A general contractor (Frouge) working on a housing project in
Philadelphia was subject to a collective bargaining agreement
between a local carpenters' union and a general contractors'
association in which it was agreed that union members would not
handle premachined doors. Frouge, whose contract would have
permitted "blank" doors, ordered premachined doors from a
manufacturer, a member of the National Woodwork Manufacturers
Association (NWMA). When the Union ordered its members not to hang
the premachined doors, Frouge substituted "blank" doors, which the
carpenters fitted and cut at the jobsite. The NWMA filed charges
against the Union with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
claiming that, by including the "will not handle" provision in the
collective bargaining agreement and enforcing it, the Union
violated two provisions which the Landrum-Griffin Act respectively
added to and amended in the National Labor Relations Act -- § 8(e),
which makes it an unfair labor practice to enter into an agreement
that an employer will refrain from handling the products of another
employer, and § 8(b)(4)(B), which makes it an unfair labor practice
to force a person to cease using the products of another
manufacturer. The NLRB dismissed the charges, adopting its Trial
Examiner's findings that the "will not handle" provision had as its
object the preservation for jobsite carpenters of cutting out and
fitting work which they had customarily performed, and its
enforcement against Frouge constituted "primary activity" not
prohibited by §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B). The Court of Appeals reversed
the dismissal of the § 8(e) charge, concluding that the "will not
handle" provision was designed to effect a product boycott like
that condemned
Page 386 U. S. 613
in
Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.
S. 797, and the NLRB petitioned for certiorari (No.
111). The court sustained dismissal of the § 8(b)(4)(B) charge,
agreeing with the NLRB that the Union's conduct as to Frouge was a
primary dispute, and, as such, came within the exemption proviso of
Clause (B), and the NWMA petitioned for certiorari (No. 110).
Held:
1. Section 8(b)(4)(B) was enacted not to prohibit primary
agreements and primary action directed to work preservation, but to
prohibit "secondary" objectives,
i.e., the exertion of
pressure on a neutral employer. Pp.
386 U. S.
619-633.
(a) Congress has stopped short of proscribing activity to
pressure the employer for agreements regulating relations between
him and his own employees. P.
386 U. S.
620.
(b) The predecessor of § 8(b)(4)(B) (the basic thrust of which
was not changed by the Landrum-Griffin amendments) was enacted to
eliminate the "secondary boycott" designed to injure the business
of a third person not concerned in the disagreement between an
employer and the union. Pp.
386
U.S. 623-626.
(c) Judicial decisions interpreting the predecessor of §
8(b)(4)(B) uniformly limited its application to "secondary"
situations, and this Court has consistently refused to read the
provision as banning traditional primary labor activity having an
impact on neutral employers, even though such activity fell within
the literal terms of the provision. Pp.
386 U. S.
626-627.
(d)
Allen Bradley Co., supra, distinguished. Pp.
386 U. S.
628-631.
(e) In rewriting the predecessor provision as § 8(b)(4)(B),
Congress confirmed the limited application of the section to
"secondary" conduct, adding the proviso that nothing therein "shall
be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing." Pp.
386 U. S.
632-633.
2. Section 8(e) likewise does not reach employees' primary
activity, and does not prohibit agreements made to pressure their
employer to preserve for themselves work traditionally done by
them. Pp.
386 U. S.
633-642.
(a) The addition of § 8(e) to the Act was designed to plug a
loophole resulting from
Carpenters' Union v. Labor Board (Sand
Door), 357 U. S. 93, in
which it was stressed that the mere execution of or an employer's
voluntary observance of a "hot cargo" clause did not violate the
predecessor of § 8(b)(4)(B). Pp.
386 U. S.
634-635.
Page 386 U. S. 614
(b) The legislative history of § 8(e) and provisos preserving
the
status quo in the construction industry and exempting
the garment industry from the prohibitions of §§ 8(e) and
8(b)(4)(B) indicate that primary work preservation agreements were
not to be within the ban of § 8(e). Pp.
386 U. S.
635-642.
3. Substantial evidence supported the Trial Examiner's finding,
adopted by the NLRB, that the "will not handle" provision was
designed to preserve work traditionally performed by jobsite
carpenters, and that the Union's making of the "will not handle"
agreement and its maintenance thereof did not, respectively,
violate §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B). Pp.
386 U. S.
645-646.
354 F.2d 594, affirmed in No. 110 and reversed in No. 111.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Landrum-Griffin Act amendments enacted in 1959, 73
Stat. 542, § 8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61
Stat. 141, became § 8(b)(4)(B), and § 8(e) was added. The questions
here are whether, in the circumstances of these cases, the
Metropolitan District Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity of the
United
Page 386 U. S. 615
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO
(hereafter the Union), committed the unfair labor practices
prohibited by § 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B). [
Footnote 1]
Frouge Corporation, a Bridgeport, Connecticut, concern, was the
general contractor on a housing project in Philadelphia. Frouge had
a collective bargaining agreement with the Carpenters'
International Union under which Frouge agreed to be bound by the
rules and regulations agreed upon by local unions with contractors
in areas in which Frouge had jobs. Frouge was therefore subject to
the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between the
Union and an organization of Philadelphia contractors, the General
Building Contractors Association, Inc. A sentence in a provision of
that agreement entitled Rule 17 provides that ". . . No member of
this District Council will handle . . . any doors . . . which have
been fitted prior to being furnished on the job. . . ." [
Footnote 2] Frouge's Philadelphia
project called for 3,600 doors. Customarily, before the doors could
be hung on such projects, "blank" or "blind" doors would be
mortised for the knob, routed for the hinges, and beveled to make
them fit between jambs. These are tasks traditionally
Page 386 U. S. 616
performed in the Philadelphia area by the carpenters employed on
the jobsite. However, pre-cut and pre-fitted doors ready to hang
may be purchased from door manufacturers. Although Frouge's
contract and job specifications did not call for premachined doors,
and "blank" or "blind" doors could have been ordered, Frouge
contracted for the purchase of premachined doors from a
Pennsylvania door manufacturer which is a member of the National
Woodwork Manufacturers Association, petitioner in No. 110 and
respondent in No. 111. The Union ordered its carpenter members not
to hang the doors when they arrived at the jobsite. Frouge
thereupon withdrew the prefabricated doors and substituted "blank"
doors which were fitted and cut by its carpenters on the
jobsite.
The National Woodwork Manufacturers Association and another
filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board against the
Union alleging that, by including the "will not handle" sentence of
Rule 17 in the collective bargaining agreement, the Union committed
the unfair labor practice under § 8(e) of entering into an
"agreement . . . whereby [the] employer . . . agrees to cease or
refrain from handling . . . any of the products of any other
employer . . . ," and alleging further that, in enforcing the
sentence against Frouge, the Union committed the unfair labor
practice under § 8(b)(4)(B) of "forcing or requiring any person to
cease using . . . the products of any other . . . manufacturer. . .
." The National Labor Relations Board dismissed the charges, 149
N.L.R.B. 646. [
Footnote 3] The
Board adopted the findings
Page 386 U. S. 617
of the Trial Examiner that the "will not handle" sentence in
Rule 17 was language used by the parties to protect and preserve
cutting out and fitting as unit work to be performed by the jobsite
carpenters. The Board also adopted the holding of the Trial
Examiner that both the sentence of Rule 17 itself and its
maintenance against Frouge were therefore "primary" activity
outside the prohibitions of §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B). The following
statement of the Trial Examiner was adopted by the Board:
"I am convinced and find that the tasks of cutting out and
fitting millwork, including doors, has, at least customarily, been
performed by the carpenters employed on the jobsite. Certainly,
this provision of rule 17 is not concerned with the nature of the
employer with whom the contractor does business, nor with the
employment conditions of other employers or employees, nor does it
attempt to control such other employers or employees. The provision
guards against encroachments on the cutting out and fitting work of
the contract unit employees
Page 386 U. S. 618
who have performed that work in the past. Its purpose is plainly
to regulate the relations between the general contractor and his
own employees and to protect a legitimate economic interest of the
employees by preserving their unit work. Merely because it
incidentally also affects other parties is no basis for
invalidating this provision."
"I find that . . . [the provision] is a lawful work protection
or work preservation provision, and that Respondents have not
violated Section 8(e) of the Act by entering into agreements
containing this provision and by thereafter maintaining and
enforcing this provision."
149 N.L.R.B. at 657.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the Board
in this respect. 354 F.2d 594, 599. The court held that the "will
not handle" agreement violated § 8(e) without regard to any
"primary" or "secondary" objective, and remanded to the Board with
instructions to enter an order accordingly. In the court's view,
the sentence was designed to effect a product boycott like the one
condemned in
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
325 U. S. 797, and
Congress meant, in enacting § 8(e) and § 8(b)(4)(B), to prohibit
such agreements and conduct forcing employers to enter into
them.
The Court of Appeals sustained, however, the dismissal of the §
8(b)(4)(B) charge. The court agreed with the Board that the Union's
conduct as to Frouge involved only a primary dispute with it, and
held that the conduct was therefore not prohibited by that section,
but expressly protected by the proviso
"[t]hat nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed
to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike
or primary picketing. . . ."
354 F.2d at 597.
Page 386 U. S. 619
We granted certiorari on the petition of the Woodwork
Manufacturers Association in No. 110 and on the petition of the
Board in No. 111. 384 U.S. 968. We affirm in No. 110 and reverse in
No. 111.
I
Even on the doubtful premise that the words of § 8(e)
unambiguously embrace the sentence of Rule 17, [
Footnote 4] this does not end inquiry into
Congress' purpose in enacting the section. It is a
"familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit nor within the intention of its makers."
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.
S. 457,
143 U. S. 459.
That principle has particular application in the construction of
labor legislation, which is,
"to a marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise
between strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role
of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the
appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of
management and labor to further their respective interests."
Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board
(Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93,
357 U. S.
99-100.
See, e.g., Labor Board v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers, 377 U. S. 58;
Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S.
46;
Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union,
362 U. S. 274;
Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
Labor
Page 386 U. S. 620
Board, 350 U. S. 270;
Labor Board v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.
S. 282;
Labor Board v. International Rice Milling
Co., 341 U. S. 665;
Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U.
S. 667.
Strongly held opposing views have invariably marked controversy
over labor's use of the boycott to further its aims by involving an
employer in disputes not his own. But congressional action to deal
with such conduct has stopped short of proscribing identical
activity having the object of pressuring the employer for
agreements regulating relations between him and his own employees.
That Congress meant §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B) to prohibit only
"secondary" objectives clearly appears from an examination of the
history of congressional action on the subject; we may, by such an
examination, "reconstitute the gamut of values current at the time
when the words were uttered." [
Footnote 5]
The history begins with judicial application of the Sherman Act
(26 Stat. 209) to labor activities. Federal court injunctions
freely issued against all manner of strikes and boycotts under
rulings that condemned virtually every collective activity of labor
as an unlawful restraint of trade. [
Footnote 6] The first congressional response to
Page 386 U. S. 621
vehement labor protests came with § 20 of the Clayton Act in
1914. That section purported drastically to limit the injunction
power of federal courts in controversies "involving, or growing out
of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment." In
terms, it prohibited restraining any person from "ceasing to
perform any work or labor" or
"from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such
dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by
peaceful and lawful means so to do."
38 Stat. 738. Labor hailed the law as a charter immunizing its
activities from the antitrust laws. This expectation was
disappointed when
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U. S. 443, and
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn.,
274 U. S. 37, held
that § 20 immunized only trade union activities directed against an
employer by his own employees. In
Duplex, the union
carried on an elaborate scheme to coerce and restrain neutral
customers of the complainant manufacturer from dealing with it,
with the object of using these customers as an economic lever to
bring the nonunion manufacturer to terms. The Court there
stated:
"The substance of the matters here complained of is an
interference with complainant's interstate trade, intended to have
coercive effect upon complainant, and produced by what is commonly
known as a 'secondary boycott,' that is, a combination not merely
to refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise or by
peaceful means persuade complainant's customers to refrain
('primary boycott'), but to exercise coercive pressure upon such
customers, actual or prospective, in order to cause them
Page 386 U. S. 622
to withhold or withdraw patronage from complainant through fear
of loss or damage to themselves should they deal with it."
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, supra, at
254 U. S.
466.
Thus, "primary," but not "secondary," pressures were excepted
from the antitrust laws.
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.
S. 312,
257 U. S. 330,
defined "secondary boycott" as one
"where many combine to injure one in his business by coercing
third persons against their will to cease patronizing him by
threats of similar injury. . . . The question in such cases is
whether the moral coercion exercised over a stranger to the
original controversy by steps in themselves legal becomes a legal
wrong."
See 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining
§ 145 (1940). [
Footnote 7]
Commentators of the day, while noting the ambiguity which lurked in
the definition, discerned its core concept: union pressure directed
at a neutral employer the object of which was to induce or coerce
him to cease doing business with an employer with whom the union
was engaged in a labor dispute. [
Footnote 8]
In 1932, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act and tipped
the scales the other way. Its provisions
"established that the allowable area of union activity was not
to be restricted, as it had been in the
Duplex case, to an
immediate employer-employee relation."
United
Page 386 U. S. 623
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219,
312 U. S. 231.
[
Footnote 9] Congress
abolished, for purposes of labor immunity, the distinction between
primary activity between the "immediate disputants" and secondary
activity in which the employer disputants and the members of the
union do not stand "in the proximate relation of employer and
employee. . . ." H.R.Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1932).
Thus, in
Hutcheson, supra, the Court held that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act immunized a jurisdictional strike trapping a
neutral employer in the middle of an "internecine struggle between
two unions seeking the favor of the same employer,"
supra
at
312 U. S. 232.
Commentators of the post-Norris-LaGuardia era, as those before,
while continuing to deplore the chameleon-like qualities of the
term "secondary boycott," agreed upon its central aspect: pressure
tactically directed toward a neutral employer in a labor dispute
not his own. [
Footnote
10]
Labor abuses of the broad immunity granted by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act resulted in the Taft-Hartley Act prohibitions
against secondary activities enacted in § 8(b)(4)(A), which, as
amended in 1959, is now 8(b)(4)(B). As will appear, the basic
thrust of the
Page 386 U. S. 624
accommodation there effected by Congress was not expanded by the
Landrum-Griffin amendments. The congressional design in enacting §
8(b)(4)(A) is therefore crucial to the determination of the scope
of §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B). Senator Taft said of its purpose:
"This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a
secondary
boycott to injure the business of a third person who is wholly
unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his
employees. . . . [U]nder the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became impossible to stop a secondary
boycott or any other kind of a strike, no matter how unlawful it
may have been at common law.
All this provision of the bill
does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary
boycotts. [
Footnote
11]"
(Emphasis supplied.) Senator Taft and others frequently sounded
this note that § 8(b)(4)(A) was designed to eliminate the
"secondary boycott," [
Footnote
12] and its proponents uniformly cited examples of union
conduct which evidenced labor efforts to draw in neutral employers
through pressure calculated to induce them to cease doing business
with the primary employer. [
Footnote 13] And the Senate Committee Report
carefully
Page 386 U. S. 625
characterized the conduct prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(A) in the same
terms:
"Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in a strike
against employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to
cease doing business with employer B; nor would it be lawful for a
union to boycott employer A because employer A uses or otherwise
deals in the goods of or does business with employer B (with whom
the union has a dispute)."
S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22, I 1947 Leg.Hist. 428.
[
Footnote 14]
The other subsections of § 8(b)(4) of the Act were similarly
limited to protecting employers in the position of neutrals between
contending parties. The prohibition of subsection (B) against a
noncertified union's forcing recognition from an employer was
designed to protect the employer trapped between the union and his
employees, a majority of whom may not desire to choose the union as
their representative. The prohibition of subsection (C) against a
demand for recognition when another union has been certified
protects the employer trapped between the noncertified and the
certified unions. The prohibition of subsection (D) against
coercion to force an employer to assign certain work to one of two
unions contesting for it protects the employer trapped between the
two claims. The central theme pervading these provisions of
protection for the neutral employer confirms the assurances of
those sponsoring the section that, in subsection (A), Congress
likewise meant to protect the
Page 386 U. S. 626
employer only from union pressures designed to involve him in
disputes not his own. [
Footnote
15]
Judicial decisions interpreting the broad language of §
8(b)(4)(A) of the Act uniformly limited its application to such
"secondary" situations. [
Footnote 16] This limitation was in
"conformity with the dual congressional objectives of preserving
the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on
offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding
unoffending employers and
Page 386 U. S. 627
others from pressures in controversies not their own."
Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council,
341 U. S. 675,
341 U. S. 692.
This Court accordingly refused to read § 8(b)(4)(A) to ban
traditional primary strikes and picketing having an impact on
neutral employers, even though the activity fell within its
sweeping terms.
Labor Board v. International Rice Milling
Co., 341 U. S. 665;
see Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board,
366 U. S. 667.
Thus, however severe the impact of primary activity on neutral
employers, it was not thereby transformed into activity with a
secondary objective.
The literal terms of § 8(b)(4)(A) also were not applied in the
so-called "ally doctrine" cases, in which the union's pressure was
aimed toward employers performing the work of the primary
employer's striking employees. The rationale, again, was the
inapplicability of the provision's central theme, the protection of
neutrals against secondary pressure, where the secondary employer
against whom the union's pressure is directed has entangled himself
in the vortex of the primary dispute.
"[T]he union was not extending its activity to a front remote
from the immediate dispute, but to one intimately and indeed
inextricably united to it."
Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of
Architects, 75 F. Supp.
672, 677 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1948);
see Labor Board v. Business
Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics, 228 F.2d 553 (C.A.2d
Cir.1955). We summarized our reading of § 8(b)(4)(A) just a year
before enactment of § 8(e):
"It aimed to restrict the area of industrial conflict insofar as
this could be achieved by prohibiting the most obvious, widespread,
and, as Congress evidently judged, dangerous practice of unions to
widen that conflict: the coercion of neutral employers, themselves
not concerned with a primary labor dispute, through the inducement
of their employees to engage
Page 386 U. S. 628
in strikes or concerted refusals to handle goods."
Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board
(Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93,
357 U. S.
100.
Despite this virtually overwhelming support for the limited
reading of § 8(b)(4)(A), the Woodwork Manufacturers Association
relies on
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
325 U. S. 797, as
requiring that the successor section, § 8(b)(4)(B), be read as
proscribing the District Council's conduct in enforcing the "will
not handle" sentence of Rule 17 against Frouge. The Association
points to the references to
Allen Bradley in the
legislative debates leading to the enactment of the predecessor §
8(b)(4)(A). We think that this is an erroneous reading of the
legislative history.
Allen Bradley held violative of the
antitrust laws a combination between Local 3 of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and both electrical contractors
and manufacturers of electrical fixtures in New York City to
restrain the bringing in of such equipment from outside the city.
The contractors obligated themselves to confine their purchases to
local manufacturers, who, in turn, obligated themselves to confine
their New York City sales to contractors employing members of the
local, and this scheme was supported by threat of boycott by the
contractors' employees. While recognizing that the union might have
had an immunity for its contribution to the trade boycott had it
acted alone, citing
Hutcheson, supra, the Court held
immunity was not intended by the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts
in cases in which the union's activity was part of a larger
conspiracy to abet contractors and manufacturers to create a
monopoly.
The argument that the references to
Allen Bradley in
the debates over § 8(b)(4)(A) have broader significance in the
determination of the reach of that section is that there was no
intent on Local 3's part to influence the internal labor policies
of the boycotted out-of-state
Page 386 U. S. 629
manufacturers of electrical equipment. There are three answers
to this argument: first, the boycott of out-of-state electrical
equipment by the electrical contractors' employees was not in
pursuance of any objective relating to pressuring their employers
in the matter of their wages, hours, and working conditions; there
was no work preservation or other primary objective related to the
union employees' relations with their contractor employers. On the
contrary, the object of the boycott was to secure benefits for the
New York City electrical manufacturers and their employees.
"This is a secondary object because the cessation of business
was being used tactically, with an eye to its effect on conditions
elsewhere. [
Footnote
17]"
Second, and of even greater significance on the question of the
inferences to be drawn from the references to
Allen
Bradley, Senator Taft regarded the Local 3 boycott as in
effect saying,
"We will not permit any material made by any other union or by
any nonunion workers to come into New York City and be put into any
building in New York City."
93 Cong.Rec. 4199, II 1947 Leg.Hist. 1107. This clearly shows
that the Senator viewed the pressures applied by Local 3 on the
employers of its members as having solely a secondary objective.
The Senate Committee Report echoes the same view:
"[It is] an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in the
type of secondary boycott that has
Page 386 U. S. 630
been conducted in New York City by local No. 3 of the IBEW,
whereby electricians have refused to install electrical products of
manufacturers employing electricians who are members of
some
labor organization other than local No. 3."
S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22, I 1947 Leg.Hist. 428.
(Emphasis supplied.) Other statements on the floor of Congress
repeat the same refrain. [
Footnote 18] Third, even on the premise that Congress
meant to prohibit boycotts such as that, in
Allen Bradley
without regard to whether they were carried on to affect labor
conditions elsewhere, the fact is that the boycott in
Allen
Bradley was carried on not as a shield to preserve the jobs of
Local 3 members, traditionally a primary labor activity, but as a
sword, to reach out and monopolize all the manufacturing job tasks
for Local 3 members. It is arguable that Congress may have viewed
the use of the boycott as a sword as different from labor's
traditional concerns with wages, hours, and working conditions. But
the boycott in the present cases was not used as a sword; it was a
shield carried solely to preserve the members' jobs. We therefore
have no occasion today to decide the questions which might arise
where the workers carry on a boycott to reach out to monopolize
jobs or acquire
Page 386 U. S. 631
new job tasks when their own jobs are not threatened by the
boycotted product. [
Footnote
19]
It is true that the House bill proposed to amend the Clayton Act
to narrow labor's immunity from the antitrust laws. H.R. 3020, §
301(b), I 1947 Leg.Hist. 220. This was omitted from the Conference
agreement. It is suggested that this history evidences that
Congress meant § 8(b)(4)(A) to reach all product boycotts with work
preservation motives. The argument is premised on a statement by
the House Managers in the House Conference Report that,
"[s]ince the matters dealt with in this section have, to a large
measure, been effectuated through the use of boycotts, and since
the conference agreement contains effective provisions directly
dealing with boycotts themselves, this provision is omitted from
the conference agreement."
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 65, I 1947
Leg.Hist. 569. The statement is hardly probative that § 8(b)(4)(A)
enacted a broad prohibition in face of the overwhelming evidence
that its Senate sponsors intended the narrower reach. Actually, the
statement, at best, reflects that the House may have receded from a
broader position and accepted that of the Senate. For § 8(b)(4)(A)
constituted the "effective provisions" referred to and the House
Managers' understanding of and agreement with the reach of the
section as intended by its Senate sponsors is expressed at page 43
of the same Report, I 1947 Leg.Hist. 547:
"Under clause (A), strikes or boycotts, or attempts to induce or
encourage such action, were made unfair labor practices if the
purpose was to force an employer or other person to cease using,
selling,
Page 386 U. S. 632
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
another, or to cease doing business with any other person. Thus, it
was made an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in a strike
against employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to
cease doing business with employer B. Similarly, it would not be
lawful for a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses or
otherwise deals in the goods of, or does business with, employer
B."
In effect, Congress, in enacting § 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act,
returned to the regime of
Duplex Printing Press Co. and
Bedford Cut Stone Co., supra, and barred as a secondary
boycott union activity directed against a neutral employer,
including the immediate employer, when, in fact, the activity
directed against him was carried on for its effect elsewhere.
Indeed, Congress, in rewriting § 8(b)(4)(A) as § 8(b)(4)(B),
took pains to confirm the limited application of the section to
such "secondary" conduct. The word "concerted" in former § 8(b)(4)
was deleted to reach secondary conduct directed to only one
individual. This was in response to the Court's holding in
Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co.,
341 U. S. 665,
that "concerted" required proof of inducement of two or more
employees. But to make clear that the deletion was not to be read
as supporting a construction of the statute as prohibiting the
incidental effects of traditional primary activity, Congress added
the proviso that nothing in the amended section "shall be construed
to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike
or primary picketing." [
Footnote
20] Many statements
Page 386 U. S. 633
and examples proffered in the 1959 debates confirm this
congressional acceptance of the distinction between primary and
secondary activity. [
Footnote
21]
II
The Landrum-Griffin Act amendments in 1959 were adopted only to
close various loopholes in the application of § 8(b)(4)(A) which
had been exposed in Board and court decisions. We discussed some of
these loopholes, and the particular amendments adopted to close
them, in
Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S.
46,
377 U. S. 51-54.
We need not repeat that discussion here, except to emphasize, as we
there said, that
"these changes did not expand the type of conduct which §
8(b)(4)(A) condemned,
Page 386 U. S. 634
that is, union pressures calculated to induce the employees of a
secondary employer to withhold their services in order to force
their employer to cease dealing with the primary employer."
Id. at
377 U. S.
52-53.
Section 8(e) simply closed still another loophole. [
Footnote 22] In
Local 1976,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door),
357 U. S. 93, the
Court held that it was no defense to an unfair labor practice
charge under § 8(b)(4) (A) that the struck employer had agreed, in
a contract with the union, not to handle nonunion material.
However, the Court emphasized that the mere execution of such a
contract provision (known as a "hot cargo" clause because of its
prevalence in Teamsters Union contracts), or its voluntary
observance by the employer, was not unlawful under § 8(b)(4)(A).
Section 8(e) was designed to plug this gap in the legislation by
making the "hot cargo" clause itself unlawful. The
Sand
Door decision was believed by Congress not only to create the
possibility of damage actions against employers for breaches of
"hot cargo" clauses, but also to create a situation in which such
clauses might be employed to exert subtle pressures upon employers
to engage in "voluntary" boycotts. [
Footnote 23] Hearings in late 1958 before the Senate
Select Committee explored seven cases of "hot cargo" clauses in
Teamsters Union contracts, the use of which the Committee found
conscripted neutral employers in Teamsters organizational
campaigns. [
Footnote 24]
Page 386 U. S. 635
This loophole-closing measure likewise did not expand the type
of conduct which § 8(b)(4)(A) condemned. Although the language of §
8(e) is sweeping, it closely tracks that of § 8(b)(4)(A), and, just
as the latter and its successor § 8(b)(4)(B) did not reach
employees' activity to pressure their employer to preserve for
themselves work traditionally done by them, § 8(e) does not
prohibit agreements made and maintained for that purpose.
The legislative history of § 8(e) confirms this conclusion. The
Kennedy-Ervin bill, as originally reported, proposed no remedy for
abuses of the "hot cargo" clauses revealed at the hearings of the
Select Committee. Senators Goldwater and Dirksen filed a minority
report urging that a prohibition against "hot cargo" clauses should
be enacted to close that loophole. Their statement expressly
acknowledged their acceptance of the reading of § 8(b)(4)(A) as
applicable only
"to protect genuinely neutral employers and their employees, not
themselves involved in a labor dispute, against economic coercion
designed to give a labor union victory in a dispute with some other
employer. [
Footnote 25]"
They argued that a prohibition
Page 386 U. S. 636
against "hot cargo" clauses was necessary to further that
objective. They were joined by Senator McClellan, Chairman of the
Select Committee, in their proposal to add such a provision. Their
statements in support consistently defined the evil to be prevented
in terms of agreements which obligated neutral employers not to do
business with other employers involved in labor disputes with the
union. [
Footnote 26] Senator
Gore initially proposed, and the Senate first passed, a "hot cargo"
amendment to the Kennedy-Ervin bill which outlawed such agreements
only for "common carriers subject to Part II of the Interstate
Commerce Act." This reflected the testimony at the Select Committee
hearings which attributed abuses of such clauses primarily to the
Teamsters Union. Significantly, such alleged abuses by the
Teamsters invariably involved uses of the clause to pressure
neutral trucking employers not to handle goods of other employers
involved in disputes with the Teamsters Union. [
Footnote 27]
Page 386 U. S. 637
The House Labor Committee first reported out a bill containing a
provision substantially identical to the Gore amendment. [
Footnote 28] The House Report
expressly noted that, since that proposal tracked the language of §
(B)(4)(A), "it preserved the established distinction between
primary activities and secondary boycotts." [
Footnote 29] The substitute Landrum-Griffin
bill, however, expanded the proposal to cover all industry, and not
common carriers alone. H.R. 8400, 70(b)(1) in I 1959 Leg.Hist. 683.
Representative Landrum stated, "I submit if such contracts are bad
in one segment of our economy, they are undesirable in all
segments." 105 Cong.Rec. 14343, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1518. In
describing the substitute bill, Representative Landrum pointedly
spoke of the situation
"where the union, in a dispute with one employer, puts pressure
upon another employer or his employees, in order to force the
second employer or his employees, to stop doing business with the
first employer, and 'bend his knee to the union's will.'"
Ibid. An analysis of the substitute bill submitted by
Representative Griffin referred to the need to plug the various
loopholes in the "secondary boycott" provisions, one of which is
the "hot cargo" agreement. [
Footnote 30] In Conference Committee, the Landrum-Griffin
application to all industry, and not just to common carriers, was
adopted.
However, provisos were added to § 8(e) to preserve the
status quo in the construction industry and exempt the
garment industry from the prohibitions of § 8(e)
Page 386 U. S. 638
and 8(b)(4)(B). This action of the Congress is strong
confirmation that Congress meant that both § 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B)
reach only secondary pressures. If the body of § 8(e) applies only
to secondary activity, the garment industry proviso is a
justifiable exception which allows what the legislative history
shows it was designed to allow, secondary pressures to counteract
the effects of sweatshop conditions in an industry with a highly
integrated process of production between jobbers, manufacturers,
contractors and subcontractors. [
Footnote 31] First, this motivation for the proviso sheds
light on the central theme of the body of § 8(e), to which the
proviso is an exception. Second, if the body of that provision and
§ 8(b)(4)(B) were construed to prohibit primary agreements and
their maintenance, such as those concerning work preservation, the
proviso would have the highly unlikely effect, unjustified in any
of the statute's history, of permitting garment workers, but
garment workers only, to preserve their jobs against subcontracting
or prefabrication by such agreements and by strikes and boycotts to
enforce them. Similarly, the construction industry proviso, which
permits "hot cargo" agreements only for jobsite work, would have
the curious and unsupported result of allowing the construction
worker to make agreements preserving his traditional tasks against
jobsite prefabrication and subcontracting, but not against
non-jobsite prefabrication and subcontracting. On the other hand,
if the heart of § 8(e) is construed to be directed only to
secondary activities, the construction proviso becomes, as it was
intended to be, a measure designed to allow agreements pertaining
to certain secondary activities on the construction site
because
Page 386 U. S. 639
of the close community of interests there, [
Footnote 32] but to ban secondary objective
agreements concerning non-jobsite work, in which respect the
construction industry is no different from any other. The provisos
are therefore substantial probative support that primary work
preservation agreements were not to be within the ban of § 8(e).
[
Footnote 33]
The only mention of a broader reach for § 8(e) appears in
isolated statements by opponents of that provision, expressing
fears that work preservation agreements would be banned. [
Footnote 34] These statements have
scant probative value against the backdrop of the strong evidence
to the contrary. Too,
"we have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a
statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents.
In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to
Page 386 U. S. 640
overstate its reach."
Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers,
377 U. S. 58,
377 U. S. 66.
"It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the
statutory words is in doubt."
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384,
341 U. S.
394-395.
See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor
Board, 350 U. S. 270,
350 U. S.
288.
In addition to all else, "[t]he silence of the sponsors of [the]
amendments is pregnant with significance. . . ."
Labor Board v.
Fruit & Vegetable Packers, supra, at
377 U. S. 66.
Before we may say that Congress meant to strike from workers' hands
the economic weapons traditionally used against their employers'
efforts to abolish their jobs, that meaning should plainly
appear.
"[I]n this era of automation and onrushing technological change,
no problems in the domestic economy are of greater concern than
those involving job security and employment stability. Because of
the potentially cruel impact upon the lives and fortunes of the
working men and women of the Nation, these problems have
understandably engaged the solicitous attention of government, of
responsible private business, and particularly of organized
labor."
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. Labor Board,
379 U. S. 203,
379 U. S. 225
(concurring opinion of STEWART, J.). We would expect that
legislation curtailing the ability of management and labor
voluntarily to negotiate for solutions to these significant and
difficult problems would be preceded by extensive congressional
study and debate, and consideration of voluminous economic,
scientific, and statistical data. The silence regarding such
matters in the Eighty-sixth Congress is itself evidence that
Congress, in enacting § 8(e), had no thought of prohibiting
agreements directed to work preservation. [
Footnote 35] In fact, since the
Page 386 U. S. 641
enactment of § 8(e), the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the
Subcommittee on Unemployment and the Impact of Automation and the
Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education
and Labor have been extensively studying the threats to workers
posed by increased technology and automation, [
Footnote 36] and some legislation directed to
the problem
Page 386 U. S. 642
has been passed. [
Footnote
37] We cannot lightly impute to Congress an intent in § 8(e) to
preclude labor-management agreements to ease these effects through
collective bargaining on this most vital problem created by
advanced technology.
Moreover, our decision in
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
supra, implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of work
preservation clauses like that involved here. Indeed, in the
circumstances presented in
Fibreboard, we held that
bargaining on the subject was made mandatory by § 8(a)(5) of the
Act, concerning as it does "terms and conditions of employment," §
8(d).
Fibreboard involved an alleged refusal to bargain
with respect to the contracting-out of plant maintenance work
previously performed by employees in the bargaining unit. The Court
recognized that the
"termination of employment which . . . necessarily results from
the contracting out of work performed by members of the established
bargaining unit,"
supra at
379 U. S. 210,
is "a problem of vital concern to labor and management . . . ,"
supra at
379 U. S. 211.
We further noted,
supra at
379 U. S.
211-212:
"Industrial experience is not only reflective of the interests
of labor and management in the subject matter, but is also
indicative of the amenability of such subjects to the collective
bargaining process.
Page 386 U. S. 643
Experience illustrates that contracting out in one form or
another has been brought, widely and successfully, within the
collective bargaining framework. Provisions relating to contracting
out exist in numerous collective bargaining agreements, and
'[c]ontracting out work is the basis of many grievances, and that
type of claim is grist in the mills of the arbitrators.'
United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S.
574,
363 U. S. 584."
See Local 2, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.
S. 283,
358 U. S. 294.
It would therefore be incongruous to interpret 8(e) to invalidate
clauses over which the parties may be mandated to bargain and which
have been successfully incorporated through collective bargaining
in many of this Nation's major labor agreements.
Finally, important parts of the historic accommodation by
Congress of the powers of labor and management are §§ 7 and 13 of
the National Labor Relations Act, passed as part of the Wagner Act
in 1935 and amended in 1947. The former section assures to
labor
"the right . . . to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection. . . ."
Section 13 preserves the right to strike, of which the boycott
is a form, except as specifically provided in the Act. In the
absence of clear indicia of congressional intent to the contrary,
these provisions caution against reading statutory prohibitions as
embracing employee activities to pressure their own employers into
improving the employees' wages, hours, and working conditions.
See Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.
S. 274;
Labor Board v. International Rice Milling
Co., 341 U. S. 665,
341 U. S.
672-673;
Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Trades
Council, 341 U. S. 675,
341 U. S. 687;
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, at
350 U. S. 284,
350 U. S.
287.
Page 386 U. S. 644
The Woodwork Manufacturers Association and
amici who
support its position advance several reasons, grounded in economic
and technological factors, why "will not handle" clauses should be
invalid in all circumstances. Those arguments are addressed to the
wrong branch of government. It may be
"that the time has come for a reevaluation of the basic content
of collective bargaining as contemplated by the federal
legislation. But that is for Congress. Congress has demonstrated
its capacity to adjust the Nation's labor legislation to what, in
its legislative judgment, constitutes the statutory pattern
appropriate to the developing state of labor relations in the
country. Major revisions of the basic statute were enacted in 1947
and 1959. To be sure, then, Congress might be of opinion that
greater stress should be put on . . . eliminating more and more
economic weapons from the . . . [Union's] grasp. . . . But
Congress' policy has not yet moved to this point. . . ."
Labor Board v. Insurance Agents' International Union,
361 U. S. 477,
361 U. S.
500.
III
The determination whether the "will not handle" sentence of Rule
17 and its enforcement violated § 8(e) and § 8(b)(4)(B) cannot be
made without an inquiry into whether, under all the surrounding
circumstances, [
Footnote 38]
the Union's objective was preservation of work for Frouge's
employees, or whether the agreements and boycott were tactically
calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. Were the latter
the case, Frouge, the boycotting employer, would be a neutral
bystander, and the
Page 386 U. S. 645
agreement or boycott would, within the intent of Congress,
become secondary. There need not be an actual dispute with the
boycotted employer, here, the door manufacturer, for the activity
to fall within this category, so long as the tactical object of the
agreement and its maintenance is that employer, or benefits to
other than the boycotting employees or other employees of the
primary employer, thus making the agreement or boycott secondary in
its aim. [
Footnote 39] The
touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed
to the labor relations of the contracting employer
vis-a-vis his own employees. [
Footnote 40] This will not always be a simple test to
apply. [
Footnote 41] But
"[h]owever difficult the drawing of lines more nice than obvious,
the statute compels the task."
Local 761, Electrical Workers v.
Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667,
366 U. S.
674.
That the "will not handle" provision was not an unfair labor
practice in these cases is clear. The finding of the
Page 386 U. S. 646
Trial Examiner, adopted by the Board, was that the objective of
the sentence was preservation of work traditionally performed by
the jobsite carpenters. This finding is supported by substantial
evidence, and therefore the Union's making of the "will not handle"
agreement was not a violation of § 8(e).
Similarly, the Union's maintenance of the provision was not a
violation of § 8(b)(4)(B). The Union refused to hang prefabricated
doors whether or not they bore a union label, and even refused to
install prefabricated doors manufactured off the jobsite by members
of the Union. This and other substantial evidence supported the
finding that the conduct of the Union on the Frouge jobsite related
solely to preservation of the traditional tasks of the jobsite
carpenters.
The judgment is affirmed in No. 110, and reversed in No.
111.
It is so ordered.
|
386
U.S. 612app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
The relevant provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended (61 Stat. 141, 73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 158), are as
follows:
8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents --
* * * *
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the
course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport,
or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or
Page 386 U. S. 647
in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is --
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person .
. . to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by section
8(e);
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing
business with any other person. . . .
Provided, That
nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or
primary picketing;
* * * *
(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor
organization and any employer to enter into any contract or
agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or
refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using,
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products
of any other employer or to cease doing business with any other
person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or
hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforceable and void:
Provided, That nothing in this
subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor
organization and an employer in the construction industry relating
to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site
of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building,
structure, or other work:
Provided further, That for the
purposes of this subsection (e) and section 8(b)(4)(B) the terms
"any employer," "any person engaged in commerce or an industry
affecting commerce," and "any person" when used in relation to the
terms "any other producer, processor, or manufacturer," "any other
employer,"
Page 386 U. S. 648
or "any other person" shall not include persons in the relation
of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on
the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing
parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and
clothing industry:
Provided further, That nothing in this
Act shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within
the foregoing exception.
* Together with No. 111,
National Labor Relations Board v.
National Woodwork Manufacturers Association et al., also on
certiorari to the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
The text of these sections appears in the
386
U.S. 612app|>Appendix.
[
Footnote 2]
The full text of Rule 17 is as follows:
"No employee shall work on any job on which cabinet work,
fixtures, milk-work, sash, doors, trim or other detailed millwork
is used unless the same is Union-made and bears the Union Label of
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. No
member of this District Council will handle material coming from a
mill where cutting out and fitting has been done for butts, locks,
letter plates, or hardware of an description, nor an doors or
transoms which have been fitted prior to being furnished on job,
including base, chair, rail, picture moulding, which has been
previously fitted. This section to exempt partition work furnished
in sections."
The National Labor Relations Board determined that the first
sentence violated § 8(e), 149 N.L.R.B. 646, 655-656, and the Union
did not seek judicial review of that determination.
[
Footnote 3]
There were also charges of violation of §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B)
arising from the enforcement of the Rule 17 provision against three
other contractors whose contracts with the owners of the
construction projects involved specified that the contractors
should furnish and install pre-cut and pre-finished doors. The
Union refused to permit its members to hang these doors. The Board
held that this refusal violated § 8(b)(4)(B). The Board reasoned
that, since these contractors (in contrast to Frouge) did not have
"control" over the work that the Union sought to preserve for its
members, the Union's objective was secondary -- to compel the
project owners to stop specifying pre-cut doors in their contracts
with the employer-contractors. 149 N.L.R.B. at 658. The Union
petitioned the Court of Appeals to set aside the remedial order
issued by the Board on this finding, but the court sustained the
Board. 354 F.2d 594, 597. The Union did not seek review of the
question here. Not before us, therefore, is the issue argued by the
AFL-CIO in its brief
amicus curiae, namely, whether the
Board's
"right to control doctrine -- that employees can never strike
against their own employer about a matter over which he lacks the
legal power to grant their demand"
-- is an incorrect rule of law inconsistent with the Court's
decision in
Labor Board v. Insurance Agents' International
Union, 361 U. S. 477,
361 U. S.
497-498.
[
Footnote 4]
The statutory language of § 8(e) is far from unambiguous. It
prohibits agreements to "cease . . . from handling . . . any of the
products
of any other employer. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied.) Since both the product and its source are mentioned, the
provision might be read not to prohibit an agreement relating
solely to the nature of the product itself, such as a work
preservation agreement, but only to prohibit one arising from an
objection to the other employers or a definable group of employers
who are the source of the product, for example, their nonunion
status.
[
Footnote 5]
Letter of Judge Learned Hand, quoted in Lesnick, The Gravamen of
the Secondary Boycott, 62 Col.L.Rev. 1363, 1393-1394, n. 155
(1962).
See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 321
(Horack ed.1943):
"Before the true meaning of the statute can be determined,
consideration must be given to the problem in society to which the
legislature addressed itself, prior legislative consideration of
the problem, the legislative history of the statute under
litigation, and to the operation and administration of the statute
prior to litigation."
[
Footnote 6]
See Loewe v.Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, and
235 U. S. 235 U.S.
522 (
Danbury Hatters' Case). The history of this
development under the Sherman Act is traced in
Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443;
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.
S. 797,
325 U. S.
800-803.
See generally Berman, Labor and the
Sherman Act (1930). Collective activity was also being restrained
through the doctrine of "malicious combination."
See Duplex
Printing Press Co. v . Deering, supra, at
254 U. S.
484-485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see
generally Laidler, Boycotts and the Labor Struggle 189-194
(1914).
[
Footnote 7]
Painters District Council v. United States, 284 U.S.
582, which summarily affirmed
44 F.2d 58,
also involved secondary activity within the rubric of
Duplex; the union, whose members' primary employers were
painting contractors, sought to "compel
manufacturers to
bring their products into the state unfinished. . . ." 44 F.2d at
59. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 8]
See Laidler,
op. cit. supra, n 6, at 64; Clark, The Law of the Employment
of Labor 289-290 (1911); Oakes, Organized Labor and Industrial
Conflicts § 408 (1927); Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor
Injunction 43 (1930).
[
Footnote 9]
Section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provided that the term
labor dispute and thus the scope of immunity
"includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of
employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee."
47 Stat. 73. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 10]
See 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining
§ 145 (1940); Barnard & Graham, Labor and the Secondary
Boycott, 15 Wash.L.Rev. 137 (1940); Smith, Coercion of Third
Parties in Labor Disputes -- The Secondary Boycott, 1 La.L.Rev. 277
(1939); Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 Yale
L.J. 341, 364 (1938).
[
Footnote 11]
93 Cong.Rec. 4198, II Legislative History of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947 (hereafter 1947 Leg.Hist.),
1106.
[
Footnote 12]
See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 7, 8,
22, 54, in I 1947 Leg.Hist. 413, 414, 428, 460; H.R.Conf.Rep. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 43, in I 1947 Leg.Hist. 547; 93
Cong.Rec. 4131, 4138, 4837-4838, 4843, 4844, 4858, 4859, 4865,
5005, 5011, 5014, 6445-6446, 7537, in II 1947 Leg.Hist. 1055, 1068,
1354-1355, 1364, 1365, 1370-1371, 1372-1373, 1383, 1479, 1491,
1497, 1544, 1654. A statement of Senator Javits, an opponent of the
bill, at 93 Cong.Rec. 6296, I 1947 Leg.Hist. 876, that might
suggest a broader reading was merely one of the "isolated
references . . . [that] appear more as asides in a debate. . . ."
Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.
S. 274,
362 U. S.
286-287.
[
Footnote 13]
See, e.g., 93 Cong.Rec. 3424 (Rep. Hartley), 3432 (Rep.
Landis), 3449 (Rep. Buck), A1910-A1911 (Rep. Meade), 1844 (Senator
Morse), 3838 (Senator Taft), 5014 (Senator Ball), in I 1947
Leg.Hist. 614, 630, 658, 869, and II 1947 Leg.Hist. 982, 1012,
1497.
[
Footnote 14]
See also a similar statement in H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510,
supra. at 43, I 1947 Leg.Hist. 547, in which the House
Managers limit the "boycotts," referred to at 65, I 1947 Leg.Hist.
569.
[
Footnote 15]
Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U.
S. 270,
350 U. S. 285;
Labor Board v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.
S. 282,
352 U. S.
288.
[
Footnote 16]
See, e.g., Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Labor Board, 89
U.S.App.D.C. 155, 191 F.2d 642,
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869
(1951);
J. G. Roy & Sons Co. v. Labor Board, 251 F.2d
771 (C.A. 1st Cir.1958);
Rabouin v. Labor Board, 195 F.2d
906, 912 (C.A.2d Cir.1952);
Piezonki v. Labor Board, 219
F.2d 879 (C.A.4th Cir.1955);
Labor Board v. General Drivers
Local 968, 225 F.2d 205 (C.A. 5th Cir.1955),
cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 914;
Local 618, Automotive Petroleum
Employees Union v. Labor Board, 249 F.2d 332 (C.A. 8th
Cir.1957);
Labor Board v. Local Union No. 55, 218 F.2d 226
(C.A. 10th Cir.1954). An oft-cited definition of the conduct banned
by § 8(b)(4)(A) was that of Judge Learned Hand in
International
Bro. of Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 181 F.2d 34,
37:
"The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear
not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon
some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is to compel him
to stop business with the employer in the hope that this will
induce the employer to give in to his employees' demands."
For the scholarly acceptance of this primary-secondary dichotomy
in the scope of § 8(b)(4)(A),
see Koretz, Federal
Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts -- A New Chapter, 37
Cornell L.Q. 235 (1952); Tower, A Perspective on Secondary
Boycotts, 2 Lab.L.J. 727 (1951); Cushman, Secondary Boycotts and
the Taft-Hartley Law, 6 Syracuse L.Rev. 109 (1954); Lesnick, The
Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 Col.L.Rev. 1363 (1962); Cox,
The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 Minn.L.Rev. 257, 271 (1959); Aaron, The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1086, 1112
(1960). For the NLRB's vacillations during the period,
see
Lesnick,
supra, 62 Col.L.Rev. at 1366-1392.
[
Footnote 17]
Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA
§§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1000, 1017-1018 (1965).
It is suggested that the boycott in
Allen Bradley is
indistinguishable from the activity today held protected in
Houston Insulation Contractors Association v. Labor Board,
post, p.
386 U. S. 664. The
crucial distinction is that, in
Houston Insulation Contractors
Association, the boycott was being carried out to affect the
labor policies of the employer of the boycotting employees, the
primary employer, and not, as in
Allen Bradley, for its
effect elsewhere.
[
Footnote 18]
See 93 Cong.Rec. 4132 (Senator Ellender), II 1947
Leg.Hist. 1056:
"A secondary boycott, as all of us know, is a concerted attempt
on the part of a strong union to compel employers to deal with
them, even though the employees of that employer desire to he
represented by other unions, or not to be represented at all. . . .
[An] example is the New York Electrical Workers Union, the
IBEW."
See also Statement of Senator Ball, 93 Cong.Rec. 5011,
II 1947 Leg.Hist. 1491, who described
"one of the worst situations which has arisen, such as that in
New York where a local of the IBEW is using the secondary boycott
to maintain a tight little monopoly for its own employees, its own
members, and a few employers in that area."
[
Footnote 19]
We likewise do not have before us in these cases, and express no
view upon, the antitrust limitations, if any, upon union employer
work preservation or work extension agreements.
See United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657,
381 U. S.
662-665.
[
Footnote 20]
The proviso was added in the Conference Committee, the report of
which stated its purpose to be
"to make it clear that the changes in section 8(b)(4) do not
overrule or qualify the present rules of law permitting picketing
at the site of a primary labor dispute."
H.R. Conf.Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 38 (1959), in I
Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (hereafter 1959 Leg.Hist.), 942.
See
Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U.
S. 667,
366 U. S.
681.
[
Footnote 21]
See 105 Cong.Rec. 1729-1730, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 993-994
(remarks of the Secretary of Labor, inserted into the record by
Senator Dirksen); 105 Cong.Rec. 3951-3952, 6290, 6667, II 1959
Leg.Hist. 1007, 1052, 1193-1194 (Senator McClellan); 105 Cong.Rec.
6285, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1046 (Senator Ervin); 105 Cong.Rec.
6300-6301, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1059 (Senator Mundt); 105 Cong.Rec.
6390, 6428, 17674, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1061, 1079, 1386 (Senator
Goldwater); 105 Cong.Rec. 6670, 17907-17908, II 1959 Leg.Hist.
1197, 1440-1441 (Senator Curtis); 105 Cong.Rec. 1426, 15674, II
1959 Leg.Hist. 1462, 1616 (Rep. Bosch); 105 Cong.Rec. 3926-3927,
3928, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1469-1470, 1471 (Rep. Lafore); 105
Cong.Rec. 14343-14344, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1518-1519 (Rep. Landrum);
105 Cong.Rec. 14347-14348, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1522-1523 (analysis of
Landrum-Griffin bill inserted into the record by Rep. Griffin); 105
Cong.Rec. 15532, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1568 (Rep. Griffin); 105
Cong.Rec. 15195, 15544-15545, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1543, 1580-1581
(Rep. Rhodes); 105 Cong.Rec. 15529, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1565 (Rep.
Shelley); 105 Cong.Rec. 15551-15552, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1587-1588
(report prepared by Rep. Elliott); 105 Cong.Rec. 15688, II 1959
Leg.Hist. 1630 (Rep. Riehlman); 105 Cong.Rec. 15691, II 1959
Leg.Hist. 1633 (Rep. Arends).
[
Footnote 22]
Throughout the committee reports and debates on § 8(e), it was
referred to as a measure designed to close a loophole in §
8(b)(4)(A) of the 1947 Act.
See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 187,
86th Cong., 1st Sess., 78-79, I 1959 Leg.Hist. 474-475 (1959)
(Minority Views); H.R.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21, I
1959 Leg.Hist. 778-779.
[
Footnote 23]
See Cox,
supra, n 16, at 272.
[
Footnote 24]
See Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, S.Rep. No.
1139 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1960). The Final Report, ordered to
be printed after enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Act, defined a
"hot cargo" clause as
"an agreement between a union and a unionized employer that his
employees shall not be required to work on or handle 'hot goods' or
'hot cargo' being manufactured or transferred by another employer
with whom the union has a labor dispute or whom the union considers
and labels as being unfair to organized labor."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 25]
S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 78, I 1959 Leg.Hist. 474.
The Senators explained, at 79, I 1959 Leg.Hist. 475:
"
Hot-cargo clauses. -- It has become common to find
clauses in union contracts whereby the employer agrees not to
handle what the union chooses to call 'hot goods,' 'unfair
materials,' and 'blacklisted products.' Such clauses have become
standard in contracts entered into by the Teamsters Union. Here,
employer A, who has a dispute with a union or whose employees are
being solicited for union membership, is in real trouble. He may
have customers waiting for his product or he may have suppliers
eager to send him raw material, but both his delivery of products
and supply of raw material cannot move from or to his place of
business because the carriers in either instance have 'hot cargo'
clauses in their contracts with the Teamsters Union. His
alternative is . . . [to] go out of business or yield to the
union's demand, which often is a demand for a compulsory membership
contract with a union which his employees do not want."
[
Footnote 26]
See statements of these Senators, cited
n 21,
supra. Both Senators Dirksen
and McClellan introduced unsuccessful "hot cargo" legislation in
substantially the same terms as enacted in § 8(e), 105 Cong.Rec.
3948, 6411-6412, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1007 (Senator McClellan), 1071
(Senator Dirksen).
[
Footnote 27]
See, e.g., remarks of Secretary of Labor Mitchell
inserted into the record by Senator Dirksen, 105 Cong.Rec. 1730, II
1959 Leg.Hist. 993:
"The testimony before the select committee again and again
illustrated the method by which certain unions, particularly the
Teamsters, utilized the inadequacies of the present secondary
boycott provisions to force employers to do business with only
those people approved by union officials."
[
Footnote 28]
H.R. 8342, § 705(a)(2) (Elliott hill), in I 1959 Leg.Hist.
755-757.
[
Footnote 29]
H.R.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 21, I 1959 Leg.Hist.
779.
[
Footnote 30]
105 Cong.Rec. 14347, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1522-1523. Rep. Griffin
noted that the present law did not
"prohibit resort to . . . [secondary] activity to force
[secondary] employers to sign contracts or agreements not to handle
or transport goods coming from a source characterized by a union as
'unfair.'"
[
Footnote 31]
See, e.g., 105 Cong.Rec. 6668, 17327, II 1959 Leg.Hist.
1195, 1377 (Senator Kennedy).
[
Footnote 32]
See Essex County and Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters v.
Labor Board, 332 F.2d 636 (C.A.3d Cir.1964); Comment, The
Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction
Industry, 60 Yale L.J. 673, 684-689 (1951).
[
Footnote 33]
See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U.
S. 270,
350 U. S.
285-286, and cases there cited.
[
Footnote 34]
105 Cong.Rec. 17884, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1428 (Senator Morse); 105
Cong.Rec. l 6590, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1708 (analysis of "Secondary
Boycotts and Hot Cargo Contracts" by Senator Kennedy and Rep.
Thompson). It is somewhat unclear whether statements by Senator
McNamara and Reps. Thompson and Kearns respecting plumbing
prefabrication clauses for construction projects concerned
agreements with a primary or a secondary objective. 105
Cong.Rec.19785, 19809, 20004-20005, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1815, 1816,
1861. As described by Senator McNamara, the clause in question
permitted fabrication so long as it was accomplished by members of
a local union of the pipefitters. 105 Cong.Rec.19785, II 1959
Leg.Hist. 1815. Moreover, the statements purported only to indicate
their interpretation of the construction industry proviso. In any
event, these statements could represent only the personal views of
these legislators, since the statements were inserted in the
Congressional Record after passage of the Act.
[
Footnote 35]
In fact, Rep. Alger introduced a bill which would have banned
union attempts to limit prefabrication of building materials, which
bill was given no attention whatever, and failed of adoption. 105
Cong.Rec. 12137, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1508. The understanding of
Congress with regard to that issue might have bee best reflected in
a statement on the House floor by Rep. Holland:
"When the labor reform bill is out of the way -- labor and
management could, as they eventually must, sit down together and
work toward a solution of our most serious problem -- automation --
which has already affected the employment picture through more
productivity and less employment. If allowed to go unchecked,
automation will eventually create many thousands of displaced
persons, and unless this problem is properly worked out, it
portends a serious threat to our national economy."
105 Cong.Rec. 13133, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 1511.
[
Footnote 36]
See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment and
Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt.s. 1-9 (1963), 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 10
(1964), on the Nation's Manpower Revolution (concluding with
recommendations for a National Commission on Automation and
Technological Progress,) and Hearings, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963), on Manpower Retraining; Hearings before the Select
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), on H.R. 10310 and Related Bills
"To Establish a National Commission on Automation and Technological
Progress"; Hearings before the Subcommittee on Unemployment and the
Impact of Automation of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), on H.R. 7373, a "Bill Relating to the
Occupational Training, Development, and Use of the Manpower
Resources of the Nation."
See statement in these latter
hearings of then Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg, at 3:
"Many achievements in attempting to overcome the difficulties
created by radical technological change can and should be
accomplished through collective bargaining and joint
labor-management efforts. Much has been achieved through such
efforts in recent years. Even greater concentration by labor and
management on these problems is needed in the period ahead."
[
Footnote 37]
See the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962,
§ 102(1), 76 Stat. 24, which directs the Secretary of Labor to
"evaluate the impact of, and benefits and problems created by
automation, technological progress, and other changes in the
structure of production and demand on the use of the Nation's human
resources; establish techniques and methods for detecting in
advance the potential impact of such developments; develop
solutions to these problems, and publish findings pertaining
thereto."
The Secretary has, pursuant to this direction, published
numerous bulletins.
See, e.g., Technological Trends in
Major American Industries, Dept. of Labor Bulletin No. 1474.
[
Footnote 38]
As a general proposition, such circumstances might include the
remoteness of the threat of displacement by the banned product or
services, the history of labor relations between the union and the
employers who would be boycotted, and the economic personality of
the industry.
See Comment, 62 Mich.L.Rev. 1176, 1185
et seq. (1964).
[
Footnote 39]
See Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The
Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1000, 1018, 1040
(1965).
[
Footnote 40]
See Orange Belt District Council of Painters v. Labor
Board, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 328 F.2d 534 (1964);
Retail
Clerks Union Local 770 v. Labor Board, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 246,
296 F.2d 368 (1961);
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Industrial Union
of Marine and Shipbldg. Workers, 344 F.2d 107 (C.A.2d
Cir.1965);
Labor Board v. Local 82, Int'l Union of Operating
Engineers, 326 F.2d 218 (C.A.3d Cir.1964);
Labor Board v.
Joint Council of Teamsters, 338 F.2d 23, 28 (C.A. 9th
Cir.1964);
Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union (Minnesota
Milk Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1314,
enforced, 314 F.2d 761
(C.A. 8th Cir.1963);
Ohio Valley Carpenters District Council
(Cardinal Industries), 136 N.L.R.B. 977 (1962).
[
Footnote 41]
See, e.g., Retail Clerks Union Local 770 v. Labor
Board, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 296 F.2d 368 (1961);
Baltimore Lithographers (Alco-Gravure), 160 N.L.R.B. No.
90, 63 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1966);
Joliet Contractors Assn. v. Labor
Board, 202 F.2d 606 (C.A. 7th Cir.1953),
cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 824;
Labor Board v. Local 11, United Bro.
of Carpenters, 242 F.2d 932 (C.A. 6th Cir.1957).
See
generally Lesnick,
supra, n 39; Comment, 62 Mich.L.Rev. 1176 (1964).
Memorandum of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN
In joining the Court's opinion, I am constrained to add these
few words by way of underscoring the salient factors which, in my
judgment, make for the decision that has been reached in these
difficult cases.
1. The facts as found by the Board and the Court of Appeals show
that the contractual restrictive product rule in question, and the
boycott in support of its enforcement, had as their sole objective
the protection of union members from a diminution of work flowing
from changes in technology. Union members traditionally had
performed the task of fitting doors on the jobsite, and there is no
evidence of any motive for this contract provision and its
companion boycott other than the preservation of that work. This,
then, is not a case of a union seeking to restrict by contract or
boycott an employer with respect to the products he uses, for the
purpose of acquiring for its members work that had not previously
been theirs.
2. The only question thus to be decided, and which is decided,
is whether Congress meant, in enacting §§ 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of
the National Labor Relations Act, to prevent this kind of
labor-management arrangement designed to forestall possible adverse
effects upon workers arising from changing technology.
3. Because of the possibly profound impacts that the answer to
this question may have upon labor-management
Page 386 U. S. 649
relations and upon other aspects of the economy, both sides of
today's division in the Court agree that we must be especially
careful to eschew a resolution of the issue according to our own
economic ideas and to find one in what Congress has done. It is
further agreed that, in pursuing the search for the true intent of
Congress, we should not stop with the language of the statute
itself, but must look beneath its surface to the legislative
history.
4. It is recognized by court and counsel on both sides that the
legislative history of § 8(b)(4)(B), with which 8(e), it is agreed,
is to be taken
pari passu, contains only the most
tangential references to problems connected with changing
technology. Also, a circumspect reading of the legislative record
evincing Congress' belief that the statutory provisions in question
prohibited agreements and conduct of the kind involved in
Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.
S. 797, will not support a confident assertion that
Congress also had in mind the sort of union-management activity
before us here. And although it is arguable that Congress, in the
temper of the times, would have readily accepted a proposal to
outlaw work preservation agreements and boycotts, even, as here, in
their most limited sense, such a surmise can hardly serve as a
basis for the construction of an existing statute.
5. We are thus left with a legislative history which, on the
precise point at issue, is essentially negative, which shows with
fair conclusiveness only that Congress was not squarely faced with
the problem these cases present. In view of Congress' deep
commitment to the resolution of matters of vital importance to
management and labor through the collective bargaining process, and
its recognition of the boycott as a legitimate weapon in that
process, it would be unfortunate were this Court to attribute to
Congress, on the basis of such an opaque
Page 386 U. S. 650
legislative record, a purpose to outlaw the kind of collective
bargaining and conduct involved in these cases. Especially at a
time when Congress is continuing to explore methods for meeting the
economic problems increasingly arising in this technological age
from scientific advances, this Court should not take such a step
until Congress has made unmistakably clear that it wishes wholly to
exclude collective bargaining as one avenue of approach to
solutions in this elusive aspect of our economy.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS, and MR. JUSTICE CLARK join, dissenting.
The Union's boycott of the pre-fitted doors clearly falls within
the express terms of the federal labor law, which makes such
conduct unlawful when "an object thereof" is "forcing or requiring
any person to cease using . . . the products of any other . . .
manufacturer. . . ." [
Footnote 2/1]
And the collective bargaining provision that authorizes such a
boycott likewise stands condemned by the law's prohibition of any
agreement whereby an employer "agrees to cease or refrain from
handling . . . any of the products of any other employer. . . ."
[
Footnote 2/2] The Court undertakes
a protracted review of legislative and decisional history in an
effort to show that the clear words of the statute should be
disregarded in these cases. But the fact is that the relevant
history fully confirms that Congress meant what it said, and I
therefore dissent.
The Court concludes that the Union's conduct in these cases
falls outside the ambit of § 8(b)(4) because it had an ultimate
purpose that the Court characterizes as
Page 386 U. S. 651
"primary" in nature -- the preservation of work for union
members. But § 8(b)(4) is not limited to boycotts that have as
their only purpose the forcing of any person to cease using the
products of another; it is sufficient if that result is "an object"
of the boycott. Legitimate union objectives may not be accomplished
through means proscribed by the statute.
See Labor Board v.
Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675,
341 U. S.
688-689. [
Footnote 2/3]
Without question, preventing Frouge from using pre-fitted doors was
"an object" of the Union's conduct here. [
Footnote 2/4]
It is, of course, true that courts have distinguished "primary"
and "secondary" activities, and have found the former permitted
despite the literal applicability of
Page 386 U. S. 652
the statutory language.
See Local 761, Electrical Workers v.
Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667. But
the Court errs in concluding that the product boycott conducted by
the Union in these cases was protected primary activity. As the
Court points out, a typical form of secondary boycott is the
visitation of sanctions on Employer A, with whom the union has no
dispute, in order to force him to cease doing business with
Employer B, with whom the union does have a dispute. But this is
not the only form of secondary boycott that § 8(b)(4) was intended
to reach. The Court overlooks the fact that a product boycott for
work preservation purposes has consistently been regarded by the
courts, and by the Congress that passed the Taft-Hartley Act, as a
proscribed "secondary boycott."
In the interim between the passage of § 20 of the Clayton Act,
38 Stat. 738, and the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47
Stat. 70, this Court established that secondary strikes and
boycotts were not exempt from the coverage of the antitrust laws.
In
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.
S. 443, the antitrust laws were found applicable to a
secondary boycott of the Employer A-Employer B type described
above. A refusal to install stone that had not been cut by union
labor was held an illegal secondary boycott in
Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U. S.
37. Then, in
Painters District Council v. United
States, 284 U.S. 582, the Court, on the authority of
Bedford Cut Stone, affirmed a decision holding that a
product boycott for work preservation purposes was an illegal
secondary boycott. The case involved a refusal to install
pre-finished kitchen cabinets by workmen who sought to secure the
work of finishing for themselves. [
Footnote 2/5]
In 1932, Congress reversed
Duplex and its progeny by
passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
See
Drivers'
Union
Page 386 U. S. 653
v. Lake Valley Co., 311 U. S. 91,
311 U. S.
100-103;
United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U. S. 219,
312 U. S.
229-231,
312 U. S.
235-237. But, in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,
61 Stat. 136, Congress clearly provided that, quite apart from the
antitrust laws or the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a product boycott of
the kind involved in these cases was to be an unfair labor
practice.
A proper understanding of the purpose of Congress in enacting §
8(b)(4) in that year requires an appreciation of the impact of this
Court's 1945 decision in
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.
3, 325 U. S. 797.
Allen Bradley was a private antitrust action brought
against the electrical workers union in New York City. Union
members were employed by contractors to install electrical
equipment in buildings. Other union members were employed by New
York City manufacturers of electrical equipment. As part of a
conspiracy between the manufacturers, the contractors and the
union, union members refused to install any electrical equipment
manufactured outside the city. The Union's interest in this scheme
is plainly set forth in the Court's opinion; it was to obtain "work
for its own members." 325 U.S. at
325 U. S. 799.
"The business of New York City manufacturers had a phenomenal
growth, thereby multiplying the jobs available for the Local's
members." 325 U.S. at
325 U. S. 800.
Just as in the cases before us, the union enforced the product
boycott to protect the work opportunities of its members. [
Footnote 2/6] The Court found the antitrust
laws applicable
Page 386 U. S. 654
to the union's role in the scheme, but solely on the ground that
the union had conspired with the manufacturers and contractors.
Significantly for present purposes, the Court stated that,
"had there been no union-contractor-manufacturer combination,
the union's actions here . . . would not have been violations of
the Sherman Act."
325 U.S. at
325 U. S. 807.
The Court further indicated that, by itself, a bargaining agreement
authorizing the product boycott in question would not transgress
the antitrust laws. 325 U.S. at
325 U. S. 809.
In conclusion, the Court recognized that allowing unions to effect
product boycotts might offend sound public policy, but indicated
that the remedy lay in the hands of the legislature:
"Our holding means that the same labor union activities may or
may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether
the union acts alone or in combination with business groups. That,
it is argued, brings about a wholly undesirable result -- one which
leaves labor unions free to engage in conduct which restrains
trade. But the desirability of such an exemption of labor unions is
a question for the determination of Congress."
325 U.S. at
325 U. S.
810.
Congress responded when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.
Although there have been differing views within the Court as to the
scope of labor unions' exemption from the antitrust laws, [
Footnote 2/7] the Court in
Allen
Bradley had plainly stated that a work preservation product
boycott by a union acting alone fell within that exemption. Two
years after the
Allen Bradley decision, the 80th Congress
prohibited such product boycotts, but did so through the
Taft-Hartley Act, rather than by changing the antitrust
Page 386 U. S. 655
laws. The Senate report on § 8(b)(4)(A) [
Footnote 2/8] of the bill that became law clearly
indicates that Congress intended to proscribe not only the Employer
A-Employer B model of secondary boycott, but also product boycotts
like that involved in
Allen Bradley and in the cases
before us:
"Under paragraph (A), strikes or boycotts, or attempts to induce
or encourage such action, are made violations of the act if the
purpose is to force an employer or other person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of another, or to cease doing business with any other
person. Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in a
strike against employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer
to cease doing business with employer B; nor would it be lawful for
a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses or otherwise
deals in the goods of or does business with employer B (with whom
the union has a dispute). This paragraph also makes it an unfair
labor practice for a union to engage in the type of secondary
boycott that has been conducted in New York City by local No. 3 of
the IBEW, whereby electricians have refused to install electrical
products of manufacturers employing electricians who are members of
some labor organization other than local No. 3. (
See . . .
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, I.B.E.W.,
325 U. S.
797.) [
Footnote
2/9]"
This clear expression of legislative intent is confirmed by the
floor debates. [
Footnote 2/10] It
is entirely understandable that
Page 386 U. S. 656
Congress should have sought to prohibit product boycotts having
a work preservation purpose. Unlike most strikes and boycotts,
which are temporary tactical maneuvers in a particular labor
dispute, work preservation product boycotts are likely to be
permanent, and the restraint on the free flow of goods in commerce
is direct and pervasive, not limited to goods manufactured by a
particular employer with whom the union may have a given dispute.
Although it was deeply concerned with the extensive restraints on
trade caused by product boycotts, the 80th Congress specifically
declined to amend the antitrust laws to reach the
Allen
Bradley type of secondary
Page 386 U. S. 657
boycott because it correctly understood that such practices were
already directly covered by § 8(b)(4) of the 1947 Act. The House
Conference Report explained why a provision in the House draft that
would have amended
"the Clayton Act so as to withdraw the exemption of labor
organizations under the antitrust laws when such organizations
engaged in combinations or conspiracies . . . [to] impose
restrictions or conditions upon the purchase, sale, or use of any
product, material, machine, or equipment . . ."
was dropped in the conference that agreed on the Taft-Hartley
Act. It stated that,
"[s]ince the matters dealt with in this section have, to a large
measure, been effectuated through the use of boycotts, and since
the conference agreement contains effective provisions directly
dealing with boycotts themselves, this provision is omitted from
the conference agreement. [
Footnote
2/11]"
The Court seeks to avoid the thrust of this legislative history
stemming from
Allen Bradley by suggesting that, in the
present cases, the product boycott was used to preserve work
opportunities traditionally performed by the Union, whereas, in
Allen Bradley, the boycott was originally designed to
create new job opportunities. But it is misleading to state that
the union in
Allen Bradley used the product boycott as a
"sword." The record in that case establishes that the boycott was
undertaken for the defensive purpose of restoring job opportunities
lost in the depression. Moreover, the Court is unable to cite
anything in
Allen Bradley, or in the Taft-Hartley Act and
its legislative history, to support a distinction in the
applicability of § 8(b)(4) based on the origin of the job
opportunities sought to be preserved by a product boycott. The
Court creates its sword and shield distinction out of thin air;
nothing could more clearly indicate
Page 386 U. S. 658
that the Court is simply substituting its own concepts of
desirable labor policy for the scheme enacted by Congress. The
courts and the National Labor Relations Board fully recognized that
Congress had intended to ban product boycotts along with other
forms of the secondary boycott, and that it had not distinguished
between "good" and "bad" secondary boycotts. [
Footnote 2/12] In a 1949 decision involving §
8(b)(4), the Board stated that "Congress considered the
product
boycott' one of the precise evils which that provision was designed
to curb." [Footnote 2/13] The
courts agreed. In Joliet Contractors Assn. v. Labor Board,
202 F.2d 606, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 824, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a glaziers' union boycott
of pre-glazed sashes to preserve work they had traditionally
performed was an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(4). A similarly
motivated boycott of prefabricated doors by construction workers
was likewise held illegal by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Labor Board v. Local 11, United Bro. of
Carpenters, 242 F.2d 932. There were no court decisions to the
contrary prior to the 1959 amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act. Although it made extensive other changes in § 8 at
that time, Congress did not disturb
Page 386 U. S. 659
the law firmly established by these decisions. [
Footnote 2/14] The conclusion is inescapable that
the Union's boycott of the pre-fitted doors in these cases clearly
violated § 8(b)(4)(B). [
Footnote
2/15]
Page 386 U. S. 660
In 1959, Congress enacted § 8(e) to ensure that § 8(b)(4)'s ban
on boycotts would not be circumvented by unions that obtained
management's agreement to practices which would give rise to a §
8(b)(4) violation if the union attempted unilaterally to enforce
their observance. In the
Sand Door decision in 1958,
[
Footnote 2/16] the Court had
indicated that the execution of a union employer agreement
authorizing a secondary boycott, and the employer's observance of
that agreement, did not constitute an unfair labor practice.
Section 8(e) was the congressional response. Congress also added a
new paragraph (A) to § 8(b)(4), proscribing union pressure on an
employer to force him to execute an agreement banned by § 8(e). It
is thus evident that §§ 8(b)(4)(A), 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) must be
construed in harmony as prohibiting various union methods of
implementing the type of boycotts that Congress sought to prohibit
in the Taft-Hartley Act. As the Court observes, the sweep of § 8(e)
is no greater than that of § 8(b)(4). By the same logic, it is no
narrower. The relation between the two sections was set forth in
Ohio Valley Carpenters, 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 987:
"[T]he validity of a restrictive agreement challenged under 8(e)
must be considered in terms of whether that agreement, if enforced
by prohibited means, would result in an unfair labor practice under
Section 8(b)(4)(B). Clearly, there is little point and no logic in
declaring an agreement lawful under 8(e) but in finding its
enforcement condemned under 8(b)(4)(B). . . ."
Since, as has been shown, the product boycott enforced by the
union in the cases before us violates § 8(b)(4)(b),
Page 386 U. S. 661
it follows that Rule 17, the provision in the collective
bargaining agreement applied to authorize this same boycott by
agreement, equally violates § 8(e). As the Court points out, an
important element in the political impetus behind the enactment of
§ 8(e) was congressional opposition to "hot cargo" boycotts imposed
by the Teamsters Union. But the language and logic of § 8(e) has a
broader scope, and the legislative history clearly establishes that
§ 8(e) was intended to prohibit all agreements authorizing product
boycotts violative of § 8(b)(4). [
Footnote 2/17]
The content of the construction industry proviso to § 8(e) is
also persuasive of that section's principal scope. That proviso
exempts only construction industry agreements "relating to the
contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the
construction. . . ." The logical inference from this language is
that boycotts of products shipped from outside the worksite are
prohibited by § 8(e), and that inference is confirmed by the House
Conference Report:
"It should be particularly noted that the proviso relates only
and exclusively to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction. The proviso does not exempt
from
Page 386 U. S. 662
section 8(e) agreements relating to supplies or other products
or materials shipped or otherwise transported to and delivered on
the site of the construction. [
Footnote 2/18]"
The Court indeed recognizes that the § 8(e) construction
industry proviso does not immunize product boycotts from the reach
of that section. By a curious inversion of logic, the Court
purports to deduce from this fact the proposition that product
boycotts are not covered by § 8(e). But if § 8(e) and its
legislative history are approached without preconceptions, it is
evident that Congress intended to bar the use of any provisions in
a collective agreement to authorize the product boycott involved in
the cases before us.
Finally, the Court's reliance on
Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. Labor Board, 379 U. S. 203, is
wholly misplaced. That case involved an employer's use of workers
hired by an independent contractor to perform in its own plant
maintenance work formerly done by its own employees. This
reassignment of work was held by the Court to be a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. The circumscribed nature of the
decision is established by the Court's careful observation that
"The Company's decision to contract out the maintenance work did
not alter the Company's basic operation. The maintenance work still
had to be performed in the plant . . . ; the Company merely
replaced existing employees with those of an independent contractor
to do the same work under similar conditions of employment.
Therefore, to require the employer to bargain about the matter
would not significantly abridge his freedom to manage the
business.
Page 386 U. S. 663
An employer's decision as to the products he wishes to buy
presents entirely different issues. That decision has traditionally
been regarded as one within management's discretion, and
Fibreboard does not indicate that it is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining, much less a permissible basis for
a product boycott made illegal by federal labor law."
The relevant legislative history confirms and reinforces the
plain meaning of the statute, and establishes that the Union's
product boycott in these cases and the agreement authorizing it
were both unfair labor practices. In deciding to the contrary, the
Court has substituted its own notions of sound labor policy for the
word of Congress. There may be social and economic arguments for
changing the law of product boycotts established in § 8, but those
changes are not for this Court to make
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, § 8(b)(4)(B), 73 Stat.
543, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B).
[
Footnote 2/2]
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, § 8(e), 73 Stat. 543,
29 U.S.C. § 158(e).
[
Footnote 2/3]
As originally drafted, § 8(b)(4) proscribed only those strikes
and boycotts that had "the purpose of" forcing employers to cease
using products manufactured by another, etc. The significance of
the adoption in conference of the language found in the Act was
explained by Senator Taft:
"Section 8(b)(4), relating to illegal strikes and boycotts, was
amended in conference by striking out the words 'for the purpose
of' and inserting the clause 'where an object thereof is.'
Obviously, the intent of the conferees was to close any loophole
which would prevent the Board from being blocked in giving relief
against such illegal activities simply because one of the purposes
of such strikes might have been lawful."
93 Cong.Rec. 6859, II Legislative History of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947 (hereinafter 1947 Leg.Hist.),
1623.
[
Footnote 2/4]
In
Local 598 Plumbers & Steamfitters, 131 N.L.R.B.
787, the employees of a contractor, Scott Co., boycotted tunnel
sections with prefabricated supports manufactured by Eaton. In
rejecting a work preservation "primary purpose" argument like that
advanced in this case, the Board stated:
"To say that the object of the [union] was to induce or compel
Scott Company to assign the work of installing the disputed
supports to the [union's] members . . . , and not to force Scott
Company to cease using Eaton's product or to cease doing business
with Eaton, is . . . to pretend that the latter object is not a
necessary consequence of the former object. The two objects are
inseparable. It is immaterial that one objective might be legal if
the other is illegal."
131 N.L.R.B. at 800.
[
Footnote 2/5]
See United States v. Painters' District
Council, 44 F.2d
58.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The present cases, in which the boycotting employees were
protecting their own work opportunities, cannot be distinguished
from
Allen Bradley on the ground that there, the
boycotting employees were protecting the work opportunities of
other members of their union. For today, in
Houston Insulation
Contractors Assn. v. Labor Board, post, p.
386 U. S. 664, the
Court applies its holding in the present cases to validate a
boycott by employees to protect the work opportunities of other
workers who were not even members of their union.
[
Footnote 2/7]
See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.
S. 657,
381 U. S. 672;
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.
S. 676,
381 U. S. 697,
381 U. S.
735.
[
Footnote 2/8]
In the 1959 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, §
8(b)(4)(A) of the original Act was, with changes not here relevant,
retitled § 8(b)(4)(B).
See 386
U.S. 612fn2/14|>n. 14,
infra.
[
Footnote 2/9]
S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22, I 1947 Leg.Hist.
428.
[
Footnote 2/10]
A strong supporter of the Act, Senator Ellender, cited the New
York City electrical workers' work preservation product boycott as
an example of "the secondary boycott" that the Act would prohibit,
adding that
"one can readily understand that such procedure is
unconscionable, and that it results in high costs to those engaged
in the erection of office buildings, homes, and stores. . . ."
93 Cong.Rec. 4132, II 1947 Leg.Hist. 1056. In contrasting the
coverage of the Act with shortcomings in the measures suggested by
the President, Senator Ball noted that the Administration's
proposals
"would not touch at all one of the worst situations which has
arisen, such as that in New York, where a local of the IBEW is
using the secondary boycott to maintain a tight little monopoly for
its own employees, its own members, and a few employers. . . ."
93 Cong.Rec. 5011, II 1947 Leg.Hist. 1491. Replying to
criticisms by Senator Pepper, Senator Taft stated that Senator
Pepper's position would entail approval of the New York City
electrical workers' product boycott:
"The principle announced by the Senator from Florida would make
that stand lawful, as it is lawful today. Of course, we propose to
change the law in that respect."
93 Cong.Rec. 4199, II 1947 Leg.Hist. 1107. Opponents of the bill
likewise recognized that the Act would prohibit work preservation
boycotts, and at least one of them, Representative Javits, accepted
this feature of § 8(b)(4) but criticized the Act for also
prohibiting secondary boycotts that he believed had legitimate
purposes. He stated that such legitimate boycotts were
"not the kind of boycott which is contrary to the public
interest, that other kind results from a misguided labor union's
efforts to keep certain goods out of a market because the labor
union fears the effect of new inventions or new methods. But, while
dealing with this . . . abuse, the bill also has the effect of
depriving labor of a right of self-preservation which has never
been questioned before."
93 Cong.Rec. 6296, I 1947 Leg.Hist. 876.
[
Footnote 2/11]
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 65, I 1947
Leg.Hist. 569.
[
Footnote 2/12]
In the floor debates, Senator Taft stated that
"It has been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts
and bad secondary boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for weeks.
and never succeeded in having anyone tell us any difference between
different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we have so broadened the
provision dealing with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair
labor practice."
93 Cong.Rec. 4198, II 1947 Leg.Hist. 1106.
This reading of § 8(b)(4) is confirmed by the Senate Minority
Report, which complained that it
"ignores valid distinctions between justified and unjustified
boycotts based on the objective of the union in carrying on such a
boycott. . . . It indiscriminately bans all such boycotts, whether
justified or not."
S.Rep. No. 105, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 20, I 1947
Leg.Hist. 482.
[
Footnote 2/13]
United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 81 N.L.R.B. 802, 806,
enforced, 184 F.2d 60.
[
Footnote 2/14]
In addition to recasting the original § 8(b)(4)(A) as §
8(b)(4)(B), the 1959 amendments produced §§ 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)
expanding the modes of union pressure covered by § 8(b)(4).
See
Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S.
46,
377 U. S. 51-54.
Among the changes was the deletion of the Act's original
requirement that union pressure on individuals for the objectives
proscribed must be pressure commanding "concerted" activity on the
part of those individuals. This was the legislative response to
Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co.,
341 U. S. 665,
where the Court had indicated that jobsite picketing directed at
truck drivers employed by a customer of the struck employer was not
an unfair labor practice because there was no attempt to persuade
the truck drivers to engage in "concerted" activity. In addition to
dropping the "concerted" activity requirement, and thus bringing
secondary conduct directed at an individual employee within §
8(b)(4), Congress also added the proviso that nothing in the
amended section "shall be construed to make unlawful, where not
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing." The
purpose of this proviso was simply to make clear that Congress did
not intend to disturb another ground of the Court's decision in
Rice Milling -- that jobsite picketing of the employees of
others was protected primary activity.
See Local 761,
Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U.
S. 667,
366 U. S.
681.
Thus, the proviso was not intended to modify the distinction
between proscribed secondary boycotts and permitted primary strikes
and picketing embodied in the original Act. The conference report
on the 1959 amendments specifically states that "the changes in
section 8(b)(4) do not overrule or qualify the present rules of law
permitting picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute."
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 38, I Legislative
History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (hereinafter 1959 Leg.Hist.), 942. Congress thus intended no
change in the Taft-Hartley Act's proscription of product boycotts,
which court decisions had consistently recognized as "secondary"
and illegal.
[
Footnote 2/15]
What has been said establishes that product boycotts are
normally illegal regardless of the employer's contractual relations
with the supplier of the boycotted goods, or with other persons.
Thus, it appears that the concept of "control" which the Board
applied in these cases lacks relevance to the correct determination
of whether a § 8(b)(4)(B) violation has occurred.
Cf.
n 3 to the Court's opinion,
ante at
386 U. S.
616.
[
Footnote 2/16]
Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenter v. Labor
Board, 357 U. S. 93.
[
Footnote 2/17]
The Court and the Board point to H.R.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., 21, I 1959 Leg.Hist. 7, which noted the similarity in
language between § 8(h)(4) and a provision in a Senate hill
somewhat similar to what became § 8(e), and characterized the
latter as preserving "the established distinction between primary
activities and secondary boycotts." But the "established
distinction" embodied in the Taft-Hartley Act and recognized by the
courts classified product boycotts as secondary, and illegal.
The floor debates show that both proponents and opponents of the
Landrum-Griffin bill acknowledged that it would prohibit product
boycotts, including those with work preservation purposes. For
example,
see 105 Cong.Rec. 17884, II 1959 Leg.Hist. 148
(remarks of Senator Morse); 105 Cong.Rec. 15545, II 1959 Leg.Hist.
1581 (remarks of Representative Rhodes).
[
Footnote 2/18]
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 39, I 1959
Leg.Hist. 943.