Negro pupils and their parents sued in two Federal District
Courts in Tennessee to desegregate racially segregated public
schools. In each case, a desegregation plan submitted to the
District Court by the school board provided for the rezoning of
school districts without reference to race; but each plan contained
a transfer provision under which any student, upon request, would
be permitted, solely on the basis of his own race and the racial
composition of the school to which he was assigned by virtue of
rezoning, to transfer from such school, where he would be in the
racial minority, back to his former segregated school, where his
race would be in the majority. These plans were approved by the
respective District Courts and the Court of Appeals.
Held: Insofar as they approve such transfer provisions,
the judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, since such
transfer plans are based on racial factors which inevitably would
lead toward segregation of students by race, contrary to this
Court's admonition in
Brown v. Board of Education,
349 U. S. 294. Pp.
373 U. S.
684-689.
301 F.2d 164, 828, reversed in part and causes remanded.
Page 373 U. S. 684
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari (371 U.S. 811) limited to the question
whether petitioners, Negro school children seeking desegregation of
the public school systems of Knoxville, Tennessee (the
Goss case), and Davidson County, Tennessee, an area
adjacent to Nashville (the
Maxwell case), are deprived of
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The question centers around
substantially similar transfer provisions incorporated in formal
desegregation plans adopted by the respective local school boards
pursuant to court orders. The claim is that the transfer programs
are invalid because they are based solely on race and tend to
perpetuate the preexisting racially segregated school system. Under
the overall desegregation plans presented to the trial courts,
school districts would be rezoned without reference to race.
However, by the terms of the transfer provisions, a student, upon
request, would be permitted, solely on the basis of his own race
and the racial composition of the school to which he has been
assigned by virtue of rezoning, to transfer from such school, where
he would be in the racial minority, back to his former segregated
school where his race would be in the majority. The appropriate
District Courts and the Court of Appeals approved the transfer
plans. 301 F.2d 164, 301 F.2d 828. The transfer plans being based
solely on racial factors which, under their terms, inevitably lead
toward segregation of the students by race, we conclude that they
run counter
Page 373 U. S. 685
to the admonition of
Brown v. Board of Education,
349 U. S. 294,
349 U. S. 301
(1955), wherein the District Courts were directed to "consider the
adequacy of any plans" proposed by school authorities "to
effectuate a . . . racially nondiscriminatory school system." Our
conclusion here leads to a reversal of the judgments of the Court
of Appeals to the extent they approve the transfer provisions of
respondent boards in each of the cases. The only question with
which we are here concerned relates solely to the transfer
provisions, and we are not called upon either to discuss or to pass
on the other provisions of the desegregation plans. [
Footnote 1]
I
These cases were brought by Negro public school pupils and their
parents as class actions against the respective school authorities.
They challenged, among other points in the desegregation plans not
here relevant, the transfer provisions which permitted a pupil to
transfer, upon request, from the zone of his residence to another
school. The transfer plans are essentially the same, each
containing, in addition to the provisions at issue here, general
provisions providing for transfers on a showing of "good cause."
[
Footnote 2] The crucial
provisions, however, present in
Page 373 U. S. 686
somewhat the same form in each plan, is exemplified by ยง 6 of
the Knoxville plan:
"6. The following will be regarded as some of the valid
conditions to support requests for transfer:"
"a. When a white student would otherwise be required to attend a
school previously serving colored students only;"
"b. When a colored student would otherwise be required to attend
a school previously serving white students only;"
"c. When a student would otherwise be required to attend a
school where the majority of students of that school or in his or
her grade are of a different race."
This provision is attacked as providing racial factors as valid
conditions to support transfers which, by design and operation,
would perpetuate racial segregation. It is also said that no
showing is made that the transfer provisions are essential to
effectuation of desegregation and that other procedures are
available.
II
It is readily apparent that the transfer system proposed lends
itself to perpetuation of segregation. Indeed, the provisions can
work only toward that end. While transfer are available to those
who choose to attend
Page 373 U. S. 687
school where their race is in the majority, there is no
provision whereby a student might transfer upon request to a school
in which his race is in a minority, unless he qualifies for a "good
cause" transfer. As the Superintendent of Davidson County's schools
agreed, the effect of the racial transfer plan was "to permit to
child [or his parents] to choose segregation outside of his zone,
but not to choose integration outside of his zone." Here, the right
of transfer, which operates solely on the basis of a racial
classification, is a one-way ticket leading to but one destination,
i.e., the majority race of the transferee and continued
segregation. This Court has decided that state-imposed separation
in public schools is inherently unequal, and results in
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483
(1954). Our task, then, is to decide whether these transfer
provisions are likewise unconstitutional. In doing so, we note
that, if the transfer provisions were made available to all
students, regardless of their race and regardless as well of the
racial composition of the school to which he requested transfer, we
would have an entirely different case. Pupils could then, at their
option (or that of their parents), choose, entirely free of any
imposed racial considerations, to remain in the school of their
zone or to transfer to another.
III
Classifications based on race for purposes of transfers between
public schools, as here, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As the Court said in
Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192,
323 U. S. 203
(1944), racial classifications are "obviously irrelevant and
invidious." The cases of this Court reflect a variety of instances
in which racial classifications have been held to he invalid,
e.g., public parks and playgrounds,
Watson v. City of
Memphis, ante, p.
373 U. S. 526
(1963); trespass
Page 373 U. S. 688
convictions, where local segregation ordinances preempt private
choice,
Peterson v. City of Greenville, ante, p.
373 U. S. 244
(1963); seating in courtrooms,
Johnson v. Virginia, ante,
p.
373 U. S. 61
(1963); Restaurants in public buildings,
Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715
(1961); bus terminals,
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.
S. 454 (1960); public schools,
Brown v. Board of
Education, supra; railroad dining-car facilities,
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.
S. 816 (1950); state enforcement of restrictive
covenants based on race,
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S.
1 (1948); labor unions acting as statutory
representatives of a craft,
Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., supra; voting,
Smith v. Allwright,
321 U. S. 649
(1944); and juries,
Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U. S. 303
(1879). The recognition of race as an absolute criterion for
granting transfers which operate only in the direction of schools
in which the transferee's race is in the majority is no less
unconstitutional than its use for original admission or subsequent
assignment to public schools.
See Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d
43 (C.A.5th Cir.).
The alleged equality -- which we view as only superficial -- of
enabling each race to transfer from a desegregated to a segregated
school does not save the plans. Like arguments were made without
success in
Brown, supra, in support of the separate but
equal educational program. Not only is race the factor upon which
the transfer plans operate, but also the plans lack a provision
whereby a student might with equal facility transfer from a
segregated to a desegregated school. The obvious one-way operation
of these two factors in combination underscores the purely racial
character and purpose of the transfer provisions. We hold that the
transfer plans promote discrimination, and are therefore
invalid.
This is not to say that appropriate transfer provisions, upon
the parents' request, consistent with sound school administration
and not based upon any state-imposed
Page 373 U. S. 689
racial conditions, would fall. Likewise, we would have a
different case here if the transfer provisions were unrestricted,
allowing transfers to or from any school regardless of the race of
the majority therein. But no official transfer plan or provision of
which racial segregation is the inevitable consequence may stand
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In reaching this result, we are not unmindful of the deep-rooted
problems involved. Indeed, it was consideration for the
multifarious local difficulties and "variety of obstacles" which
might arise in this transition that led this Court eight years ago
to frame its mandate in
Brown in such language as "good
faith compliance at the earliest practicable date" and "all
deliberate speed."
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S.
at
349 U. S.
300-301. Now, however, eight years after this decree was
rendered and over nine years after the first
Brown
decision, the context in which we must interpret and apply this
language to plans for desegregation has been significantly altered.
Compare Watson v. City of Memphis, supra. The transfer
provisions here cannot be deemed to be reasonably designed to meet
legitimate local problems, and therefore do not meet the
requirements of
Brown. Accordingly, the decisions of the
Court of Appeals, insofar as they approve the transfer provisions
submitted by the boards of education of Knoxville, Tennessee, and
Davidson County, Tennessee, are reversed, and the cases are
remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand to the
District Courts for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
A full discussion of the Knoxville plans may be found in the
opinion of the Court of Appeals, 301 F.2d 164, which affirmed, with
modifications not relevant here, the over-all plan, including the
transfer provisions. Likewise, the opinion of the Court of Appeals
in
Maxwell v. County Board of Education of Davidson
County, 301 F.2d 828, affirmed the action of the District
Court in approving the Davidson County plan, including the transfer
provisions which are set out in detail in that opinion.
[
Footnote 2]
The Knoxville Plan provides (R. 31):
"5. Requests for transfer of students in desegregated grades
from the school of their Zone to another school will be given full
consideration and will be granted when made in writing by parents
or guardians or those acting in the position of parents, when good
cause therefor is shown and when transfer is practicable,
consistent with sound school administration."
The Davidson County Plan provides (R. 214):
"4. Application for transfer of first grade students, and
subsequent grades according to the gradual plan, from the school of
their zone to another school will be given careful consideration
and will be granted when made in writing by parents, guardians, or
those acting in the position of parents, when good cause therefor
is shown and when transfer is practicable and consistent with sound
school administration."