Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)
U.S. Supreme CourtGrosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)
Grosso v. United States
Argued January 18, 1967
Reargued October 10-11, 1967
Decided January 29, 1968.
390 U.S. 62
Petitioner was convicted for failure to pay the excise tax on wagering and the occupational tax imposed, respectively, by 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401 and 4411 and for conspiracy to defraud the Government by evading payment of both taxes. In addition to the general statutory and regulatory requirements described in Marchetti v. United States, ante, p. 390 U. S. 39, those liable for payment of the excise tax must submit monthly to the tax authorities on a special form, to accompany payment, detailed information concerning their wagering activities which the tax authorities make available to prosecuting officers. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioner's contention that the charges relating to the excise tax violated his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Petitioner has not made a similar contention concerning his conviction on charges involving the special occupational tax.
1. The wagering excise tax provisions, which, like the provisions involved in Marchetti v. United States, supra, were directed almost exclusively to individuals inherently suspect of criminal activities, violated petitioner's privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Fifth Amendment. Ibid. Pp. 390 U. S. 64-69.
2. The "required records" doctrine of Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, cannot appropriately be applied here. Marchetti v. United States, supra. Pp. 390 U. S. 67-69.
3. Restrictions upon the use by prosecuting authorities of information obtained as a consequence of payment of the wagering excise tax would be inappropriate where this Court has held it improper to impose similar restrictions with respect to "an integral part" of the same system. Ibid. P. 390 U. S. 69.
4. Since petitioner did not waive the privilege against self-incrimination with regard to the charges involving the occupational tax and reversal by the lower courts of his conviction thereon would be inevitable in the light of this case and Marchetti, the judgment of conviction in its entirety is reversed by this Court. Pp. 390 U. S. 71-72.
358 F.2d 154, reversed.