 21st day of March 1796,
Samuel Coates obtained judgment in the Supreme Court against Thomas
Ruston. A writ of error was taken out by the defendant, returnable
to July 1797, and judgment affirmed in the High Court of Errors and
Appeals; and the record being remitted, a ca. sa. was sued out of
the Supreme Court, returnable to December 1797, on which (and other
writs of sa. sa. issued at the suit of other plaintiffs) the
defendant was committed to gaol; and remained in custody until the
21st day of November 1798, when he was discharged from confinement,
by virtue of the several acts of assembly, for relief of insolvent
debtors, for the benefit of all of which he petitioned.
'Prior to his said discharge, the
above venditioni exponas was issued returnable to September term
1798; and on the 12th day of July 1798, certain messuages, &c.
were sold by the sheriff, by virtue of the said execution, for
13,320 dollars.
'The purchasers at these sales were
themselves, judgment creditors of the said Thomas Ruston. The sum
of 11,451 dollars was paid on account of the purchases, before the
discharge of Dr. Ruston; and the puschasers have retained in their
hands 1869 dollars, part of the purchase monies, on account of
their own judgments; which judgments are, however, subsequent in
Page 4 U.S.
214, 215
date to that of Mr. Coates; but no writs of ca. sa. were ever
issued out thereon.
'The sheriff has paid sundry prior
judgments out of the proceeds of the sales; and there remains in
his hands, or within his power, the sum of 8866 dollars and 17
cents, including the balance of 1869 dollars, which the purchasers
have retained, on account of their judgments as aforesaid. All of
which, however, for the purposes of this agreement, are considered
as being in Court, and liable to such distribution, as the Court
shall direct.
'If the Court shall be of opinion,
that Samuel Coates is entitled to an equal dividend, or proportion,
of the said monies, with other creditors by judgment of the same
date, who have not issued writs of ca. sa., then the rule to be
made absolute, and the parties, in case of disagreement, as to the
sums and portions, agree to appoint three men to determine their
proportions.'
Rawle, on behalf of Samuel Coates, referred to the 17th and 19th
sections of the act of assembly,(a) under which Ruston had
(a) Sect. 17. 'And be it further enacted by the authority
aforesaid, That no debtor, who shall obtain an order of discharge,
as aforesaid, shall, at any time thereafter, be imprisoned by
reason of any judgment obtained for payment of money only, or for
any debt, damages, costs, sum and sums of money, contracted,
accrued, occasioned, owing or growing due, before the date of the
said debtor's deed or assignment, but that upon every arrest upon
such judgment, or for such debt, damages, costs, sum and sums of
money, it shall and may be lawful for any judge of the court, where
the process issued, upon showing a copy of the order of discharge,
certified by the clerk of the court where the same is recorded,
under seal of office, to release and discharge the said debtor out
of custody, and the said judge is directed so to do, so that the
said debtor, if arrested or detained on mesne process, do give a
warrant of attorney to appear to the action or actions on which he
is so arrested or detained, and to plead thereunto: Provided, That
the discharge of any debtor by virtue of this [1 act] shall not
acquit any other person from any debt, sum or sums of money, or any
part thereof, but that all other persons shall be answerable for
the same, in the same manner as before the passing of this act, and
all mortgages, judgments and executions, whereby the goods and
chattels, lands and tenements of the said debtor shall be bound,
shall remain good and effectual in law, and shall be first
satisfied out of the debtor's estate, according to their priority
of lien, in the same manner as if this act had never been
passed.'
1 The word [act] is omitted in the original law.
Sect. 19. 'And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,
That notwithstanding the discharge of any debtor, by virtue of this
act, all and every debt or debts, due and owing from such debtor,
and all and every judgment and judgments had and taken against him,
shall stand and be good and effectual in law, to all intents and
purposes, against the lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods and
chattels of such debtor, which he, or any other person or persons
in trust for him, at the time of his assignment, hath or have,
Page 4 U.S.
214, 216
been discharged, as an insolvent debtor. 4 State Laws, 274; and
contended, that by the force of the terms there used, the judgment
continued a lien, upon the debtor's discharge, notwithstanding a
ca. sa. had been previously issued. Indeed, a judgment is
constituted a lien by the constitution and laws of Pennsylvania, in
the nature of a mortgage; and it must ultimately be satisfied out
of the real estate, without regard to the process, either against
person, or goods, to which a plaintiff may first resort. 1 State
Laws, 262. The law in England is different. There a ca. sa. was
considered so complete a satisfaction, that if the debtor died in
prison, the creditor had lost all remedy, till the statute of 21
Jac. 1. c. 24. was enacted to afford him relief. But there are
sufficient reasons, for the difference. In England, real estate
cannot be sold, for the payment of debts, as it may in
Pennsylvania. In England, too, the insolvent acts are gratuitous,
and occasional; temporary in duration, and restricted in objects;
but in Pennsylvania, they are constitutionally ordained; permanent,
and universal. Const. art. 9. s. 16.
W. Tilghman, for the assignees of Ruston, contended, that Coates
had lost the lien of his judgment, by issuing a ca. sa. That a ca.
sa. amounts to a legal satisfaction of the debt, is the settled law
of England; and there is no reason to depart from it here. 5 Co.
Rep. 86. Bloomfield's case. Hob. 56-62. Nor can the terms, or the
principles, of the insolvent law affect the case. The sheriff's
sale was made on the 12th of July 1798, and Ruston was not
discharged, until the 21st of November following; before which, the
greater part of the purchase money had been actually paid to the
sheriff. The state of the fact and the law, when the property was
sold, and the price received, must govern the decision, not matter
arising ex post facto. And the act of assembly, when it provides,
for the distribution of the lands of the debtor, at the time of his
discharge, can never be fairly construed, retrospectively, to
unravel, revise, and cancel sales, and payments, and distributions,
all regular at the time that they occurred. It is true, that the
17th section of the act continues in force all judgments, by which
the debtor was bound, at the time of his discharge; but if the ca.
sa. against the person, extinguished the lien upon the estate
(which is the very point to be decided) then Ruston was not bound
by Coates's judgment, at the time of his discharge; and such is the
necessary exposition of the law, when
Page 4 U.S.
214, 217
the 17th and 19th sections are considered together, as to the
fund, the existing fund at the time of discharge, which is to be
distributed among the creditors. The adverse doctrine, would give
the execution creditor two remedies, contrary to the principles of
the common law: it would open a door for collusion between the
debtor, and his ca. sa. creditor: and it would involve the relative
rights of creditors, in endless perplexity and uncertainty,
whenever an insolvency of a debtor happened, or even the prospect
of it was in view.
By the COURT:
The case appears so clear to us, that we do not wish another
moment for consideration. The law is settled in England, that a ca.
sa. operates as a satisfaction of the debt; as an extinguishment of
the lien of the judgment. We have no other rule prescribed to us in
Pennsylvania; nor can we conceive that there would be any policy,
or justice, in departing from it. Ruston was in actual custody,
upon Coates's ca. sa. when the land was sold. He had no lien, no
claim, to the proceeds of the sale, at that time; and we can
perceive nothing, in the fact, or the law, of the case, which has
since revived his old right, or given him a new one, to the land
itself, or to any part of the purchase money.
The rule must, therefore, be discharged.
Footnotes
or at any time thereafter shall or may be any ways seised or
possessed of, interested in, or entitled to, in law or equity,
except the necessary wearing apparel and bedding for himself and
his family; and if he be a mechanic of manufacturer, his tools, not
exceeding in value the sum of fifty dollars; and it shall and may
be lawful for any of his creditors, or his or their executors or
administrators, to take out a new execution against the lands,
tenements, hereditaments, goods and chattels of such debtor, except
as before excepted, for the satisfaction of their debts
respectively, in the same manner and form as they might have done,
if the said debtor had never been taken in execution, any act,
statute, law or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.'
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